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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
9 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Almost everyone enters into contracts every day. Contracting aims to create a bigger 
transactional pie in a world where parties' incentives are misaligned. The writing of 
contracts enables parties to hedge against market risks, and to coordinate the produc-
tion of information, rights, duties and procedures. The notion of contract and contract 
law are indispensably linked to legal studies. Within the legal context a contract can 
generally be defined as a meeting of minds which creates effects in law.1 The law of 
contracts is grounded in the moral principle that a person should fulfill promises and 
abide by agreements. An economist's view of a contract is less strict and refers to any 
agreement under which two or more parties engage in mutual commitments concern-
ing their behavior.2 
Rules of contract law and theories of contract enable us to predict ultimate con-
tract design. Only the study of contracts themselves, however, will allow us to actually 
conceptualize and comprehend the world of structures that in fact shape economic 
activity. With an eye to empirics and contracting practices, the aim of this research is 
to offer the reader a better insight in and understanding of actual contract design. 
B A C K G R O U N D 
Let's avert our attention from the body of substantive contract law and specific con-
tract law rules as it has developed, is enforced and has been studied extensively in 
different jurisdictions, to focus instead on contract as a concept. In doing so, we may 
establish that theories of contract have developed not only in law, but in a number of 
other disciplines such as management, economics and sociology. Despite the simplicity 
of contract as a concept, its success lies in its analytical power. The idea of contract 
permits us to analyze coordination mechanisms within a simple but meticulous 
framework.3 Not only does this shed light on the properties of contracts, but also on 
'other harmonization instruments such as markets, organizations and institutions' 
which 'reveal mechanisms comparable to those of typical contracts'.4 While contracts 
epitomize economic exchange, the diverse theories often mirror the social and eco-
nomic developments of their time. 
Law as a discipline has of course long paid the most attention to the notion of 
contract. Legal scholars in common law jurisdictions for example, have written exten-
sively on diverse depictions of contract (law).5 In general, legal scholars have distin-
11 acknowledge that a universal definition of 'contract', which is recognized in all bodies of substantive law, 
Is not feasible. 
2 See also Brousseau and Glachant 2002. 
3 Ibid., p. 5. 
4 Ibid. 
5 While I focus on contract as a concept, I cannot dismiss the fact that in legal studies the concept of contract 
is influenced by substantive rules of contract law. 
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guished between classical, neoclassical and more recently modern or relational con-
tract theory.6 The precise relevance and content of these doctrines is subject to de-
bate7, and we can generally distinguish between two polar types of contract doctrine: 
classical and relational contract doctrine. 
Classical contract theory supports the discrete market transaction. The manifesta-
tion of parties' intention or will is leading, and contracts function primarily as a risk 
allocation mechanism, are short-lived and expected to be complete and binding. The 
paradigm of classical contract law can be traced to classical economic theory of the 
19th century where the 'economic man' with self-interested exogenous preferences 
engages in complete and costless contracting in a market dictated by laissez faire pol-
icy and maximum individual freedom. With the sophistication of commerce, the com-
plexity of the exchange relationship increased. The idea of the discrete transaction 
which lay at the hart of classical contract theory was replaced by the notion that con-
tracts are a social institution, a result of mutual planning over a longer period of time.8 
Relational contract theory is based on the knowledge that contracts are incomplete 
and governed by relational norms, with a central role for flexibility, interdependency 
and trust.9 
From the 1970s onward, the concept of contract also became a central theme in 
the economics literature. Contract economics developed primarily due to dissatisfac-
tion with Walrasian (neoclassical) economic thought, which was based on the costless 
operation and coordination of the market. Inspired by Coase's seminal 1937 article10, 
new analytical tools were sought to explain the market mechanism and the existence 
of different contractual and organizational forms. Leaving aside applicable rules of 
contract law, theories of contract such as transaction cost theory, property rights the-
ory and agency theory attempt to examine and predict the optimal design of contracts. 
This economics of contracts literature is produced mainly by economists and published 
predominantly in economics journals.11 
Both property rights and transaction cost theory derive from the idea that writing 
and enforcing contracts is not costless. Transactions costs give rise to incomplete con-
tracts. Williamson indicates that transaction costs vary with each transaction depend-
ing on the presence of relation specific investments, the frequency of the transaction 
and the uncertainty involved. Different types of transactions are therefore aligned with 
governance structures in a transaction cost economizing manner. Williamson considers 
three types of governance structures - market, hybrid and hierarchy - and links them to 
6 Atiyah 1989, Eisenberg 2000b, Friedman 1973, Horwitz 1977. See also Macneii's three way discussion of 
contracts in Macneil 1978. 
7 Eisenberg 2000a, Feinman 2000, Gordley 1991, Macneil 2000. 
8 Williamson 1979, Nassar 1995, Macneil 1978. 
9 Schwartz 1992, Eisenberg 2001. 
10 Coase 1937. 
11 Eggleston et al. 2000. 
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(classical, neoclassical and relational) contract law doctrine.12 Property rights theory is 
based on the premise that the type of governance structure hinges on the allocation of 
property rights.13 Property rights entail both ownership and control over non-human 
assets. In a world dictated by transaction costs, it is costly to specify all rights to an 
asset. The right to decide in case of non-specification resides with the owner of the 
asset. These 'residual rights of control' are important in that they affect ex post bar-
gaining power and the division of wealth. Within the framework of contract, principal-
agent theory appreciates the roles of different economic actors and recognizes that 
conflicts of interest may arise between them, for example between owners of re-
sources and managers. In order to maximize welfare, the owner (i.e. principal) must 
establish appropriate incentives for the manager (i.e. agent) in order to align objec-
tives. With regard for observability problems and information asymmetry, agency 
theory examines the nature of optimal incentive schemes. The foregoing theories 
have given rise and relate to a more general economic 'theory of incomplete contracts' 
which applies the mathematical modeling methods associated with agency theory to 
problems addressed by transaction cost theory. The main idea is to specify optimal 
contracts in presence of specific investments which are non-verifiable. 
The economics of contracts literature can be distinguished from another literature 
on contracting which developed in the 1970s. The law and economics literature con-
cerns the economic analysis of law.15 Law and economics developed from the insight 
that economic concepts can be applied as a normative standard for evaluating law and 
more specifically to predict the effect of policies on efficiency and welfare distribution. 
This literature appears mostly in law-related journals and is produced primarily by law 
professors and some economists who teach at law schools.16 The distinction between 
the economics of contracts and law and economics literature might seem somewhat 
artificial.17 Both literatures attempt to describe the conditions under which the value 
of contractual exchange is maximized. As economists become more familiar with legal 
theory and legal scholars with economic concepts, the literatures coalesce.18 
Both the legal and economic theories of contract have been criticized. Scholars 
write that the 'law review literature on contracts is almost completely devoid of the 
positive analysis of contracts'19 and that the law and economics approach 'does not 
explain the current system of contract law' nor provide a 'solid basis for criticizing and 
12 Williamson 1985, 1991 and 1996. 
13 Grossman and Hart 1986. 
" Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Stiglitz 1974, Grossman and Hart 1983, Milgrom and Roberts 1992. 
15 Eggleston et al. 2000, Posner 2003. 
16 Eggleston et al. 2000. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Both literatures for example maintain a theory of incomplete contracts. The definition of what constitutes 
an incomplete contract and its implications, however, varies. Only recently have scholars accepted a more 
general definition (see the most recent American Law and Economics Association conference (2008), which 
includes papers from both literatures). 
19 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 93. 
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reforming contract law.'20 'What good is contract law? Who uses it? When and how?'21 
Legal scholarship in general is criticized for its lack of empirical and experimental work. 
The empirical work that exists is often descriptive rather than analytical. The econom-
ics literature on the other hand, is characterized by complicated theoretical analyses, 
while the validation of theory seems to lag behind. This gap in the legal and social 
science literature leaves scholars, lawyers, and policymakers without a basic knowl-
edge of contract design. Scholars in both economics and law have made a plea for the 
study of actual contracts in order to develop a deeper understanding of how contracts 
actually operate in practice.22 Only recently have scholars attempted to study actual 
contracts on a greater scale. These studies have generally been based on transaction 
cost and property rights theory, which has led to the examination of control rights 
and/or transaction cost implications. 
O B J E C T I V E S A N D R E S E A R C H Q U E S T I O N 
Sophisticated contractual relationships have become an increasingly important feature 
of the business landscape. Contractual terms vary depending on parties' characteristics 
and goals, their shared understandings, transaction costs, the characteristics of the 
transaction, and the background legal regime. What distinguishes contract design? 
Why are some contracts relatively complex or simple? Understanding the functions 
and implications of contractual terms is important for the design (legisla-
ture/policymakers), drafting (practitioners) and enforcement (courts) of contract law. 
A greater understanding substantiates the debate on the proper content and role of 
contract law. Contract law being largely non-mandatory, the freedom of contract is 
often used to develop new rules. To what extent do parties opt out of default law 
rules? Should there be an argument for more or less law? And what rules of contract 
law best serve the interest of parties? These questions are not only relevant on a na-
tional level, but also have implications for the European debate on the harmonization 
of contract law. Especially since the study of contracts provides us with an insight into 
the effects of internationalization and cross pollination of contract styles and allows us 
to compare legal rules within their symbolic and functional context; how do cultural 
aspects such as trust and negotiation styles affect contract design? The analysis of 
contracting practices also provides useful information on the level of enforcement: 
should the variety in contract design give rise to a differentiated enforcement of con-
tracts? The study of contracts will allow courts to develop a deeper understanding of 
contracting practices and processes. 
But information regarding contract design is also food for thought for practitioners 
i.e. lawyers. Commercial contracts evolve over time in response to a complex and 
20 Posner 2003, p. 830. 
21 Macaulay 1963. 
22 Coase 1992, Suchman 2003, Bercowitz et al. 2003. 
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shifting set of influences.23 Clauses may be added, modified or dropped, and some 
clauses may loose their significance in changing context. Adding clauses may come at a 
cost and we must ask ourselves whether more detail is always good.24 
My research question can therefore be stated as follows: 
'How do we define contract design and what differences do we find within a particular 
industry and between countries?' 
As reviewed above, numerous theories of contract exist in the legal and economics 
literatures which attempt to prescribe the manner in which contracts should be 
drafted under certain conditions. In an attempt to integrate the legal and economic 
perspectives on contract, Williamson aligns different governance structures with con-
tract law doctrines. But theory has not been able to provide us with a unifying struc-
ture for the specificity and testing of contract design hypotheses.25 This may in part be 
due to the fact that the diversity of possible contractual designs is virtually unlimited. 
Contractual structure may vary with objectives, underlying relations, nature and size of 
informational and strategic impediments to contract formation, legal rules and en-
forcement. My main research question is split into three sub-questions: 
to what degree are commercial contracts governed by either a classical or more 
relational contracting perspective, 
how can we measure contract design, and 
what factors influence contract design? 
In order to answer these questions in full would require an investigation of almost 
every type of transaction between individuals and organizations. This is not feasible, 
while the main difficulty regarding the study of actual contracts is the acquisition of 
data.26 Most insights are therefore gained from studying a particular type of contract 
and/or industry. In choosing a certain industry the researcher has to make a trade-off 
between precision and generality. In addition, the question arises whether contract 
research should focus on the study of the actual contracts or a firm's interpretation of 
the contract. The actual contract contains apparent objectivity but excludes any un-
written terms that parties involved in drafting the contract may accept as standard or 
customary. Conducting a survey on the manner in which the contract is interpreted on 
the other hand, is subject to a subjectivity bias. Researchers also have to deal with 
issues of confidentiality, the construction of a database and the description and coding 
of the contents of contracts. Keeping the aforementioned reservations in mind, I am 
ready to confront contract theory with evidence. 
23 Buchheit (unpublished note). 
M Eggleston et al. 2000. 
25 Masten and Saussier 2002. 
20 Brousseau and Glachant 2002, Masten and Saussier 2002, Lyons 1996, Furlottl 2007. 
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M E T H O D O L O G Y 
For my empirical research, I set up a contracts database, which contains over 400 ac-
tual contracts. The dataset is restricted to commercial agreements concluded in the 
biotechnological and pharmaceutical sector. The agreements are all inter-firm collabo-
rative agreements.27 This choice is driven by the fact that since the 1980s inter-firm 
collaborations have increased in relative importance.28 Globalization has driven the 
interdependence of technologies and industries, thereby creating a higher demand for 
solutions involving different types of competences. The biotechnological and pharma-
ceutical sectors reflect this growth in various types of contractual collaborations.29 
These contracts therefore make an interesting study case. 
A detailed conceptual analysis of the number, types and length of the contractual 
provisions of the contracts in the dataset was made possible with the use of content 
analysis software. This software enables me to accurately distinguish between differ-
ent types of (for example) termination and dispute resolution terms, in addition to 
mapping their co-occurrence within a particular contract. The dataset of contracts is 
supplemented by extensive information on the contracting parties and their contract-
ing environment, such as the size of the undertakings, total revenue and asset turn-
over, and contracting experience. Additional data was also collected by means of case 
studies and through numerous interviews with experts in the field. 
S T R U C T U R E 
My dissertation consists of four main chapters. Each of the chapters originally com-
prised a separate paper. Together, these papers provide the reader with a broad per-
spective on contract design. 
In the next chapter (chapter 2), I study some major legal implications of inter-firm 
technology partnering through equity joint ventures, non-equity partnerships30, and 
licensing contracts. These different partnerships are placed within classical and rela-
tional contracting perspectives, while also considering intellectual property rights is-
sues. Samples of contracts in bioscience, fine chemicals, biotechnology and biophar-
maceuticals are analyzed in detail, with reference to distribution of property rights, 
major contractual clauses, and measures of conflict resolution. 
Chapter 3 presents a new perspective on contract theory and comparative con-
tract law. Complex contracts are defined to mean those contracts that contain many 
27 'Inter-firm collaborative agreements' is a term used in the business literature. What is meant is a commer-
cial contract entailing the cooperation of two or more firms on a project. 
28 Narula and Hagedoorn 1998. 
29 Powell et al. 1996, Hagedoorn and Kranenburg 2003, Hagedoorn 2002. 
30 The term 'partnership' is used in the business sense and does not refer to the legal definition of 'partner-
ship'. 
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clauses with a relatively large number of interdependencies that also impose a signifi-
cant cognitive load upon parties. Starting from differences in comparative contract 
law, the concept of complex contracts allows us to better study the intricacy of con-
tract design. Integrating both legal and business insights on the study of contracts, I 
develop a theoretical and multidimensional framework of contractual complexity. The 
framework is used to illustrate that factors generally invoked to explain contract de-
sign, such as limits of cognition, asymmetric information, asset specificity and strategic 
importance, uncertainty of the environment, and trust and reputation, are ultimately 
driven by their embeddedness in the particular legal and socio-cultural environment. 
In chapter 4, I further develop the concept of contractual complexity as ex-
pounded in chapter 3. In this chapter in particular, I seek rapprochement with the 
business economics literature where several constructs of complexity have been ad-
vanced and tested empirically. These studies on contractual complexity employ objec-
tive measures such as the number of contractual provisions, pages or the amount of 
kilobytes of the contract file to measure complexity. Following some suggestions in the 
literature, I argue that the degree to which a contract imposes a cognitive load, i.e. an 
information processing effort, upon contracting parties should be taken as another 
important dimension of contractual complexity. I define and empirically test the con-
ceptual model of the complexity of contracts using a multidimensional perspective 
where both objective and subjective dimensions are taken into account The empirical 
analysis is based on a sample of nearly 400 research and development (R&D) alliance 
contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry. 
In chapter 5 I apply the multi-dimensional construct of contractual complexity as 
developed in chapter 4. Continuing along the lines of business economic theory, I am 
interested to learn under which conditions firms are inclined to increase contractual 
complexity. Most empirical studies that try to explain diversity in contractual design 
are heavily influenced by transaction cost economics (TCE) and property rights theory. 
Based in part on this prior research, but also on other approaches found in empirical 
industrial organization, finance, strategic management, law and economics, and legal 
theory, I focus on three levels of conditions that impact contractual complexity: com-
pany characteristics, transaction characteristics, and the organizational routines of 
firms. Using a dataset of over 300 R&D alliance contracts and extensive company in-
formation, I model the effects of size, R&D capability and information asymmetry 
(company characteristics), strategic importance and asset specificity (transactional 
characteristics), and general and partner-specific contracting experience (organiza-
tional routines) on the complexity of R&D alliance contracts. 
In a final overview (chapter 6) I gather my conclusions and discuss the limitations 
and implications for further research. 
Chapter 6 of this dissertation was concluded in September 2008. Some of the chapters 
were, however, concluded at an earlier date and have (in a modified version) either 
been accepted or submitted for publication. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONTRACT LAW AND THE GOVERNANCE OF INTER-FIRM TECHNOLOGY 
PARTNERSHIPS - AN ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT MODES OF PARTNERING 
AND THEIR CONTRACTUAL IMPLICATIONS 
A modified version of this chapter has been published as: J. Hagedoorn, G. Hesen, 'The 
governance of inter-firm technology partnerships and contract law - an analysis of 
different modes of partnering and their contractual implications', Journal of Manage-
ment Studies, 44, 2007, p. 342-365. 
19 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Over a decade ago, when Ronald Coase delivered his 1991 Nobel Prize lecture in 
Stockholm, he noticed, amongst other things, a strong need for economists1 to de-
velop a much more detailed understanding of the actual process of contracting be-
tween companies in a 'real-world setting'.2 More than seventy years ago, Coase al-
ready paid attention to the important role of contracts and inter-firm relationships in 
his seminal paper on 'The nature of the firm'.3 This chapter follows Coase's suggestion 
and as such it is part of the growing body of literature that studies, in detail, the legal 
and organizational ramifications of inter-firm contracting. In that context, I study three 
major forms of inter-firm partnering, i.e. equity joint ventures, non-equity partner-
ships, and licensing contracts. I will concentrate on a specific group of inter-firm part-
nerships for which technology development or technology sharing is a crucial element 
in the agreement. Not only have these technology agreements become a major cate-
gory of inter-firm partnering4, the specific nature of the development, sharing, or 
transfer of technology through these agreements also creates some interesting intel-
lectual property rights issues for inter-firm contractual arrangements. 
Earlier work by Ring and Van de Ven (1992) and Williamson (1985,1991 and 1996) 
already discussed some general perspectives on contract law in the context of the 
types of transactions between companies and their specific mode of governance and 
organization.5 Hierarchies appear to follow relational contractual governance, market 
transactions coincide primarily with classical contract law, and a broad group of inter-
firm arrangements (hybrids) are expected to be regulated by relational governance.6 
Other contributions that consider the general association between types of transaction 
and mode of governance indicate that equity joint ventures are to be seen as quasi-
hierarchical organizational structures, non-equity inter-firm partnerships are contrac-
tual hybrids, while licensing contracts largely reflect market transactions.7 
I will take the next step and analyze in greater detail the different perspectives on 
contract law, describe various incentive schemes, and discuss specific transactional 
characteristics that play a role in equity joint ventures, non-equity partnerships and 
licensing contracts. Compared to some recent studies8, which are still somewhat more 
1 I assume that this need is not only relevant for economists but for all social scientists interested in the 
implications of inter-firm contracting. 
2 Coase 1992. 
3 Coase 1937. 
4 Hagedoorn 2002. 
5 A broader social perspective on the social factors affecting contracting is offered by Bonn (1972). His con-
tribution discusses the effects of social institutions, formal organizations and inter-organizational linkages on 
the use of contracts and contract law. 
"Williamson 1991 and 1996. 
7 Contractor and Lorange 2002, Narula 2001. 
8 Kalnins and Mayer 2004, Mayer and Argyres 2004, Parkhe 1993, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Reuer and Arino 
2002, Sampson 2004. 
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general in nature, my analysis aims at presenting an in-depth and detailed, qualitative 
analysis of the interaction of contract law and different modes of technology partner-
ing. As such, this chapter follows some recent contributions that study the interaction 
between organizational and legal implications of inter-firm relationships.9 
My contribution will clarify the degree to which different modes of inter-firm 
technology partnering are governed by either a classical or a more relational contract-
ing perspective. From a theoretical perspective, I argue that inter-firm technology 
partnerships organized through equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships will 
largely follow a relational contracting perspective. This relational perspective is ex-
pected to play little or no role in licensing contracts which are primarily governed by a 
classical contracting perspective. As these different perspectives can be linked to the 
actual legal interpretation and the use of a variety of contractual clauses, I will also be 
able to interpret how these clauses are applied in different contractual settings and 
whether the content and scope of these different clauses and provisions demonstrate 
subtle differences according to the actual mode of technology partnerships for which 
they are incorporated in concrete contracts. As such, this will enable me to present a 
fine-grained analysis of different modes of technology partnering, based on a theoreti-
cal understanding of different contractual perspectives and the actual legal implica-
tions of these perspectives on the contractual clauses in different inter-firm technol-
ogy partnerships. 
In the following section, I will first briefly discuss some of the major differences 
between the classical and the relational contracting perspective. This is followed by a 
section in which these perspectives are projected on relevant contractual provisions 
for various partnerships. In the next section, the role of different perspectives on con-
tract law will be examined further for three major categories of inter-firm technology 
partnering: equity joint ventures, non-equity partnerships, and licensing contracts. This 
is followed by a detailed analysis of a small set of actual contracts for equity joint ven-
tures, non-equity partnerships, and licensing. I continue with a discussion of my find-
ings in the context of the distribution of property rights and the relevant contractual 
provisions such as adaptation clauses, damage measures, warranties, and dispute 
resolution. The final section presents the conclusions with some directions for further 
research. 
D I F F E R E N T P E R S P E C T I V E S O N C O N T R A C T L A W 
Legal scholars, predominantly in common law jurisdictions, have extensively written 
about the diverse depictions of contract law10, which have been applied by business 
scholars to explore the content and scope of different governance structures and con-
9 Harrison 2004, Wright and Lockett 2003. 
10 Atiyah 1989, Friedman 1973, Gordley 1991, Horwitz 1977, Nassar 1995, Wightman 1996. 
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trading practices.11 In general, legal scholars in both the US and UK have distinguished 
between classical contract law, dominant in the first three quarters of the 19th cen-
tury, and neoclassical contract law and more recently relational contract theory, which 
have slowly replaced classical contract law from the late 19th century onwards.12 The 
exact content and relevance of these doctrines is, however, subject to debate.13 Given 
these unclear demarcations, I will concentrate on two broad, apparently polar, con-
tracting perspectives, namely a 'classical contracting perspective' and a 'relational 
contract perspective'.14 This classification into perspectives enables me to extract the 
relevant characterizing principles from each depiction of contract law, classical and 
relational. As such, I am able to abstract from the particular jurisdiction, in this case 
common law, in which classical and relational contract law have originally developed. 
The current classification then, makes it possible to apply these 'perspectives' to dif-
ferent types of technology partnerships and contracts, regardless of the applicable 
legal regime, namely common or civil law.15 
The classical contracting perspective supports the discrete market form of organi-
zation. 16,17 In that context, the identity of parties is irrelevant and transactions occur 
entirely separate from all other past, present and future transactions.18 Freedom of 
contract constitutes the basis of market exchange and is enforced by a laissez-faire 
policy envisioning the sanctity of contracts.19 The freedom of contract emphasizes the 
fact that the mere consent or will of the parties is sufficient to create content obliga-
tions and justify enforceability.20 Contracts are regarded as risk allocation mechanisms, 
whidh .incorporate all relevant contingencies and obligations, i.e. a contract is consid-
ered to be a clear-cut and 'complete' agreement.21 The adaptation of a contract to 
accommodate aiahange of circumstances is considered to impede the sanctity of con-
tracts.22 The classical contracting perspective can also be characterized by the follow-
11 Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Williamson 1985,1996. 
12 Atiyah 1989, Eisenberg 2001, Friedman 1973, Horwitz 1977. 
13 Eisenberg 2000, Feinman 1983 and 1990, Gordley 1991, Macneil 2000, Wightman 1996. 
" Eisenberg 2000, Macneil 1979. I discuss these different approaches as perspectives because, given the 
primarily, private ordering nature of relational contracting, there is no relational contract law in the strict 
sense. Harrison (2004) discusses an interesting case where both the UK High Court and the Court of Appeal 
refused to legally enforce a relational contract between two companies, based on implied obligations and 
promises without a formal contract. 
15 Economic theory and some of its spill-over to the management literature, rely on other approaches than 
either a classical or a relational contracting perspective. In that context one has to think of the contributions 
related to Incomplete contracting (Hart and Moore 1999, Posner 1986), and work on the property rights 
theory of the firm (Hart and Moore 1990). 
16 Discrete must be understood as 'as-if-discrete' (Macneil 2000), as almost every exchange is embedded in a 
minimal social context and truly discrete transactions are rare. 
" Williamson 1991, Macneil 1978. 
18 Foss et al. 2000, Williamson 1991,1996. 
10 Nassar 1995, Friedman 1973. 
20 Wightman 1996, Atiyah 1979, Nassar 1995. 
21 Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Triantis 2000. 
22 Nassar 1995. 
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ing legal recommendations: account for as much of the subject matter of the contract 
as possible, avoid open-ended agreements, restrict the sources used to define the 
content of the agreement i.e. formal documents are preferred over informal commu-
nication, limit the amount of contractual remedies available to parties, court enforce-
ment is the preferred method of dispute resolution.23 
The relational contracting perspective is modeled upon the assumption that con-
tracts are incomplete.24 Models of incomplete contracting assume that in a complex 
world, characterized by asset specificity, measurement difficulties and uncertainty, 
transaction costs impede the writing of elaborate contracts.25 More specifically, 
bounded rationality and verification and information constraints increase transaction 
costs and thus make it impossible to efficiently allocate parties' obligations across all 
future contingencies contractually.26 Such incompleteness raises the risk of contractual 
hazards and thus reinforces the need for (in)formal contractual safeguards that aim to 
realign the incentives and interests of parties. With the recognition that contracts are 
to some degree incomplete, flexibility plays an important role for the governance of 
contractual relationships.27 
The relational contracting perspective supports these incomplete contracts as it 
replaces discreteness and presentiation by relational norms.28 Such norms may be 
explicitly expressed in the contract through the incorporation of vague terms such as 
'best efforts' and 'reasonableness', or through mechanisms which facilitate continuity 
and promote efficient adaptation, such as revision clauses, the doctrine of excuse, 
internal dispute resolution agreements and arbitration.29 Furthermore, various schol-
ars use the term relational governance to refer to norms such as reputation and trust 
that act to enhance cooperation between parties.30 It is important to note that under 
the relational contracting perspective the contract is regarded as a risk sharing mecha-
nism, as opposed to a risk allocation mechanism under the classical approach.31 
23 Macneil 1978. 
24 Scott 2003. 
25 Brousseau and Glachant 2002, Harrison 2004, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Wil-
liamson 1985,1991. 
26 Ayres and Gartner 1992, Masten 1996, Williamson 1996, 1991. Legal scholars and economic and manage-
ment scholars seem to define the incompleteness of contracts differently. However, the definition as articu-
lated in this chapter is increasingly accepted, i.e. a contract is considered incomplete if the contract does not 
specify all future contingencies and/or the contract does not exploit all gains from trade. 
27 This differentiation into complete and incomplete contracting, that stresses the role of flexibility and 
adaptability to conflict, is somewhat similar to Peter Ring's distinction between 'state of contract' and 'state 
of union' (Ring 1997). 
28 Bonn 1972, Eisenberg 2000, Williamson 1985. 
25 Eisenberg 2000, Scott 2003, Speidel 2000. 
30 The effect of these latter norms on partnerships has been subject to extensive research and does not 
pertain to the scope of this paper (Gulati 1995, Macaulay 1963, Parkhe 1993, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Reuer 
and Arino 2002, Ring 2002, Ring and Van de Ven 1992). 
31 Speidel (2000) gives an example of a contract in which a pricing mechanism designed to track the market 
rate for the transportation of ore allows parties to share the risk of a price change instead of allocating such 
a risk ex ante. 
24 
C O N T R A C T U A L C L A U S E S 
It is generally acknowledged that the environment within which technology partner-
ships are negotiated is complex. The partnerships generally involve asset specific in-
vestments and they are characterized by uncertainty, raising the risk of contractual 
exchange.32 As indicated in the introduction, previous studies have predominantly 
investigated the way in which (intellectual) property and control rights, payment 
schemes and contract duration are able to mitigate exchange hazards and induce effi-
cient contract structures. Whilst the foregoing constructs have been held to effectuate 
cooperative behavior in the long run, scholars have recently acknowledged that as the 
risk of opportunistic behavior augments there is a greater need for contractual safe-
guards. Such provisions, specifying the consequences of breach and termination, as 
well as dispute resolution processes have become increasingly important.33 Building 
upon these prior literatures, that discuss the relevance of particular clauses for under-
standing contracts in the context of technology partnering, I will analyze revision 
clauses, hardship and force majeure clauses, damage measures, warranties and dis-
pute resolution mechanisms in the light of classical and relational contracting perspec-
tives. 
Revision clauses 
In complex environments, revision clauses can mitigate the effect of unforeseen con-
tingencies, as they impose a general duty on the revision of a contract.34 Under a revi-
sion clause, parties are expected to initiate and pursue good faith negotiations and the 
advantaged party generally has a duty to accept an equitable adjustment.35 A revision 
clause, for example, may pertain to force majeure and hardship clauses, and will stipu-
late that parties are obliged to review the situation and attempt to accommodate the 
unforeseen change of circumstances before deciding upon termination. The incorpora-
tion of revision clauses clearly falls within the domain of the relational contracting 
perspective. Under the classical contracting perspective, a closed contract is sanc-
tioned and final and a revision clause would set aside the discreteness inherent to the 
classical approach. The fact that revision clauses do not impose well-defined obliga-
tions on the parties to the contract will suffice to render them invalid and unenforce-
able.36 
32 Gulati 1995. It also possible to consider inter-firm partnerships, in particular those outside the most re-
search intensive high-tech sectors, in the context of non-specific public good aspects of technological knowl-
edge that leads to property rights problems and associated transaction failures. 
33 Dyer 1997, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Reuer and AriRo 2002. 
34 Perillo 1998. 
35 Eisenberg 2000. 
36 Nassar 1995. 
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Hardship and force majeure clauses37 
The implementation of hardship or force majeure clauses indicates that parties are 
willing to accommodate the relationship to an unforeseen change of circumstances in 
38 I 
order to intercept the harmful effects of such unforeseen contingencies. Under the 
classical approach, the principle of pacta sunt servanda plays a primary role; the final 
goal is performance of the contract even if this has become burdensome to one of the 
parties. Although parties will attempt to ex ante identify and efficiently allocate all 
future risks, bounded rationality, verification and information constraints impede 
complete ex ante allocation. In the case of a disruptive event, not accounted for in the 
contract, parties intend to let the loss lie where it falls, and in general, the classical 
contracting perspective will thus not provide for adjustment. A relationship involving 
specific investments, however, increases the costs related with premature termina-
tion. Nassar (1995) argues that in that context, adjustment will be preferred even un-
der the classical contracting perspective. The situations in which performance is ex-
cused will be limited to truly disruptive external events, which are both unforeseeable, 
unavoidable and render performance absolutely impossible, e.g. wars, revolution 
(force majeure).39 The legal consequence of force majeure is either termination or 
suspension of the relationship. In case of termination each party must carry its own 
risk, which often means that the debtor bears the consequences of termination. In 
some cases, the parties might be compensated for the performance already rendered 
(restitution interest), dependent on the duration of the event. 
The relational contracting approach is focused on the continued relation between 
parties and clauses calling for termination of the relationship in the light of unforeseen 
circumstances are essentially discrete in nature. Relational elements may be added to 
such clauses by stipulating parties to use 'best efforts' in remedying the cause, initiate 
negotiations and attempt to accommodate the changes instead of direct termination, 
pursue equitable remedies. Under the relational contracting perspective performance 
does not have to be completely impossible, but may be excused as soon as perform-
ance becomes onerous40, e.g. economic, financial, legal or technological factors that 
cause serious adverse consequences to a contracting party.41 The legal consequences 
of hardship may range from excusing performance to renegotiating and adjusting con-
tractual rights and obligations in order to accommodate for the change.42 In case of 
termination, parties may be compensated for costs already incurred (reliance interest) 
and / or performance already rendered (restitution interest). 
371 realize that 'hardship' and 'force majeure' are general legal terms, which are subject to different interpre-
tations in each national jurisdiction. I have, however, chosen this terminology in accordance with the inter-
national legal practice. 
38 Perillo 1998. 
3D Doudko 2001, Perillo 1998. 
40 Perillo 1998. 
41 Nassar 1995. 
42 Doudko 2001. 
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Damage measures 
Termination rights and the associated damages act to reinforce cooperative behavior. 
In case of breach of contract43, the main question that arises - after it has been de-
cided which party should bear the risk of the debtor's inability to perform - is to what 
extent damages should be awarded. According to the classical perspective, parties 
voluntarily assume liability through a promise or an agreement, losses lie where they 
fall.44 Furthermore, the dominant principle of pacta sunt servanda requires perform-
ance - actual or hypothetical - to take place and damages are assigned accordingly.45 
The classical contracting perspective thus complies well with the doctrine of expecta-
tion damages, which places the 'injured' party in the same position as it would have 
been in, had the contract been fulfilled.46 The classical approach will in principle fail to 
recognize consequential damages - damages incurred to other protected interests of 
the party - as it will only allow for compensation of losses that follow immediately and 
directly from non-performance. 
Apart from the scope of damages to be awarded, the question arises how the 
precise amount of expectation damages is to be determined. The fact that parties 
under the classical approach attempt to specify all rights and obligations ex ante, com-
plies well with the doctrine of liquidated damages, which refers to contractual ex ante 
damage specification. Liquidated damages are static and their application depends 
entirely on the circumstances existing at the time of contract formation, whilst later 
events are deemed irrelevant.47 
In contrast to classical theory, the relational contracting perspective is based upon 
the premise of risk-sharing instead of ex ante risk allocation; damages must be both 
reasonable and fair.48 In the case of asset specific investments, parties must be com-
pensated for the sunk costs thereof if the investments have not been covered by in-
come from performance.49 Accordingly, parties are compensated for performance 
already rendered (restitution interest) and / or costs incurred prior to the breach (reli-
ance interest). Reliance damages and restitution will place a party in the position it 
would have been in, had there been no contract in the first place. In the light of the 
foregoing it becomes evident that the relational contracting perspective does not 
comply well with the doctrine of expectation damages. 
1,3 'Breach of contract' extends to include every case where performance rendered falls short of a promise in 
contract. I will not extensively discuss the difference between the case where the debtor is 'innocent' and at 
'fault'. I restrict my discussion to several types of damage measures in the light of classical and relational 
theory; a more extensive legal discussion of this subject, including various other remedies for breach of 
contract, is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
44 Feinman 1990. 
45 Macnell 1978. 
46 Feinman 1990. 
47 Eisenberg 2001. 
48 Nassar 1995. 
"Ibid. 
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Warranties50 
A warranty in a contract between companies may be characterized as an information 
mechanism that mitigates the hazards associated with problems of asymmetric infor-
mation regarding the characteristics of parties or their product quality.51 The imple-
mentation of warranties incites parties to correctly display all relevant rights and obli-
gations. The enforcement of warranties through the legal system reduces warranty 
commitments to credible signals; the firm presenting a warranty has to be aware of 
the resulting costs if the warranty is based on misrepresentation.52 Warranties are 
often enforced by indemnifications. An indemnity is a promise by one party to take 
responsibility for the loss the other party will suffer as a result of the first party's 
breach of its warranties. 
In general, warranties comply with the classical contracting perspective, i.e. war-
ranties act as an ex ante risk allocation mechanism. A warranty indicates that a party is 
willing to guarantee a certain state of affairs and consequently carry the risk of misrep-
resentation. On the other hand, warranties concerning the characteristics of a party 
may be employed under the relational contracting perspective while the exact identity 
of parties is of substantial importance in such long-term partnerships. 
Dispute resolution mechanisms 
Two main categories of dispute resolution may be distinguished: internal dispute reso-
lution and third party dispute resolution such as arbitration, mediation and litigation. 
In the context of internal dispute resolution an attempt is made to resolve the dispute 
without reference to a third-party, goodwill and cooperation thus play a significant 
role. A common type of third-party dispute resolution is arbitration, under which a 
dispute is submitted to an arbitrator who will make a binding decision.53 Arbitration 
procedures can be tailored to the parties' needs and parties often feel that arbitration 
is faster, less expensive and more efficient than litigation.54 Both internal dispute reso-
lution and arbitration comply well with the relational contracting perspective as these 
mechanisms take into account the general context of the partnership, the identity of 
parties and their relationship, and pursue fair and equitable solutions.55 
Under the classical contracting perspective, the relationship is of secondary impor-
tance and parties prefer an effective resolution with an assignment of damages over a 
'fair' resolution of the conflict. Litigation complies with this classical approach as courts 
strictly apply applicable law, they might pay less attention to the context of the rela-
tionship and they will often take the written terms of the contract as an approximation 
50 This section refers to warranties in the sense of guarantees, not be confused with the qualification of a 
warranty in Anglo-Saxon law as a non-essential term of the contract. 
51 Courville and Hausman 1979. 
52 Wehrt2000, 
53 Bonn 1972. 
s" Ibid., Williamson 1985,1996. 
55 Speidel 2000, Bonn 1972. 
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of parties' intentions.56 Macaulay (1963) and others have observed that even in a clas-
sical setting, contract execution by companies is often less formal and not necessarily 
frequently relied upon. However, I expect that litigation is both relevant and crucial in 
the context of inter-firm partnerships where intellectual property rights protection and 
control over resources are of vital interest to companies.57 
T E C H N O L O G Y P A R T N E R S H I P M O D E S A N D C O N T R A C T L A W 
Equity joint ventures 
Equity joint ventures are quasi-hierarchical in nature as the new venture embodies the 
creation of a hierarchy structure, namely common governance of the joint venture by 
the parent companies, which remain legally and economically independent of each 
other.58 The legal form of governance which supplants these common ownership 
structures is the contractual agreement embodying the creation of the joint venture. 
The (reciprocal) contribution of specific assets and consequently the share partici-
pation of each parent company in an equity joint venture, will serve as credible com-
mitments.59 More specifically, property rights are able to ex ante allocate risks inher-
ent to e.g. R&D projects undertaken within the equity joint venture.60 If all partners 
contribute assets that are of significant importance to the relationship, it is expected 
that shareholding should occur on an equal basis in order to induce optimal invest-
ment decisions. Equity participation may mitigate contractual hazards, but it also cre-
ates additional monitoring rights and administrative controls, inducing potential prin-
cipal-agent conflicts as joint venture ownership accrues to different parent companies, 
whilst the management resides with the equity joint venture. This means that incen-
tives have to be aligned, not only between the owners themselves, but also between 
management and owners. 
Due to the investments in specific assets and the uncertainty concerning the out-
come of R&D projects or other innovative efforts, I contemplate that equity joint ven-
tures will be governed by a relational contracting perspective that complements the 
'safeguards' that are provided for by the distribution of property rights. Relational 
contracting can create the flexibility necessary to mitigate the negative effects of un-
foreseen contingencies and ensure long-run collaboration and mutual forbearance.61 
More in particular, I argue that equity joint ventures refer to internal dispute resolu-
sfi I am aware of the fact that there is a difference in contract interpretation between common and civil law 
courts; compared with civil law jurisdictions, common law jurisdictions attach more importance to the 
precise language / words of the written contract. 
57 See also Rothaermel and Deeds 2004. 
58 Gulati 1995. 
53 Klein 1996, Klein et al. 1978, Teece 1992. 
60 Killing 1988. 
61 Williamson 1985,1991 and 1996. 
29 
tion mechanisms and include adaptation clauses construed in the light of a relational 
contracting perspective. 
Non-equity partnerships 
Non-equity partnerships are 'pure hybrid forms'62 which do not include the creation of 
a new venture.63 Property rights and profit allocation schemes do not ensue from 
shareholdings and residual rights of control are thus not automatically accounted for.64 
The division of property rights derives solely from the formal contract, which must 
specifically allocate these rights. I stipulate that the lack of a de facto common owner-
ship structure in a complex environment incites parties to resort to a substantial range 
of other contractual safeguards. 
The norms eminent to the classical contracting perspective do not seem to provide 
for the flexibility needed to create and prolong mutual forbearance in these long-term 
partnerships. Relational contracting, on the other hand, attributes considerable atten-
tion not only to the initial agreement, but also to the relationship as it evolves be-
tween parties. Non-equity partnerships are thus expected to be governed by a rela-
tional contracting perspective. In this context, these partnerships will stipulate that 
property rights and research outcomes are shared on an equal basis, and damage 
measures must be reasonable and fair. In addition, revision clauses and force majeure, 
extending to include hardship, will need to be incorporated into the contract. More-
over, disputes will be resolved internally, with arbitration acting as a last resort. 
Licensing contracts 
Licensing contracts involve the transfer of intellectual property protected by law, usu-
ally in the form of a patent.65 Unlike equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships, 
licensing contracts are unilateral in nature. They entail the one-way flow of technical 
information from the licensor to the licensee in return for some compensation. In 
principle, a licensing contract complies with a market transaction, the identity of par-
ties is of secondary importance, the transaction does not involve reciprocal invest-
ments, and information exchange is minimal (except at the initial stage). Licensing 
contracts do not entail long-term research cooperation, but are based on the static 
relationship between parties, as each party independently attempts to pursue profit 
maximization. Because cooperation is less important, contracts will be based on risk 
allocation instead of risk sharing, which corresponds with the classical contracting 
perspective. More specifically, licensing contracts are expected to: contain no general 
revision clauses, excuse performance only when this has become absolutely impossi-
ble, stipulate liquidated damages which cover only the expectation interest, use war-
62 Williamson 1991 and 1986, Gulati 1995. 
63 Hagedoorn 1990, Killing 1988, Wolf 1995. 
6" Root 1988. 
65 Bessy and Brousseau 1998, Fox 1992, Hagedoorn 1990, 
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rarities to ex ante allocate certain risks, and refer disputes to court. Therefore, the 
classical contracting perspective will in general apply to licensing contracts.66 
Concerning ex ante property rights allocation, the licensor holds all property rights 
and thereby residual rights of control with respect to the transferred knowledge. 
Unless explicitly specified in the contract, the licensee usually owns all property rights 
to the product or process that may result from the use of the patent.67 Whilst property 
rights are clearly defined and they guarantee the licensor a certain return on invest-
ment, contracts remain characterized by considerable information and verification 
constraints. The licensor faces a relatively low degree of ex ante uncertainty due to 
intellectual property protection, whilst the licensee is confronted with an informa-
tional disadvantage regarding the true value of the asset. Moreover, the fact that a 
licensing contract involves both the transfer of codified knowledge (the patent) and 
tacit knowledge (the instructions), gives rise to double moral hazard. Upon receipt of 
the patent fee, the licensor can forego to foreclose all necessary instructions, whilst 
the licensee may fail to complete payment upon receipt of the full instructions.68 
R E V I E W OF T E C H N O L O G Y P A R T N E R S H I P C O N T R A C T S 
Methods 
In order to exemplify our understanding of different modes of inter-firm technology 
partnering and their contractual setting, I present a detailed, qualitative analysis of 
concrete contracts for different technology partnerships, i.e. equity joint ventures, 
non-equity partnerships, and licensing. I will review two samples of contracts for each 
mode of inter-firm technology partnering. In the following 1 will summarize the con-
tent of these contracts, concentrating on property rights, major contractual clauses, 
and measures for conflict resolution, as discussed in the above, but 1 will also provide a 
large number of direct quotes from these contracts that illustrate how companies 
write such contracts. 
Based on information from the MERIT-CATI database on technology partnerships69 
and the sources of these contracts (see below) these six sample contracts can be un-
derstood as exemplary for the partnerships established in the high-tech industries 
mentioned below. Moreover, some extensive and detailed discussions with corporate 
66 In this context, it is irrelevant whether companies are jointly engaged in licensing, joint ventures or other 
agreements. The co-existence of numerous agreements between partners will not affect the drafting style of 
the contract, while such contracts relate to different areas of research and are usually drafted by different 
departments within companies. I note that the foregoing does not apply to e.g. all licensing and option 
agreements which are sometimes specifically attached as appendix to a collaborative agreement and then 
constitute an integral part of that collaborative agreement. 
67 The question as to who owns know-how related to licenses may depend on the law of a particular jurisdic-
tion. 
68 Arora 1995, Arora and Fosfuri 2002. 
69 Hagedoorn 2002. 
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lawyers and legal counsel involved in these contracts revealed that these contracts are 
to be seen as representative for contracts made in the high-tech industrial context that 
surrounds the three modes of technology partnering discussed in this chapter.70 This 
in-depth review complements prior literature through its detailed analysis of the con-
tent of contractual provisions (adaptation clauses, such as revision and force ma-
jeure/hardship clauses, damage measures, warranties, dispute resolution) and relevant 
property rights issues. 
In order to get this in-depth understanding of these contractual provisions and 
relevant property rights issues, I not only studied the actual contracts but I also inter-
viewed corporate lawyers and legal counsel involved in the drafting of each of these 
technology partnerships. Each of these interviews took several hours, in that context I 
discussed both general legal issues such as the preferred jurisdiction in case of litiga-
tion, the level of detail that is needed in each of these contracts, intellectual property 
rights issues, and specific provisions in these contracts.71 In addition to corporate law-
yers and legal counsel involved in drafting these technology partnership contracts, I 
also interviewed corporate lawyers and legal counsel in four other high-tech compa-
nies, mainly in advanced electronics, and an international legal firm that specializes in 
technology partnering in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.72 
All six partnerships and their contracts refer to companies in bioscience, fine 
chemicals, biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals. These industries are characterized 
by rapid technological developments and a high degree of intellectual property rights 
protection. In these specific high-tech industries, relational contract theory will provide 
parties with the flexibility needed to adapt their contract to the constantly changing 
environment. Some of these partnerships fall under a common law regime; others are 
subject to a civil law regime. The two cases of non-equity partnerships entail the col-
laboration between Orchid Biocomputer Inc. and Affymetrix Inc., both from the USA, 
and the partnership between ImClone Systems Inc. from the USA and Boehringer 
Ingelheim Pharma KG (Bl Pharma KG) from Germany. Orchid Biocomputer is a provider 
of services and products for profiling genetic uniqueness, whereas Affymmetrix devel-
ops technologies for analyzing and managing complex genetic information for use in 
biomedical research. ImClone Systems is a biopharmaceutical company engaged in the 
development of biologic medicines and Bl Pharma KG produces pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals and biopharmaceuticals. The two cases of licensing contracts and the two 
70 It should be noted that additional research is necessary to study the exact effects of contingencies such as 
repeated ties, general partnering experience, partner specific experience, expertise with regard to different 
legal systems on the particular content of contract provisions. 
71 Although I will make an attempt to be as specific as possible when it comes to citing specific clauses in 
contracts, I am limited by the non-disclosure agreements that I was asked to sign by some of the companies 
involved. 
72 In total, I interviewed ten experts. Nine of them are in-company legal counsel, general legal counsel, 
senior legal counsel, or head of the department of intellectual property and standards of their respective 
companies, one expert is an associate of an international law firm and an expert on intellectual property and 
technology, responsible for negotiating and drafting technology agreements. 
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cases of contracts for the equity joint ventures were provided by DSM, a Dutch chemi-
cal company. The contracts for the non-equity partnerships were extracted from the 
FindLaw.com internet database on inter-firm partnership contracts. The FindLaw.com 
internet database is freely accessible and powered by Thomson; it contains informa-
tion on more than 7000 deals, including over 1000 inter-firm partnerships. 
The equity joint ventures 
The contracts for the equity joint ventures indicate a common ownership structure 
(shareholdings) and income, profits and losses are allocated accordingly. The joint 
ventures are controlled by a board of directors, but day-to-day operations are run by 
general managers, one appointed by each party. Shareholdings correspond to voting 
rights and structural decisions, e.g. decisions relating to an increase or reduction in the 
venture's share capital, the dissolution of the venture, and the issuance of new shares, 
require approval not only of the parties, but are subject to complex majority voting 
procedures. As typically stated in such contracts, such decisions may '(...) require the 
approval by the parties before being presented to the general meeting and when pre-
sented to the general meeting require affirmative votes of shareholders and their 
proxies representing not less than three-fourth (3/4) of all votes which all shareholders 
are entitled to cast thereat and at a subsequent general meeting of shareholders af-
firmative votes of not less than three-fourth (3/4) of all votes which all shareholders 
are entitles to cast thereat.' 
Parties must use their 'best efforts' to cooperate and to prevent any conflict of 
interest arising. Clauses that are found to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable are open 
to negotiations. In that case, the contract may stipulate that the '(...) parties shall 
promptly meet and negotiate substitute provisions of equivalent economic impact for 
those rendered invalid, illegal or unenforceable (...)'. Also, the equity joint ventures are 
established for an indefinite period, unless dissolved or terminated sooner. Each part-
ner has the right to withdraw from the equity joint venture, but will need prior consent 
of the other party(s) if it decides to do so before the xth anniversary of each venture. 
Upon the xth anniversary of each equity joint venture, parties may sell their shares 
under the condition that the other party is offered a 'right of first refusal'. 
The contracts state several grounds for termination: the unanimous consent of 
parties to dissolve the joint venture, the decision of parties not to fulfill the capital 
requirements for the joint venture, the sale or disposition of all the assets of the ven-
ture, the occurrence of an event of default, or a force majeure exceeding three hun-
dred and sixty five consecutive calendar days. An event of default is, for example,'(...) 
considered to have occurred if either party: (...) fails to perform or violates any of the 
material terms or conditions of (the) agreement or of the associated agreement, and 
continues such failure or violation for sixty (60) calendar days after it has been given 
notice by the non-defaulting party (...)' The force majeure condition refers to a delay in 
performance or non-performance in whole or in part caused by the circumstances 
reasonably beyond the control of the affected party. In one of the sample contracts it 
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is typically stated that this includes,'(...) but is not limited to: acts of God, fire, flood, 
war, accident, explosion, breakdowns, or labour trouble; embargoes or other import or 
export restrictions; shortage of or inability to obtain energy, equipment, transporta-
tion, (the inputs for making the product), or good faith compliance with any regulation, 
direction or request (whether valid or invalid) made by any governmental authority or 
person (...)'. 
When a joint venture's affairs are wound up, due to the occurrence of an event of 
termination, the assets and equity of the venture are divided in proportion to each 
party's equity ownership. As stated in these contracts, in '(...) event of default, the 
non-defaulting party may choose to purchase (...) the equity ownership of the default-
ing party (...) and continue the business of the venture (...) or dissolve the venture (...) 
without prejudice to its rights to recover from the defaulting party all costs, damages 
and expenses (...) incurred and/or suffered by the non-defaulting party in connection 
with the event of default (...).' In that case, the defaulting party is not be relieved of 
any liability it may have to the other party and/or the joint venture which liability 
arose to or on account of such termination. 
The contracts also provide for warranties and accompanying indemnities concern-
ing the duly establishment and existence of the parties and their authority, legal rights 
and power to execute and perform the agreement. Disputes are to be settled inter-
nally, through negotiation and conciliation procedures. If it is not possible to resolve 
the dispute within sixty days, parties must resort to arbitration. In any case, a party is 
not liable to the other party or its affiliates for any consequential damages suffered or 
incurred by that party or its affiliates. 
The non-equity partnerships 
Both non-equity partnerships are project-based collaborations. The parties agree to 
act collaboratively and shall use their commercially 'reasonable efforts' to fulfill their 
respective obligations. Project managers, appointed by both parties, are responsible 
for inter-firm communications. The partnerships are coordinated by a collaboration 
management committee, composed of two or more representatives of each party. 
Under both partnerships, each party retains ownership of its contributed technol-
ogy, of which it'(...) shall have sole and exclusive ownership of all right, title and inter-
est.' For the partnership for which the contract is governed by California State law, a 
party making an improvement to the contributed technology of the other party during 
the collaboration is obliged to transfer the rights relating to the improvements to the 
party with initial ownership. In addition, the latter contract stipulates that each party 
shall own an undivided one-half interest in all 'joint technology'. Under US patent law, 
joint ownership implies that each party is free to utilize his/her interest in virtually any 
manner without consent of the co-owner, unless parties specify otherwise in a written 
agreement. The preferred solution is to assign all rights to one single party, who will 
then own the patent and control how it is used. While the parties to the foregoing 
contract have chosen joint ownership, they have restricted the co-ownership to the 
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creation of 'joint technology'. In addition, the clause seems in line with the current 
increase of joint patenting in the US biotechnological and pharmaceutical industry.73 
The contract governed by German law stipulates that the property rights that solely 
cover the 'product', arising out of the joint efforts, shall accrue to party A; whilst all 
other emergent intellectual property rights shall accrue to party B; the latter must 
grant party A a non-exclusive, royalty-free, worldwide license for use to the 'product'. 
Under German law, in absence of any agreement which states otherwise, the princi-
ples of the 'Bruchteilsgemeinschaft' (section 741 and following of the German Civil 
Code) will apply and legal entities will share an undivided interest in the patent that is 
created. Although this seems similar to US law, the manner in which the parties may 
use the patent without the other party's consent is somewhat restricted. However, 
parties usually provide for a different allocation of rights through a written agreement, 
of which this contract is an illustration. 
The partnerships are of a fixed duration, i.e. performance of the last required 
service automatically terminates the agreement, but either party may request an ex-
tension of one year. Actual termination of the partnership can be effectuated by a 
force majeure event (see previous section for the formulation of the clause) or through 
the impossibility to perform due to scientific or technical reasons. Parties may attempt 
to resolve the problem through negotiations during a thirty day period, if negotiations 
fail,'(...) either party may terminate (the) agreement effective upon written notice (...)' 
The terminating party must pay the other party an amount in damages '(...) equal to all 
expenses reasonably incurred by (...) the other party (...) prior to such termination (...) 
and for a period of 8 (eight) weeks thereafter (..,)' Breach of a material provision of the 
agreement and bankruptcy of either party gives parties the right to terminate the 
partnership, whilst taking into account a period of thirty days for the other party to 
remedy the breach. During this thirty day period, neither party shall be relieved of any 
obligations. 
Force majeure allows performance to be excused and extended for the period of 
delay or the period of inability to perform, if a party has used its best efforts to avoid 
the occurrence of such an event. The contracts explicitly stipulate that '(...) neither 
party shall incur any liability or compensation obligation for any damages, (...) losses or 
expenses of any kind suffered or incurred by the other (...) arising from or incident to 
any termination of (the partnership) by such party that complies with the terms of the 
agreement whether or not such party is aware of any such damage, loss or expenses.' 
The contracts also include warranty and indemnity clauses regarding the exis-
tence, authority, legal rights and power of each of the parties to execute and perform 
the agreement. In addition, the contracts relate breach of a warranty to termination, 
as'(...) each party shall be entitled (but not required) to terminate this agreement (...) 
in the event that (...) the other party shall have breached a covenant, representation or 
warranty made in this agreement (...).' 
73 Hagedoorn 2003. 
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Disputes are resolved internally by senior officers or project managers. If the conflict 
cannot be resolved within thirty days, the dispute will be referred to a mediator, and 
thereafter to an arbitrator for'(...) final and binding arbitration (...).' Arbitrators are not 
allowed to award punitive or other multiple damages to any of the parties. However, 
disputes concerning the validity or scope of patents '(...) shall be set aside by the arbi-
trator^) and shall not be decided by them (...)', these matters will be subject to litiga-
tion. 
Furthermore, if any provision of these contracts is held to be invalid or unenforce-
able, all other provisions shall continue in full force and effect. Parties must attempt to 
substitute the respective term by a provision that pursues the economic and legal goal 
of the unenforceable term to the greatest extent. 
The licensing contracts 
Both licensing contracts incorporate a complex payment scheme consisting of '(...) a 
non-refundable initial licensing fee (...)', a type of lump sum, that is to be paid shortly 
after the conclusion of the licensing contract, and '(.••) non-refundable annual mini-
mum(...)' royalties based upon a percentage of the net sales of the licensed product. 
The licensee is obliged to take 'reasonable efforts' to exploit the license and may 
be asked for a progress report. The licensing contracts also stipulate that'(...) any im-
provement to the licensed patents shall be the property of the party inventing such 
improvement. Any improvement to the (...) system itself as patented in the licensed 
patents shall be the property of licensor and shall be licensed to licensee under the 
terms and conditions of this agreement.' 
The terms of the licensing contracts extend to the last-to-expire valid claim to a 
licensed patent. However, the licensor can decide to dispose of the patent beforehand, 
under the condition that the licensee is offered the 'first right of refusal'. Taking into 
account a certain notice period, the licensee may terminate the agreement at all 
times, also if the licensor fails to enforce the patents or if patents are held to be inva-
lid. The licensor may terminate the licensing contract if the licensee infringes the li-
cense or has not used its 'reasonable best efforts' to exploit the license. Each party has 
the right to terminate the contract when the other party '(...) materially breaches a 
material provision of (the) agreement and has failed to cure, failed to commence with 
remedial action and the diligent prosecution of the same, or failed to demonstrate the 
non-existence of the breach within thirty (30) days of receipt from the other party of a 
written notice and demand to cure such breach (...).' 
The termination does not affect the rights of parties arising prior to the termina-
tion and does not relieve parties of any obligation or liability or rescind any actions or 
payments by parties that have accrued prior to the termination. The occurrence of 
wars, riots, insurrections, serious labour disputes, floods, fires, explosions, or other 
natural disasters which render performance impossible or unfeasible, temporarily 
excuse performance, but automatically effectuate termination if performance is pre-
vented for three or six consecutive months. 
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One of the licensing contracts contains a (partial) warranty concerning the rights of the 
licensor and the status and maintenance of the patent and subsequently an indemnifi-
cation. The warranty does not cover the '(...) merchantability or fitness for a particular 
purpose (or) warranty as to the enforceability or scope of any licensed patent or li-
censed technology (...).' The second licensing contract does not provide for any war-
ranties. In both cases, the licensee assumes the entire risk concerning both licensed 
and application products. The licensor is not liable for any claims made by the licensee, 
or claims that arise out of the contract or any actions taken there under. 
These licensing agreements also state that each party '(...) shall bear its own costs 
and expenses in relation to the negotiation, preparation, execution and implementa-
tion (...)' of the contract. Disputes shall be tried in court and '(...) the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to costs and necessary dis-
bursements (...).' 
With respect to severability, the contracts state that if provisions are found to be 
contrary to the law, the law prevails and the provision is only affected to the extent 
necessary to bring it within applicable law, not affecting the remaining provisions. 
D I S C U S S I O N 
The review of the different partnerships illuminates several major differences in the 
interpretation of contracts referring to dissimilarities between the classical contracting 
perspective and the relational contracting perspective. Similar types of contractual 
clauses, such as dispute resolution clauses, adaptation clauses, and damage clauses 
are employed for the various forms of inter-firm technology partnering. However, it 
turns out that these clauses are given a different content and thus have divergent 
effects for distinct forms of partnership. Also, property rights seem to play a manifest 
role by inducing credible commitments in order to mitigate opportunistic behavior. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the three modes of inter-firm technology partner-
ships, their contractual clauses and property rights. 
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Table 1 Overview of modes of inter-firm technology partnerships, their contractual clauses, and property 
rights. 
Equity joint ventures Non-equity partnerships Licenses 
Adaptation clauses 
(hardship and force 
majeure clauses) 
- Any event beyond 
reasonable control of 
party 
- Suspension of obliga-
tions for long period 
before termination (one 
year) 
- Relational contracting 
perspective 
- Any event beyond 
reasonable control of 
party 
- Relational contracting 
perspective 
- Natural disasters and 
war may allow for sus-
pension of obligations 
for short period before 
termination (three-six 
months) 
- Classical contracting 
perspective 
Damage measures - Reliance damages plus 
compensation for per-
formance already ren-
dered (restitution inter-
est) 
- Difference between 
agreed termination and 
termination due to de-
fault of one party 
- Relational contracting 
perspective 
- Reliance damages plus 
compensation for per-
formance already ren-
dered (restitution inter-
est) 
- Expenses made by non-
defaulting party (limited 
period) 
- Relational contracting 
perspective 
- No explicit provision 
- Licensor not liable for 
claims 
- Classical contracting 
perspective 
Warranties - Standard terms 
- Indemnity with respect 
to breach of warranty 
- In principle classical 
contracting perspective, 
construed from a rela-
tional perspective 
- Standard terms 
- Indemnity with respect 
to breach of warranty 
- Breach of warranty may 
trigger termination 
- In principle classical 
contracting perspective, 
construed from a rela-
tional perspective 
- In general no warranties 
- (Partial) warranties 
concerning rights, status 
and maintenance 
- In general no indemnifi-
cation 
- Indicates classical con-
tracting perspective 
Dispute settlement 
mechanisms 
- Internal dispute resolu-
tion, arbitration and 
mediation second-best 
options 
- Relational contracting 
perspective 
- Internal dispute resolu-
tion, arbitration and 
mediation second-best 
options 
- Relational contracting 
perspective 
- Litigation 
- Classical contracting 
perspective 
Property rights - Clear distribution of 
equity ownership 
- Several additional 
safeguards regarding 
regulation of exit 
- Regulation of ownership 
of new technology, de-
veloped throLjgh part-
nership 
- Property rights are with 
licensor 
Revision clauses - Revision clause related 
to unenforceable and 
invalid provisions 
- Revision clause ireüäted 
to minrenferaealfelle =arrcl 
invalid provisions 
- Revision linked toioccur-
Not mentioned 
rence of supervening 
events 
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Distribution of property rights 
The role of property rights is most prevalent in the case of equity joint ventures as the 
distribution of equity ownership drives the division of gains and losses. According to 
property rights theory, an equal dispersion of property rights induces optimal invest-
ment decisions and mitigates opportunistic behavior.74 Additional provisions however, 
reinforce the allocation of property rights: parties may not withdraw from the venture 
before a certain period of time, shares may only be sold subject to a 'first right of re-
fusal' and decisions affecting the structure of the venture can only be taken by affirma-
tive majority vote. Apparently, the mere ex ante allocation of property rights does not 
suffice to create credible commitments. 
Property rights also play an important role in non-equity partnerships, which lack a 
common equity ownership structure. The contracts explicitly refer to the division of 
property rights: parties retain ownership of self-developed and contributed technology 
and subsequently either share equally or divide the property rights to jointly devel-
oped technology. In licensing contracts, property rights play a less prominent role in 
securing cooperation and generally the licensor holds all property rights to the codified 
and transferable knowledge. 
Companies that I interviewed stressed that equity joint ventures may be preferred 
over non-equity partnerships when parties seek to limit the financial risks involved, as 
equity joint ventures entail a common ownership structure and thus a clear definition 
of property rights. However, this specific form of collaboration is not always necessary, 
and increasingly, the preferred form for research collaborations is a non-equity part-
nership in particular when collaboration is short-term and project-based. Companies 
also indicated that they prefer non-equity partnerships when the (intellectual) prop-
erty rights are clearly granted to the party which makes the discovery or the improve-
ment to a technology. In general the companies and legal counsel stated that it is very 
important for parties to manage their rights to the outcome of the collaborative pro-
ject and clearly define in the contract who will hold the rights to the research results. 
Often ownership and use of the results are defined through the grant of an intellectual 
property right to one of the parties and a license to the other party. 
Revision clauses 
The equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships do not explicitly provide for 
general revision clauses. However, it may be asserted that both the equity joint ven-
tures and the non-equity partnerships have, to a certain extent, integrated a duty to 
revise or (re)negotiate in several other clauses. Both types of partnership allow for 
negotiations in case of severability, the 'new' and enforceable clause must pursue the 
economic and legal goals of the prior unenforceable term to the greatest extent. 
Whilst one might characterize this ability to (re)negot(ate as a type of 'revision', it 
74 Klein 1996, Klein et al. 1978. 
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offers no real flexibility as severability as such already forces parties to adjust the spe-
cific clause under penalty of severance. 
In contrast to the equity joint ventures and the non-equity partnerships, the li-
censing contracts adhere to a classical contracting approach and lack the possibility to 
negotiate an optimal replacement clause in case of severability. 
The non-equity partnerships have also attached a 'revision clause' to the occur-
rence of a supervening event. Upon the occurrence of such an event, parties must 
start negotiations and termination of the partnership is restricted to the case in which 
negotiations and subsequently accommodation of the contract fail. 
Adaptation clauses: force majeure and hardship 
The equity joint ventures, non-equity partnerships and licensing contracts all foresee 
in an adaptation or force majeure clause. However, the extent to which supervening 
events excuse performance differs under the classical and relational contracting per-
spective. According to the classical contracting perspective, performance must be 
absolutely impossible and either suspend or terminate parties' obligations. The rela-
tional contracting perspective, on the other hand, extends force majeure events to 
include economic impossibility, i.e. hardship, whereas legal consequences are not 
restricted to direct termination but may range from excusing performance to adjust-
ment. Indeed, the different partnerships seem to follow either a classical or relational 
approach. The licensing contracts only excuse performance if specifically identified 
events render performance absolutely impossible, during which the obligations of the 
party are suspended. However, the consecutive duration of the events for a relatively 
short period, may concede in termination of the partnership; there is no room for 
negotiations which may mitigate the effects of the supervening events. 
The equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships adhere to a relational ap-
proach, whilst the force majeure clause extends to include hardship. Both types of 
partnership provide for a 'best efforts' revision clause in order to resolve or accommo-
date the effects of supervening events. Under the equity joint ventures, termination 
may only be invoked if the event has lasted and obstructed performance for three 
hundred and sixty five consecutive days, a much longer period than the three months 
stated in the licensing contracts. This indicates that parties attempt to prevent termi-
nation as long as possible. 
During the interviews it became clear that many companies often apply force ma-
jeure and hardship clauses as so called boilerplates.75 These boilerplate clauses are not 
a completely standard type of clauses, but are drafted for the particular type of rela-
75 Boilerplate is defined as the '... language which is used commonly in documents having a definite meaning 
in the same context without variation; used to describe standard language in a legal document that is identi-
cal in instruments of a like nature ...' (Black's Law Dictionary 1990, p. 175). Using boilerplates, firms attempt 
to enshrine in the contract the decisions of the applicable cases decided in court. They thereby limit the 
application of statute or common law as a default rule. 
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tionship. Licensing contracts as well as non-equity partnerships incorporate boiler-
plates, but the type of boilerplate may vary. As a licensing contract is clearly of a dif-
ferent contractual nature compared to a non-equity partnership, it is possible to find 
both somewhat similar, but also very different boilerplate clauses in these inter-firm 
agreements. 
Damages 
The three types of partnership attach different consequences to breach of the con-
tract. In the context of the equity joint ventures, termination related to a force ma-
jeure event implies that the affairs of the venture are 'wound up' and assets and equity 
of the venture are dispersed in proportion to each party's equity ownership. In princi-
ple, parties are not liable and they are assured of a reimbursement of part of their 
investments. The foregoing complies with a relational contracting perspective as ter-
mination is governed by a restitution interest and parties are willing to share the risks. 
Breach and termination of the contract due to default has different implications: 
the non-defaulting party is awarded damages incurred due to the event of default and 
the defaulting party is not relieved of any liabilities that have risen due to termination. 
The non-equity partnerships extend the assignment of damages to include all expenses 
incurred by the non-defaulting party eight weeks after the termination has taken ef-
fect. The non-equity partnerships both include the designation of 'reasonable' conse-
quential damages in relation to an event of default, but explicitly forbid the assign-
ment of punitive and multiple damages, that are often over-compensatory and that do 
not coincide with the view of relational contracting. The equity joint ventures, how-
ever, explicitly state that a party is not liable for any consequential damages suffered 
by the other party. 
The equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships are generally based upon 
the notion of reliance and restitution interest, and the damages awarded thus comply 
with the relational contracting perspective: parties are merely compensated for per-
formance already rendered (restitution), or costs already incurred (reliance). 
The licensing contracts do not explicitly provide for the assignment of damages. 
The contracts merely stipulate that termination in general does not relieve parties of 
any obligations, liabilities, rescission of any actions or payments that parties have ac-
crued prior to termination. The contracts allocate all risks with the licensee and explic-
itly exclude liability of the licensor regarding any claims made by the licensee. Fur-
thermore, each party carries its own enforcement costs. Whilst no clear damage 
measures have been foreseen, one might assert that these terms indicate a classical 
approach to damages. Indeed, the contracts seem to allocate risks ex ante and let each 
party carry its own losses. The licensor is responsible for the licensed patent and the 
licensee for the exploitation. 
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Warranties ! 
Both the equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships provide standard term 
warranties and accompanying indemnities concerning the characteristics of the par-
ties. In addition, One of the non-equity partnerships relates breach of a warranty with 
the right to termination. The incorporation of warranties indicates that even in equity 
joint ventures and non-equity partnerships, parties are willing to allocate certain risks 
ex ante. The risk allocation does not relate to (unforeseen) future contingencies, but 
merely confirms companies' ability to become a duly established party to the partner-
ship. The duly establishment of parties and legal rights to enter into the partnership 
are understood to be essential in an agreement, which entails long-term cooperation. 
Contrary to my expectations (see the section on licensing contracts), warranties do 
not seem to be part of the standard contractual licensing terms. In the event that a 
warranty is incorporated, it is limited to the valid registration and ownership of prop-
erty rights. The foregoing seems to indicate, and this was also confirmed during the 
interviews with companies, that parties to licensing contracts take the characteristics 
of the party to be of marginal importance compared to the object of the contract, 
namely the patent. Given the limited warranties, parties are assumed to contract at 
their own risk and consequently must bear the losses. This complies with the classical 
contracting perspective under which the characteristics of parties are of subordinate 
importance. Another possible explanation might be the fact that the licensor in es-
sence holds a monopoly position with regard to the patented technology. The licensor 
has no incentive to take on certain risks, by means of guarantees, which would nor-
mally accrue to the licensee. The licensor's guarantees are thus limited to the bare 
minimum: the valid registration and ownership of the property rights. This makes 
sense, as risks pertaining to exploitation of the license are understood to be part of the 
normal business risks. A warranty covering the content and value of the patent might 
(partially) mitigate the informational disadvantage of the licensee regarding the true 
value of the patent. However, such a warranty would deprive the licensor of its infor-
mational advantage. The licensee is thus actually placed in a 'take-or-leave-it' position, 
where it is obliged to carry most of the risks inherent to the agreement or forgo the 
opportunity to contract. 
Dispute settlement 
The relational contracting perspective favors internal and private dispute resolution 
over court enforcement. Especially in equity joint ventures and non-equity partner-
ships, the cooperation of parties is of foremost importance, as specific assets accrue 
most value within the particular relationship. It is therefore not surprising that the 
equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships that I reviewed incorporate private 
enforcement clauses, where internal dispute resolution is followed by arbitration and 
mediation, litigation is not even mentioned. 
Licensing contracts attach less value to the prolongation of the specific relation-
ship, whilst patents may easily be allocated to another use. Subsequently, the re-
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viewed licensing contracts stipulate court adjudication. This clearly complies with the 
classical contracting perspective: a court will assign damages and interpret the con-
tract according to the law and in a way the court deems reasonable. 
Companies I interviewed stated that several internal dispute resolution mecha-
nisms are provided for in joint venture contracts and non-equity partnerships, such as 
bringing the dispute before an R&D committee with members of both parties, or bring-
ing the dispute before the CEOs of the partners. When these amicable settlements do 
not have an effect, parties will refer to third party dispute resolution through external 
arbitration. When no agreement can be reached via internal dispute resolution or later 
through external arbitration, disputes are finally referred to the court. While in the 
first place an attempt is made to resolve all disputes internally, an arbitration clause is 
merely incorporated into the contract to leave the option of arbitration open when a 
resolution cannot be reached through amicable settlements. 
Companies and legal counsel that I interviewed experience litigation as more for-
mal compared to arbitration. Arbitration has several advantages over litigation: the 
arbitration procedure is confidential, the arbitrator can take a closer look at the con-
tent of the contract, the relationship between parties itself is also taken into account, 
an arbitrator is usually chosen for his/her technical expertise, an arbitrator is not 
bound by the strict application of legal rules or case law. Also, arbitration is perceived 
as being quicker and more cost effective than litigation. 
As stated by one of the companies: 'In general, our first preference is to solve all 
disputes internally, through amicable settlements, and then through arbitration. In 
international agreements, where parties are often unfamiliar with each others legal 
system, we prefer arbitration over litigation. The choice for arbitration over litigation 
also depends on the type of agreement. For example, disputes in light of non-equity 
partnerships often relate to the content or scope of the collaboration, while licensing 
contracts often involve patent infringements or disputes relating to payment schemes. 
In the case of a scope or content conflict we will emphasize the need to settle the 
dispute internally. In addition, in common law jurisdictions, where the discovery pro-
cedure plays a role, we find that litigation is a good option in case of a patent in-
fringement in the context of licensing contracts, when we know that the infringing 
party possesses valuable information.' 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
Different general perspectives on contract law indicate either a continuum from a 
classical to relational contracting perspective76 or a more orthogonal setting for both 
perspectives.77 My findings suggest that different modes of inter-firm technology part-
76 Macneil 1978. 
77 Ring and Van de Ven 1992. 
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nering are first and foremost governed by either a classical or a more relational con-
tracting perspective (see also table 1). As I expected, inter-firm technology partner-
ships that are organized through equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships 
largely follow a relational contracting perspective. The relational approach appears to 
play little or no role in licensing contracts which seem to be almost exclusively gov-
erned by a classical contracting perspective. 
The relational contracting perspective is associated with the general understand-
ing that contracts are to some extent incomplete from a social, economic and organ-
izational point of view.78 This is particularly relevant in the context of the exchange or 
creation of new technology, where the commitment of parties is crucial. Relational 
contract theory acknowledges that the contract is an element in a joint effort of par-
ties that is not of a short-term nature but that focuses on the further development of 
the relationship where flexibility and adjustment can reduce the incentives for oppor-
tunistic behavior. In addition, the allocation of property rights can act as credible 
commitments that create investment incentives and stimulate mutual forbearance. 
Although, most of my findings are largely in line with my expectations (see also 
Table 1) there are also a number of interesting surprises. Minor surprises refer to li-
censing contracts that do not contain extensive warranties and the clear division of 
property rights in the non-equity partnership contracts even though these partner-
ships do not entail a de facto common ownership structure. More substantial surprises 
were found in the contracts for equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships that 
also include elaborate appendices with project plans, explicit task and responsibility 
description, and association agreements. In my opinion, this stresses the relational 
perspective of equity joint ventures but in particular of non-equity partnerships even 
further as such a package of various appendices places the actual collaboration and 
the inter-relationship of the partners in the realm of the contract itself. I also found 
that the time perspective for the joint ventures was set at a far distance as the con-
tracts do not allow parties to withdraw before a particular anniversary of the venture 
(in practice ten years). This stresses how much companies can place their long-term 
relationship at the centre of the agreement.79 
Also, by their nature, equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships require 
flexibility in contractual provisions. Many obligations involve necessarily ambiguous 
commitments or agreements regarding the future direction of the relationship. In 
other words, I expected a number of revision clauses: however, this was not the case. 
Explicit revision clauses were not incorporated in the agreements; revision was merely 
integrated in other clauses such as force majeure, hardship and severability. 
In the non-equity partnerships patent disputes were excluded from arbitration and 
made subject to litigation. This was not expected as non-equity partnerships are asso-
ciated with 'softer' dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration and mediation. 
78 Lorenz 1999, Macaulay 1963, Macneil 197S, Williamson 1996. 
73 Eisenberg 2000a, Speidel 2000. 
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However, this option might be preferred as many countries recognize special patent 
judges and a court's decision is open to appeal. In addition, the profits associated with 
a patent might outweigh the substantial costs associated with litigation. Furthermore, 
as some legal counsel have asserted, in such disputes valuable information may be 
gained from the other party due to the discovery procedure. 
Finally, in the licensing contracts, the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable 
attorney's fees in case of a dispute or litigation. This does not comply with classical 
perspective that each party should bear his or her own costs. However, this type of 
cost allocation, when the losing party has to pay the expenses of the prevailing party, 
might be a way to refrain parties from initiating a procedure too easily. 
Obviously, my research is only a small step on the long road leading to a more 
detailed understanding of, what Ronald Coase described as, the actual process of con-
tracting between companies. The current contribution focuses on a limited number of 
modes of governance and their contractual setting found in a small number of sample 
contracts. However, my study is, to the best of my knowledge, also one of the first 
attempts to combine such a differentiated perspective on contract law with an in-
depth and detailed analysis of different forms of inter-firm partnering considering their 
contractual clauses. 
There are some obvious suggestions for further research, which follow more or 
less directly from the limitations that were indicated in the above. My study clearly 
invites further study of legal and managerial implications of inter-firm technology 
partnerships based on larger samples of companies and contracts. Another suggestion 
is to study other forms of contracting, in particular inter-firm partnerships where tech-
nology is not of primary importance (e.g. marketing partnerships, customer-supplier 
relationships, outsourcing, co-production contracts). In addition to this, the analysis of 
a range of partnerships in other industries, with different regimes of intellectual prop-
erty rights protection, can also improve our detailed understanding of the nature of 
inter-firm contracting. Future research would also benefit from a more in-depth un-
derstanding of the specific context in which the contracting and negotiation process 
takes place and the outcomes of these activities (the actual contracts), or when and 
how the parties to any of these contracts consider using any of the alternative partner-
ships as a means of governing their relationship. In this light, further research might 
analyze the effect of the applicable legal regime on contract design or choice of type of 
partnership. Finally, it would be interesting to investigate further whether either 
common law or civil law jurisdictions are predominantly classically or relationally ori-
ented. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE 
COMPLEXITY OF CONTRACTS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
A commonly cited anecdote told by Louvain Professor of Law G. van Hecke in 1962 is 
the following: 
'In one instance that is known to me an American company was to acquire a one-third 
interest in a European company (...) The lawyers of the American company had drafted 
two separate contracts with a total length approaching 10,000 words. This was the 
first experience of the European party with American lawyers and when he was pre-
sented with the drafts he nearly renounced the deal. Thereupon the American busi-
nessman asked his European counterpart to have a counterdraft prepared by a local 
counsel. The result was a document of 1400 words. It was found by the American party 
to include all the substance that was really needed, and it was readily executed by 
both parties and adequately performed.'1 
This anecdote was used by Van Hecke to indicate that American contracts are gener-
ally much more detailed than their European counterparts. In 1987, more than a dec-
ade later, American law professor J. Langbein noted that '[a]mong businessmen and 
lawyers familiar with commercial practice in complex transactions on both sides of the 
Atlantic, it is a common observation that a contract drafted in the United States is 
typically vastly more detailed than a contract originating in Germany or elsewhere on 
the Continent'.2 Despite the fact that business lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic 
continue(d) to be confronted with a difference in contractual style, the latter did not 
appear to receive much further thought from legal scholars. 
Recently the difference in contractual style has received renewed attention by legal 
scholars and practitioners. They contemplate that American and - to a lesser extent -
English business contracts differ substantially from their Continental European coun-
terparts.3 Hill and King (2004) write that 'German business contracts are much shorter 
than their American counterparts'.4 Likewise, Conway (2005) states that 'Continental 
lawyers feel comfortable with short concise documents setting out the basics of the 
parties' deal'.5 Tjittes (2005) indicates that contracts subject to English law are very 
extensive and that thick contracts are common under an Anglo-American jurisdiction.6 
' V a n Hecke 1962, see amongst others Langbein 1987 and Hill and King 2004. 
2 Langbein 1987, p. 381. 
3 Conway 2005, Lundmark 2001, Tjittes 2005, 
4 Hill and King 2004, p. 889. 
s Conway 2005, p. 119. 
6 See Tjittes 2005, p. 3: '[d]at naar Engels recht de nadruk bij de uitleg op de bewoordingen van een contract 
liggen, heeft bovendien tot gevolg dat contracten naar Engels recht zeer omvangrijk zijn' and Tjittes and 
Hartlief 2005, p. 1605-1623: '[dje vaagheid van de vaderlandse uitlegnorm staat in schril contrast tot het 
Engelse recht, waarin vooral de tekst voorop staat en de bedoeling van partijen die daarvan afwijkt (...) niet 
relevant is. Dat scheelt een hoop geprocedeer (...) en dwingt partijen voortaan zorgvuldiger te letten op de 
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Collins (1996) writes that he is 'not aware of any systematic study of this question of 
the length or complexity of written contracts, [but that] there is a wealth of anecdotal 
evidence to support Langbein's observation.'7 
In addition, the issue of contract design has recently received attention in the business 
economic literature. Not aimed at country-level analyses, this literature has shown 
that different factors such as trust and reputation, information asymmetries and asset 
specificity affect the design of the contract in the sense that the contract may become 
more 'prolix', 'lengthy', 'complete', 'complex' or to the contrary, 'less explicit' or 'sim-
ple'. 
Why is it important to address this difference in contractual style and how may it con-
tribute to comparative contract law studies? 
Most comparative contract law studies focus on the differences between legal systems 
in general and on the set of rules these systems provide in particular. These studies, 
for example, signal differences in contract formation and validity, and compare the 
different remedies for breach of contract. Contract law rules should, however, not be 
assessed in isolation; it is precisely in their application and the context within which 
they operate that the rules accrue meaning and become effective. I therefore consider 
it important to shift the attention from the study of conceptual systems to the con-
tracting practice, while this may provide valuable insights into (comparative) contract 
law. 
First of all, the study of contractual practice may have implications for the debate on 
the proper content of and role for contract law. It may demonstrate the extent to 
which parties opt out of the contract law provided for by the state, i.e. the default 
rules. More specifically, the detail and length of American contracts may signal a 
greater need for parties to contract around the default rules than their Continental 
European counterparts, whose contracts are regarded as 'short concise documents'.8 
This 'opting-out' may point towards the sub-optimality of such rules. Such findings 
could enrich the debate on the role for contract law in the sense that either less rules 
or contract law rules tailored specifically to the needs of corporate parties are prefer-
able.9 On the contrary, the lack of detail in Continental European contracts might also 
formulering van hun contracten. Dit heeft dikke contracten tot gevolg, zoals in de Anglo-Amerikaanse 
rechtssfeer gebruikeiijk is.' Likewise Hartkamp and Tillema 2005, p. 50: '[generally speaking, the Dutch style 
of drafting of contracts more or less fits into the civil law tradition and is much less detailed and elaborate 
than the Anglo-American style of drafting. Where American contracts may fill complete books, Dutch con-
tracts are often restricted to a few dozen (rather short) articles.' 
7 Collins 1996. 
8 Conway 2005, p. 119. 
9 For the 'less law' argument see for example Schwartz and Scott 2003, Hill and King 2004. For the theory of a 
differentiated contract law, see amongst others Tjittes 1994, Smits 1998, Wightman 1996. 
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indicate that Continental European parties are not wary to rely extensively on default 
rules. 
Secondly, the analysis of commercial contracts may be able to signal to the courts 
information concerning the contractual goals of the parties, the negotiation process, 
and the characteristics of the parties.10 This information in turn may help courts decide 
in which manner they should interpret contracts: courts may choose to abide by either 
a strict and literal, or a liberal and active interpretation.11 
In the third place, the study of contracts may serve as a normative implication directed 
at lawyers: more detail is not always good.12 Take the example of a contract which is 
relatively detailed due to the fact that each party is wary of the other and as a result 
attempts to incorporate as many terms13 as possible. Instead of promoting a sound 
contractual relationship, such a contract may signal distrust at an early stage. 
Finally, the difference in contractual style may highlight the role that branches of the 
legal system such as procedural law may play. 
The foregoing implications have led several authors to exchange the classical approach 
to contract law studies for a more practical one.141 hope to contribute to this growing 
amount of literature through a critical examination of the difference in style of con-
tracts in England, the Netherlands and the United States. This chapter will relate pri-
marily to commercial agreements or commercial contracts, while the difference in 
contractual style is particularly eminent in these types of contracts. The question 
which I seek to answer is: What factors may explain the difference in contractual style 
between civil and common law jurisdictions? With the invocation of the business lit-
erature I hope to be able to provide the reader with a multidisciplinary perspective. 
In the next section of this chapter, I will provide the reader with an overview of the 
terms which are used to qualify contractual style. Economic and legal scholars for ex-
ample, have used the term 'incomplete contracting' and more recently 'complexity' 
and 'simplicity' in order to address the specific style of a contract. While it is now gen-
erally assumed that most real-world contracts are incomplete15, the current discussion 
focuses on whether these incomplete contracts are either complex or simple. I will 
10 Eggleston et al. 2000. 
11 A strict or literal interpretation refers to the situation where a court adheres to the contract law rules In a 
relatively mechanical way. Liberal or active interpretation refers to the case where the court also considers 
the context of the agreement and the parties' contractual goals (Schwartz 1992), 
12 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 126. 
13 The words 'term', 'contractclause' and 'provision' will be used interchangeably in this chapter (in Dutch: 
'contractsbedlngen' of 'contractsclausules'). 
14 Supra n. 113. 
15 Craswell 2000, Williamson 1996, Hart and Moore 1998. 
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therefore use the latter terms to qualify and explain the difference in contractual style 
across jurisdictions. The qualification of a contract along a continuum of increasing 
complexity is able to provide a point of departure for an inquiry into the factors which 
may give rise to complexity conversely simplicity. These factors, which predominantly 
emanate from the business economic literature on contracting practices, will be re-
viewed in more detail in this chapter. I will illustrate that these factors cannot be as-
sessed in isolation, but must be placed within their legal and socio-cultural environ-
ment. The focus of this chapter will be predominantly on the effect of the legal envi-
ronment. After a brief inquiry into the effect of the socio-cultural environment, a con-
clusion will be drawn. 
C O M P L E T E N E S S A N D I N C O M P L E T E N E S S , C O M P L E X I T Y A N D 
S I M P L I C I T Y O F C O N T R A C T S 
Scholars use the concepts of completeness and incompleteness and complexity and 
simplicity to refer to the style of a contract. While the foregoing concepts are related, 
they have been used interchangeably and interpreted differently dependent on the 
discipline - legal or economic - in which they are employed. This creates confusion with 
respect to the exact meaning of these terms, and I therefore find it important to define 
both of these groups of terms in this chapter. As most contracts are currently under-
stood to be incomplete I will, in the following paragraphs, first provide a definition of 
incomplete and complete contracts before turning to the complexity and simplicity of 
contracts and their relationship to the former. 
The completeness and incompleteness of contracts 
The concept of an 'incomplete contract' has been defined by both legal and economic 
scholars, which has given rise to slightly different interpretations depending upon the 
particular context - legal or economic - in which it is applied.16 Over the past few years, 
the literature on incomplete contracting appears to have brought legal and economic 
scholars closer together and presently both groups of scholars seem to refer to a simi-
lar and more universal definition of an incomplete contract. In the following para-
graphs, I will first provide an overview of these divergent descriptions and thereafter, I 
will present the current and more generally accepted definition. 
Legal definition 
Legal scholars use the term 'obligationally incomplete' to refer to an incomplete con-
tract. An obligationally incomplete contract refers to a contract which fails to address a 
particular term of the exchange.17 Conversely, a contract is termed obligationally com-
plete when it fully specifies (1) the obligations of parties for 2) all future states of the 
16 Tirole 1999, Ayres and Gertner 1992, Hadfield 1994. 
17 Ayres and Gertner 1992, p. 730. See also Goetz and Scott 1985, Scott and Triantis 2006, Katz 2004. 
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world. Whatever happens, the contract will stipulate how parties should act. A state of 
the world refers to an event that may or may not occur, and is also referred to as a 
contingency.18 Scott and Triantis (2005) further indicate that a 'state of the world' may 
refer to both endogenous and exogenous variables: the market price of oil would be 
an example of an exogenous variable, whilst the decision of a seller to sell or not is 
characterized as an endogenous variable. Ayres and Gertner (1992) provide the follow-
ing example of what they define as an obligationally complete contract: 
'A Seller promises to provide 100 gallons of 10W40 oil to [specific address] before 
noon on the first day of each month for the next 10 years. Buyer agrees to pay Seller 
$1000 in cash at the time of delivery. If Buyer or Seller breaches this contract for any 
month, the breaching party will owe the non-breaching party $1000, and all other 
contractual obligations will be rescinded.'19 
This contract, according to Ayres and Gertner (1992), states the obligations of parties 
for all future states of the world, i.e. all possible contract terms are included. I cannot, 
however, derive from their example that the obligations of the parties are specified 
under all future states of the world; what if an unforeseen event such as a war makes 
the delivery of oil temporarily impossible, should the buyer be allowed to claim $1000 
and rescind all other contractual obligations? Likewise, assuming that delivery has 
occurred on time for the past eight years, should the fact that the delivery of the oil is 
delayed by half a day due to an event beyond the control of the Seller, give the Buyer 
the right to claim $1000 and terminate the contract? The example merely stipulates 
parties' mutual obligations in case of (1) performance and (2) breach. The reasoning 
that Ayres and Gertner (1992) follow in order to conclude that this contract is obliga-
tionally complete might become easier to comprehend, when I take into consideration 
that the authors understand a contractual promise to be a promise to either (1) per-
form or (2) pay damages; damages being the primary remedy for breach under com-
mon law. This leads me to conclude that - according to the authors - it is not relevant 
whether a contract distinguishes between different causes of breach, such as an un-
foreseen event, e.g. a war or strike, or some kind of damage to the object, e.g. the oil 
is of inferior quality, as long as the contract describes the parties' rights and obliga-
tions in case of breach and performance. 
Hadfield (1994) refers to an incomplete contract as a contract that 'fails to specify the 
components of an exchange in some states of the world.'20 Likewise, Katz (2004) refers 
to the situation in which 'a contract is incomplete, silent, or ambiguous with regard to 
a particular term of the exchange.'21 In this light, Katz (2004) poses the question 
18 In this chapter I will use the terms 'contingency' and 'state of the world' interchangeably. 
19 Ayres and Gertner 1992, p. 731, n. 10. 
20 Hadfield 1994, p. 160. 
21 Katz 2004, p. 502. 
53 
whether the court should fill the 'gap' in a sales contract which fails to specify the 
price, or whether the court should decline to enforce the contract entirely?22 
Finally, Goetz and Scott (1985) indicate that '[t]his 'incompleteness error' typically 
occurs when the parties inadvertently overlook a potentially important, but low prob-
ability contingency'.23 In this light, they argue that the key purpose of the standard or 
default rules of contract law is to save parties the trouble of formulating a complete 
set of express conditions for specific events. More specifically, Goetz and Scott (1985) 
stipulate that 'courts will complete the instructions with a pre-formulated legal norm 
whenever the contingency in question was reasonably foreseeable.'24 The authors 
refer to an example given by Holmes (1897): a lecturer had agreed to speak without 
mentioning the time and as a consequence both parties construed the promise in a 
different manner. Disagreement arose concerning the specific time at which the lec-
turer should appear.25 Holmes resolved this apparent incompleteness by stipulating 
that the lecturer should appear in reasonable time.26 It should be noted that legal 
scholars find almost every contract to be somewhat incomplete, either because of the 
constraints parties face in practice or because parties intentionally omit to contract on 
certain matters. The causes of incompleteness will be more elaborately discussed in 
the next paragraphs. 
In light of the above, I understand a contract to be obligationally incomplete when the 
contract fails to specify the obligations of parties under a certain state of the world, i.e. 
fails to incorporate a specific term of the exchange. A contract then contains a 'gap' 
and courts will have to decide whether they will fill this gap or declare the contract 
void and unenforceable for matter of vagueness.27 
Economic definition 
The term incomplete contracting originally emanates from the economic literature. In 
order to be able to understand the economic definition of an incomplete contract, it is 
important to have some knowledge of economic theory. 
A concept frequently used in economic theory as a basic unit of analysis is the market: 
a place in which sellers and buyers trade quantities of goods and services for a certain 
22 Katz Z004, p. 502, n. 20. 
23 Goetz and Scott 1985, p. 270. 
24 Ibid., p. 270. 
25 Ibid., n. 17, Holmes 1897. 
26 One might argue that whilst the gap is filled - the contract now refers to a time period - the term 'reason-
able' is actually a vague term which might still lead to interpretation difficulties: what exactly is understood 
to be within 'reasonable time'? 
27 The literature on when and how courts should fill such gaps is extensive and lies beyond the scope of this 
chapter (see amongst others Schwartz 1992, Schwartz and Scott 2003, Hadfield 1994, Ayres and Gertner 
1992, Ayres and Gertner 1989). 
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price. Early micro-economic theory takes as point of departure that these markets are 
free and perfectly competitive, which means that the market satisfies the following 
conditions: (1) there are many buyers and sellers; (2) these buyers and sellers offer 
functionally identical goods, i.e. homogeneous goods; (3) the buyers and sellers face 
low entry and exit barriers; and (4) the buyers and sellers have perfect information, 
which is fully shared. According to economists, under these conditions, the market 
works perfectly, i.e. the market will reach equilibrium where a certain quantity of 
goods is offered against a specific price.28 In this market equilibrium, the goods pro-
duced are those most highly valued by consumers - this is referred to as an allocative 
efficiency - and the production of these goods is carried out at minimum cost - this is 
termed a productive efficiency or cost efficiency. The allocative efficiency is also 
known as Pareto efficiency. A situation is Pareto or allocatively efficient if it is impossi-
ble to make at least one person better off without making another person worse off. In 
practice, it is almost impossible to make a change without making at least one person 
worse off. Presently, economists often refer to the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency rather than 
the Pareto efficiency. Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, an outcome is efficient if those 
that are made better off, i.e. 'the winners' gain enough such that they can in theory 
compensate those that are made worse off, i.e. 'the losers'. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
does not require compensation to actually be paid, but merely requires that the win-
ners can hypothetically compensate the losers. Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for 
example, a contractual clause is efficient if the savings it creates for sellers are such 
that the sellers could hypothetically compensate the harmed buyers and still retain 
some of the savings for themselves. 
Under the competitive equilibrium, allocative efficiency implies that consumer and 
producer surplus are maximized. Consumer surplus refers to the benefits that the 
consumers receive from the market exchange of a good: the value of the good to the 
consumer (also referred to as the willingness to pay) minus the price of the good 
(payment to the seller). Producer surplus refers to the benefit the seller attains from 
participating in the market: the price paid to the seller minus the cost of production. 
The maximization of consumer and producer surplus implies that all the potential gains 
from trade are exploited. Consumer and producer surplus may be used to indicate a 
certain degree of welfare. For reasons of simplicity, I will assume that the maximiza-
tion of consumer and producer surplus constitutes total welfare maximization. 
Now that I have defined some basic concepts underlying economic theory, I will return 
to the economic definition of an incomplete contract. Economic scholars use the term 
'contingently incomplete' or 'insufficiently state contingent' to refer to an incomplete 
28 In this equilibrium, the price of the goods offered is actually equal to their marginal cost of production. 
The marginal cost of production is equal to the change in total cost when the quantity produced changes by 
one unit. 
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contract.29 A contingently incomplete contract fails to efficiently allocate obligations 
across all states of the world, and thus fails to fully realize the potential gains from 
trade in each state.30 As Ayres and Gertner (1992) indicate, from an economic perspec-
tive, even if a contract specifies all future contingencies and is obligationally complete, 
a contract may be contingently incomplete if it fails to realize the potential gains from 
trade due to the fact that the contractual obligations are contingent on too many or 
incorrect contingencies. A contingently incomplete contract indicates that the contrac-
tual terms which have been incorporated in the contract are not the best terms, in the 
sense that they are not optimal from an economic point of view. 
Let us take a look again at the example given by Ayres and Gertner (1992) of the con-
tract relating to an oil delivery: 
'a Seller promises to provide 100 gallons of 10W40 oil to [specific address] before 
noon on the first day of each month for the next 10 years. Buyer agrees to pay Seller 
$1000 in cash at the time of delivery. If Buyer or Seller breaches this contract for any 
month, the breaching party will owe the non-breaching party $1000, and all other 
contractual obligations will be rescinded.'31 
Ayres and Gertner (1992) termed this contract obligationally complete, whilst it speci-
fied the price, date and place of delivery and the amount of damages to be paid upon 
breach. The same contract may however, not be termed contingently complete whilst 
the oil price is fixed at $1000. The price of $1000 will apply regardless of any change in 
circumstances or conduct by either party and the price of oil is thus not made depend-
ent upon a state of the world, for example a change in demand for oil. I will illustrate 
this with an example.32 
Assume that parties face a simple environment and merely two states of the world 
concerning the demand of oil can materialize: high demand and low demand. When 
demand for oil is high, the seller expects to sell the oil for $1100. In contrast, when 
demand on the market for oil is low, the seller expects to sell the oil for $900. The 
chance of the high demand state occurring is 0.9 and of the low demand state 0,1. The 
profitability of the contract may be calculated as follows: 
Profit in high demand state Profit in low demand state Total profit 
($1100-$1000)*0,9 = ($100*0.9) = $90 ($900-$1000)*0.1= (-$100*0.1) = - $10 $80 
23 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 100, term these contracts 'optimally state-contingent' or 'perfectly complete'. 
30 Ayres and Gertner 1992, Eggleston et al. 2000, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990, Hart and 
Moore 1998, Williamson 1985, Maskin andTirole 1999. 
31 Supra n. 129. 
32 Similar examples are given by Schwartz 1998. 
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With proceedings of $80, the contract is indeed profitable. However, if the low de-
mand state were to materialize, the seller would actually make a loss of $10. A contin-
gently complete contract would specify a different price for the low demand state and 
for the high demand state, in order for the seller to exploit all possible gains from 
trade. The aforementioned contract, however, does not distinguish between the two 
future states: it states a fixed price of $1000. Contingently incomplete contracts then, 
give parties an incentive to, upon occurrence of a particular event or state of the 
world, renegotiate or breach the original contract in order to realize the additional 
gains.33 As the market demand for oil decreases, the seller will have an incentive to 
renegotiate the contract, in order to hedge against the subsequent fluctuation in his 
cost of performance. 
A contingently complete contract is a contract in which all the contract terms have 
been formulated in an optimal manner, in the sense that they allow the contracting 
parties to reap all possible profits. 
General definition 
In the foregoing paragraphs I have illustrated that legal and economic scholars have 
attached slightly different meanings to the term incomplete contract. In this chapter, I 
will take on a definition which is increasingly accepted by both legal and economic 
scholars. In order to define this incomplete contract it is necessary to first specify the 
elements of - the generally accepted definition of - a complete contract. 
A contract is complete when it allocates the rights and obligations of parties efficiently 
across all possible future contingencies.34 The foregoing definition seems similar to the 
economic definition, but actually consists of two elements.35 The first element refers 
to the fact that the contract contains terms regarding all possible future contingencies 
or states of the world. The second element refers to the fact that the contract allo-
cates the rights and obligations of parties efficiently across these contingencies or 
states of the world, i.e. the contract is thus able to fully realize all potential gains from 
trade. A contract is considered /'ncomplete if at least one of the foregoing elements is 
violated: (1) the contract does not specify parties' rights and obligations for all future 
contingencies or 2) the contract does not exploit all-gains from trade. This definition 
actually incorporates both the former economic and legal definition of an incomplete 
contract: legal scholars tend to relate the incompleteness of a contract primarily with 
the first element, while economic scholars relate the incompleteness of a contract 
with the second element.36 
33 Ayres and Gertner 1992, p. 730. 
34 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 100, Ayres and Gertner 1992, p. 730, Schwartz 1998, p. 277-278, Biard 1990. 
35 Van Bijnen 2005. 
36 Van Bijnen 2005, p. 87-88. 
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In general almost all contracts are incomplete.37 Economic scholars ascribe this appar-
ent incompleteness of contracts to the fact that perfect markets - the concept upon 
which they base complete contracts - actually do not exist: the markets 'fail'. This fail-
ure to create maximum efficiency in the market is ascribed to factors such as irration-
ality, information asymmetries and transaction costs; factors which subsequently un-
dermine the ability of parties to construe contingently complete contracts.38 Similar 
factors, such as transaction costs and information asymmetries, have been used by 
legal scholars to explain why most contracts are obligatlonally incomplete.39 Thus, 
both economic and legal scholars have used comparable arguments to explain the 
incompleteness of contracts, even though the background of these arguments differs. 
In the following section, I will discuss three of these arguments in greater detail. 
Transaction and enforcement costs 
The incompleteness of contracts may be explained by transaction and enforcement 
costs.40 When parties engage in an economic exchange they incur costs. These costs 
may include: 
(a) the costs of gathering and processing information, for example in search for the 
right contracting partner; 
(b) the costs related with negotiating, specifying and drafting an agreement. These 
costs may relate to extensive negotiations and the need to consult a lawyer; 
(c) the costs parties incur in order to ensure that each of them adheres to the agree-
ment and fulfils his or her promise, e.g. hiring a manager who controls employees; 
and 
(d) the costs related to the enforcement of the contract by a third party, e.g. court or 
arbitrator, including the uncertainty and error costs associated with such an en-
forcement.41 
37 Supra n. 125. 
38 Other causes of market failure are imperfect competition, externalities and organizational failures. While 
these factors play a less prominent role in the economic literature on incomplete contracts, they will not be 
discussed in this chapter (c/. Van Bijnen 2005, p. 117-137). For a more extensive discussion of these factors 
see amongst others Cooter and Ulen 2003. In addition, I would like to remark that even within economic 
theory the arguments used to justify the incompleteness of contracts differ. For example, economic theories 
which recognize the existence of incomplete contracts such as property rights theory, incentive theory and 
transaction cost theory, have different assumptions concerning factors such as the bounded rationality of 
parties and information asymmetries. In this chapter, however, I will take as a point of reference the as-
sumptions made by transaction cost and neo-institutional economic theory (cf. Brousseau and Fares 2000). 
39 Scott 2002, Schwartz 1998, p. 277-282, Schwartz 1992, p. 278-281, Trlantis 2002. 
40 Cooter and Ulen 2003, p. 212-225, Schwartz 1998, p. 277-278. The concept of transaction costs was first 
discussed by Coase (1937, 1960) and has been made more widely known through the work of Oliver Wil-
liamson (see amongst others Williamson 1985). 
41 The categories of transaction costs are referred to and distinguished in different manners by diverse 
scholars. For example, monitoring and enforcement costs are not always clearly distinguished in the litera-
ture. Scott and Triantis 2006, p. 822-823, for Instance, refer to these search and contracting costs as 'front-
end (transaction) costs', and the monitoring and enforcement costs as 'back-end (enforcement) costs'. 
Schwartz 1998, p. 278-279, distinguishes between transaction costs on the one hand and enforcement costs 
58 
Following Scott and Triantis (2006), these costs may either relate to the front-end of 
the contracting process and be categorized as transaction costs and - above categories 
(a), (b) and (c) - or to the back-end of the contracting process - above category (d) -
and be referred to as enforcement costs.42 According to Scott and Triantis (2006), an 
important distinction between the front and back end contracting processes is that 
they are separated by the resolution of uncertainty: '(.•.,) the front-end is drafting the 
contract and the back-end is litigating disputes that arise when the contract turns out 
to be a losing proposition for one party'.43 Parties will continue to invest in contracting 
costs, which implies formulating precise terms and increasing the completeness of the 
contract, until the marginal cost of investment outweighs the accompanying marginal 
benefit. This also means that parties may draft a more complete contract in an at-
tempt to reduce the level of expected back-end enforcement costs. Conversely if par-
ties agree to a less complete contract, they accept a higher level of expected back-end 
enforcement costs in return for lower front-end transaction costs. 
Bounded rationality 
The bounded rationality of individuals may also increase the incompleteness of con-
tracts. Rational choice or expected utility theory assumes that 'individual decision-
makers can compute (subjective) probability estimates of uncertain future events; that 
they perceive accurately the dollar cost or outcome of the uncertain outcomes; that 
they know their own attitudes toward risk; that they combine this information about 
probabilities, monetary values of outcomes, and attitudes toward risk to calculate the 
expected utilities of alternative courses of action and choose that action that maxi-
mizes their expected utility.'44 In practice, however, actors are 'intendedly rational, but 
only limitedly so.'45 Individuals do not possess unlimited computational abilities which 
would allow them to comprehensively search for and process all available information 
in an optimal manner. This is especially evident when the uncertainty about the future 
is great and the number and nature of events to be considered infinitely large.46 As a 
result, parties will fail to incorporate certain relevant terms, creating gaps, and to con-
strue contract terms which are optimal ex ante, i.e. at the time the contract is being 
on the other hand. Dyer 1997, p. 538, distinguishes between (1) search costs; (2) contracting costs; (3) 
monitoring costs; and (4) enforcement costs. Cf. Williamson 1985, Ayres and Gertner 1989, p. 92-93: 'These 
transaction costs may Include legal fees, negotiation costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of research-
ing the effects and probability of a contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying 
whether a contingency occurred'. 
42 Scott and Triantis 2006, p. 822-825. 
43 Scott and Triantis 2006, p. 823. 
44 Ulen 1989, p. 386 cited in Eisenberg 1995, p. 213. While this notion of rational choice theory is most 
commonly applied in microeconomic theory, other conceptions of this theory exist. Cf. Korobkin and Ulen 
2000. 
45 Simon 1955, p. 99-118, p. xxiv cited by Williamson 1996, p, 198. 
46 Korobkin and Ulen 2000, p. 1077-1078, refer to a game of chess where a player will have 10 l2° possible 
moves (assuming 30 possible moves each turn and 40 total turns per game). In such a situation an Individual 
is forced to make a substantive satisfactory choice, which is not the maximizing choice. 
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concluded.47 Some authors argue that bounded rationality alone does not suffice to 
explain the incompleteness of contracts while there is no worked-out theory of 
bounded rationality from which predictions about actual behavior can be made.48 
Bounded rationality not only affects contracting parties, but also the third party en-
forcer, whose predictability and reliability may be impeded. 
Information asymmetries 
In the third place, individuals are confronted with information asymmetry; they do not 
have access to the same information.49 Under the condition of asymmetrical informa-
tion, one of the parties involved in the transaction has relevant information which the 
other party does not possess. This information asymmetry gives rise to adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard. The concept of adverse selection refers to the situation where 
an actor cannot observe, or imperfectly observes, certain characteristics of another 
actor or product. Infamous is the example given by Akerlof (1970): buyers of second 
hand cars generally possess much less information on the quality of the car than the 
sellers. Due to this asymmetry in information, buyers of second hand cars do not know 
whether they are purchasing a 'lemon' (a car in bad condition) or a 'cherry' (a car in 
good condition). As a consequence, buyers of second hand cars are willing to pay a 
price that lies in between the price for a lemon and a cherry. The average value of 
goods in a market characterized by information asymmetries will thus tend to de-
crease, even for high or standard quality goods, while buyers will avoid the risk of 
paying too much for a low-quality product.50 In the contracting process, information 
asymmetries may lead to incomplete contracts while one of the parties may possess 
certain information which it is not willing to disclose, in order to retain a strategic ad-
vantage or to transact at a lower price.511 will discuss this in more detail in the section 
on the factors relating to the complexity of contracts. 
The concept of moral hazard refers to the situation where one party (A) is imperfectly 
informed on or cannot observe the action taken by another party (B).52 Party A only 
observes the outcome, an imperfect signal of the action taken by Party B. Consider the 
relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee. The franchisee must manage the 
franchise in the best possible way. A McDonald franchisee will have to use its best 
efforts to sell as much hamburgers as possible. If the franchisor would be able to di-
"'Anderlini and Felli 2004. 
48 Schwarz 1998, p. 278. 
49 Arrow 1971, Akerlof 1970, Williamson 1985, Schwartz 1998, p. 277-278. 
50 Akerlof 1970, p. 489-490. 
51 Ayres and Gertner 1989, p. 99-100, Van Bijnen 2005, p. 123-125. 
52 Williamson (1985, 1996) in this sense refers to opportunism. More specifically, Williamson assumes that 
contracting agents exhibit opportunism, meaning that they act in their self-interest with an allowance for 
guile (Williamson 1996, p. 43-48). I will use the terms 'opportunistic behaviour' and 'moral hazard' inter-
changeably in this chapter. 
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rectly observe the level of effort the franchisee exerts, it could make payment de-
pendent on the level of effort. However, while the level of effort is not observable, the 
franchisor must make payment dependent on production or another observable vari-
able which will induce the franchisee not to shirk. 
Related to the foregoing is the fact that third parties are also confronted with limited 
rationality and imperfect information. This implies that while some variables might be 
perfectly well observable by the parties to a contract, these variables are difficult to 
measure and specify in such a manner that they can be proven to the satisfaction of a 
third party, the court. The variables are non-verifiable.53 The distinction between ob-
servability and verifiability is illustrated by Hart (1995): 
'The quality of [my] book is observable, in the sense that anybody can read it. (...) 
However, it would have been difficult for Oxford University Press and me to have writ-
ten a contract making my royalties a function of quality, since if a dispute arose it 
would be hard for either of us to prove that the book did or did not meet some pre-
specified standard. (For this reason my royalties are made to depend on some (more 
or less) verifiable consequences of quality, e.g. sales.) In other words, quality is not 
verifiable.'54 
Therefore, even if transactors know which performance they desire and can personally 
observe whether this performance has occurred, the written contract is incomplete 
because performance needs to be specified in terms of an easily measurable and im-
perfect proxy that can be readily observed by courts. Verifiability is often associated 
with the cost of communicating relevant information, e.g. establishing the truth, to the 
court. Scott and Triantis (2005) term as non-verifiable a factor for 'which the informa-
tion cost at trial outweighs the incentive benefit of the related contractual provision.'55 
Both economic and legal scholars postulate that parties will avoid contracting on un-
verifiable factors.56 While third parties such as courts or arbitrators are also confronted 
with imperfect information, the performance of contracts is not guaranteed by exter-
nal institutional mechanisms. 
I discussed separately three factors which may give rise to incomplete contracts. I 
believe that these factors are interrelated. Bounded rationality and information 
asymmetries may raise transaction and enforcement costs. The bounded rationality of 
parties to the contract more raises the costs parties incur in order to search and proc-
53 Schwartz 1992, Triantis 2002, p. 1068-1069, Williamson 1985, Bernheim and Whinston 1998, Maskin 2002. 
54 Hart 1995, p. 37-38, n. 15 cited in Triantis 2002, p. 1069. 
55 Scott and Triantis 2006, p. 4. 
56 Segal 1999, Schwartz 1992, p. 304. On the other hand, Scott and Triantis 2006, p. 814 and p. 835-836, and 
Triantis 2002, p. 1067, indicate that vague expressions such as 'reasonable efforts', are very common in 
commercial agreements and thus frequently adopted by parties. 
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ess information. The bounded rationality and inability of third parties to observe in-
formation on the other hand, gives rise to uncertainty and thereby increases the costs 
of enforcement. Likewise, information asymmetries raise transaction and enforcement 
costs. Under conditions of imperfect information, a party will, for example, need to 
discover relevant product prices and search for the right contracting partner (search 
costs). While these costs may be reduced by the emergence of specialists who sell this 
information, these costs may never be completely eliminated.57 
Given these costs, most, if not all, real-world contracts can never be complete, in the 
sense that the contract optimally allocates obligations for all future contingencies. 
More specifically, economists argue that these transaction costs prevent the market 
from functioning perfectly, restricting the design of an optimal contract. In this light, 
economic theory argues that whilst optimality in the sense of a first-best outcome is 
no longer achievable, parties will have to resort to second-best optimality: the best 
that can be done taking into account the constraints.58 Legal scholars argue that trans-
action costs induce parties to conclude incomplete contracts and expect contracting 
parties to complete the contract to the best extent possible.59 This implies that a party 
will try to exploit all verifiable distinctions between states creating what Eggleston et 
al. (2000) consider to be a functionally complete contract.60 In addition, parties may 
intentionally forego to arrange for certain matters in their contract, either because 
they do not find these matters important enough or because they perceive that the 
costs of incorporation do not outweigh the expected benefits. The foregoing observa-
tions will lead to 'gaps' in contracts, and thus add to their incompleteness. 
The complexity and simplicity of contracts 
In practice, most contracts are incomplete. This incompleteness generally becomes 
apparent only when a dispute arises between the parties, signifying that either (1) not 
all relevant terms have been included; or (2) one or more terms have not been opti-
mally specified, creating problems of interpretation and motivating one party to favor 
breach of the contract over adherence. Ex ante, without the backdrop of a dispute, it 
will be difficult to discern the relative incompleteness of a contract simply by reading 
it, while at that time it is not possible to know which contingencies will actually mate-
rialize or which terms appear to have been sub-optimally specified ex post.51 The fore-
going renders it difficult to use the concept of incompleteness to measure differences 
57 Coase 1937, p. 390-391. I would like to remark that even when specialists reduce the effective search 
costs, they will impose on the party the new costs, namely the costs of using their information service. 
58 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 103-104. 
59 Triantis 2002, p. 1068-1069. 
60 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 100-103. 
61 While I assume actual contracts can never be complete due to constraints such as transaction and en-
forcement costs, bounded rationality and information asymmetries, I use the term 'relative incompleteness' 
to indicate the degree of incompleteness. 
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in contractual style, especially across jurisdictions. The incompleteness of a contract is 
also not able to provide us with detailed information on contract structure, while it 
merely points to either a lack of terms or sub-optimality. I therefore believe - in accor-
dance with several other authors62 - that an alternative, more adequate measure must 
be sought to analyze differences in contractual style. A concept which has been devel-
oped in the literature is 'contractual complexity'. Contractual complexity refers to a 
measure for the degree of complexity conversely simplicity of a contract. In the follow-
ing paragraphs, I will review the most important literature on contractual complexity, 
where after I will present a refined measure of contractual complexity and relate the 
latter to the completeness and incompleteness of contracts. 
Diverse scholars have attempted to define and develop measures for complexity. 
Macneii (1978), Joskow (1988), Poppo and Zenger (2002) and Robinson and Stuart 
(2007) for example, use the term complexity to relate to the level of specification or 
detail of the terms of a contract.63 The diverse authors, however, use different tools to 
measure this complexity. Joskow (1988) uses the amount of pages of the contract as a 
proxy for complexity. Poppo and Zenger (2002) asked firms to indicate, on a scale from 
1 to 7, to what extent a specific contract was highly customized and required consider-
able work64, and Robinson and Stuart (2007) refer to the size of the digital contract file 
in kilobytes. The foregoing studies relate the complexity of a contract to a single factor 
or dimension, and may thus be considered as relatively simple measures of contractual 
complexity. 
A more advanced measure of complexity is used by Reuer and Arino (2007) based on a 
study by Parkhe (1993).65 Through a computer-assisted search of the legal literature, 
Parkhe extracted a list of eight contractual terms, which may act as safeguards against 
opportunistic behavior: (1) periodic written reports of all relevant transactions; (2) 
prompt written notice of any departure from the agreement; (3) the right to examine 
and audit all relevant records through a firm of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs); (4) 
designation of certain information as proprietary and subject to confidentiality provi-
sions of the contract; (5) non-use of proprietary information even after the contract; 
(6) termination of the agreement; (7) arbitration clauses; and (8) lawsuit provisions. 
The provisions are listed in an increasing order of strength or severity, with the first 
clause being the weakest and the lawsuit provisions being the most severe safeguard 
62 Eggleston et al. 2000, Reuer and Arifio 2007. 
63 Macneii 1978, Joskow 1988, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Robinson and Stuart 2007. 
M In addition, the authors also asked the firms to indicate the length (in pages) of the contract. However, the 
low response rate on this item precluded it as a second indicator (Poppo and Zenger 2002, p. 717), 
65 Reuer and Arino 2007, Reuer et al. 2006 (the authors appear to use this measure of complexity in different 
papers). 
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against opportunistic behavior.66 Reuer and Arino (2007) count the number of clauses 
included in each contract and the degree to which they bundle together, taking into 
account the stringency of each provision. The complexity of contract increases with (1) 
the number, and (2) the type of provision, i.e. higher stringency of the term, included 
in the contract.67 Their measure of complexity may be qualified as a multidimensional 
concept as they measure both (1) the number and (2) the stringency of the provisions 
employed.68 While the measure of complexity as applied by Reuer and Arino (2007) is 
multidimensional, their construct remains limited to the eight provisions which they 
chose to use as a proxy for complexity. A contract is however, not only concerned with 
contractual safeguards such as lawsuit provisions, arbitration clauses and auditing 
rights, but consists of a large number of different provisions which collectively shape 
the relationship between parties. Examples are definitions and recitals, performance 
provisions which specify the duties and obligations of parties and define the scope of 
the agreement, ownership provisions, representations and warranties, provisions on 
unforeseen circumstances, etc. 
Another example of a multidimensional measure of complexity is given by Eggleston et 
al. (2000).69 Their measure of complexity refers to three dimensions: (1) the number of 
states or contingencies which have been incorporated in the contract (2) the variance 
in pay-offs between the states, and (3) the cognitive load necessary to understand the 
contract. The following table illustrates the three dimensions: 
66 In accordance with this stringency and statistical analysis, Reuer and Arino (2007) label the first three 
provisions 'coordination provisions', and provisions four through eight 'enforcement provisions' (Reuer and 
Arino 2007, p. 19). 
67 The model assigns the inclusion in the contract of provision (1) with a value of 1, provision (2) with a value 
of 2 etc., such that if all eight provisions are included this yields a total value of 36 (1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8). The 
authors then divide the total value by 36 such that the outcome variable ('complexity') can range from 0 to 
1. When the variable has a value of 1, all eight provisions are included (1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8/36=1). in contrast, 
a value of 0 indicates that none of the provisions have been included. The measure for example, returns a 
lower value for complexity when a contract includes only provisions (5), (6) and (8) (5+6+8/36=0.53), but this 
contract is still more complex than a contract which includes less stringent provisions, e.g. provisions (1), (4) 
and (5) (1+4+5/36=0.28). 
681 would like to note that I use the concept of 'multidimensionality' in a different manner than the authors. 
In their paper Reuer and Arino (2007) consider their measure of complexity to be multidimensional while the 
eight provisions which are used as a proxy for complexity, relate to or load on two different factors in their 
statistical analysis. Subsequently the authors characterize these provisions as either 'coordination' (provi-
sions 1-3) or 'enforcement provisions' (provisions 4-8) (Supra n. 176). 
69 Eggleston et al. (2000) actually argue that most contracts appear to be simple instead of complex: '[i]n 
practice, however, many contracts are quite simple. They divide the future into very crude partitions; they 
provide for constant or close to constant payments across different outcomes; and the terms are easy to 
understand', (Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 91). 
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Dimension of complexity Example of Simple K Example of complex K 
Number of contingencies 'widget for $1' 'widget for $1 if it rains, but for $2 
(or states, GH) if it does not rain' 
Variability in payoffs 'widget for $1 if it rains, for $2 if 'widget for $1 if it rains, for $10 if 
it does not rain' its does not rain' 
Cognitive load 'widget for 34 of your profits' 'widget for 15% of your profits 
beyond a normal return' 
Eggleston et al. 2000, Table 1, p. 99. 
A contract which merely states 'widget for $1' is less complex along the first dimension 
than a contract that differentiates between two states: (1) rain and (2) no rain.70 In 
addition, Eggleston et al. (2000) stress that only the expected number of states is rele-
vant: the authors exclude pay-offs that are 'specified in the contract but are contingent 
on events that are not expected to occur'.71,72 According to the second dimension, the 
contract with a large variance in payoffs $9 ($10-$1) is more complex than the contract 
where the variance in payoffs is $1 ($2-$l). Finally, it is probably easier to understand 
a clause which defines the payment as 'widget for K of your profits' than a clause 
which states 'widget for 15% of your profits beyond a normal return'.73 Eggleston et al. 
(2000) indicate that the cognitive load is difficult to measure as it is a subjective con-
cept and overlaps with the first two dimensions.74 I agree with the authors that al-
though it is preferable to advance cognitive load as a dimension of complexity, it is 
prone to create a bias: a contract which person A finds difficult to understand might be 
relatively simple to understand for person B. In addition, I find it difficult to include the 
variability in pay-offs, the second dimension proposed by the authors, as a measure of 
contractual complexity. Let me illustrate this with the earlier example of the oil con-
tract. Under this contract, high demand for oil allows the seller to sell the oil for $1100. 
In contrast, when demand for oil is low, the seller will be able to trade at a price of 
$900. The variance in payoffs is $200 ($1100-$900). Another contract might stipulate a 
price of $1500 in case the high demand state materializes, and a similar price of $900 
in the low demand state. This second contract brings the variance in pay-offs back to 
$600 ($900-$600). Does this make the first contract much different from the second 
contract? I do not believe so: the first contract merely offers a better deal. 
The first dimension as proposed by Eggleston et al. (2000) seems more likely to be able 
to capture the complexity of contracts. This dimension does not, in contrast to the 
70 For the reader with a non-economic background: economists often use the term 'widget' to describe a 
generic 'thing' when there is no real name for it, i.e. unnamed or hypothetical articles. 
71 See Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 7, n. 21: '[f]or contracts A and B, both with two contingencies, B is more 
complex than A if its contingencies occur with a probability of 50%, whereas A's contingencies occur with 
probabilities of 90% and 10%.' 
72 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 98. 
73 Cf. Lafontaine 1992, who studies franchise contracts, and assimilates the complexity conversely simplicity 
of a contract with nonlinear respectively linear front fees and royalty rates. 
7" Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 91. 
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study by Reuer and Arino (2007), limit the type of provisions that may be included in 
the contract. However, Eggleston et al. (2000) do exclude any states of the world 
which are mentioned in the contract but are not expected to occur. This strikes me as 
odd. The fact that parties have included a certain pay-off relevant state in the contract 
indicates that they found this contingency important or relevant enough to incorpo-
rate. I will devote further attention to this dimension in the following paragraph, in 
which I propose an alternative measure of contractual complexity. 
An alternative model of contractual complexity 
As has become apparent from the foregoing paragraphs, numerous authors have at-
tempted to define the complexity of contracts, but a common definition is still lacking. 
While complexity remains a subjective concept, I would like to propose an alternative 
definition of contractual complexity. This alternative definition will build upon existing 
conceptualizations, and I hope to overcome the signaled limitations of the latter. In 
addition, I aim to propose a measure of complexity which may be applied in empirical 
comparative legal research. 
My measure of complexity consists of multiple dimensions, while I believe that a single 
dimension does not suffice. Contractual complexity may be computed as an aggregate 
of the following three dimensions: (1) the number and different types of terms incor-
porated in the contract; (2) the specificity or detail of these terms; and (3) the cogni-
tive load necessary to understand the contract. This aggregate function measures 
complexity along a continuum, and contracts may be either more or less complex. The 
first dimension prescribes a positive relationship between the number of terms and 
complexity. This dimension may be measured in practice by counting the number and 
types of terms in a contract. This means that the degree of complexity captured along 
this first dimension will depend on the categorization of contract terms. What consti-
tutes a separate contract term? I assume that every part of a contract which can be 
identified as relating to a sufficiently distinguishable matter of the contract in relation 
to the rest of the agreement constitutes a separate contract term. For example, con-
sider the formerly mentioned contract on the sale of oil, to which I will add a few addi-
tional terms: 
A Seller promises to provide 100 gallons of 10W40 oil to [specific address] before noon 
on the first day of each month for the next 10 years. Buyer agrees to pay Seller $1000 
in cash at the time of delivery. If Buyer or Seller breaches this contract for any month, 
the breaching party will owe the non-breaching party $1000, and all other contractual 
obligations will be rescinded. The Seller does not in any way, expressly or impliedly, 
give any warranties to Buyer; the Seller expressly disclaims any implied warranties of 
merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose. This Agreement and the per-
formance hereunder shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York. The par-
ties hereto agree that all actions or proceedings arising in connection with this Agree-
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merit shall be tried and litigated exclusively in the State and Federal courts located in 
the State of New York of the United States of America.75 
This agreement would in my opinion consist of the following clauses: (1) definition of 
the object of sale; (2) terms of delivery; (3) terms of payment; (4) remedies for breach; 
(4) warranties; (5) governing law; and (6) choice of forum/dispute resolution. All of 
these clauses constitute a separate contract term, while these clauses relate to differ-
ent parts of the relationship between parties. A contract for example, which does not 
contain a governing law clause or a term identifying the remedies in case of breach, 
will be considered less complex. Conversely, American and English contracts, in con-
trast to Dutch contracts, often contain an entire agreement clause.76 The incorporation 
of such a clause would increase the complexity of the foregoing contract. The types of 
warranties specified in the above contract do not constitute separate contract terms 
but relate instead to the specificity of the warranty provision itself and fall within the 
second category of complexity, which will be discussed below. 
The second dimension of complexity refers to the detail or specificity of a contractual 
term. Let me illustrate this with an example. I have singled out the provisions on force 
majeure from two contracts in my contract database: 
Provision A: 
'Neither Pfizer nor Gensia shall be liable for failure of or delay in performing obliga-
tions set forth in this Agreement, and neither shall be deemed in breach of its obliga-
tions, if such failure or delay is due to natural disasters or any causes reasonably be-
yond the control of Pfizer or Gensia.' 
Provision B: 
'Performance of a party's obligations hereunder (other than the payment of money or 
the failure by Oclassen to provide insurance pursuant to Section 12.5) may be delayed 
if (a) such performance is delayed by causes beyond that party's reasonable control, 
including, but not limited to, acts of God, war, riot, epidemics, fire, flood, insurrection, 
or acts of civil or military authorities, and (b) such delaying party is at all times working 
diligently to correct the matter causing the delay and otherwise performing as re-
quired under the Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties shall remain 
liable for all obligations incurred by them prior to any termination of this Agreement' 
Regardless of the different liability regimes (non-liability under A and liability under B), 
provision B can be considered complex relative to provision A under the second di-
75 Adapted in part from Ayres and Gertner 1992, p. 731, n. 10. 
76 A merger or entire agreement clause stipulates that parties acknowledge the written contract to contain 
the complete and final agreement between the parties. The clause precludes parties to invoke any evidence 
which would modify or add to the agreement in writing. 
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mension of complexity. Provision A refers only to non-liability if the breach of obliga-
tions is due to a natural disaster or any cause reasonably beyond the control of either 
party, while provision B includes a non-exclusive list of causes which may be consid-
ered beyond the party's reasonable control and specifies additional conditions which 
either party must fulfill to remedy such breach of obligations. Provision B is thus more 
specific than provision A. 
The foregoing dimensions: (1) number and different types of terms incorporated in the 
contract, and (2) the detail or specificity of these terms, may be compared to the first 
dimension of complexity as proposed by Eggleston et al. (2000): the number of contin-
gencies incorporated in the contract. Different contingencies namely, may be either 
incorporated in separate provisions of a contract or included in one single provision, 
increasing the detail of a specific provision. 
Eggleston et al. (2000) have pointed to the difficulty of including the cognitive load 
necessary to understand the contract as a measure for contractual complexity. I 
would, subject to similar reservations, like to include this element as a third dimension 
of complexity. I recognize that in absolute terms, the cognitive load may differ across 
groups of individuals. For example, an individual who is trained as an attorney may 
read a contract and see structures and language that would require little extra effort, 
while another individual may need to employ a much greater effort to detect similar 
structures and language, assuming this individual would be able to uncover such legal 
implications at all. If the cognitive load were to be measured in practice, it should be 
done by controlling for different groups within society. Contracts are namely not only 
employed by attorneys or legally trained individuals, but also read and used by busi-
nessmen and consumers. For example, in testing for the cognitive load, a distinction 
may be made between two groups: group 1 which consists of attorneys and group 2 
which consists of businessmen. Group membership is based on a member's back-
ground: in-depth legal knowledge versus no or little legal knowledge. While average 
between-group cognitive load may differ in absolute terms, it would be interesting to 
test whether within-group differences in cognitive load are similar between groups, i.e. 
whether similar parts of a contract necessitate a greater effort of understanding by 
members of each group. 
Even if a contract induces a higher degree of cognitive load, it remains to be seen how 
this would be observable without taking into account the contracting context. This 
problem may, however, be partially eliminated by applying and controlling for the 
reasonable person standard. This standard derives from common law where it is used 
in the light of contract interpretation. When a dispute concerning the interpretation of 
a contract arises, the court may, in certain situations, interpret the contract according 
to the meaning that a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have 
attached to the matter, if the latter had given the matter thought. 'The reasonable 
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man connotes a person whose notions and standards of behavior and responsibility 
correspond with those generally obtained among ordinary people in our society at the 
present time, who seldom allows his emotions to overbear his reason and whose hab-
its are moderate and whose disposition is equable. He is not necessarily the same as 
the average man - a term which implies an amalgamation of counter-balancing ex-
tremes.'77 Interpreting the cognitive load against the backdrop of a reasonable person, 
allows for incorporation of the contracting context. A court must construct the ex-
pected actions of the reasonable person based upon the information they receive from 
the contracting parties during trial. Controlling for the reasonable person standard in 
cognitive load measurements, could be achieved in practice by providing the different 
test groups with information on the particular contracting context. 
The relationship between complexity/simplicity and completeness/incompleteness of 
contracts 
I have defined complexity as: (1) the number and types of terms incorporated in the 
contract; (2) the specificity of these terms; and (3) the cognitive load necessary to 
understand the contract. The degree of completeness on the other hand is dependent 
on: (1) the terms relating to all possible future contingencies; and (2) an optimal allo-
cation of these terms. How should we characterize the relationship between complex-
ity conversely simplicity and completeness conversely incompleteness of contracts? 
First of all, these two groups of terms relate to two distinct concepts, and refer to 
different aspects of a contract.78 The concept of complexity does not incorporate any 
reference to the optimality of a contract term: this is irrelevant. The concept of com-
plexity seems to have more in common with the first dimension of completeness: the 
amount of possible future contingencies included in the contract. While completeness 
assesses whether all relevant terms have been included (which is very difficult to 
measure ex ante) complexity does not assess whether and which relevant terms have 
been left out, but merely how many different terms have been incorporated. A compi-
lation of the two concepts reveals four different contract styles: (1) complex and com-
plete; (2) complex and incomplete; (3) simple and complete; and (4) simple and in-
complete. A complex and complete contract (1) will incorporate many detailed and 
difficult terms, which are specified in an optimal manner and refer to all relevant fu-
ture contingencies. A complex and incomplete contract (2) will incorporate many de-
tailed and difficult terms which are, however, not optimally defined and/or do not 
distinguish between relevant contingencies. A simple and complete contract (3) will 
contain few concise terms which distinguish between all relevant contingencies in an 
optimal manner. Finally, a simple and incomplete contract (4) contains few concise 
77 Black's Law Dictionary (2004) on the definition of a 'reasonable person', citing: R.F. Heuston, Salmond on 
the Law of Torts, 17th edition, 1977, p. 56. 
78 Cf. Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 102-103. They make a similar observation with regard to the functional com-
pleteness and complexity of a contract. 
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terms, and fails to incorporate all relevant contingencies in an optimal manner. In light 
of the foregoing, a contract which is complex might sooner be characterized as obliga-
tionally complete, while such a complex contract will contain a large number of de-
tailed terms. In contrast, a relatively simple contract: 
'X will deliver 100 widgets [to specific address] on [specific date] at a price of $2 per 
widget. The breaching party will pay the non-breaching party $200.' 
is not per se incomplete in the general sense of the word, while it might just as well 
optimally specify the rights and obligations of the parties for every state of the world.79 
As mentioned, - and in accordance with the general assumption present in both the 
legal and economic literature -1 presume that contracts can never be perfectly com-
plete, and I will thus consider the conditions which may give rise to the relative com-
plexity of the incomplete contract. 
F A C T O R S T H A T G I V E R I S E TO T H E C O M P L E X I T Y A N D S I M P L I C I T Y OF 
C O N T R A C T S 
In this paragraph I will discuss the factors which may affect contractual complexity. In 
an attempt to define contractual complexity, scholars have addressed several factors 
which may influence the degree of complexity. While the complexity and complete-
ness of contracts both denote a certain contractual style, some of the factors which 
are used to justify the (in)completeness of contracts, have been carried over to the 
inquiry of contractual complexity conversely simplicity. 
Limits of cognition 
A factor which may affect the complexity of the contract is bounded rationality. The 
bounded rationality of parties may not only lead to less complete contracts, but may 
also decrease the complexity of contracts. Rational and perfectly informed individuals 
are able to discern all feasible alternative actions open to them, the probability of their 
occurrence and their price or cost. As a result, these individuals are not only able to 
anticipate exactly which terms must be included in their contract, but they may also 
enforce utility maximizing behavior through these terms. In an uncertain environment 
with numerous feasible actions, the complexity of a contract may increase. 
In practice, however, contracts embody a simplified reflection of the actual contracting 
environment, while individuals, limited in their rationality, will inadvertently forego to 
contract on all relevant events. Parties to an agreement do not possess perfect infor-
mation or unlimited computational abilities instead, 'individuals are cognitive misers 
73 This assumption might hold in a relatively simple environment, where the states to be anticipated are few 
and information asymmetries are low. 
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who endeavor to simplify the world through use of cognitive shortcuts.'80 Limited by 
their information processing abilities, individuals apply heuristics to process informa-
tion efficiently. These heuristics may lead to systematic bias in decision-making. One of 
these heuristics, overconfidence, leads individuals to systematically underestimate 
risks and/or ignore low-probability risks. Ninety-seven percent of consumers for ex-
ample, believe that they have an average or above average ability to avoid accidents 
involving power mowers and bicycles.81 Likewise, individuals tend to be overly optimis-
tic in judging the success of their relationships: while American couples correctly esti-
mate the divorce rate at 50 percent, they estimate the chance their own relationship 
will end in divorce at zero.82 The representativeness heuristic on the other hand, en-
courages individuals to judge the likelihood of a future event by similarity of the pre-
sent evidence to it.83 Applied to the drafting of contracts, overconfidence and repre-
sentativeness may lead parties to forego to exonerate or limit their liability for certain 
events which they either estimate at low risk or judge unlikely to occur in light of the 
present evidence. In the same manner, parties might omit to designate certain events 
as unforeseen circumstances or not foresee in a change of circumstance clause at all, 
while they do not believe that certain events will occur or affect their relationship. 
Furthermore, overconfidence of the success of parties' relationship may lead parties to 
draft less watertight contracts, regardless of the awareness that numerous relation-
ships end up in court.84 Parties appear to perceive the risk of a dispute and subsequent 
termination of their relationship unlikely. Subject to the foregoing constraints, indi-
viduals will inadvertently forego the incorporate certain contingencies, leading to less, 
or less specific, terms. Under these conditions, even in a relatively simple environ-
ment, parties will construe a contract which is less complex compared to the contract 
which would have been concluded under conditions of perfect rationality. 
Boundedly rational individuals will find renegotiation and gap-filling important instru-
ments. However, renegotiation carries costs and risks of its own85: 'what turns out to 
be mutually beneficial or ex post efficient - that is, the outcome of renegotiation - is 
80 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 122 in reference to S. Taylor, 'The interface of cognitive and social psychology' In: 
Harvey, J. (ed.) Cognition, social behavior, and the environment, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 1981. 
81 Eisenberg 1995, p. 216 in reference to W. Vlscusi, W. Magat, Learning about risk: consumer and worker 
responses to hazard information, Harvard University Press: Cambridge 1987, p. 95, 
8 J Eisenberg 1995, p, 217 in reference to L. Baker, R. Emery, 'When every relationship is above average; 
perceptions and expectations of divorce at the time of marriage', Law and Human Behaviour 17(4), 1993, p, 
443. 
83 There are several other heuristics such as hindsight bias, anchoring and the self-serving bias, but these will 
not be discussed In this paragraph. 
"" For example, of the 11,908 cases disposed of by trial in 75 of the largest counties In the USA in 2001, 
31.1% related to cases dealing with allegations of breach of contract (Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 
'Civil justice survey of state courts 2001', April 2004). 
85 See also Arino and Reuer 2004, who argue that complex contracts have less need for renegotiation than 
simple contracts, while the former contemplate a larger range of contingencies and procedures. 
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often not optimal from the ex ante point of view [that is, the moment in time when 
parties initially enter into the contract, GH].'86 
I understand limits of cognition to include the fact that parties are limited in their in-
formation search and processing techniques as well as the fact that their decision-
making is affected by cognitive shortcuts. 
I conclude that parties' limits of cognition are negatively related to the complexity 
contracts. 
Asymmetric information 
A second factor which may affect the complexity of contracts is asymmetric informa-
tion.87 Previously defined as an impediment to the drafting of complete contracts, 
information asymmetry refers to the situation where one party (the informed party) 
possesses more information than the other party (the uninformed party). Information 
asymmetries may affect the complexity of a contract in different ways. First of all, 
information asymmetries allow parties to conceal information which otherwise would 
have been incorporated in the contract. In the second place, information asymmetries 
give rise to monitoring or measurement difficulties, which induce parties to draft de-
tailed payment schemes and incorporate supplementary contractual safeguards. 
Non-disclosure of information 
Information asymmetries or discrepancies in private information between contracting 
parties, may lead to the non-disclosure of information. When a party has an informa-
tional advantage over another party, the former may decide to reveal this information 
to the uninformed party and incorporate the relevant term in the contract at a rela-
tively low cost.88 However, there are several reasons why the informed party may 
decide precisely not to reveal this (extra) information. First of all, the informed party 
may want to keep the information - and thereby the advantage - secret, whilst the 
revelation of the information may decrease the party's bargaining position and subse-
quently potential profits.89 Strategic concealment of information will thus generate a 
contract which is relatively simple, as terms which would have been incorporated upon 
revelation of the information are now omitted. Furthermore, a party may not want to 
disclose the risks that it brings to the transaction and which the other party will thus 
become exposed to. A manufacturer of a particular product for example, may not 
disclose all the risks associated with the use of the product. Finally, the party with the 
informational advantage may forego to disclose particular information in order to 
86 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 123-124. See also Arirto and Reuer 2004, p. 38. 
87 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 109-110. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Eggleston et al. 2000, Van Bijnen 2005, Ayres and Gertner 1989. Concealment of information may give rise 
to problems of adverse selection. 
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avoid exploitation by the uninformed party. This non-disclosure leads to relatively 
simple standard contracts instead of custom-tailored contracts. Eggleston et al. (2000) 
illustrate this with the following example: 
'If a shipper demands a warranty from a carrier, the carrier might realize that the ship-
per places a high value on the shipment. If the carrier has market power, it can charge 
a high price. To avoid being victimised by such price discrimination, the shipper opts 
for the standard contract offered by the carrier, which is simpler because it does not 
contain a warranty.'90 
Concealment of information, however, becomes increasingly difficult when non-
disclosure is legally sanctioned.91 Legally enforceable rules on the disclosure of infor-
mation will thus have a negative effect on (strategic) concealment of information. The 
doctrines of duress, mistake, deceit and misrepresentation are examples of mandatory 
law which seek to limit non-disclosure. Likewise, liability rules drafted in light of buyer 
protection may hold the manufacturer liable when the latter does not warn effectively 
against the risks associated with the use of a product. 
I assume that the non-disclosure of information negatively affects the complexity of 
contracts. 
Monitoring difficulties 
Monitoring difficulties may raise the complexity of a contract.92 Subject to the condi-
tion of asymmetric information, party A is not always able to directly observe the ac-
tion taken by party B. A common example is the employer-employee relationship. An 
employer cannot directly observe and thus monitor the behavior of the employee, 
which may give the employee an incentive to shirk or act in a manner which is subop-
timal from the point of view of the employer: instead of a lunch-break of Vi hour, the 
employee takes 2 hours off. Monitoring difficulties may thus increase the risk of op-
portunistic behavior. Likewise, in a commercial collaboration agreement, monitoring 
difficulties might encourage one of the parties to attempt to free-ride on the efforts of 
80 Eggleston et al, 2000, p. 109. 
51 In addition, specialized agents and institutions dedicated to the reduction of information asymmetries can 
limit the negative effects of disclosure. For example, lawyers and consultants are employed precisely to 
combat information asymmetries, In some industries such as consumer electronics or pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, commercial databases containing detailed product information may be consulted for similar reasons, 
See also Bessy and Brousseau 1998, p. 469. 
92 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 110-112, note that monitoring difficulties may also lead to simple contracts. This 
is particularly the case when (1) the contract concerns the simultaneous performance of multiple tasks, e.g. 
a technician must repair machinery both swiftly and carefully; (2) a principal has multiple agents, or (3) an 
agent has multiple principals. These situations are, however, especially common In (temporary) employment 
and consumer contracts and do not play such a prominent role in commercial contracts. I will not discuss 
these situations in this chapter. 
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its partner or make a lower commitment to the collaborative research project in rela-
tion to wholly-owned projects. In order to constrain such opportunism, parties may 
take several precautions which lead to relatively complex contracts. They may, for 
example, choose to construct complex contracts, in the sense that the contract fore-
sees in complicated payment schemes which give rise to extensive payment provisions 
and increase the cognitive load necessary to understand the contract.93 Consider in 
this light the relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee. The franchisee must 
manage the franchise in the best possible way. A McDonald franchisee should exert its 
best efforts to sell as much hamburgers as possible. If the franchisor would be able to 
directly observe the level of effort the franchisee exerts, the former could suffice with 
a relatively simple payment contract based on a fixed remuneration. However, effort is 
often not directly observable; the amount of hamburgers sold could be a product of 
chance as well as effort. In such a case, the franchisor may prefer a complex over a 
simple payment contract. Such a complex payment contract will make the remunera-
tion dependent on the amount of hamburgers sold and thus offer the franchisee an 
incentive to exert a certain level of effort.94 In addition, economists generally argue 
that in order to combat opportunistic behavior, parties must incorporate extra con-
tractual safeguards. Collaborative research agreements for example, often incorporate 
(detailed) clauses concerning the establishment of a committee which must monitor 
the research efforts and progress made by the parties to the agreement. Other exam-
ples are clauses which require parties to submit a progress-report periodically, the 
inclusion of elaborate research plans as exhibit to the official legal document (con-
tract), extensive provisions on termination, and confidentiality of information 
clauses.95 The incorporation of contract clauses which endeavor to safeguard parties 
against opportunism increases the number and types of terms included in the contract 
and thus the complexity of the contract.96 
I conclude that monitoring difficulties are positively related to the complexity of con-
tracts. 
Asset specificity and strategic importance of the contract 
When contracts involve the investment in specific assets - assets which are difficult to 
deploy elsewhere - parties become locked into their relationship and the potential 
value loss in case of termination increases. In other words, the asset specificity of the 
93 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 105. 
94 Cf. Bessy and Brousseau 1998, p. 464, who indicate that payments in licensing agreements are generally 
based on royalty rates instead of a fixed fee. 
95 Reuer and Arino (2007) refer to a diverse range of provisions In relation to their measure of complexity. 
Argyres et al. (2007) refer to a combination of provisions on task description, contingency planning and 
termination clauses. 
96 Business economics, more specifically transaction costs economics, assumes that the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour and the need for (additional) contractual safeguards increases not only with monitoring difficul-
ties, but also with uncertainty of the environment and asset specificity (Williamson 1985, Klein et al. 1978). 
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contract, like monitoring difficulties, increases the risk of exchange hazards or oppor-
tunism. An example of such a lock-in effect is given by Klein et al. (1978).97 General 
Motors ('GM') had entered into a 10-year contract with a company called Fisher Body 
('Fisher') for the production and delivery of car bodies. At a certain point in time, GM 
became unhappy with the price it paid and demanded that Fisher move their produc-
tion facilities closer to the GM assembly plant in order to enhance production effi-
ciency. The relocation would involve considerable investments on the part of Fisher. 
The investment in plant and equipment would, however, have no other value except 
for manufacturing bodies for GM. Fisher refused to admit to the relocation, while it 
feared that once Fisher had made the investment, GM would reduce the price per 
body to a level at which Fisher could cover the costs of running the plant, but not the 
investment in assets, which could not be deployed elsewhere.98 Fisher thus was afraid 
that GM would exhibit opportunistic behavior once it had made the specific invest-
ments. In order to limit the risks of such behavior, parties who face specific invest-
ments, especially in long-term relationships, will find it beneficial to negotiate more 
complex contracts.99 These kinds of contracts will contain detailed terms regarding the 
project description, the division of ownership rights, the consequences of breach and 
termination and the dispute resolution processes.100 
Likewise, when a contract is of great strategic importance, parties have an incentive to 
specify clearly the scope of the agreement and their rights and obligations, specifically 
with respect to the exchange of information. About half of the alliances formed today 
are among competitors.101 Where parties operate in similar markets or are embedded 
in a strategic network or rely on multiple partners, they will have an extra incentive to 
57 Klein etal. 1978, p. 308-310. 
08 In the end, the dissatisfaction with the situation led GM to acquire the remaining outstanding stock of 
Fisher in 1926. 
95 Williamson 1985, Hart 1988. Grossman and Hart 1986, p. 716, stipulate that in case of asset specificity, 
ownership over nonhuman assets should reside with the firm who makes the specific investments. Such 
ownership will also give this firm the residual control rights over the asset. For example, if a firm is given the 
ownership rights of particular machinery, this firm will also be allowed to choose the maintenance policy for 
machine, production line speed etc. Property rights theory stipulates that such ownership rights will reduce 
opportunistic behavior and act as self-enforcement mechanisms. The distribution of property rights Is given 
in e.g. merger and acquisition or joint venture agreements, where shareholdings provide for the allocation of 
ownership rights. In other types of agreements, such as collaborative research, marketing, supply and distri-
bution agreements, parties will have to incorporate a specific clause which grants a party these ownership 
rights, increasing the complexity of the contract. 
100 Dyer 1997, p. 537, Poppo and Zenger 2002, p. 708-709 and p. 720-722, Arina et al. 2006, p. 309-310. 
However, Arino et al. (2006) found the relationship between asset specificity and complexity to be non-
significant (p. 320). In a second paper, Reuer and Arino (2007) distinguish between enforcement and coop-
erative provisions, and do find a positive relationship between asset specificity and the number and strin-
gency of the provisions Incorporated in the contract (Reuer and Arino 2007, p. 327). 
101 This proportion ranges from 25 percent in the entertainment industry to as high as 75 percent in the 
airline industry (CriticalEYE, June-August 2005). 
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specify clearly how the agreement will end to guard against valuable resources falling 
into the hands of a competitor or third party.102 
I conclude that both asset specificity and strategic importance are positively related to 
the complexity of contracts. 
Uncertainty of the environment 
A fourth factor which affects contractual complexity is environmental uncertainty. 
Environmental uncertainty relates to the degree of change in economic conditions 
facing an organization.103 Such conditions may for example relate to the instability or 
unpredictability of markets, factors which lay beyond an organization's control and are 
hard to anticipate.104 Environmental uncertainty is positively related to the complexity 
of a contract. In general, parties enter into a contract which specifies the rights and 
obligations of parties, based upon a certain state of the world or status quo. However, 
in a complex environment, parties face uncertainty with respect to the future state 
which will materialize. The foregoing will induce parties to incorporate all those states 
which they expect to materialize - subject to the constraint of bounded rationality -
during their contractual relationship.105 Economists argue that under a condition of 
increasing environmental uncertainty, the potential for opportunism will increase, and 
necessitates the incorporation of additional contractual safeguards. The uncertainty of 
the environment may then be positively related to the complexity of a contract. 
Trust and reputation effects 
Trust and reputation constitute the fifth factor which may lead parties to construe less 
complex contracts. Traditionally, the notion of trust has been difficult to define and 
measure. Based on a review of the literature, Rousseau et al. (1998) define trust as: 
'A psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.'106 
While some scholars regard trust as a static concept, either trust or no trust, in this 
article I take the view that trust exists along a continuum; trust is present in varying 
degrees. Even though it is the individual who is ultimately able to propagate expecta-
tions of trust, it is possible to think of inter-firm trust in economic exchange.107 This 
inter-firm trust refers to the ability of a party to rely on its partner not to exploit its 
102 Arino et al. (2006) find support for the relationship between their measure of complexity and the strate-
gic importance of the agreement (p. 312 and p. 321). 
103 Dess and Beard 1984. 
104 Wholey and Brittain 1989. 
105 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 104, Stuart and Robinson 2002, p. 33-34, Mayer and Argyres 2004. Poppo and 
Zenger 2002, p. 709, refer explicitly to the technological uncertainty of the environment. 
106 Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 395. 
107 Gulati 1995, p. 92. 
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vulnerabilities.108 Trust involves placing reliance on the knowledge of the character of 
the other party, and from this knowledge a party can establish that the other will not 
act opportunistically. Trust thus counteracts the fear of opportunism and influences 
confidence in partner cooperation. For example, low degrees of trust will engender an 
increased fear of opportunistic behavior and therefore effectuate lengthy and difficult 
negotiations over unforeseen contingencies. The contract will augment in complexity 
due to parties' attempt to put in place contractual and structural safeguards to protect 
their relational investments. In contrast, under conditions of high trust, firms are less 
inclined to rely on these safeguards for specifying, monitoring, and enforcing their 
contract. High(er) levels of trust will therefore lead less complex contracts in the form 
of eased negotiations.109 
Trust may be endorsed by prior encounters and social networks of strong ties. Social 
networks raise the awareness of firms' existence and serve as referral networks. In 
general, social networks and prior ties allow firms to learn about each other and de-
velop trust around norms of equity ('knowledge-based trust').110 Trust generated 
through prior ties and knowledge of the other party will allow parties to establish rou-
tines to coordinate their relationship. The more positive information a party possesses 
concerning cooperation with a specific partner, the less will this party tend to invest in 
contractual safeguards.111 This trust is engendered in part because the parties know 
that if one of them breaches the agreement, this will have negative effects on the 
reputation of the non-performing firm.112 The extent to which trust may affect the 
complexity of the contract is thus partly dependent on credible sanctions of deterrent 
behavior, such as negative reputation effects. Robinson and Stuart (2004) argue that 
firms with stronger reputations write less detailed contracts while firm reputation and 
contractual control act as substitutes.113 Reputation effects, however, are dependent 
on communication mechanisms and geographical dispersion. Social networks and 
more formal mechanisms such as trade associations are necessary in order to commu-
nicate and disperse information regarding an actor's reputation and consequently 
108 Gulati 1998. See also Ring and Van de Ven 1992. 
109 Zaheer et al. 1998. 
110 Gulati 1995, p. 105. Ryaii and Sampson, 2003, p. 31-33, do not find significant effects for the relationship 
between prior alliances and the detail of the agreement but do find that the number of concurrent alliances 
between parties negatively influences the detail of the alliance agreement. 
111 Dyer 1997, p. 549, Gulati 1995, p. 85-112, Collins 1999. See otherwise Argyres et al. 2007, p. 5-6, who 
hypothesize that as the relationship between parties evolves over time, the level of detail in the contracts 
will increase, while the learning effect is stronger than the trust effect. Poppo and Zenger 2002, p. 719, find 
that increases in the level of relational governance (defined as a composite measure of open communication 
and sharing of information, trust, dependence and cooperation) are associated with greater levels of con-
tractual complexity and vice versa. 
112 Stuart and Robinson 2002, p. 4, Gulati 1995, p. 93, 
113 Supra n. 223. 
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sanction deterrent behavior.114 The existence of these types of informal and formal 
enforcement mechanisms is inherent the structure of society and depends on cultural 
contexts. Collins (1996) indicates for example, that in London the chartering of vessels 
by shipbrokers is conducted through informal rather than formal agreements: 'the 
"fix" is arranged by phone and the ship sails, only to be followed by the later paper-
work usually in the form of standard charter parties'.115 Another example of a high 
trust society are the diamond merchants in the Jewish community in New York City, 
where firms are embedded within a social network of strong ties which motivates 
good behavior; deterrent behavior has severe consequences. 
Eggleston et al. (2000) furthermore add that the simplicity of a contract may engender 
and reflect trust. Similarly Macaulay (1963) observed: '[n]ot only are contracts and 
contract law not needed in many situations, their use may have, or may be thought to 
have, undesirable consequences (...) detailed negotiated contracts can get in the way 
of creating good exchange relationships between business units'.117 Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) on the other hand, argue that well-specified, complex contracts actually pro-
mote more cooperative, long-term trusting exchange relationships. Such contracts 
narrow the demand and severity of risk to which an exchange is exposed and thereby 
encourage cooperation and trust. They argue that the drafting of complex contracts 
positively effects future exchange through the development of social relations.118 
I conclude that the interaction between trust and reputation is negatively related to 
the complexity of contracts. 
Contracting costs 
A sixth factor which influences contractual complexity and may give rise to relatively 
simple contracts, are contracting costs. I stated that contracting costs are part of the 
overall transaction costs parties incur when they engage in market transactions. I re-
114 Collins 1999, p. 5-6 refers to comparative studies of similar market transactions in the German, Italian and 
UK which reveal that an important contribution to formation of trust is provided by trade associations, 
quality assurance organisations and industry standards for quality and safety of products (in reference to C. 
Lane, R. Bachmann, 'The social construction of trust: supplier relations in Britain and Germany', Organization 
Studies 17,1996, p. 365, C. Lane, 'The social regulation of interfirm relations in Britain and Germany: market 
rules, legal norms, and technical standards', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 21, 1997, p. 214, A. Arrighettl, 
R. Bachmann, S. Deakin, 'Contract law, social norms and inter-firm cooperation', Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 21, 1997, p. 182). 
115 Collins 1996, p. 5. 
116 Bernstein 1992. 
117 Macaulay 1963, p. 64. See also Reuer et al. 2006, p. 310-311. 
118 Poppo and Zenger 2002, p. 719, actually find that increases in relational governance are associated with 
greater levels of contractual complexity (in the sense of greater specification of promises, obligations and 
dispute resolution mechanisms) and that increases in contractual complexity are related to increases in 
relational governance. Likewise, Arreghetti et al. (1997) contend that loosely structured interpersonal un-
derstandings will increase the risk of litigation and hence signal distrust. 
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ferred to amongst others the search costs - the costs incurred gathering and process-
ing information, and contracting costs - the costs related with negotiating, specifying 
and drafting an agreement. In light of the complexity of contracts, I will not make such 
an explicit distinction but incorporate the search costs under the heading of contract-
ing costs. Contracting costs then refer to all the costs parties incur in the process that 
leads to the establishment of the actual written contract. These contracting costs in-
clude, but are not limited to, searching for information, conducting negotiations and 
drafting terms. Contracting costs are invoked by scholars in order to explain the in-
completeness of contracts. Parties will draft an incomplete contract when the con-
tracting costs necessary to draft a complete contract, outweigh the associated benefits 
of the latter contract. Economists add to this argument by stipulating that whenever 
the contracting costs outweigh the benefits, parties will prefer to remove the transac-
tion from the market, and vertically integrate, by way of a merger or acquisition.119 
Contracting costs, as defined above, may prevent parties from including many differ-
ent types of terms, or terms which are very detailed in their contract, thereby affecting 
the relative complexity of the contract. In line with the argumentation used in the 
incomplete contracting literature, I stipulate that parties will not find it worthwhile to 
negotiate complex contracts when the contracting costs parties incur, outweigh the 
associated benefits. A method to measure the contracting costs of, and the benefits 
associated with, the incorporation of additional or more detailed terms is, however, 
lacking. This is not wholly incomprehensible as certain costs are not always apparent. 
How do we observe and measure for example the costs associated with the parties' 
search for information? In addition, these costs are dependent on the type of contract, 
the characteristics of the parties and the contracting environment. Every sector, coun-
try and type of contract would actually warrant a specialized function or formula for 
measurement. 
I conclude that contracting costs are negatively related to the complexity of contracts. 
Enforcement costs 
Enforcement costs are a final factor, which may affect the relative complexity of con-
tracts. Like contracting costs, these costs are part of the more general category of 
transaction costs. I defined enforcement costs as the costs associated with ex post 
bargaining and the sanctioning of non-performance of a contracting partner through a 
third party. These enforcement costs do not primarily refer to the administrative costs 
payable into court, but more in particular to the costs of communicating information 
to the court and the uncertainty and error costs of enforcement. In general, various 
scholars recognize that courts will not always enforce contracts accurately, especially 
where it concerns long-term agreements or relational contracts, while courts, like 
119 Williamson 1985. 
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individuals, face imperfect information and rationality constraints.120 These factors 
raise the costs of communicating information to court and decrease judicial reliability. 
In light of the foregoing, parties will forego to condition their rights and obligations on 
information which is difficult to verify. For example, a contract between an author of a 
book and his publishing house is unlikely to include a term which makes royalties de-
pendent on the quality of the book, while quality is not verifiable: the claimant for 
example, will have to incur costs in order to prove that a certain quality standard was 
or was not met, while the chance that the court will find in favour of the claimant is 
uncertain. As a result, parties prefer to contract on a more or less verifiable conse-
quence of quality, such as sales. Likewise, several authors argue that parties will avoid 
or reduce the use of vague terms such as 'best efforts' and 'commercial reasonable-
ness'.121 
Eggleston et al. (2000) argue that enforcement costs will push toward simple con-
tracts. More specifically, parties will prefer to use simple terms which judges have no 
difficulty to understand or draft broader terms that apply to several contingencies or 
events at the same time:'(...) suppose seller and buyer agree that seller should replace 
the goods if they break down after reasonable use by the buyer (state X) but not if the 
buyer's use is unreasonable (state Y). The parties know that they will be able to tell 
whether the buyer's use was reasonable or not, but have no confidence that a court 
will be able to do so. So they agree to a simpler contract that either contains a war-
ranty for all states or no warranty at all.' On the other hand, enforcement costs may 
just as well give rise to contractual complexity: instead of the decision to incorporate a 
very broad warranty or no warranty at all, parties may draft a very specific warranty, in 
the sense that the clause specifically provides what is understood under 'reasonable 
use' or under which particular conditions a party can rely on the warranty. I am in-
clined to believe that, in general, enforcement costs are more likely to give rise to 
complex than simple contracts. This choice is also justified by the following arguments. 
First of all, the fact that courts are boundedly rational and employ heuristics can raise 
judicial uncertainty. Even though institutions such as courts recognize the bias caused 
by such decision-making rules and adapt to these cognitive illusions of judgment, for 
example by allocating the burden of production and formulating ex ante norms of 
compliance, total elimination of the bias caused by heuristics is not possible.123 When a 
dispute concerning a contract is brought before court, there are different ways in 
120 Posner 2000. 
121 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 119-121, supra n. 163. 
122 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 120. 
123 In addition, Rachlinski 2000, p. 63-64, argues that compared with other institutions, judges may not have 
the same incentives to adapt. Courts lack adequate pressure to improve quality of decision-making and 
rarely encounter feedback; few cases reach appeal, parties rather opt for settlement. As such, courts both 
ignore and adapt to illusions. 
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which a court may attempt to resolve the dispute. A court may seek to identify the 
norms, such as fairness, that govern the relationship and enforce the contract accord-
ing to those norms.124 Limited cognition, however, will not always allow courts to dis-
cern these particular norms or may cause misinterpretation of the agreement in light 
of these norms. Other authors argue that a court should enforce contracts in a manner 
that maximizes the value of the relationship. For example, if a party fails to deliver a 
widget, the affected party should be awarded an amount in damages in reference to 
the current market price for a similar widget. The court, however, can only attempt to 
maximize the value of the relationship ex post. This maximization is often not consis-
tent with the actual intention of parties: ex ante maximization. In addition, in their 
attempt to maximize contract value, courts are often oblivious to the structure of the 
actual relationship between parties. 
Schwartz (1992,1998) on the other hand, advocates a passive or literal enforcement of 
the agreement.125 Consider the contract for the oil delivery. As pointed out earlier, this 
contract does not anticipate for a change in circumstances. Schwartz argues that even 
if an event radically changes the scope of the agreement, the court should go ahead 
and enforce the contract anyway while parties knew that certain events would have a 
negative effect on the relationship. This view foregoes to incorporate the fact that 
parties are subject to information and cognitive constraints. More importantly, how-
ever, the hindsight bias can induce courts to consider some things as evident while 
they were not, as Baruch Fischoff (1982) states: 
'In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in 
foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but 
also to view it as having appeared "relatively inevitable" before it happened. People 
believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was 
actually the case. They even misremember their own predictions so as to exaggerate in 
hindsight what they knew in foresight (...).'126 
In addition, the representative heuristic can lead judges to misinterpret evidence in 
contract proceedings. The representative heuristic refers to the fact that in determin-
ing whether an event belongs to a particular category, courts will underestimate back-
ground statistics and classify the event to a category based on general features: 'if a 
bird looks like a duck, quacks like a duck , and walks like a duck, it's a duck'.127 But 
what about geese? Overconfidence finally can lead judges to believe that they are less 
prone to make mistakes and underestimate the probability of errors in judgment. 
124 Macneil 1978, p. 854-905. 
125 Schwartz 1992, Schwartz 1998, p. 277-278. 
126 Fischoff 1982, p. S35. 
127 Rachlinski 2000, p. 85. 
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As a response to the foregoing biases in judicial decision-making, parties will try to 
specify their rights and obligations as precisely as possible, drafting complex contracts 
in order to preclude a dispute from happening or necessitate the inference of a court 
in the first place. A complex contract serves to guide parties' collaborative behavior 
precisely because parties forget what they agreed upon and parties tend to testify 
consistent with a self-serving reality they have created in their minds about the events 
leading to litigation.128 In addition, parties will draft their contract in such a manner as 
to decrease the uncertainty involved in litigation when the dispute does come before a 
court. The more specific or complex parties draft their contract, the less room to ma-
neuver they leave for the court to misinterpret the agreement. 
I conclude that enforcement costs are positively related to the complexity of contracts. 
Figure 1 Overview of factors affecting contractual complexity 
T H E R E L A T I O N S H I P B E T W E E N T H E D I F F E R E N T F A C T O R S 
In the foregoing paragraphs, I reviewed nine factors and their effect on contractual 
complexity. In practice, an interaction takes place between these factors. The degree 
of complexity is a function of the aggregate effect of the factors. Factors may reinforce 
or offset each other. Some examples may serve to illustrate this. 
128 Solan 2000. 
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First of all, factors which have opposing correlations with contractual complexity may 
mitigate each other's effect. Information asymmetries for example, give rise to moni-
toring difficulties, which increase the risk of opportunism. Subsequently, parties may 
commit to incorporate additional safeguards in their contract, in the sense of extra or 
more detailed terms. This raises the complexity of the contract, which in turn may lead 
to a rise in contracting costs. While this increased complexity may offer benefits in the 
sense that opportunistic behavior is deterred, the costs of drafting a complex contract 
will add to the total expenditure of the deal. It seems reasonable that as long as the 
associated benefits outweigh the additional costs, parties will increase the complexity 
of the contract through the inclusion of extra or more detailed terms. A similar reason-
ing holds for the relationship between contracting and enforcement costs. Enforce-
ment costs are positively related to contractual complexity. Parties may combat the 
expected level of enforcement costs through the construction of a relatively complex 
contract. Parties will favor the higher degree of complexity, as long as the associated 
costs do not outweigh the benefits. The foregoing examples illustrate that any increase 
in complexity in principle implies a rise in contracting costs, however slight this rise in 
costs may be. Underlying each factor is thus a cost-benefit analysis: contracting parties 
will weigh the contracting costs of increased complexity against the potential benefits. 
In addition, monitoring difficulties and non-disclosures are both caused by information 
asymmetries. While these factors are positively and negatively related to contractual 
complexity, their independent effects may offset each other. In the second place, fac-
tors can reinforce each other's impact on contractual complexity. Levels of trust, for 
example, may influence contract negotiations and thereby the level of contracting 
costs: negotiations are less costly under conditions of high inter-organizational trust 
because parties are able to come to terms much faster. Trust reduces the complexity 
of a contract, but also has a negative effect on the contracting costs and thereby rein-
forces the total effect of these factors on contractual complexity. 
U S I N G F A C T O R S T O E X P L A I N N A T I O N A L D I F F E R E N C E S 
I have examined nine factors which may affect the relative complexity of a contract. 
However, without placing them in context, these factors may explain complexity In 
general, but not the difference across countries. Authors point out that the latter dif-
ferences in contractual complexity are predominantly found in three parts of the con-
tract: (1) boilerplates129; (2) provisions for contingencies in performance; and (3) de-
tailed definitions of terms.130 Boilerplate clauses refer to the standard provisions, often 
preceded by the heading 'General provisions' or 'Miscellaneous'.131 Boilerplate clauses 
129 Tjittes and Hartlief 2005, p. 1607. 
130 Lundmark 2001, p. 122-123. Cf. Langbein 1987, p. 384-385, Hill and King 2004, p. 893-897. 
131 McKendrtck 2003. 
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are a recitation of black-letter rules and are often copied into different contracts 
within the same company, across firms, the legal profession and even states, and must 
be distinguished from the set of standard terms which a business incorporates in all of 
its contracts.132 Some examples of boilerplates are: notice, force majeure, entire 
agreement, and severability. The provisions for contingencies in performance refer to 
the regulation of parties' performance obligations.133 Examples are the provisions 
mentioned by Reuer and Arino (2007) on the periodic written reports of relevant 
transactions and the examination of records. Performance obligations also include the 
planning of meetings, hiring of staff and research obligations. Finally, the definition of 
terms refers to the list of definitions at the beginning of a contract. Other contractual 
provisions, such as the description of the subject matter of the contract, may also 
reflect differences in contractual style. 
In order to explain the fact that contracts in England and the US comprise a greater 
level of complexity than similar types of contracts in the Netherlands and Continental 
Europe in general, the level of the factors - dependent on their positive or negative 
relation with regard to complexity - must differ between the countries. In addition, the 
cost-benefit analysis underlying each factor implies that parties contracting in coun-
tries characterized by relatively complex contracts, must encounter lower contracting 
costs or experience greater benefits at similar cost levels. 
The main similarity between the US and England, and concurrently their major differ-
ence with the Netherlands, seems to be that the US and England are both common law 
jurisdictions while the Netherlands is a civil law jurisdiction. I believe therefore, that 
the jurisdiction, and more generally the legal environment, may be identified as the 
primary influence on the level of the factors and thereby indirectly the degree of con-
tractual complexity.134 In short, the legal environment encompasses the historical 
background and development of the legal system, the mode of thought, and the man-
ner in which the legal order is organized and the law is established and enforced. I will 
examine the distinguishing characteristics of the relevant legal environments in greater 
detail in Section 6. In addition, the US, England and the Netherlands are each set apart 
by their own unique culture, economy and social and political structures and proc-
esses. The foregoing elements constitute the socio-cultural environment. The socio-
cultural environment may also impact upon the level of the factors and thereby con-
tractual complexity. Trust and reputation effects are for example dependent on the 
extent to which institutional frameworks and social networks constitute credible trust 
132 In Dutch these standard terms are referred to as 'algemene voorwaarden'. 
133 Przeracki 1989, p. 173 and n. 151, Lundmark 2001, p. 121 and p. 127. 
1341 prefer to refer to the 'legal environment' and discuss some tangible aspects of the former, than to use 
the concept of 'legal culture' which can be understood In different ways. 
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enforcing mechanisms.135 In this chapter the focus will be on the legal environment, 
but I will pay some attention to the socio-cultural environment as well. 
An analysis of the factors within their legal and socio-cultural environment makes it 
clear that the parties' limits of cognition, monitoring difficulties, asset specificity, and 
strategic importance, remain largely unaffected by variations in the legal and socio-
cultural environment. Parties' limits of cognition may vary across individuals, but on 
average every individual is affected by this constraint, regardless of the particular legal 
or socio-cultural environment. A similar reasoning holds for the level of monitoring 
difficulties, caused by information asymmetries. Ceteris paribus, all individuals are 
faced with information asymmetries and thus monitoring difficulties. While the precise 
degree of monitoring difficulties may vary with each transaction, this variation can be 
ascribed primarily to the characteristics of the transaction or the parties. Likewise, the 
asset specificity and strategic importance of a transaction remain largely unaffected by 
disparities in the legal or socio-cultural environment. Parties contracting to collaborate 
in the high-tech industry may each contribute specific intellectual property rights to 
the relationship, increasing asset specificity, and thereby the complexity of the con-
tract. In contrast, parties who conclude a contract for the sale of 100 barrels of oil face 
very low asset specificity and therefore may abide by a simpler contract structure. 
Finally, the strategic importance of a transaction is judged by the party who enters into 
the transaction. In principle, the legal and socio-cultural environments do not directly 
influence this subjective judgment. The aforementioned factors will not receive any 
specific attention in the sections which deal with the legal and socio-cultural environ-
ments. 
In the following paragraphs I will furthermore assume that contractual complexity 
relates predominantly to three elements of the contract: boilerplates, performance 
contingencies, and extensive definitions. I also assume that every written contract in 
principle contemplates the risk of a lawsuit in the event of breach of contract. There-
fore, parties will pay attention to the drafting of the contract, while the written docu-
ment will provide security in event of a dispute.136 
135 See for example Hill and King 2004, p. 915, who establish that '[t]rade associations are far more impor-
tant in Germany than they are in the United States'. 
136 Cf. the study by Arreghetti et al. 1997, p. 186: '[njumerous respondents saw contract formality as an 
aspect part of doing business.' 
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Figure 2 Overview of factors affecting contractual complexity and the legal and social-cultural environment 
Legal environment 
Socio-cultural environment 
T H E L E G A L E N V I R O N M E N T 
There are numerous aspects of the legal environment which I would be able to address 
in this chapter. While this chapter seeks to explain differences in contractual complex-
ity between countries, the focus of this paragraph will be on those elements which are 
commonly recognized as the distinguishing characteristics of the legal environments of 
the three countries under scrutiny. In the first place, these legal systems may be classi-
fied as based either on a general codification of the law or on case law. It is this distinc-
tion which lies at the root of the categorization of a legal system as either common or 
civil. In the second place, the US and England give a different reading to rules on con-
tract interpretation and good faith in comparison to the Netherlands. Rules on con-
tract interpretation and good faith play a prominent role in defining the scope of the 
relationship and the rights and obligations of the parties once a dispute is brought 
before court. In the next paragraphs, I will offer a comparison of the rules on contract 
interpretation and the application of good faith. Finally, I will briefly review some other 
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distinguishing aspects of the respective legal environments, which have been ad-
dressed in the literature: default rules relating to non-performance and liability for 
non-performance, and rules of civil procedure. 
The divide between civil and common law 
A distinction in the legal environment may be sought in the classification of the former 
as either a civil or common law jurisdiction. Civil law jurisdictions are based on a code, 
while common law jurisdictions are based primarily on judicial decisions and remain 
largely uncodified.137 Most Western European countries may be characterized as civil 
law systems. Dutch private law for example, is predominantly found in the Dutch Civil 
Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek 1992) ('DCC'), supplemented by detailed authoritative com-
mentaries. The DCC offers a single body of law and supplies contracting parties with a 
set of well-defined standardized rules.138 The DCC is divided into seven different sec-
tions or books. Book 3, 6 and 7 contain provisions related to the law of contracts. Book 
3 concerns the law of obligations in general, Book 6 contains rules on (bilateral) con-
tracts, and Book 7 incorporates rules for specific types of contracts. The DCC comprises 
both default and mandatory law. Default law refers to rules which can be modified by 
agreement. Rules of mandatory law on the other hand, apply to a contract and will be 
enforced regardless of the intention of the parties; an attempt to modify these rules 
by contract has no effect. 
In contrast to the Netherlands, England and the US may be categorized as common law 
jurisdictions. In general, rules and principles are not based on statute, but derive from 
court decisions which reflect the gradual development of the law. In constructing rules 
of law, a common law judge will start with an assessment of the facts of the case at 
hand and test his solution against the background of similar cases before rendering his 
final judgment. A judge is obliged to take note of previous decisions and follow them 
whenever this seems proper on the facts of the case.139 This is referred to as the bind-
ing force of precedent or stare decisis. Every court is bound by all decisions handed 
down by courts superior in hierarchy. When a precedent has been set by a court lower 
137 See also Van Hecke 1962. Cf. Hill and King 2004, p. 912-915. Differently Langbeln 1987, p. 384: 'I do not 
mean to deny the bearing that the gulf between case-law and code-law legal cultures may have on the 
contrast between American- and Continental-style contracting (...) But comparative law long ago recognized 
how much case law was being generated in the code systems (...) Accordingly, it seems unrealistic to attrib-
ute a practical difference as fundamental as the discrepancy between American- and Continental-style 
contracting to that tired contrast between code and case law.' 
138 In addition, each proposal of law which is sent to the Parliament for approval, including any revision of 
the DCC, is accompanied by a 'Memorie van Toelichting' or detailed commentary which serves as an impor-
tant reference guide once the proposal of law has been enacted as statute. Finally, the Council of State, a 
special advisory board for the government, advises on proposed bills and regulations. 
139 'A judicial precedent...is then considered as furnishing the rule for the determination of a subsequent 
case involving identical or similar material facts [emphasis added, GGH] ( . . . ) . ' (Allegheny General Hospital v. 
NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969-970 (3rd Cir. 1979), as quoted in United States Internal Revenue Serv. V. Osborne (In 
re Osborne), 76 F.3d 306, 96-1 US Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph. 50,185 (9"' Cir. 1996). 
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in hierarchy, the judge is not obliged to follow the rule, but cannot overrule without 
due consideration. In the US and England, the most important cases and judgments by 
the highest courts are compiled in readily accessible Law Reports. 
The claim that the distinction between common and civil law jurisdictions is primarily 
based on the existence or not of a general codification must not be made to swiftly. 
The French Code civil became effective only in 1804, while the Burgliches Gesetzbuch 
was not generally enacted until 1900. In addition, Greece only adopted a civil code 
after WWII. Surely this does not imply that these countries could not be characterized 
as civil law jurisdictions before 1804,1900 or WWII respectively?140 On the other hand, 
countries categorized as common law systems are not unfamiliar with the codification 
process: California appears to have quite a few codes, while all US states have adopted 
some version of the Uniform Commercial Code ('UCC') and England has enforced a 
Sales of Goods Act 1979 ('SGA 1979')141 and a Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 
('SGSA 1982')142. Furthermore: '[tjhe usual distinction to be made between the two 
systems is that the common law system tends to be case centered and hence judge 
centered, allowing scope for a discretionary, ad hoc, pragmatic approach to the par-
ticular problems that appear before the courts, whereas the civil law system tends to 
be a codified body of general abstract principles which control the exercise of judicial 
discretion. In reality, both these views are extremes, with the former over-emphasizing 
the extent to which the common law judge can impose his discretion and the latter 
under-estimating the extent to which continental judges have the power to exercise 
judicial discretion.'143 The assertion that the distinction between civil and common law 
jurisdictions lies in the (modern) codifications of the law, must be viewed in the proper 
light.144 To this account, three remarks must be made. 
First of all, civil law systems may be categorized as composing a family of legal 
systems where 'parts or the whole of Justinian's Corpus juris civilis have been in the 
past or are at present treated as the law of the land or, at the very least, are of direct 
and highly persuasive force; or else it derives from any such system.'145 At the base of 
the legal orders which we presently regard as civil law jurisdictions, lies the codifica-
140 Watson 1981, p. 3. 
141 As amended by the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 and the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995. 
142 Other statute law applicable to contracts is the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulation 1999. 
143 Watson 1981, p. 2. 
144 Cf. Von Mehren and Gordley 1977, p. 3: '[t]he legal systems of the western world are, for purposes of 
comparisons, frequently divided into two groups: the civil law system, seen in French and German law, and 
the common law system developed in England. Two points of difference are usually emphasized in compar-
ing the civil and the common laws. First, in the civil law, large areas of private law are codified. Codification 
is not typical for the common law. Second, the civil law was far less profound and in no way pervasive. These 
points of difference should not be allowed to obscure the extent to which civil and the common law share a 
common tradition. Both systems were developments within Western European culture; they hold many 
values in common. Both are products of western civilization.' 
145 Watson 1981, p. 4. 
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tion of Roman law, and Roman law rules, which have continually developed during the 
centuries to serve the needs of successive generations and societies.146 Despite the 
acknowledgement that Roman law has played an important role in the development of 
modern civil law systems, the fact that Roman law has had a profound influence on the 
structure of these legal systems as a whole, on the conceptualization of rules of private 
law in particular, as well as on the manner in which lawyers approach the law, has 
consistently been underestimated.147 And while it may be argued that elements of the 
English common law, such as the law of easements and the contract of sale, were at 
various times affected by Roman law rules and doctrines, it is not possible to claim that 
the Corpus juris chilis was ever there treated as binding or as directly persuasive.148 
Although the successful codification in some jurisdictions and its failure in others may 
be explained by factors inherent the legal systems themselves - both natural law and 
revolutionary ideology have played their part - the immediate ancestors of most mod-
ern civil codes with their systematic structure and sharp divisions between branches of 
law, are without doubt the institutes of local law themselves which derive directly 
from Roman law and long centuries of study of the Corpus juris civiiis.149 
This brings me to my second remark. Although the phenomenon of a code is not un-
known to common law jurisdictions, the underlying ideology, the conception of what a 
code is and the functions it should perform in the legal process, does not correspond 
with that in civil law jurisdictions. The code as the expression of an ideology makes it 
easier to understand why it makes sense to address codes from a comparative per-
spective.150 In civil law systems, law-making is seen as the exclusive task of the legisla-
tor. The codification of the law is regarded as a 'legislative enactment which entirely 
pre-empts the field and which is assumed to carry within it the answers to all possible 
questions: when a court comes to a gap or an unforeseen situation, its duty is to find, 
by extrapolation and analogy, a solution consistent with the policy of the codifying 
law'.151 When a case is brought before court, a civil law judge will begin with an exami-
nation of statute law which might govern the case at hand. A common law judge in 
contrast, will start with an examination of the facts of the case and any relevant 
precedent. While a civil law judge has the function of interpreting and applying the 
146 Watkin 1999, p. 9 and p. 450. See also Slapper and Kelly 2006, p. 2: '[t]he use of the term "common law" ( 
...) refers to all those legal systems which have adopted the historic English legal system ( . . . ) The term "civil 
law" refers to those other jurisdictions which have adopted the European continental system of law derived 
essentially from ancient Roman law, but owing much to the Germanic tradition.' 
147 Watson 1981, p. 179. 
148 Watkin 1999, p. 2. Civil law may still be found in parts of the US and Canada. The State of Louisiana for 
example, still employs a civil system based on French law, while the province of Quebec in Canada maintains 
the civil law system as part of its French inheritance. 
149 Watson 1981, p. 144 and p. 180. 
150 Merryman 1985, p. 26. 
151 G. Gilmore, 'Legal Realism: its cause and cure', Yale Law Journal (70) 1961, quoted by Farnsworth 1996, p. 
230. 
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law, it is not his/her function to 'create" Saw in any 'way."'" it is inevitable of course 
that, in interpreting the law, civil law judges are bound to supply detail to legislative 
enactments which the legislator has not foreseen. Although there exists no formal rule 
of stare decisis: '[i]t would violate the rules against judicial lawmaking if decisions of 
the courts were to be binding upon subsequent courts"" 5, the decisions of courts, in 
particular those of the Dutch Supreme Court f'Hoge Raad'j do encompass substantial 
persuasive force in providing examples of how the law is being interpreted and ap-
plied. In addition, high value is placed upon ensuring that each rule is interpreted and 
applied in conformity with the other provisions of the legal system as a whole. 
In the US and England, the present codifications have no pretense of completeness: 
they do not purport to abolish all prior Saw in the field. Moreover, even in legislation 
such as the UCC, one does not find the systematic structure and the relatively high 
degree of generalization and conceptualization typical of codes in civil law systems.'5'5 
And although 'there has been a significant increase in statute law in the 20th and 21st 
centuries, the courts still have an important role to play in creating and operating law 
generally and in determining the operation of the legislation in particular."55 English 
and American statutes reflect the 'Swiss cheese theory': '[the code is regarded] as a 
piece of Swiss cheese with all its holes, and if, when you search for a solution to your 
case, you find a hole in the Code, look through it to the backdrop of case law.'156 If a 
provision is in possible conflict with a deeply rooted rule of common law, the aim will 
be to interpret the relevant provision in the code in such a manner as to avoid conflict. 
While the regime of precedent exists, a judge is not compelled to find a basis for decid-
ing a given case within a particular statute. 
These aforementioned differences in legal thought and the role of statutes in shaping 
the law have been well expressed by Weber and Trubek. Weber (1968) characterized 
European civil law as having 'logically formal rationality', which Trubek (1972) explains 
as follows: '[l]egal thought is rational to the extent that it relies on some justification 
that transcends the particular case, and is based on existing, unambiguous rules; for-
mal to the extent that the criteria of decision are intrinsic to the legal system; and 
logical to the extent that rules or principles are consciously constructed by specialized 
This separation of legislative from judicial power may be primarily traced to the Revolutionary period in 
Europe, where the judicial aristocracy was targeted for their failure to distinguish between applying and 
making the law (see also Merryman 1985, p, 14-18). This strict separation stands in contrast to judicial 
tradition in the United States and England, where the judiciary h3S often constituted a progressive force on 
the side of the individual as counterweight to the control of the ruler. The power encumbered upon the 
judges to develop the law was well received and not a target of the American Revolution in contrast to the 
French revolutionary reform, 
Merryman 19S5, p. 46. 
; i 4 Von Mehren 2000, p. 10. 
Slapper and Kelly 2006, p. 4. 
Farnsworth 1996, p. 231. 
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modes of legal thought which rely on a highly logical systematization, and to the ex-
tent that decisions of specific cases are reached by processes of specialized deductive 
logic proceedings from previously established rules or principles.'157 As a consequence, 
court decisions in civil law jurisdictions are based on rules that are general, have been 
previously established, and derive from autonomous legal sources. Formal rationality 
means that the law exists as a system in its own right, but law is not an end in itself. 
The presence of this formal rationality in European civil law systems may be ascribed in 
large part to the historical authoritative role of the Corpus juris civilis.1SB 
In the third place, and related to the foregoing, a difference may be found in the scope 
of the codification. As mentioned earlier, civil law codifications are extremely system-
atic and highly articulated. They are intended to set out authoritatively at least the 
principles and basic rules of a wide field of law, such as the whole of private law. The 
DCC codifies, in principle, the whole of contract law rules in the Netherlands, encom-
passing general rules of contract law as well as rules applicable to particular types of 
contracts. In contrast, codifications in common law jurisdictions carry no pretense of 
completeness; the UCC and the SGA 1979 are limited to specific types of contracts, 
primarily the sale of goods and provision of services.159 The UCC is not in itself law 
unless it has been enacted by the legislature of a state.160 Any state can decide not to 
adopt certain provisions of the UCC or make revisions to the Code. However, all fifty 
states have adopted the UCC with substantial uniformity. Article 1 UCC is of general 
application and relates to issues of interpretation and uniformity of the Code, but the 
main provision is Article 2, which governs the sale of goods between merchants. The 
sale of goods under Article 2 only applies to the transfer in property (sale) of mov-
ables; transactions concerning e.g. real estate transactions and the supply of services 
are excluded from application.161 The SGSA 1982 is concerned with contracts for the 
157 Watson 1981, p. 23 citing D.M. Trubek, 'Max Weber on law and the rise of capitalism', Wisonsln Law 
Review 1972, p. 730. 
158 Watson 1981, p. 23. 
155 Cf. Cooter and Ginsburg 2004, p. 1: '[c]ompared to the great codes of the continental tradition, the com-
mon law provides a less predictable set of rules because it is dynamic and because its sheer volume renders 
it imprecise.' 
100 The UCC Is a product of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and The 
American Law Institute in an attempt to unify the laws concerning commercial transactions with the goal of 
facilitating interstate commerce. The UCC, in one or another of its several revisions, has been enacted In all 
of the SO states, as well as in the District of Columbia, Guam and the US Virgin Islands. Louisiana has enacted 
most provisions of the UCC with the exception of Article 2, giving preference to its own civil law tradition for 
the governance of the sale of goods (www.all.org, last accessed September 18, 2006). 
161 Agreements concerning the transfer of information such as licensing agreements are precluded from 
Article 2. A revision of the UCC was envisaged to incorporate such agreements under a new Article 2B. 
However, the project met resistance of the American Law Institute and the provisions have now been incor-
porated as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, which as of October 12, 2004 had only been 
adopted by 2 states; Maryland and Virginia. 
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transfer in property in goods162, for the hire of goods, and for the supply of services. 
Both Article 2 UCC and the SGA 1979 regulate only general aspects of contracts such as 
formation, effects of the contract, performance and breach. The SGSA 1982 on the 
other hand, incorporates a list of implied terms concerning conditions and warranties 
as to title, quality or fitness, and correspondence with description by sample. These 
terms do not constitute mandatory law, and may be varied by express agreement 
unless this is prohibited under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. In addition to the 
UCC, the American Restatements of the Law are published by the American Law Insti-
tute in order to organize the increasing flood of precedent. The Restatements are 
recognized as scholarly refinements of black letter law, including the law of contract. In 
their systematic structure of abstractly formulated rules, the Restatements seem like 
civil codes, however, the former do not compose primary sources of law and the judge 
is not bound to follow the Restatements in any way that he or she is bound to follow 
binding statute or case law. 
Implications for the complexity of contracts 
The foregoing account on the divide between common and civil law affects the level of 
contracting and enforcement costs. 
First of all, a blunt categorization of civil and common law systems based on the pres-
ence respectively absence of a general codification of private law, implies that parties 
in civil law jurisdictions have access to a large resource of contract law rules. In these 
jurisdictions, the legislator has incurred the bulk of the contracting costs by identifying 
and specifying relevant rules of law in a freely accessible code. Of course, lawyers will 
incur certain costs while they may have to look up particular rules and related court 
decisions. I assume, however, that these costs are relatively small compared to the 
costs of formulating and enforcing legal rules. Let us assume that parties are not wary 
to rely on the general codification of the law. A justification for this assumption may be 
found in the fact that the legislator has access to a large amount of resources which 
allow him to identify and lay down in a national code the rules most relevant for the 
largest group of parties. The DCC 1992 in many aspects reflects case law developed 
under its predecessor, but also incorporates new rules which are the result of com-
parative legal study in order to find the rule which fits 'best' within the Dutch legal 
culture. Parties themselves do not have the resources and time to conduct such in-
depth (comparative) research. They will therefore often rely on default law, which is 
tailored to appeal to the largest part of the population. This 'ability to rely' implies that 
the costs for parties at the front end of the contracting process are small. Parties only 
have to incorporate particularities which are not foreseen for in the national code and 
can suffice with a reference to this code for other matters. For example, Article 6:265 
16aThis is broader than the 'sale of goods' under the SGA 1979, also including contracts where the considera-
tion consists of something other than money. 
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and further of the DCC encompass detailed rules on the termination of contracts. Un-
der the reliance assumption, parties could suffice to briefly refer to these Articles in 
their contracts, without incorporating the whole of the statutory rules. In addition, 
parties may forego to reference these legal rules at all and just rely upon the DCC to fill 
these gaps in their contract. The foregoing would be able to explain the existence of 
relatively simple contracts in the Netherlands. In accordance with this point of view, 
participants at the Association of Corporate Counsel Europe's 2006 Annual Conference 
established that civil law jurisdictions are characterized by a heavy reliance and refer-
ence to the civil code which allows for a practical approach to drafting issues.163 It 
becomes clear that in this case, even a relatively low level of contracting costs does 
not give parties an incentive to write complex contracts. Apparently, the expected 
benefits of copying extensive contract law rules into a contract do not outweigh the 
associated costs. It seems parties will rely upon the judge to apply the correct default 
rules to their contracts in case of a dispute. The ability to rely on the third party en-
forcer indicates that enforcement costs are expected to be low. This postulation re-
lates to the back end of the contracting process and will be more elaborately investi-
gated in the section on the interpretation of contracts. 
In England and the US, case law substitutes for a national code. In first instance, it 
appears that this judge made law - of which the most prominent cases are made easily 
accessible through the compilation of Law Reports - and the system of precedent, 
complemented in particular areas by statute law, ought to be able to provide for a 
similar resource of contract law rules as offered by a general codification under a civil 
law system. The doctrine of precedent offers predictability and cohesion: '[u]nder a 
system of strict precedent, it is not merely the applicable legal principles which are 
predictable, but, more vitally, the precise interpretation which will be placed upon a 
particular clause in a contract is also predictable, since this issue of interpretation is a 
question of law governed by precedent.'164 The foregoing implies that similar civil law 
jurisdictions, parties can suffice with relatively simple contracts. However, empirical 
evidence illustrates that contracts in the US and England are relatively complex com-
pared to their counterparts in the Netherlands. While this complexity might be ex-
plained by relaxing the assumption that parties are not wary to rely on default rules. 
Without abandoning the reliance-assumption, an explanation might be found in the 
fact that the doctrine of precedent and the established statutes cannot be assimilated 
with the supply of contract law rules in a national code. Three arguments may be 
made in this respect. 
First of all, judges in common law jurisdictions built their decisions on the particular 
facts of a case. When a case goes to court, a judge will first examine the facts in order 
163 Cf, Przeracki 1989, p. 174, Hill and King 2004, p. 928. 
164 Collins 1996, p. 3. 
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to decide whether a precedent can apply or whether a different judgment should be 
rendered. If parties do not specify precisely and correctly the black-letter rules which 
apply to their contract, the risk that the judge will find differently is increased. English 
and American judges have devised various ways to distinguish precedent. Sometimes, 
there are no precedents to rely on and a court will draw analogies from other areas of 
law to come to a just decision, which then becomes precedential. In addition, courts 
may overrule precedent. In England, the issuance of the Practice Statement 1966 has 
given the highest court, the House of Lords, the freedom to overrule its own decisions 
where it appears right to do so. 1 " The English Court of Appeals is free to overturn 
precedent when two cases conflict with each other1*6 and when it has previously taken 
a decision in ignorance of some authority which would have led to a different conclu-
sion167, or which has been expressly or impliedly overruled by the House of Lords.168 
Likewise the US Supreme Court is able to depart from its prior decisions when histori-
cal conditions change or the philosophy of the court undergoes a major shift.169 The US 
appellate courts are divided into circuits and each panel of judges on the court of ap-
peals of a certain circuit is bound by prior decisions of the same circuit. However, 
precedents may be overruled by the court en banc, a session of all active appellate 
judges of a particular circuit. This undermines the certainty of black letter rules and 
their consistent application, even if they are compiled in law reports. Both Van Hecke 
(1962) and Langbein (1987) argue that the lack of a systematic codification indeed 
reduces the predictability and precision of the law170 which has a positive effect on the 
level of enforcement costs. Likewise, Collins (1996) states that the incorporation of 
black letter law is the only way that predictability can be achieved.171 It seems that the 
system of case law inherent common law jurisdictions offers parties a smaller ability to 
rely on established rules of law than parties in civil law jurisdictions. In the latter juris-
diction, established rules of law may be interpreted by judges, but can be less easily 
altered or overturned. 
In the second place, it may be postulated that the UCC or SGA have a function similar 
to a national code which would allow parties to suffice with simple contracts. A second 
explanation for the relative complexity in the US and England may be sought in the 
divergent function of a code in civil and common law jurisdictions. In civil law jurisdic-
tions, a code endeavors to embody the complete and coherent representation of the 
law. A judge will attempt to apply the codified rules to the case at hand. In common 
:°5 Actually, it was not until 1898, with the case of London Street Tramways v London County Council in 1898 
(AC 375) that the House of Lords became bound by its own decisions. The Practice Statement has seldom 
been applied. As of 2005, the House of Lords has rejected its past decisions no more than 20 times. 
Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd (1974). 
I S ? Williams v Fawcett 1985. 
158 Family Housing Association v Jones (1990). 
159 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483,74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). 
170 Lord Macmillan in Tennyson, Aymler's Field 146,1894, cited by Langbein 1987, p. 383. 
: n Collins 1996, p. 2 
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law jurisdictions on the other hand, codes are fragmentary, applying only to the sale of 
goods for example and the judge is not compelled to find basis for a decision in the 
code. This means that parties cannot wholly rely on the judge to apply the rules as 
embedded in the UCC or SGA to the case at hand. The foregoing implies that parties 
will prefer to incorporate black letter rules in their contracts for those areas which are 
not covered by statute law and even for the cases covered by statute law; this law is 
not necessarily leading. 
An additional argument concerns the US in particular. Some authors argue that parties, 
who draft a contract subject to American law, draft to combat the diversity in jurisdic-
tions. These authors state that the precise adoption and the interpretation of the UCC 
may vary across states, and that lawyers are not familiar with the law of each state. I 
find this argument less convincing. First of all, the UCC §1-102 contains a mandate to 
interpret law as uniformly as possible. In addition, scholarly writing concerning the 
interpretation of the UCC, is usually addressed to the Official version of the UCC and 
therefore uniform. Secondly, the UCC has been enacted in all fifty states to a substan-
tial uniformity making the UCC virtually identical in all states. Finally, as Langbein 
(2001) indicates: 'the lengthy contractual terms seldom, if ever, mention the few sub-
stantive areas of difference that exist among the jurisdictions [GH: states]. Rather, the 
contractual terms that address substantive law recite "black letter rules".'172 
Concluding, when parties in a common law jurisdiction draft a contract, the incorpora-
tion of black-letter law will enhance certainty when a case is brought before court. To 
the contrary parties in civil law countries, despite low contracting costs, do not find it 
worthwhile to incur even the costs of copying relevant provisions of law into their 
contract, while the degree of enforcement costs which they encounter are substan-
tially lower than those of their counterparts in common law jurisdictions. The expected 
level of enforcement costs is also affected by the manner in which contracts are inter-
preted by the courts. This aspect will be examined in the next section, 
The interpretation of contracts 
When corporate parties bring a dispute concerning the rights and obligations arising 
from their contract before court, the latter must decide what constitutes the precise 
content of the contract and how this content must be interpreted. The manner in 
which these issues are addressed is dependent upon the legal system in which the case 
is brought forward. While most common law systems restrict the types of evidence 
which may be used to establish and interpret the content of the contract, civil law 
systems usually do not place limits on the kind of admissible evidence. Furthermore, 
common law generally takes an objective approach toward the interpretation of con-
tracts, i.e. the focus is on the terms as expressed in the contract, while civil law sys-
172 Langbein 2001, p. 127. 
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terms mostly apply a subjective theory of interpretation, i.e. the court will inquire into 
the actual intentions of the parties. Finally, parties may have omitted to foresee in a 
particular term of the agreement. Dependent on the jurisdiction in which the dispute 
arises, courts may be more or less lenient to supply a term to remedy this omittance. 
The differences in the establishment of contractual terms, their interpretation and the 
implication of omitted terms, may have an effect on enforcement costs and thereby 
the relative complexity of commercial contracts. Restriction of the types of evidence 
that may be used to establish the terms of a contract, encourages parties to carefully 
consider whether they have incorporated their whole agreement in writing. In order to 
avoid any doubt as to whether the contract encompasses the whole agreement, par-
ties may add additional terms, thereby increasing contractual complexity. A similar 
effect may be caused by the reluctance of a court to imply terms. Likewise, parties 
whose contract is subject to an objective approach may benefit from writing a complex 
contract which contains numerous and detailed clauses. A subjective approach to 
contract interpretation may induce parties to rely on a relatively simple contract. In 
the following paragraphs, I will first discuss the manner in which the different jurisdic-
tions establish the terms of a contract and the manner in which this may affect the 
relative complexity of a contract. Thereafter I will examine in greater detail the differ-
ent approaches with regard to contract interpretation and the manner in which Eng-
land, the US and the Netherlands deal with omitted terms. 
The establishment of the terms of the contract in England, the US and the Netherlands 
Before a court can commence with the actual interpretation of a contract, it must 
establish the precise content of the contract, i.e. which written terms have the parties 
agreed upon, and decide whether there any other terms which add to, or modify these 
terms. This distinction is especially relevant in England and the United States, where 
the rule of parol evidence restricts all evidence of agreements or negotiations, 
whether written or oral, prior to the time of contract conclusion that may supplement, 
contradict, or vary the terms of the agreement in writing. In the US, the parol evidence 
rule is recognized in all states and has been embodied in the UCC §2-202 and Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts ('Restatement Second') §215.173 In England, the parol evi-
dence rule is not embodied in any statute, but is apparent from various cases.174 De-
spite its name, the parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of contract interpretation 
173 UCC §2-202: 'Terms (...) set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agree-
ment (...) may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral 
agreement but may be explained or supplemented (...) (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless 
the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of 
the agreement.' See also the case of Gianni v R. Russel and Co., Inc., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 1924, 
281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791. 
174 Goss v Lord Nugent (1833) 110 Eng. Rep. 731, Evans v Roe [1872] LR 7 CP 138, Jacobs v Batavia and Gen-
eral Plantations Trust [1924] 1 Ch 287. 
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rather than a rule of evidence. Although the rule has encountered quite some criti-
cism, it has much to commend it, especially for commercial parties: '[The] policy of 
upholding the integrity of written contracts (...) is particularly relevant in cases (...) 
between two large corporations presumably represented by competent counsel'.175 
The parol evidence rule only applies once it has been established that the written 
document represents a 'complete' contract: a document which contains all the terms 
of the parties' agreement. When is a contract considered to be 'complete'? Under 
English law, the party relying on a written document has the benefit that, upon ap-
pearance of completeness to a party taking a reasonable view of it, the document is 
presumed to represent the complete contract, subject to the other party's right of 
rebuttal.176 In the US on the other hand, a major area of conflict relates to the question 
of what constitutes a complete contract or total integration.177 In the US, the parol 
evidence rule may be said to operate in two steps178: a court will first ask whether the 
writing is integrated, meaning it is intended to represent the final expression of the 
parties' agreement.179 Only if it has been established that the writing is integrated are 
parties obstructed from introducing any prior evidence that may contradict the terms 
in writing. When the written document also represents the complete and exclusive 
expression of the terms of the agreement, it will be considered 'completely inte-
grated', and no prior or contemporaneous evidence may be introduced to either: (1) 
contradict; or (2) add to the written terms.180 It can be argued, that the ability under 
English law for a party to prove that the written agreement did not constitute the 
entire contract between parties, renders English law more flexible than US law on this 
matter.181 Although the rule of parol evidence restricts any evidence of prior or con-
temporaneous oral or written agreements which may supplement, contradict or vary 
the terms of the written contract, the rule has been limited in several ways in both the 
US and England. 
First of all, the parol evidence rule applies only once it has been established that there 
is a valid and complete or completely integrated agreement; it does not preclude evi-
dence which might indicate that no valid agreement was reached in the first place. 
Thus prior evidence may be invoked to prove that the written agreement is condi-
175 Empire Gas Corp. v UPG, 7 8 1 S W.2d 148 (Mo. App. 1989). 
176 Treitel 2003, Wetherburn [1959] CU 58. 
177 See also Fuller and Eisenberg 2006, p. 591-595 and the discussion between Professor Corbin and Williston 
referenced therein. 
178 See Farnsworth 1999, p. 431-432. 
" 9 In contrast to a detailed and signed document, notes or draft agreements will usually not be deemed 
Integrated (Farnsworth 1999, p. 431-439) and Restatement Second §209. 
180 Restatement Second §213-§216. In the US, courts have used different methods to determine whether a 
writing is 'completely Integrated'. Most courts presently follow the approach taken by Restatement Second 
§210, §216. The UCC has adopted a similar approach: UCC §2-202 comment 1 (a). 
181 Fontaine and De Ly 2006, p. 118. 
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tional, unenforceable for lack of consideration182 or avoidable due to fraud183, duress, 
mistake184 or misrepresentation185. Second, the parol evidence rule does not preclude 
evidence of 'collateral agreements', i.e. side agreements which are entirely separate 
and distinct agreements between parties, as long as these side agreements qualify as a 
contract and do not contradict the completely integrated or complete agreement.186 In 
addition, parol evidence is generally still admissible for the purpose of interpreting the 
terms found in the latter agreements. This rule will be discussed in greater detail be-
low. 
In order to indicate that their agreement encompasses a complete and final integra-
tion of the terms and to ensure that reliance will not be placed on representations 
made prior or contemporaneous to the execution of the writing, parties in the US and 
England often incorporate an entire agreement clause.187 An example of such a clause 
is the following: 
'Except as specifically contemplated in this Agreement and except for the CDA and the 
Supply Agreement, this Agreement sets forth the entire understanding of the parties 
with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements, written 
and oral, between the parties.' 
While it may be argued that such clauses should not simply be taken at face value188, 
courts in England currently seem to have decided otherwise.189 It is argued that these 
types of clauses provide certainty 'since the parties have by the clause expressed their 
182 US: Kay v Spencer, 213 P. 571 (Wyo. 1923) and Restatement Second § 214(d). England: Solly v. Hinde 
(1834) 2 Crand M 516, Abbott v Hendricks (1840) 1 Man and G 791. 
183 US: Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v Russo Bros., 641 A.2d 1297 (R.I. 1994), Farmers State Bank v Huebner, 
475 N.W. 2d 640 (Iowa App. 1991). England: Pickering v Oowson (1813) 4 Taunt 779. 
184 England: Pym v Campbell (1856) 6 E and B 370, Raffles v Wichelhous (1864) 2 H and C 906. US: Bollinger v 
Central Pennsylvania Quarry Stripping & Construction Co. 229 A.2d (Pa. 1967). 
185 England: Pennsylvania Shipping Co v Compagnie Nationale de Navigation [1936] 2 All ER 1167. US: Guard-
ian State Bank v Stangl 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989). 
186 England: De Lassalle v Guilford [1901] 2 KB 215, Mendelssohn v Normand Ltd [1970] 1 QB 177, Lord 
Moulton in Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30: '[i]t is evident, both on principle and on author-
ity, that there may be a contract the consideration for which is the making of some other contract. "If you 
will make such and such a contract, I will give you one hundred pounds," is in every sense of the word a 
complete legal contract. It is collateral to the main contract, but each has an independent existence, and 
they do not differ in respect of their possessing to the full the character and status of a contract". US: 
Masterson v Sine Supreme Court of California 1968 68 Cal. 2d. 222, P.2d. 561, Mitchill v Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 
647 (N.Y. 1928), Restatement Second. 
187 The term 'entire agreement' seems to have been developed in England. The clause is also known as 
'merger" or 'integration' clause (see Fontaine and De Ly 2006, p. 117). 
188 Beale 2004. 
189 Deepak Fertilisers v. Imperial Chemicals Industries pic [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 387. 
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intention that the document is to contain all the terms of their agreement'.190 In the 
US, the value attached to entire agreement clauses varies. Some courts are of the 
opinion that the weight to be given to an entire agreement clause depends on the 
precise circumstances.191 Although entire agreement clauses are often not regarded as 
'absolutely conclusive' they are considered to be 'indicative of the intention of the 
parties to finalize their complete understanding in the written contract (...) that there 
was no other prior or contemporaneous agreement not included in the written con-
tract.'192 This conclusion may be supported by the length and detail of the contract as 
well as evidence of extensive negotiations prior to contract conclusion. While the parol 
evidence rule applies only to prior or contemporaneous evidence, subsequent evi-
dence, for example agreements or negotiations which arise after the conclusion of the 
contract, are not excluded from examination.193 Such evidence may in principle mod-
ify, add or supplement the terms of the written agreement. Under the parol evidence 
rule and the ensuing entire agreement clause, parties spend a lot of effort to reduce all 
arrangements in one written document. These efforts and attempts to concentrate the 
entire agreement in one written document may be frustrated if oral arrangements 
subsequently concluded between parties or written agreements concluded by unau-
thorized employees, officers or sale representatives would permit parties to deviate 
from the written contract. In order to make their contracts immune to such changes, 
no-oral modification (NOM) clauses have been devised by parties as to 'provide a par-
allel formalism regarding changes to the written contract and require that amend-
ments be made in writing'194: 
'No modification of any of the terms of this Agreement shall be deemed to be valid 
unless it is in writing and signed by both parties.' 
190 Chitty on Contracts 2004, p. 758 and n. 443 which refers to McGrath v Shah (1989) 57 P. & CR 452. The 
approach is somewhat different when the entire agreement clause extends to prevent liability for represen-
tations (Furmston 2003, p. 528 and Chitty on Contracts 2004, p. 758). In addition, an entire agreement 
clause may be waived by a party who might otherwise have relied on it (Chitty on Contracts 2004, p. 758 and 
n. 446 which refers to SAM Business Systems Ltd v Hedley & Co [2002] EWHC (TCC) 2733, [2003] 1 All. ER. 
(Comm.) 465. 
191 Fuller and Eisenberg 2006, p. 602. 
192 Pumphrey v, Kehoe, 261 Md. 496, 505, 276 A.2d 194, 199 (1971) cited In ARB (American Research Bu-
reau), Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc. 663 F.2d 189, 198099 (D.C. Clr. 1980. See also Farnsworth (1999) who states 
that one must be aware however, that a basic merger clause may extend to (1) prevent liability for represen-
tation; (2) bar evidence of a condition to the written agreement taking effect; (3) bar evidence of course of 
dealings or usage of trade; or (4) include a no-oral-modification clause. The enforcement of such extensive 
merger clauses may vary accordingly. In this light, Tjittes 2005, p. 27, argues that an entire agreement clause 
which extends to exclude pre-contractual liability or liability for representations under Dutch law is in princi-
ple enforceable, unless Invocation of the clause is contrary to good faith. 
193 US: Kelso v McGowan, 604 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1992). England; Furmston 2003, par. 3.5, p. 523. 
19,1 Fontaine and De Ly 2006, p. 159. 
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NOM clauses are generally assumed to be enforced in England although there is no 
authority on this point.195 The common law rule in the US traditionally has been that a 
court will not enforce these types of clauses.196 The underlying reasoning was that: '(1) 
Parties can, by later contracts, change their earlier contracts. (2) An oral modification 
is a later contract. (3) An implied provision of the later contract is to abrogate the 
n.o.m. provision of the earlier contract.'197 The fact that New York state law and UCC 
§2-209(2)198 do give effect to such provisions, have led courts to adapt a more liberal 
approach to these NOM clauses and presently, unless the defendant has waived the 
benefits of such a clause by acting in contravention of such a clause, the court will 
usually enforce them.199 
There is no equivalent of the parol evidence rule in Dutch law. In principle prior evi-
dence of oral or written agreements is always admitted: the Dutch court is free to 
assess any extrinsic evidence, including evidence of prior negotiations, in order to 
establish the terms of the contract.200 In the case where one party claims that the 
written document does not contain the entire agreement, Tjittes (2000) illustrates that 
certain rules of evidence in the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke 
Rechtsvordering) ('DCCP') have an effect comparable to the parol evidence rule.201 
Tjittes (2002) states that a written agreement between parties may be qualified as an 
195 See also World Online Telecom U.K. Ltd. V l-Way Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 413, [1]-[17] in which a lower 
court decision was upheld not to determine in the summary judgment phase whether a contractual clause 
prohibited oral modifications (cited by Davis 2006, p. 490-491, n. 9). 
136 Autotrol Corp. v. Continental Water Sys. Corp. 918 F. 2d 689 (7th Circuit 1990), Clark v Clark 535 A.2d 872 
(DC 1987), Beaty v Guggenheim Exploratio Co. 122 N.E. 378 (NY 1919). See also Restatement Second §311 
comment a: '[t]he parties to a contract cannot by agreement preclude themselves from varying their duties 
to each other by subsequent agreement.' 
197 Fuller and Eisenberg 2006, p. 608. 
198 'A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be 
otherwise modified or rescinded ( . . . ) . ' 
199 Cf. UCC §2-209(4): '[although an attempt at modification does not satisfy [Section 2-209(2)] it can oper-
ate as a waiver' (a waiver is the process of giving up any right on anything with a voluntary action or non 
action). Beware, however, that Section 2-209(4) may be limited by Section 2-209(5) that under particular 
circumstances the waiver may be retracted. Cf. Etheridge Oil Co. v. Panciera, 818 F. Supp. 480 (DRI 1993): 
'because parties' subsequent conduct conformed to each of the modifications, seller cannot now question 
the validity of those modifications'. Indeed, doctrines of 'waiver', estoppel in English law and Rechtswirkung 
or principles of implied renunciation in other national legal systems may act to derogate from entire agree-
ment and NOM clauses (Fontaine and De Ly 2006, p. 163). In order to preclude the foregoing effects, parties 
will often complement an entire agreement and/or NOM clause with an anti-waiver or non-waiver clause. 
The enforcement of these anti-waiver clauses is dependent on the jurisdiction: under English law, which 
takes a predominantly objective and literal approach to interpretation, these clauses will generally be en-
forced. Under Dutch law, however, good faith and fair dealing may be imposed to limit the application of the 
anti-waiver clause. 
200 HR 13 March 1981, NJ1981, 635 (Haviltex). 
201 Tjittes 2000. 
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evidence agreement according to Article 153 DCCP.202 The judge is obliged to regard 
the content of such an agreement as correct and true. The party who disputes the 
written terms of the agreement, and asserts that he has orally agreed otherwise, is 
granted the right to prove that the written agreement does not encompass the actual 
and complete agreement. Providing this evidence is a difficult task, while the party will 
have to call upon witnesses and search for documents which prove that oral arrange-
ments contrary the written document have been made. The judge is entrusted with 
the valuation of the alleged evidence.203 Tjittes (2002) illustrates that, while Dutch law 
thus not recognize the parol evidence rule as such, Dutch rules of evidence may effec-
tuate similar results in practice. The effect in Dutch law seems comparable to the case 
of parol evidence in English law, which will swiftly acknowledge that the agreement is 
complete, subject to a party's right of rebuttal. It should be noted however, that, simi-
lar English and American law, the Dutch rules of evidence exist and apply independ-
ently of the substantive law regarding the interpretation of contracts. 
When Dutch parties incorporate an entire agreement clause in their contracts, this 
clause may be regarded as a substantive waiver clause under which parties sign away 
their rights and obligations emanating from agreements, negotiations or promises 
made prior to the main agreement.204 It has been argued that such a clause may be 
held to be invalid, especially when it is found in general conditions of contract.205 Un-
derlying this reasoning is the overriding principle of good faith (redelijkheid en bil-
lijkheid) in Dutch contract law. This principle, laid down in Article 6:2 DCC in general, 
and in Article 6:248(1) DCC for contracts in particular, stipulates that good faith may 
act to supplement, modify or extinguish parties' obligations and thus the written terms 
of the agreement. A court may thus use the principles of good faith and fair dealing to 
strike down a clause which excludes prior evidence for the establishment of contract 
terms. 
Published case law relating to the incorporation of NOM clauses does not yet 
seem to exist in the Netherlands. Tjittes (2005), states that nothing seems to prohibit 
parties contracting under Dutch law to include a NOM clause in their contract. When 
parties orally modify an agreement subject to such a clause, the oral modification will 
be 'estopped' by the agreed upon formality: the requirement that any modification 
must be put into writing. However, the principle of good faith may interfere with the 
validity of such a clause. A party may waive his right to invoke the NOM clause for 
example, by conduct, agreement or unreasonable behaviour. 
202 Actually Tjittes (2002) still refers to the old Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvorderlng, Articles 183 and 
184. See on this issue also Fontaine and de Ly 2006, p. 115 and p. 138, 
203 HR 5 January 2001, RvdW 2001, 23 (Brooke Holland/Mr Overes q.q.). 
2M Tjittes 2005, p. 26, Fontaine and De Ly 2006, p. 139. 
205 Hondius 1986. 
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Implications for the complexity of contracts 
The establishment of the relevant terms by the court places us at the back end of the 
contracting process. Rules of parol evidence, entire agreement and NOM clauses affect 
the level of enforcement costs. Failure to put all the relevant terms in writing creates 
uncertainty and unpredictability for parties who bring suit in England or the US. This 
means that these parties will incorporate detailed performance obligations, as any 
elements which are not comprised in their written document will not be regarded as 
part of their agreement.205 The incorporation of an entire agreement clause ensures 
that reliance will not be placed on representations made prior or contemporaneous to 
the execution of the writing, while NOM clauses warrant that any oral modifications ex 
post are invalid. The rule of parol evidence, entire agreement and NOM clauses, may 
reduce the expected enforcement costs, but increase the complexity of the contract. 
Dutch parties are not focused on including absolutely everything in contract, while 
presentation of evidence which adds or modifies the terms in writing is in principle not 
precluded. Subsequently, the inclusion of entire agreement and NOM clauses is not 
standard practice, leading to a reduction in contract terms and thereby complexity. 
The interpretation of the established contract terms 
W h e n the terms of the contract have been established, the courts must decide which 
meaning must be given to the terms of the contract. Language is not always clear, but 
may be (1) ambiguous: susceptible to more than one interpretation (e.g. parties sign a 
contract for the sale and delivery of cotton by a ship which sales under the name 
'Peerless': do parties refer to the Peerless that sails in October or the ship of similar 
n a m e that sails in December?) or (2) vague: unclear in the specific context (an Ameri-
can seller and a Swiss buyer agree upon the sale of 'chicken': does stewing chicken 
conform?).207 In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the approach taken by England, 
the US and the Netherlands towards the interpretation of contract terms. 
England 
The overriding objective of the interpretation of contracts in English law is to find the 
parties' common intention.208 This seems to indicate that the English judge will con-
s ider the parties' actual intention and hence take a subjective approach to the inter-
pretation of contracts. However, the court's endeavor into the parties' intention is 
highly objective: '[tjo ascertain the intention of the parties the court reads the terms 
of t h e contract as a whole, giving the words used their natural and ordinary meaning in 
the context of the agreement ( . . . ) the court does not of course inquire into the par-
ties' subjective states of mind but makes an objective judgment based upon the mate-
206 Przeracki 1989, p. 174. 
207 T h e examples have been taken from Farnsworth 1999, p. 454-458. 
208 M'Cowan v Baine, & Johnson [1891) AC 401, 403, Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd. [1982] AC 
724, 736, Lord Bingham in BCCI v Ali [2001] 1 All ER 961. 
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rial already identified.'203 The court associates the parties' mutual intention with the 
words as expressed in the contract. This approach may be justified by the certainty it 
creates. Under a subjective approach, parties would be able to provide in hindsight, 
any evidence to their benefit. Historically, the majority of cases, which came before 
the English courts, were of a commercial nature. The certainty created by the objective 
approach advances the interests of trade and serves the needs of commerce.210 Finally, 
it is believed that an objective approach leads to inexpensive judicial rulings while 
reference to extrinsic evidence is limited. I am of the opinion however, that this last 
argument is not so strong, while discovery procedures in England and the US, in which 
parties may bring forward any evidence they deem necessary to support their position 
in court, can increase litigation costs enormously. 
Under an objective rule of interpretation, court must ascertain the intention of the 
parties from the words as expressed in the written agreement. Traditionally, the focus 
of the court was to find the plain and ordinary meaning of the words as understood by 
ordinary and reasonable persons.211 This was achieved by looking within the four cor-
ners of the written document. The ordinary grammatical meaning of the language was 
given the greater weight, except in case of a technical or special use of a word. An 
examination of extrinsic evidence was only allowed when the judge was not able to 
establish the meaning of the words from the document itself.212 This extrinsic evidence 
precluded any evidence of prior negotiations.213 This is still recognized as the golden 
rule of interpretation.214 
Canons of construction were developed in order to help judges ascertain the meaning 
of the words within the immediate context of the contract. These canons are still used. 
The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, requires the court to interpret a number 
of listed items to the exclusion of others. For example, a court may apply it to read a 
contract for the sale of a firm together with 'cattle and hogs' to exclude the seller's 
sheep and house-dog.215 Another rule relates to the expression ejusdem generic (of the 
same kind). Where a contract lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers 
to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or 
things specifically listed. For example, if a clause refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors 
2mlbid. 
210 Steyn 2003. See more recently for a critical view with regard to the objective contract interpretation: Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead 2005. 
211 Lake v Simmons [1927] AC 487, Hayward v Norwich Ins. Ltd. [2001] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 410 (C.A.). 
" 2 Bank of New Zealand v Simpson [1900] AC, p. 189. The court in this case indicates that where words are 
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and other motor-powered vehicles, the term 'vehicles' would not include airplanes, 
since the list referred only to land-based transportation.216 Furthermore, courts will 
attempt to interpret the language of the contract in a consistent manner. Words that 
are used more than once are assumed to have the same meaning throughout the con-
tract, which is consistent with the sense of the contract as a whole. Subsequently, 
more attention will also be paid to non-standard terms of the contract than standard 
terms.217 When words are susceptible to two different meanings within the contract, 
one which validates the contract and the other which renders it void or unenforceable, 
then the meaning which validates the contract shall prevail. Finally, an important 
rule of interpretation is the interpretation contra proferentem. When the language 
supplied by one party is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which favors each 
party, the one that is less favorable to the party that supplied the language is pre-
ferred.219 This rule is based on the ground that the party against whom the rule oper-
ates has had the possibility of drafting the language in such a manner to avoid the 
dispute. 
In recent years, contract interpretation in England has developed in the sense that the 
context in which the contract is concluded should play an important role in light of 
contract interpretation. Instead of ascertaining the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
language within the direct context of the contract itself, courts now recognize and 
accept that the language of the contract is influenced by the surrounding circum-
stances. Despite these developments, it is important to note that the objective ap-
proach to interpretation remains unchallenged and still represents the overriding prin-
ciple.220 In Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society221, 
Lord Hofmann referred to the fundamental change that has overtaken the process of 
interpretation - particularly as a result of speeches by Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v 
Simmonds and Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngar Hansen-Tangen - and seeks to 
restate the principles of contemporary contract interpretation: 
'The principles may be summarized as follows: 
1. Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would 
convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would 
216 Young v Sun Alliance & London ins. Ltd. [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 189,191 (CA). 
217 Woolfall & Rimmer Ltd. V Moyle [1942] 1 KB 66,73 ff. (CA). 
218 Fausset v Carpenter (1831) 2 Dow & CI 232, when there are two possible interpretations, one which is 
lawful and the other which isn't, the court will apply the lawful interpretation, WN Hillas & Co v Arcos (1932) 
LT 503: in case of a possible invalid and valid interpretation, the valid interpretation will prevail. 
219 Savill Bros Ltd v Bethell [1902] 2 Ch 523. 
220 Kornet 2006, chapter 5. 
221 [1998] 1WLR 896. 
222 [1971] 1 WLR 1381. 
223 [1976] 1 WLR 989. 
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reasonable have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were 
at the time of the contract. 
2. The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the "matrix of 
fact", but this phrase is if anything, an understated description of what the back-
ground may include. Subject to the requirement that it should have been rea-
sonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it in-
cludes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the lan-
guage of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man. 
3. The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the 
parties and their declaration of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an 
action for rectification. The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical pol-
icy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would in-
terpret utterances in ordinary life. The boundaries of this reception are in some 
respects unclear. But this is not the occasion on which to explore them. 
4. The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a rea-
sonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of 
words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is 
what the parties using those words against the relevant background would rea-
sonably have been understood to mean. The background may not merely enable 
the reasonable man to choose between the possible meaning of words which are 
ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the 
parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax (see 
Mannai Investment Co. Ltd. V Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd). 
5. The 'rule' that words should be given their "natural and ordinary meaning" reflects 
the commonsense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have 
made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if 
one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something must have 
gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to the 
parties an intention which they plainly could not have had,' 
The first principle emphasizes that the background or 'matrix of facts' is attributed an 
increasingly important role in the interpretation of contracts: it is no longer necessary 
to establish that the language is ambiguous or vague in order to introduce evidence of 
surrounding circumstances: '[t]he starting point is that language in all legal texts con-
veys meaning according to the circumstances in which it is used. It follows that the 
context must always be identified and considered before the process of construction 
or during it. It is therefore wrong to say that the court may only resort to evidence of 
the contextual scene when ambiguity has arisen'.224 This means that words are given 
the meaning ascertained from the document itself and the admissible background 
knowledge which could reasonably have been available to the parties at the time of 
m Lord Steyn In Westminster City Council v National Asylum Service, [2002] 1WLR. 2956, par. 5. 
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contract conclusion. If the matrix of fact indicates that parties actually assign to the 
language a meaning which is disparate from the plain meaning, the court is willing to 
give effect to the latter meaning.225 
While the starting point for interpretation is the actual wording of the contract in light 
of the background or surrounding context, the second principle attempts to give guid-
ance as to what may be included within this background. Lord Hoffman in his second 
principle, however, creates confusion, by stating that the 'background' may include 
'absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the 
document would have been understood by a reasonable man.'226 In Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International v Ali he attempts to clarify this and affirms: 'I did not think it 
necessary to emphasize that I meant anything which a reasonable man would have 
regarded as relevant. I was merely saying that there is no conceptual limit to what can 
be regarded as background (...) I was certainly not encouraging a trawl through "back-
ground" which could not have made reasonable person think that parties must have 
departed from conventional usage.'227 In general, the relevant background includes 
the factual, legal and commercial context known to the parties. This includes, but is 
not limited to, evidence of industrial and commercial practices, technical terminology 
as understood by experts and professionals, market conditions and the state of law.228 
Another aspect to consider is the underlying purpose of the agreement229. The court 
will seek to reveal the commercial purpose of the contract and adopt a meaning which 
is congruent with this purpose. The meaning of the words as expressed remains the 
primary focus. Courts may not use the commercial purpose of the transaction to re-
write the contract. 
Information may be included as background subject to the condition that such infor-
mation is reasonably available to parties: common knowledge to both parties at the 
moment of contract conclusion. Apart from this underlying condition, what may, and 
will be considered part of the matrix of facts depends on the nature of the contract. 
For example, third parties who are not involved in the drafting process, but do derive 
rights from a contract, are unlikely to be aware of the surrounding circumstances at 
the time of contract conclusion. It seems that where more parties are involved, the 
background should be limited to the written agreement and factual, legal and com-
225 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, Mannai Invest-
ment Co. Ltd. v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co. Ltd [1997] 2 WLR 945. 
226 Lord Hoffman in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
227 [2002] 1 A.C. 251, par. 39. See also Lord Steyn in Mannai Investment Co. Ltd. v Eagle Star Life Assurance 
Co. Ltd [1997] 2 WLR 945. 
228 Steyn 2003, p. 7, Chuah 2001, p. 295. 
229 Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 and Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngar Hansen-
Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989. 
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mercial knowledge of a general nature. In a contract involving only two parties, more 
detailed information may be considered.230 
The third principle limits what may be included in the background. Excluded from con-
sideration are parties' previous negotiations and declarations of subjective intent. This 
is a corollary of the parol evidence rule. The exclusion of prior evidence for the inter-
pretation of the contract is justified in that it seeks to '(...) discourage curial exploration 
of the unfathomable depths of subjective intentions'.231 In addition, parties' negotiat-
ing positions may alter during the negotiation process, and these developments can-
not be directly understood from the final written agreement; to admit evidence of 
prior negotiations, would introduce uncertainty and unpredictability into the process 
of dispute resolution. On the other hand, prior evidence may shed light on facts which 
would clarify certain questions of interpretation. 
The boundaries of the foregoing rule are not always clear. In Prenn v Simmonds232 for 
example, Lord Wilberforce appears to admit evidence of prior negotiations as part of 
the matrix of fact, while it supplies a commercial purpose for the agreement, which 
would be frustrated by the suggested interpretation of the contract. In Partenreederei 
M.S. Karen Oltman v Scarsdale Shipping Co. Ltd233 evidence of pre-contractual negotia-
tions was admitted to show that parties had reached consensus concerning the par-
ticular meaning to be given to certain words used in the final contract. Likewise, in 
Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co234, the Court of Session admitted 
prior evidence relating to a loan transaction to establish the state of both parties' 
knowledge of the surrounding circumstances at the time of contract conclusion. 
The fourth principle emphasizes the focus on the meaning of the contractual docu-
ment as a whole as opposed to the meaning of the words alone: '[t]he meaning which 
a document (or any other utterance) would covey to a reasonable man is not the same 
as the meaning of its words.'235 While words cannot be taken from their context, the 
emphasis lies with the contextual meaning of the contract as opposed to the textual 
meaning of individual words. Even where words of a document are clear, the court 
must interpret these words against the objective surrounding circumstances known to 
the parties at the time of contract conclusion.236 
230 Association of British Travel Agents Ltd v British Airways pic [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 169, 
231 B&B Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd. v Brian A Cheeseman Associates Pty Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 227. 
232 [1971] 1 WLR 1381, p. 1385. 
233 [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 708, p. 712. 
234 [1998] S.C. 657. 
235 See Lord Hoffman's fourth principle in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwlch Building 
Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
236 Westminster City Council v National Asylum Service [2001] EWHC Admin 138. 
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Finally, the fifth principle attempts to shed light on the question whether the approach 
to seek the natural and ordinary meaning of the words is entirely abandoned. Lord 
Hoffman points out that if the language of the contract can be given its natural and 
ordinary meaning, this provides a strong indication that the words must be interpreted 
in this manner. However, in the end, the contractual language is ascribed a meaning 
which makes sense in the light of the surrounding circumstances and underlying pur-
pose of the contract. While the ascertainment of the ordinary and plain meaning re-
mains the natural starting point for the interpretation of contracts, the court is not 
obliged to attribute this ordinary meaning to the parties' intention, while the parties 
may have had another intention: parties can make mistakes.237 
Concluding, English law adheres to a predominantly objective approach to the inter-
pretation of contracts. Words can only be given meaning within the context in which 
they appear. Despite the traditionally literal interpretation, courts now look beyond 
the four corners of the contract at the object and purpose of the parties' agreement in 
order to clarify the contractual language. More in particular, they may take into ac-
count the surrounding circumstances and give preference to parties' common inten-
tion, even if this diverts from the text in writing.238 
The United States 
American law emanates from the English common law tradition. In the two hundred 
years since the American Declaration of Independence, however, the law has devel-
oped in its own distinct way, independent of the English model which lies at its base.239 
When a dispute concerning the interpretation of a contract arises before an American 
court, the court will attempt to give effect to the common intention of the parties. The 
intention is to be determined as of the time and place that the contract was con-
cluded. Like English law, this does not mean that the court will inquire into the parties' 
actual state of mind at the time of contracting: 'if the "actual state of the parties' 
minds" is relevant, then each litigated case must become an extended factual inquiry 
into what was "intended", "meant", "believed" and so on [while if] we can restrict 
ourselves to the "externals" (...) than the factual inquiry will be much simplified and in 
time can be dispensed with altogether as the courts accumulate precedents about 
recurring types of permissible and impermissible "conduct".'240 The court will give the 
contract terms their plain and ordinary meaning, interpreting them as ordinary, aver-
age, or reasonable persons would understand them.241 The common intention of the 
parties then is assimilated with the terms as expressed in the written document. 
237 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W L R 896. 
238 Adamastos Shipping Co. Ltd. v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co Ltd [1959] AC 133. 
239 Zweigert and Kôtz 1998, p. 239. 
240 Gilmore 1999. 
241 Rains v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 246 Neb. 746, 523 N.W.2d 506 [Neb. 1994], 
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Traditionally, like English law, American courts placed a strong emphasis on the plain 
meaning of the contract language. The court was not willing to give effect to any 
meaning which was disparate from this plain meaning. Even if witness testimony was 
able to show that the parties assigned a different but common meaning to the con-
tractual language, the plain meaning triumphed.242 Presently, however, the courts 
have taken a more liberal approach toward contract interpretation. For example, 
where parties have attached the same meaning to a term of the contract, this common 
meaning will prevail, regardless of the ordinary meaning of that term.243 The cases in 
which parties share a common meaning, however, are rare. More often, parties will 
have attached a different meaning to the same contractual term, or have given little or 
no thought to the precise meaning of the former term at the time of contract conclu-
sion. The court then is obliged to search for a meaning which might not accord with 
parties' intentions at all. While the approach to contract interpretation has become 
less strict, the court in these situations will still take a predominantly objective ap-
proach to contract interpretation and 'turn on the meaning that reasonable persons in 
the position of the parties would have attached if they had given the matter 
thought.'244 Similar to English law, American law recognizes several principles and rules 
that guide the courts in their task of interpretation. 
The overarching principle of contract interpretation is that a court may take into ac-
count all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction. It is no longer neces-
sary for the contract language to be qualified as ambiguous and vague in order to ad-
mit evidence of surrounding circumstances for the purpose of interpretation.245 It is 
indeed questionable whether language can be ascribed a meaning at all when divorced 
from its context: '[tjhere is no surer way to misread any document than to read it 
literally.'246 These surrounding circumstances may include any oral or written state-
ments and other conduct which manifested the parties' assent, any evidence of an 
applicable course of dealing, performance or trade usage. In addition, the court may 
have reference to the state of the world, including the state of law.247 The importance 
of the surrounding circumstances is reflected in the judicial emphasis on purpose in-
terpretation.248 In resolving interpretation disputes, a meaning which favors the pur-
pose of the agreement will prevail rather than a meaning which would frustrate this 
242 Conway 2005, p. 119, Hotchkiss v National City Bank, 200 Fed. 287, 293 (SDNY 1911), affirmed 201 Fed. 
664 (2d Cir. 1912) affirmed 231 US 60 (1913). 
243 Berke Moore Co. v Phoenix Bridge Co., 98 A.2d 150, 156 (NH 1953) and Sunbury Textile Mills v. Com-
misioner, 585 F.2d 1190 (3rd Cir. 1978). See also Restatement Second §201(1). 
244 Farnsworth 1999, p. 465-466. See also Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v Florida EC Ry, 339 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 
1968). 
245 Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v CXS Transp., 42 F.3d 1125 (7lh Cir. 1994, Berg v Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 230 
(Wash. 1990). Cf. The first principle of contract interpretation under English law. 
246 Judge Learned Hand in Guiseppi v Walling 144 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1944). 
247 Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commn. V Lynn, 514 F.2d. 829 (DC Cir. 1975). 
248 Farnsworth 1999, p. 468. See also New England Structures v Loranger, 234 N.E.2d. 888 (Mass. 1968). 
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purpose.249 In addition, the conduct of the parties after the conclusion of the contract 
might illuminate the meaning attached to contract language. Such practical construc-
tion is given great weight by the courts: 'the interpretation placed upon a contract by 
the parties themselves, before a dispute has arisen, is entitled to the greatest 
weight.'250 Sometimes the court may also be able to discern the meaning of the words 
from the context of the contract itself; contract recitals, referring to the surrounding 
circumstances and the objectives of the parties-even though regarded as subordinate 
to the operative part of the contract-may help to ascertain the meaning of contractual 
language. As stated by a court: 'Although they [the recitals] do not ordinarily form any 
part of the real agreement, they do indicate the background of the contract, and may 
be referred to in determining the intent of the parties where its operative parts are 
ambiguous.'251 The language itself however, poses a natural limit on the extent to 
which the court can take in to account surrounding circumstances: '[t]he more bizarre 
and unusual an asserted interpretation is, the more convincing must be the testimony 
that supports it. At what point the court should cease listening to testimony that white 
is black and that a dollar is fifty cents is a matter for sound judicial discretion and 
common sense.'252 
I have indicated that the court may take into account all relevant surrounding circum-
stances in order to ascertain the meaning to be given to the language of the contract. 
However, a corollary of the parol evidence rule, which restricts prior evidence to be 
invoked in order to add or contradict contract the terms of a completely integrated 
agreement, acts to exclude from the surrounding circumstances evidence of prior 
negotiations. This rule, referred to as the plain meaning rule, limits the type of evi-
dence to be included under the surrounding circumstances. Justification for this rule is 
sought in arguments similar to those under English law. First of all, the exclusion of 
prior evidence may allow for a faster trial while the pre-trial process is shortened. In 
addition, if prior evidence is excluded, issues concerning contract interpretation will be 
increasingly left to judges as issues of law rather than issues of fact. The former are 
addressed by a trial judge instead of a jury and reviewed on a plenary rather than 
erroneous basis.253 Similar to English law, the rule that prior negotiations are excluded 
from the surrounding evidence in light of contract interpretation, has been subject to 
several exceptions. 
In the US, two approaches have been taken with regard to the application of the plain 
meaning rule. Under both approaches, the court will first assess whether the language 
249 Restatement Second §201(1): 'if the principle purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great 
weight.' 
250 Farnsworth 1999, chapter 7. 
251 Ohio Valley Gas v. Blackburn, 445 N.E.2d 1378 (Ind. App. 1983), p. 1383. 
252 Corbin 1944, p. 623. 
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in dispute lacks clarity, i.e. is ambiguous or vague, before continuing to the second 
stage, namely the interpretation of this ambiguous or vague language. Under the old 
and more restrictive view of the plain meaning rule, incorporated in Restatement 
First254, the court can only look at the language itself in light of surrounding circum-
stances, but is not allowed to resort to evidence of prior negotiations in order to estab-
lish whether the language lacks clarity (stage 1). The judge may use evidence of prior 
negotiations to interpret the language only if this language is found to be ambiguous 
or vague. While this restrictive view still finds expression in judicial opinions, the rule 
has gradually been relaxed under the recognition that the meaning of contract lan-
guage is often dependent upon its context. The liberal view, incorporated in Restate-
ment Second (§212), does admit evidence of prior negotiations in order to determine 
whether the meaning of the language lacks clarity (stage l).255 Both Restatement First 
and Second will allow the court to invoke evidence of prior negotiations in order to 
ascertain the meaning of language which is ambiguous or vague (stage 2). It is impor-
tant to note that even under the liberal approach, evidence of prior negotiations is 
only admissible if it is offered for the purpose of interpreting the terms in writing, and 
not to contradict or add to them. 
In interpreting contract language, the court may also rely on various other rules of 
interpretation. Many of these rules are also found in English law and I will therefore 
not explicate in detail the meaning of each of these rules in this paragraph. First of all, 
the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, requires the court to interpret a number 
of listed items to the exclusion of others.256 Another rule relates to the expression 
ejusdem generic (of the same kind).257 A contract must, to the extent possible, be in-
terpreted as a whole, giving effects to all of its parts. Interpretations which would 
negate or give no effect to a provision are to be avoided.258 From the foregoing rule, 
emanates the principle that the court will attempt to interpret the language of the 
contract in a consistent manner: words that are used more than once are assumed to 
have the same meaning throughout the contract259 in addition to a meaning that is 
consistent with the meaning of the contract in general.260 Contractual clauses which 
have received greater attention in negotiations and drafting are considered to be more 
likely to reflect the parties' intentions. In accordance with the foregoing, separately 
254 Restatement First §230. See also WWW Assocs. V Giancontierl 566 NE.2d 639 (NY 1990). 
255 Pacific Gas & Electric Co, v G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. 442 P.2d, 641, 644 (Cal. 1968). 
256 See Famsworth 1999, p. 471 in reference to Central Hous. Inv. Corp. v Federal Natl. Mortgage Assn., 248 
P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1952), where the court held that mortgage covering 'all heating, plumbing and lighting fix-
tures and equipment' did not cover cooling and refrigerating equipment. 
257 See Farnsworth 1999, p. 471 in reference to State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v Butler 753 P.2d 
1334 (Okl. 1987) where the court held that the 'reservation of an interest in 'oil, gas and other mineral 
rights'did not include coal. 
258 Brinderson-Newberg Joint Venture v Pacific Erectors, 871 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1992). 
255 Taracorp, Inc. v NL Indus., 73 F.3d 738 (7th Clr. 1996). 
260 Barco Urban Renewal Corp. v Housing Auth., 674 F2.d 1001 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
negotiated terms are given greater weight than standardized terms.261 Important also, 
is the contra proferentem rule.262 When the language supplied by one party is suscep-
tible to two interpretations, one of which favors each party, the one that is less favor-
able to the party that supplied the language is preferred.263 This rule is based on the 
ground that the party against whom the rule operates has had the possibility of draft-
ing the language in such a manner to avoid the dispute. While this rule is most com-
monly applied in consumer contracts, it has also been made applicable to commercial 
agreements.264 In addition, an interpretation of a term which favors the public interest 
is preferred over any other interpretation of the term. The justification for this rule 
may be found in the argument that terms which are contrary to public policy are inva-
lid, a justification unrelated to the intentions of the parties. Finally, in reference to 
standard terms. Restatement Second (§211) states that '[sjuch a writing is interpreted 
whenever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, without regard to 
their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the writing.' The effect of 
this provision is that standard terms will be interpreted in a manner such that the 
equal treatment of parties in similar situations prevails over any meaning an individual 
party may have ascribed to the term. 
The Netherlands 
In contrast to the US and England, Dutch law takes a primarily subjective approach 
towards contract interpretation: the common or actual intention of the parties will 
prevail and contract interpretation is governed by reasonableness and equity. The 
celebrated Dutch Haviltex-case265 lays down the criteria for the interpretation of con-
tracts. In this case, the court rejects both an approach based solely on the literal ex-
pression of parties' intentions, as well as a purely subjective approach to contract 
interpretation. Instead, the court stipulates that a contract should be interpreted ac-
cording to parties' intentions and expectations in the given circumstances. Even when 
the words seem clear on their face (plain meaning), the court should take into account 
both the intention of the parties as well as the surrounding circumstances in order to 
determine if the words really are clear. The parties' intention stretches beyond a 
party's own intentions, to comprise what each party believed and could reasonably 
have believed that the other intended with the contract. As such, each party is granted 
protection in their justified reliance on the meaning they gave to the words as well as 
their justified reliance that the other party meant the same. 
261 Restatement Second §203(d). 
262 Farnsworth 1999, p. 472 distinguishes this rule from the foregoing rules, while the contra proferentem 
rule helps to determine the legal effect which must be given to the language independent from the meaning 
that parties may have attached to it. This is in line with his distinction between the interpretation of con-
tracts, i.e. giving meaning to the language of the contract and the construction of the contract, i.e. giving 
legal effect to the language of the contract, I do not make this distinction in this chapter. 
263 Production Credit Assn. v Wynne, 474 N.W.2d 735 (S.D. 1991). 
264 Bay State Smelting Co v Ferric Industries 292 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1961). 
265 Supra n. 311. 
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The Haviltex-standard is generally characterized as a subjective-objective criterion. The 
primary goal is to find the common meaning that parties have attached to the lan-
guage of the contract, and if this is not possible, e.g. because parties have not agreed 
to a common meaning, courts will take a more objective approach towards interpreta-
tion. When parties have agreed to a common meaning, this meaning will prevail, even 
though the latter might not coincide with the ordinary linguistic meaning of the term. 
Tjittes (2005) argues that while it is difficult to discern the internal will of parties, the 
common intention must be found in extrinsic evidence. Extrinsic evidence includes, but 
is not limited to, the nature of the contract, evidence of prior negotiations, and par-
ties' subsequent conduct. Most often however, parties will not have attached the 
same meaning to a contract term, or not given the meaning of the term specific 
thought at all. In this case, the Haviltex-standard allows a court to invoke parties' rea-
sonable or justified expectations. In order to ascertain parties' reasonable or justified 
expectations, the court does not invoke the 'eye' of the reasonable person, but instead 
investigates which meaning parties acting in a reasonable manner could have given to 
the terms expressed in the contract. The reasonableness thus reflects an objective 
element: the ascribed meaning must be reasonable in the given context. In order to 
determine this reasonable meaning, the court may take into account the surrounding 
circumstances such as the nature and purpose of contract266, negotiation and drafting 
history267, parties' statements and (subsequent) conduct, the nature of the parties, 
trade usages and other relevant facts surrounding the transaction.268 For example, a 
court may consider the recitals or preambles in order to shed light on the interpreta-
tion which must be given to a specific term.269 Discerning the underlying intention of 
the parties, however, remains the determinative element in giving meaning to the 
language of the contract. 
In principle the interpretation of contracts is governed by the Haviltex-norm. In two 
cases concerning collective labour or employment agreements in 1993270 the Dutch 
Supreme Court ruled, however, that in particular circumstances, the text of the 
agreement may be decisive. A collective employment agreement ('Collectieve ar-
beidsovereenkomst') ('CAO') is an agreement which is negotiated between employee 
and employer organisations and regulates their rights and obligations. While this con-
tract creates rights and obligations for employees, they are not themselves involved in 
the negotiations and drafting of the contract terms; the negotiations are conducted by 
representatives of the former. When a contract creates rights for third parties, who 
were not present during the negotiations of the contract, the court will prescribe an 
266 HR 1 July 198S, NJ 1986, 692 (Frenkel/KRO), HR 26 June 1998, NJ 1998, 660, HR 17 December 1976, NJ 
1977, 241 (Bunde/Erckens). 
267 HR 13 January 1978, NJ 1978, 302 (Swimming pool/dlligentia), HR 1 July 1982, NJ 1983, 682 (Codicil). 
268 Wissink 2002. 
269 HR 30 November 1951, NJ 1953, 76 (Van Stljverden/Olst). 
270 HR 17 September 1993, NJ 1994,173 (Gerritse/Has), HR 24 September 1993, NJ 1994,174 (Hoi/ EIMK). 
interpretation according to an objective standard. Under this standard, the focus is on 
the wording of the contract. Consideration is given primarily to the parties' intention 
as expressed in the written document, explanatory texts available to third parties and 
other relevant information that is publicly available.271 While this method of interpre-
tation was specifically developed for the interpretation of CAO agreements, it has 
been extended to apply to other types of contracts that affect third parties. A third 
party refers to a party that has become involved, but was not present during negotia-
tions and thus could not influence the content of the agreement (e.g. compensation 
agreements, contracts concerning the transfer of property and arbitration regulations). 
It is important to note that the mere fact that the rights and obligations of a third party 
are affected does not justify the application of the CAO interpretative standard perse; 
it must lie within the nature of the contract to affect or influence the legal position of 
third parties.272 
In DSM/Fox, the Dutch Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the two different views 
with regard to contract interpretation laid down in the cases of Haviltex and CAO, and 
indicated that these should not be seen as opposing and contradictory, but rather as a 
continuum. 
The standards of interpretation discussed above should be read while keeping in mind 
that the interpretation of contracts under Dutch law is governed by the principle of 
good faith, regardless of the specific approach taken.273 Parallel English and American 
law, general principles of contract interpretation exist in order to aid the process of 
interpretation: (1) a contractual stipulation must be understood in sense that it has 
effect rather than no effect; (2) the contra proferentem rule establishes that in case of 
uncertainties, general conditions drawn up by professional party are in principle con-
strued in favour of the other party, especially when the other party is a consumer; (3) 
written or typed additions to general conditions prevail over printed conditions; (4) a 
contractual provision must be interpreted in the light of the contract as a whole274; 
and (5) when the main part or 'body' of an agreement contradicts with the recitals or 
appendix, greater weight will be given to the meaning of the terms as defined in the 
body of the agreement. 
Implications for the complexity of contracts 
The interpretation of contract terms takes place at the back end of the contracting 
process and has an effect on the level of enforcement costs. English and American 
courts take a predominantly objective approach toward the interpretation of contracts 
in contrast to the subjective approach adhered to in many civil law jurisdictions. The 
271 Wissink 2004. 
372 HR 9 July 2004, NJ 2005,496 (Hoeves/van Dijk). 
273 HR 20 February 2004, NJ 2005,493 (DSM-Chemie/Fox). 
274 HR 18 November 1983, NJ 1984, 272. 
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modern development of contract interpretation in the US and England has created an 
increasing role for surrounding circumstances, which seems to close the gap between 
civil and common law systems with regard to rules on contract interpretation. Despite 
this development, the common intention as objectively expressed by the parties, re-
mains leading. An elaborate and precise account of parties' intentions and thereby 
obligations and rights, will produce substantial benefits for parties contracting in the 
US and England once a dispute arises before court. The general preclusion of prior 
negotiations with regard to the interpretation of contracts may for example induce 
parties to pay greater attention to the drafting of Recitals. Even though Recitals are 
generally not given legal effect, they are able to shed light on the surrounding circum-
stances, e.g. the positions of parties, and parties' negotiations and objectives upon 
entering into the contract.275 In addition, definitions of specific terms and words will 
guide the courts in the interpretation of the language of the contract, giving the lan-
guage its special or technical sense if so specified. The contracting costs associated 
with a detailed description of parties' rights and obligations and the specific use of 
language, will be offset by the benefits. A predominantly objective approach to con-
tract interpretation enables parties to rely upon the judge to strictly adhere to the 
writing of the said document. 
In contrast to common law judges, judges in the Netherlands will seek the actual inten-
tion of parties and are permitted to take into account any evidence, including evidence 
of prior negotiations, to establish this intention. Parties will not be restricted in the 
provision of evidence in order to establish and prove the definition of the language of 
the contract. The rules of contract interpretation do not seem to provide the parties 
with an incentive to specify their obligations and rights in great detail.276 Such a liberal 
interpretation, however, seems to provide the parties with the opportunity to strategi-
cally advance a favorable interpretation of the contract. A detailed written account of 
the parties' agreement on the other hand supplies the court with an instruction on 
how parties' rights and obligations must be construed and may assist in recovering the 
actual intentions of parties. A detailed account of parties' agreement thus reduces the 
risk that one of the parties will strategically advance a favorable interpretation. How-
ever, contracts governed by Dutch law and litigated in the Netherlands, more often 
than not, do not include detailed lists of definitions, rights and obligations or extensive 
recitations of black letter law. Obviously the associated contracting costs are not justi-
fied. A reason might be that the advancement of a particular interpretation of the 
terms ex post, becomes less attractive due to the existence of general conventions of 
275 Under English law, recitals may be invoked in order to ascertain the meaning of an ambiguous or vague 
term in the body of the agreement. However, when the language in the operative or main part of the 
agreement is clear, recitals will not be accepted as determinative (see Fontaine and De Ly 2006, p. 89 and p. 
89, n. 50). 
™ An exception can be made for the case of CAO agreements and comparable cases, where the judge has 
taken a more objective approach. 
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fairness such as the principle of good faith, These conventions, serve to prevent unjust 
outcomes. In addition, a greater level of trust might exist between the contracting 
parties on the one hand, and the contracting parties and the third party adjudicator on 
the other hand. The former assumption will negatively affect strategic advancement of 
interpretation, while the latter situation implies that parties entrust the judge to inter-
pret the language of the contract in a fair and just manner. The level of trust in the 
respective countries will and conventions of fairness such as good faith will be dis-
cussed in other sections of this chapter. 
Dealing with omitted cases (implied terms) 
In addition to the interpretation of the written and established terms of a contract, 
circumstances may arise for which parties have not provided in their contract. There 
are two types of situations in which omissions may occur. In the first place, parties may 
foresee a potential circumstance or dispute, but make the decision not to deal with 
the specific situation in the contract as it is unlikely that the precise circumstance will 
arise. Businessmen will often 'pay more attention to describing the performance in an 
exchange than to planning for contingencies or defective performance or to obtaining 
legal enforceability of their contracts'.*'7. The conscious omittance may also relate to 
the reluctance of one party to disclose certain information. In the second place, the 
specific situation may simply not have been foreseen by either of the parties. Some 
situations are so unlikely to occur such that neither party gives these situations any 
thought. In addition, circumstances likely to arise may be overlooked due to haste or 
inadvertence; such unforeseeability increases with the lifespan of the contract. In 
either of the two foregoing cases, the courts may decide to supply a term in order to 
fill the gap left by the parties. These terms which are to be supplied by the courts, are 
traditionally referred to as 'implied terms'. The associated rules are commonly de-
scribed as 'default rules' or 'gap-filling rules'. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss 
the manner in which each legal system attempts to deal with this omission of terms. 
England 
Closely linked and not always easily distinguished from contractual interpretation, is 
the power of the English Courts to imply terms where parties have omitted them. 
Terms may be implied by statute, custom or usage, or may be developed by the courts. 
The terms implied by courts may be divided into two groups: (1) terms implied in fact 
and (2) terms implied in law. Whereas the distinction between these two terms is not 
always clear, terms implied in fact are created for detailed contracts on an individual 
basis. These terms are implied in order to give effect to parties' intention on matters 
which they omitted to express in their contract. Terms will be implied in law where 
precedent or statute has incorporated such terms in particular types of contracts. 
Terms implied in law are used to incorporate into contracts certain basic rules of law, 
271 In the US such tendency is enforced by the parol evidence rule. 
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for example to achieve greater fairness. When the term implied in law is of a manda-
tory nature, parties' intentions play a secondary role; parties cannot contract around 
such a term. 
Terms implied by custom or trade usage 
Terms may be implied by custom or trade usage. A custom is often local and idiosyn-
cratic and most customs have existed for a long time. When parties both understand 
the custom to be part of their contract, such a customary term will generally be en-
forced. However, such a term must be consistent with the express terms of the 
agreement and the rules of common law. In addition, such customary rules should be 
reasonable.278 Trade usage on the other hand, is assimilated with a particular area of 
business. Transacting on basis of a certain trade usage is often so straightforward that 
parties do not bother to explicitly incorporate this usage into their contract. In order to 
be enforced, trade usages must be both reasonable and certain. A court will generally 
not enforce an unreasonable trade usage. However, if a party is aware of the usage 
and agrees to its incorporation, albeit not as an explicit written term in the contract, 
then this party is considered bound, even if the usage is unreasonable. In addition, 
trade usages should be generally recognized in the trade or industry and not only by 
the parties themselves. Finally, parties must show that they both intended to be 
bound by the trade usage even though they did not explicitly incorporate this usage 
i . 279 
into their contract. 
Terms implied by statute 
Statute may also serve as a source of implied terms. Depending on the type of con-
tract, different kinds of terms may be implied. The SGA 1979 for example, implies a 
number of terms into all contracts for the sale of goods, most of which refer to condi-
tions of quality. These conditions apply to all contracts, whether the buyer is a private 
party or acts in business capacity. Examples are s,13, which regulates that goods must 
strictly respond with their description, and s,14(2a) and (3b) which determine that the 
goods sold must be of 'satisfactory quality' and 'reasonably fit for their purpose'. The 
breach of such conditions is strict, i.e. the buyer is not obliged to prove fault on the 
side of the seller.280 Contracts for services are governed by the SGSA 1982, which im-
plies terms with regard to the quality and fitness of the transfer of goods (excluding 
the transfer of property and ownership) and supply of services.281 
278 Hutton v Warren (1836) M and W 466,150 ER 517. 
279 Cunliffe-Owen v leather and Greenwood [1967] 1 W L R 1421. 
280 Under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 ('UCTA 1977') it Is not possible to contract out of liability for 
breach in light of s,14(2a), (2b) and (2c) or s.13 when it concerns consumer sales. The terms are thus manda-
tory. In case of non-consumer sales, any exclusion or limitation of liability for breach of the foregoing sec-
tions is subject to a 'reasonableness' test (UCTA 1977, s.6). 
281 SGSA 1982, s . l l stipulates that the terms may be 'negatived or varied by express agreement, or by the 
course of dealing between parties, or by such usage as binds both parties to the contract' (unless prohibited 
under the UCTA 1977). 
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Terms implied by the courts 
With regard to terms implied by courts, it can be concluded that the law is 'vague and 
lacking in definite principles'.282 The importance of the distinction between terms im-
plied in fact and terms implied in law seems to be that the test for terms implied in law 
appears to be less stringent than for terms implied in fact.283 Conventionally, courts 
would only commit to imply a term in fact where it was necessary to do so, while the 
test for the implication of a term in law seems to lie somewhere between 'necessity' 
and 'reasonableness'. 
Traditionally, English courts have taken a cautious approach with regard to the implica-
tion of terms284, while freedom of contract and parties' autonomy presides:'(...) it is a 
dangerous thing lightly to imply what they [the parties] have not expressed (...) [T]he 
court ought not to imply a term into a contract unless there arises from the language 
of the contract itself (...) such an inference that the parties must have intended the 
stipulation in question [so] that the Court is necessarily driven to the conclusion that it 
must be implied.'285 Whenever the court implies a term, it will need to consider 
amongst others, the type and nature of the contract, the economic particularities of 
the situation, the compliance with existing law, parties' respective bargaining posi-
tions, the burden imposed on one of the parties, and the general principles and values 
of the legal system. In the following paragraphs I will give an overview of the develop-
ments with regard to the implication of terms by courts. 
The case of the Moorcock286, one of the more traditional cases with regard to the im-
plication of terms, refers to (1) the source of the implied term: the implied term must 
emanate from the presumed intention of the parties and (2) the circumstances under 
which a court may imply a term: the court may imply a term when this is necessary in 
order to give business efficacy to the transaction. With regard to the first element, 
Lord Justice (U) Bowen determined that a term should be implied to give effect to 
parties' unexpressed intention: 'the presumed intention of the parties with the object 
of giving to the transaction such efficacy as both parties must have intended that at all 
events it should have/287 The courts thus become involved in discovering the hypo-
thetical or actual intention of the parties, and with regard to the implication of terms 
take a subjective approach. With regard to the second element: a court may only imply 
a term if this is necessary in order to make the contract work. In this particular case the 
282 Peden 1998, p. 131 referenced by Kornet 2006, p. 213. 
283 McKendrick 2003, p. 375. 
2 M Easton v Hitchcock [1912] 1 KB 535, which illustrates the reluctance of the court to imply a confidentiality 
clause. As a consequence, parties now frequently incorporate explicit confidentiality clauses into their 
contracts. 
285 Hamlyn and Co. v. Wood and Co. Kay U . , [1891] 2 QB, p. 494. 
286 (1889) 14 PD 64. 
117 Ibid. p. 68. 
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term was necessary in order to give business efficacy to the contract. In the years fol-
lowing the Moorcock, the necessity test established itself in case law. 
The necessity test also played a role in Shirlaw v Southern Foundries where Lord Jus-
tice Mackinnon found that: 'Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied 
and need not be expressed is something so obvious that it goes without saying; so 
that, if while one of the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander were 
to suggest some express provision for it in the agreement, they would testily suppress 
him with a common, "oh, of course'".288 The necessity test in the foregoing case was 
one of the 'officious bystander'. Both of the foregoing tests, the business efficacy test 
and the officious bystander test, take into account the necessity of implying a term 
and import a subjective element into the reasoning of the court.289 These tests rein-
force the fact that English courts exercise restraint with regard to the implication of 
terms. They will not imply a term merely because it would be reasonable: 'they will not 
(...) improve the contract which the parties have made for themselves, however desir-
able the improvement might be.'290 
In contrast to the foregoing, Lord Denning is of the opinion that a court should not 
only imply a term if parties would have agreed to such a term, but whenever it would 
be reasonable to do so, taking into account the surrounding circumstances of the 
291 292 
case. In Liverpool City Council v Irwin , the House of Lords rejected Lord Denning's 
(wider) test of reasonableness.293 The case concerned the question whether a term, 
relating to the obligation of the tenant to keep the common parts of the property in 
repair and properly lit, should be implied in a tenant agreement. The House of Lords 
did imply a such a term, but argued that such a term may not be implied solely on 
reasonableness, but that it must also be necessary to do so: 'I cannot go as far as Lord 
Denning MR and hold that the courts have any power to imply a term into a contract 
merely because it seems reasonable to do so. Indeed, I think that such a proposition is 
288 [1939] 2 KB 206, p. 227. See also Scrutton U In Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co. [1918] 1 KB 592, p. 
605: '[i]t is such a term that it can confidently be said, that if, at the time the contract was being negotiated, 
some one had said to the parties, "What will happen in such a case?" they would have replied: "Of course, 
so and so will happen; I did not trouble to say that; it is too clear." Unless the court comes to some such 
conclusion as that, it ought not to imply a term which the parties themselves have not expressed,' 
289 While the relation between the two tests has not always been clear, the general rule currently is that 
satisfaction of either test Is sufficient (Treitel 1999, p. 185). 
2!l0Trollope & Colls Ltd. v N.W. Metropolitan Hospital Board [1973] 1 W L R 601, p. 609. 
291 Greaves and Co (Contractors) v Baynham Meikle and Partners [1975] 1 WLR 1095, and In the Court of 
Appeal in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1976] 1 Q B 319, 
292 [1977] AC 239. 
293 In addition to rejecting the reasonableness test as put forward by Lord Denning, Lord Cross of Chelsea In 
this case also addressed the issue put forward by the counsel of the defendants of whether the term con-
cerned a term implied in fact or In law. I will not explicitly address this issue in this chapter. The case is 
generally regarded as an authority on terms implied in law conform the decision of Lord Cross. 
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contrary to a!l authority.'294 The difficulty of the necessity analysis relates to its appli-
cation to the facts.293 The question may be asked if it was really necessary to imply 
such a term into a tenancy agreement, or that it actually concerned a matter of social 
policy regarding the scope of a tenant's obligations. Professor Atiyah rightly states that 
the difference between reasonableness and necessity is not very clear: 'The difference 
in opinion between the judges on this point seems, however, to have been somewhat 
unreal. For it is evident that the formula that implications can only be made when 
necessary is not to be taken too literally. It is not necessary to have lifts in blocks of 
flats ten storeys high (...) though it would no doubt be exceedingly inconvenient not to 
have them. So 'necessary' really seems to mean "reasonably necessary", and that must 
mean, "reasonably necessary having regard to the context and the price". So in the 
end there does not seem to be much difference between what is necessary and what 
is reasonable.'296 
At the same time Liverpool City Council v Irwin was addressed at the House of Lords, 
BP Refinery (Westernpoint) Pty Ltd. v Shire of Hastings297 was on appeal from the Su-
preme Court of Victoria in Australia. In the latter case, a compilation of criteria was 
given which may guide the decision to imply a term in a contract; the different criteria 
may overlap and are not cumulative. The criteria establish that a term must: (1) be 
reasonable and equitable; (2) be required for business efficacy; (3) be obvious; (4) be 
capable of clear expression; and (5) not contradict the express terms of the contract. 
The first criterion is quite straightforward and designates simply that the implied term 
must be reasonable and equitable. The second criterion refers to the business efficacy 
test, e.g. it does not suffice that a term simply improves contractual performance. The 
obviousness of the term refers to the fact that the term must be so obvious that it 
goes without saying; parties must have intended for one and only one particular term 
to be implied.292 The fourth criterion reflects the fact that the term must be capable of 
clear expression; a person without technical or special knowledge should be able to 
understand the term. Finally, an implied term may not contradict an express term of 
the agreement. Sir Bingham accepted the BP Westernpoint criteria in Phillips Electro-
nique v BSky Broadcasting Ltd as 'an accurate and comprehensive statement of the law 
on the implication of terms in to commercial contracts.'299 
294 Lord Salmon in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, p. 262. 
235 McKendrick 2003, p. 385. 
296 Atiyah 2005. 
257 (1977) 180 CLR 266. 
298 For example in the case of Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v. State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 
149 CLR 337, a term concerning the inability of a construction firm to work three shifts a day, could not be 
implied because such a term could have taken numerous forms. 
299 [1995] 3 EMLR 472 at p. 480-482. 
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The United States 
How do US courts decide whether to fill in omitted circumstances in contracts? The 
first step the court will take is to interpret the contract in order to assess whether the 
language of the contract does not cover the situation at hand. The greater the detail 
and comprehensiveness of the agreement, the more reluctant the court will be to 
imply a term. If the court reaches the conclusion that the contract does not provide for 
the specific situation at hand, the court will generally resort to the implication of such 
a term.300 The terms supplied by court have been labeled implied terms or constructive 
terms. The corollary of such a term is a default rule. 
The primary basis for implication of a term is the actual expectation of the parties. If 
the parties share a common expectation with respect to the omitted case, the court 
will give effect to that expectation. Reminiscent of English law, the implication of 
terms entails a subjective test: the actual intention of the parties is sought. However, if 
parties' expectations diverge or if one party has no expectation, the court will apply an 
objective test of expectation. The court will then inquire whether the party which 
carried no expectation should reasonably have been aware of the other party's expec-
tation with regard to the case at hand. Expectation may be inferred from the agree-
ment itself; recitals or provisions dealing with related situations may shed light on the 
parties' intention with respect to the situation at hand. Parties' intention may also be 
deduced from a course of performance, course of dealing or usage301, or from the 
negotiations that led up to the agreement, less the parol evidence rule permits such 
prior evidence to be included. Often, however, no reliable indication of expectation 
can be found and the court must then seek some other basis for implication. It is 
sometimes suggested that if the actual expectations of the parties cannot be deter-
mined, the courts should place itself in the position of the parties and imply a term 
which the parties would have incorporated had they considered the case. However, 
we must keep in mind that courts are faced with bounded rationality and it is ques-
tionable whether they can remedy 'the shortsightedness of individuals, by doing for 
them what they would have done for themselves if their imagination had anticipated 
the march of nature.'302 Farnsworth (1999) argues that in such cases, the court should 
rely on basic principles of justice, such as fairness. Principles of fairness are able to 
effectuate a fair bargain. This means that a term implied may be used to neutralize the 
bargaining position between the parties. Depending on the facts of the case, a judge 
may imply a term such that the burden of expression is placed upon the party that is 
better able to cope with it because of its greater bargaining power and drafting skill. 
300 Haines v City of New York, 364 N.E.2d 820, 822 (N.Y. 1977). 
301 Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4 lh Cir. 1971). 
302 Bentham, J., 'A General View of a Complete Code of Laws' in J. Bowring (ed.), 3 Works of Jeremy Bentham 
1843, p. 191, quoted by Farnsworth 1999, §7.16. 
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Recurring situations often lead to the development of standard terms, which have 
often been laid down in statute and may serve as a source of terms to be implied. Such 
default rules may bring certainty, in the sense that parties may rely on these rules and 
consequently make the decision to forego explicit incorporation of the particular issue 
in their contract. On the other hand, these rules do not always confer with parties' 
expectations and may encourage parties to contract around the particular rule. The 
term penalty default rule has been used to describe default rules which effectuate this 
type of evasive behavior.303 The avoidance of the application of default rules through 
the incorporation of other provisions is costly. Farnsworth (1999) indicates that as an 
increasing number of complex and refined terms exist as defaults, variation by express 
agreement becomes increasingly difficult and costly. Subsequently the court's ten-
dency to treat state-created rules as presumptively fair often leads to judicial disap-
proval of efforts to vary standard implied terms by agreement.304 
Examples of implied terms 
In this paragraph I will discuss some of the terms which have been implied on a regular 
basis by American courts. Examples are the duty of good faith and best efforts, unilat-
eral termination, terms making a party's duties conditional on performance by the 
other party, and terms relating to impracticality and frustration which subsequently 
excuse a party's performance. 
Courts have often supplied terms which require the parties to a contract to exercise 
good faith or fair dealing with regard to the performance and enforcement of the con-
tract.305 Article §1-203 UCC imposes such an obligation of good faith to non-
commercial and commercial contracts. Article §1-203 has a general application while, 
unlike Article 2, it is not restricted to agreements governing the sale of goods. The duty 
of good faith under the UCC has a mandatory character and it may thus not be dis-
claimed by agreement. However, parties may in their contract agree upon other stan-
dards of performance as long as these standards are in accordance with good faith and 
are thus not manifestly unreasonable.306 This mandatory nature of the duty of good 
faith under the UCC is not easily reconcilable with the common law principle that an 
express provision of a contract will supersede the duty of good faith, if the former 
provision is in conflict with the latter. In Riggs Ntl. Bank of Washington v Linch for ex-
ample, the court held that the 'implied duty of good faith cannot be used to override 
or modify explicit contractual terms.'307 While it concerns an implied duty of good 
faith, such a duty will only arise once an agreement has come into existence; the duty 
303 Farnsworth 1999, p. 501, citing Ayres and Gertner 1989, p. 91. 
304 Ibid., Goetz and Scott 1985, p. 298. 
30SAntony's Pier Four v HBC Associations, 583 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1991). 
306 UCC §1-102(3). 
307 36 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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will not bind parties during their earlier negotiations.308 The duty does apply to nego-
tiations concerning the modification of an existing contract. The precise scope of the 
duty depends on the nature of the contract and parties' characteristics. 
In addition, courts often imply a term which imposes on parties a duty to exert best or 
reasonable efforts in the execution and performance of the agreement. Such efforts 
are deemed reasonable in the light of party's abilities and means at its disposal, taking 
into account the justified expectations of the other party. Although the scope of this 
duty is just as vague as the duty of good faith, it is clear that the duty of best efforts is 
more onerous than that of good faith. Courts have implied a duty to exert reasonable 
efforts in a diverse range of agreements such as exclusive dealing agreements and 
percentage leases. 
A judge may also imply rights relating to the termination of an agreement. Unilateral 
termination right may for example be implied in an agreement with an otherwise in-
definite duration. Courts have traditionally applied a termination right in diverse busi-
ness contracts, such as franchise and distributorship agreements, and employment 
contracts, on the ground that parties ordinarily do not intend to maintain their busi-
ness relationships forever and should not be required to continue a relationship once 
it has gone sour.309 An implied right of termination will often include the condition that 
a reasonable period of notice must be taken into account before the right is exercised. 
Terms implied by custom and course of dealing 
Finally, it is important to note that the Article §1-205 UCC establishes that a course of 
dealing and usage of trade may not only be used to aid in the interpretation of a con-
tract term, but may also act to supplement or qualify parties' agreement. More spe-
cifically, Article §1-205(2) UCC describes a usage of trade as a 'practice or method of 
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify 
an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.' A 
usage may be limited to a particular sector or area. Article UCC §1-205(1) describes a 
course of dealing as 'a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particu-
lar transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of under-
standing for interpreting their expressions and their conduct.' In order for a course of 
dealing to come into existence, parties must have conducted comparable previous 
transactions. While the supplementary function of both the course of dealing and 
usage of trade has been 'criticized as an unwarranted encroachment on the general 
rules of law that would otherwise be used to perform this task' , the commentary of 
the Code rejects those cases where usage of trade or course of dealing acts to displace 
308 Husmann, Inc. v Triton Coal Co., 809 P.2d 796 (Wyo. 1991). 
309 Delta Services & Equipment v Ryko Manufacturing Co., 908 F.2d 7 ,11 (5 lh Cir. 1990), City of Homestead v 
Beard, 600 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1992) and Bak-A-Lum Corp. v Alcoa Bldg. Prods. 351 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1976). 
310 Farnsworth 1999, p. 485. 
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established rules of law. The existence of a usage of trade or course of dealing is a 
proof of fact. Parties must produce evidence which may establish the practice or 
method of dealing and prove that the other party had knowledge of this course of 
dealing or usage of trade. 
The Netherlands 
English and American courts apply the doctrine of implied terms to deal with these 
gaps in contracts. Article 6:248(1) DCC stipulates that additional duties and rights can 
be established when parties have failed to provide for a particular term in their con-
tract. Article 6:248(1) DCC states that a contract not only has the legal effects agreed 
to by the parties, but also those effects which, according to the nature of the contract, 
stem from legislation, custom or good faith.311 Dutch legal scholars generally do not 
refer to 6:248(1) DCC as a gap filling provision, but rather refer to the supplementary 
function of legislation, custom or good faith.312 
Article 6:248(1) and statute law 
Hartkamp (2005) argues that the most important function of 6:248(1) DCC is to sup-
plement the terms of a contract through legislation.313 The application of Article 
6:248(1) DCC presents parties with a source of default rules whenever they have omit-
ted to foresee particular circumstances in their contracts. For example, a contract for 
the sale of goods can be concluded and given legal effect even though parties have not 
stipulated a place of performance or manner of payment. Likewise, Article 6:248(1) 
provides for the ability to imply a right to terminate into an agreement whenever the 
parties themselves have not incorporated a comparable right. 
Article 6:248(1) and custom 
Dutch legal scholars usually distinguish between a custom (gewoonte/gebruik) and 
customary condition (bestendig gebruikelijk beding).3U Custom refers to the course of 
behavior followed after the conclusion of a contract, while a customary condition re-
flects the fact that parties assume a particular term to apply to their relationship or 
transaction without expressly incorporating this term in their contract.315 Under Dutch 
law, a custom is regarded as a regularly and generally followed pattern of behavior 
within a certain group, to which the group expects adherence.316 While repetition of 
the behavior is generally required, there are no strict rules concerning the frequency 
or duration.317 In order for a customary condition to develop it is required that the 
311 Besides the supplementary function of good faith, in the sense that good faith can imply terms of the 
contract, article 6:248(1) DCC, also establishes a restrictive and interpretative function of good faith. 
312 Kornet 2006. 
313 Asser-Hartkamp 4-11 2005, p. 294. 
314 Kornet 2006, p. 49. 
315 Asser-Hartkamp 4-11 2005, p. 297. 
316 Asser-Hartkamp 4-11 2005, p. 295, Kornet 2006, p. 47. 
317 Hof Amsterdam, 23 April 1920, NJ1921, 80, Kornet 2006, p. 47. 
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condition or clause is incorporated regularly when the particular type of contract is 
concluded.318 It must also be obvious that the condition is part of the contract al-
though it has not been made explicit. In addition, for the condition to have effect, both 
parties should belong to the same group or if one of the parties is not a member of the 
particular group, this party should at least be aware that the particular condition ap-
plies to the contract between itself and the member.319 The reader should be aware 
that the mere membership of a particular trade association which applies standard 
terms and prescribes these to its members is not sufficient to constitute a customary 
condition or create a custom.320 
Article 6:248(1) and good faith 
Article 6:2 DCC stipulates that every obligation is subject to the requirements of good 
faith, while Article 6:248(1) DCC repeats this explicitly for contracts. The principle of 
good faith is an open-ended norm and it is thus not possible to indicate to which ex-
tent this norm is able to supplement the terms of a contract. Under the supplementary 
function of good faith, the court will take account of the nature of the legal relation-
ship, the justified interests of the parties and other particular circumstances of the 
individual case. The duty of good faith will often supplement a parties' contract with 
duties to consult, to account, to disclose, to make information available, to compen-
sate and to not compete. In insurance relationships, relationships characterized by 
high levels of trust, the court will often imply duties to disclose, due to the high trust 
character of the contract. Similar duties have been implied in contracts between a 
landlord and tenant: a landlord is obliged to investigate the tenant's complaints321, 
while the tenant must inform the landlord of any necessary maintenance which must 
be done, before suspending the rent.322 Parties have also been obliged to make infor-
mation available in order to facilitate the enforcement of contractual performance.323 
Furthermore, the DCC for example does not contain a provision on the unilateral ter-
mination of a contract or relationship. In contracts with an indefinite duration, good 
faith may supply such a right to terminate the relationship.324 However, the implication 
of such a right is made dependent on the circumstances of the case and the justified 
interests of the parties involved.325 Similar to the US, such a unilateral right of termina-
318 Hof Arnhem 2 March 1955, NJ1955,517. 
319 HR 21 September NJ 199Q, 799. 
320 HR 26 February 1960, NJ 1965, 373. 
321 HR 5 October 1990, NJ 1991, 295. 
322 HR 4 January 1991, NJ 1991, 723. 
323 Rb. Alkmaar 12 May 1966, NJ 1967,167. 
32" Asser-Hartkamp 4-11 2005, p. 317-319. 
325 HR 3 December 1999, NJ 2000, 120 (Maison Latour/De Bruijn Wijnkopers), where the Dutch Supreme 
Court held that the grounds were not sufficiently serious to warrant unilateral termination; even though the 
particular contract had been in force for only 6 years, parties' commercial relationship stretched out over 
more than 100 years. 
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tion is often made subject to a reasonable notice period.3""6 In case of a contract of 
definite duration, a court will generally not imply a term relating to unilateral termina-
tion, except if the change of circumstances is such that under the principle of good 
faith it would be unreasonable to hold the party to the contract.327 Finally, if a contract 
does not stipulate a price or fee, good faith can be invoked in order to imply a reason-
able fee or price and good faith can stipulate that parties must cooperate in order to 
render effective performance. 
Implications for the complexity of contracts 
Generally, English and American judges will give effect to the express contract terms 
and refrain from supplementing or qualifying those terms. Anglo-Saxon lawyers be-
lieve foreign courts have greater disposition to meddle with terms of the contract. This 
fear also relates to the extensive application of the doctrine of good faith to the per-
formance and interpretation of contracts in most civil law jurisdictions: '[pjerhaps the 
most important difference lies in the attitude towards incompleteness in contracts: 
whereas common law assumes that the contract has allocated all the risks which may 
arise, civil law systems tend to start with an assumption that the contract may be in-
complete, that it rests on assumption of market conditions remaining the same, res sic 
stantibus, which requires the courts to intervene by rewriting and supplementing con-
tracts in order to cope with changes in circumstances.'328 The restricted implication of 
terms in the US and England - terms will often be implied only if this is reasonable - will 
strengthen the motivation of parties to incorporate all the terms which they believe 
are necessary to describe their relationship. The accompanied costs are offset by the 
benefits. A Dutch judge, in contrast, is not wary to imply a term, and even where stat-
ute or custom may not be used to imply a term, good faith may act as a basis for sup-
plementation. Regardless of parties' efforts to incorporate the relevant terms, the 
court may add to these contractual terms. Parties will thus take less effort to fully 
specify their relationship in a written document. 
Good faith 
In the foregoing paragraphs I already touched briefly upon the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing in relation to the interpretation of contracts and the implication of terms. 
The objective notion of good faith, or the redelijkheid en billijkheid in Dutch law, im-
poses upon parties the general duty to take into account each other's interest. It is an 
open norm of which the precise content depends on the circumstances of the case to 
which it must be applied.329 The principle of good faith is often ascribed three func-
tions in the sphere of contract law: it may aid in the interpretation of contracts, and 
may be used to either supplement or restrict contract terms. 
326 HR 23 December 1994, NJ1995, 263. 
327 Asser-Hartkamp 4-11 2005, p. 318, HR 21 October 1988, NJ 1990, 439 (Mondia/Calanda). 
328 Collins 1996, p. 4. 
325 Hesselink 1998. 
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Good faith is recognized in most civil law jurisdictions, but traditionally lacking in 
common law.330 In the Netherlands, the duty of good faith is laid down in Articles 6:2 
and 6:248(1) DCC. In England by contrast, the House of Lords in Walford v Miles held 
that: 'a duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently 
inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party.'331 The absence of a general duty 
of good faith is often justified by the fact that this would unsettle the commercial bar-
gaining process, undermine values of security and certainty and present a too large 
opportunity for personal values to obstruct otherwise well-reasoned judicial deci-
sions.332 Above all, common law jurisdictions greatly value the freedom of contract and 
fear that a general duty of good faith will impinge upon this hallowed autonomy of 
contracting parties. England and the US have instead developed piecemeal solutions to 
demonstrated problems of unfairness. Concepts such as frustration, misrepresentation 
and promissory estoppel often enact solutions similar to those achieved under the 
application of good faith in civil law. In addition, the implication of contract terms and 
the increasingly liberal approach to the interpretation of contracts in common law, are 
based on comparable notions of fairness. Presently, the US have embodied a principle 
of good faith and fair dealing in UCC §1-203: '[ejvery contract or duty within this Act 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement' and Restate-
ment Second §205: '[ejvery contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and 
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement'.333 Due care must be taken, how-
ever, in assimilating these piecemeal solutions and this codification of the duty of good 
faith with the application of the general duty of good faith in civil law systems. Com-
mon law jurisdictions for example, do not apply the duty of good faith to contract 
negotiations and thereby generally refuse to impose pre-contractual liability when 
negotiations are broken off. In the US and England, the duty of good faith does not 
arise unless an agreement is already in existence, since it is only then that the court 
may supply a term.334 The UCC §1-203 and Restatement Second §205 refer only to the 
enforcement and performance of contracts and not to their formation.335 In most civil 
law jurisdictions, the application of good faith to contract negotiations, does impose a 
liability for breaking off negotiations. Furthermore, common law jurisdictions, which 
embody the view that parties should look after their own interests, are also very reluc-
330 See also Smlts 2002, p. 190-19S, who states that most civil law systems recognize In some manner the 
duty of good faith, but points towards differences between German and Dutch, and French law with regard 
to the restrictive function of good faith and the absence of a general duty of good faith in common law. 
331 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128. 
332 Zwelgert and Kbtz 1998, McKendrick 2003, p. 543-S56. 
333 The first Restatement of Contracts in contrast, did not acknowledge such a good faith duty. See also 
Summerl982, and Eisenberg and Fuller 2006, Chapter 14. 
334 US: Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1965, 26 Wls.2d 683, 133 N,W,2d 267; 
Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 1986, 795 F.2d 291 and 
England: Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128. 
335 See also Carter and Furmston 1994, Farnsworth 1999, chapter 7. 
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tant to recognize duties of disclosure.336 Presently, the complete absence of any duty 
to disclose has been mitigated by the legal obligation to disclose relevant information 
in particular types of contracts, e.g. contracts uberrimae fidei, fiduciary contracts and 
consumer contracts. In addition, misrepresentations during the formation of contracts 
may lead to liability.337 In most civil law jurisdictions to the contrary, the general duty 
to disclosure derives from the good faith principle. 
I will not discuss and compare the particularities of these piecemeal solutions and the 
application of good faith in any further detail in this chapter. The question which is 
interesting in the light of this chapter is how conventions of fairness such as good faith 
may (indirectly) affect the complexity of contracts. 
Implications for the complexity of contracts 
The recognition of a general duty of good faith may provide a basis for cooperative 
behavior and reduce the risks of opportunism: 'as good faith finds a place in the law, 
and as the contractual environment becomes more congenial to trust and risk-taking, 
it is possible that these reciprocal influences will work together to promote ever more 
co-operative thinking in both legal doctrine and contracting practice.'338 Conventions 
of fairness such as good faith will give contracting parties a greater sense of security 
and flexibility in the way that they can do business. In Dutch law, the application of 
good faith to the pre-contractual stage embodies a risk of liability for a party who 
breaks off negotiations in bad faith.339 This potential liability will induce parties to 
enter negotiations with due consideration of each other's interests, which creates an 
environment of trust and mutual respect. The recognition of a duty of good faith in the 
formation of contracts may thus exert a positive influence on the level of trust be-
tween parties, which in turn negatively effects contractual complexity. In contrast, 
English law and the US are reluctant to extend good faith to the pre-contractual stage, 
which may reduce the level of trust and cooperation and thereby increase the com-
plexity of a contract. The absence of a general duty of disclosure in the aforemen-
tioned jurisdictions may also give parties a greater incentive to withhold information 
and thereby exploit information asymmetries. Non-disclosure of information is nega-
tively related to contractual complexity. 
Good faith may also apply to the performance and enforcement of contracts. In 
many civil law jurisdictions, conventions of fairness such as the duty of good faith are 
applied to all aspects of the contracting process including performance and enforce-
ment. Notwithstanding the absence of a general principle of good faith, courts in the 
US and England are also increasingly recognizing and invoking conventions of fairness 
336 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 579; e.g. Restatement Second §161. 
337 England: Hedley Byrne Co Ltd v Heller [1964] A.C. 465 and the Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
3SS Furmston 2003, p. 83. 
339 HR 18 June 1982, NJ 1983, 723 (Plas/Valburg), HR 23 October 1987, NJ 1988, 1017 (VSH/Shell), HR 14 
June 1996, NJ 1997,481 (MBO/Ruiterij) and HR 12 August 2005, NJ 2005, 467 (CBB/JPO). 
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such as good faith with regard to the performance and enforcement of contracts in 
order to achieve fair results. Conventions of fairness have the ability to raise the level 
of trust between parties during the performance of their obligations. Parties enter into 
a contract in order to gain a certain contractual surplus or benefit. The total contrac-
tual surplus or benefit is also referred to as the transactional pie. While each party 
wishes to obtain as large a portion of the transactional pie as possible, a party will 
attempt to contractually safeguard its portion of the pie by allocating its rights and 
obligations as precisely as possible for every potential contingency. This elaborate 
specification creates a relatively complex contract. In a long-term relationship, how-
ever, the level of trust may induce parties to instead rely on conventions of fairness to 
guide the distribution of the pie.340 As a result, simple contracts substitute for complex 
contracts. 
In case of a dispute, the enforcement of a contract will involve a third party adjudica-
tor. The acknowledgment by parties that the third party adjudicator will take into ac-
count good faith in interpreting and supplementing their agreement may reduce the 
incentive to construct relatively complex contracts. More specifically, this may prevent 
parties from incorporating terms which they know will be struck down by the notion of 
good faith in case the contractual dispute is presented to a judge. Furthermore, parties 
may omit to arrange for certain matters in their contract while they trust the judge to 
apply the principle of good faith to achieve a fair interpretation of their contract. This 
signifies that the notion of good faith may reduce enforcement costs. When good faith 
allows contracting parties to rely on the adjudicator to achieve a fair outcome, the 
contracting costs which are incurred in constructing a complex contract ex ante will 
not deliver sufficient ex post gains. 
The duty of good faith plays a greater role in the Netherlands than in the US and Eng-
land. The positive effect of good faith on the level of trust may explain in part why 
contracts in the Netherlands are simple compared to their counterparts in the US and 
England. In the latter jurisdictions, however, the absence of a general duty to disclose 
may negatively affect contractual complexity. In addition, account must be taken of 
the fact that conventions of fairness such as the duty of good faith are increasingly 
gaining ground in countries governed by common law systems. It is thus questionable 
whether the mere existence conversely absence of a general duty of good faith is able 
to justify the observed differences in contractual complexity. 
The role of default rules 
In the foregoing paragraphs, I have discussed general differences between the legal 
environment in England and the US on the one hand and the Netherlands on the other 
hand, including a more in-depth comparison of the rules on contract interpretation. In 
340 See also Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 114 and further. 
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the previous sections I also assumed that parties are not wary to rely on contract law 
default rules. Some authors argue, however, that the observed differences in contrac-
tual complexity across jurisdictions may be ascribed in part to a divergence in default 
rules. These scholars state that parties may designate particular default rules as disad-
vantageous and will thus attempt to circumvent the direct application of these rules. In 
this respect, contracting parties may either completely avoid the application of these 
rules by replacing them with their own creations, or attempt to mitigate the disadvan-
tageous effects. It is impossible to systematically analyze the whole of the contract law 
rules of the respective countries, and the popularity of and the differences between 
these rules, in this chapter. But I will attempt to substantiate the aforementioned 
argument with some examples, which have been given in the literature. 
Collins (1999) for example argues, that parties will enter into relatively complex con-
tracts in order to avoid the liability regime ensued upon them by law. Collins (1999) 
hereby refers to the difference between strict liability, which sets the standard in 
common law jurisdictions, and fault liability, the primary liability regime in many civil 
law jurisdictions, including the Netherlands. In light of breach of contract, fault liability 
will necessitate the fulfillment of four conditions: (1) breach of contract; (2) damage; 
(3) a causal link between the breach and the damage; and (4) the breach of contract 
must be attributable to the breaching party. A regime of strict liability lacks the fourth 
condition: any breach of contract will give the creditor a right to claim damages re-
gardless of the fault of the non-performing party. Common law in principle treats 
every contract as containing a guarantee for performance: non-performance renders 
the debtor liable, whether he was at fault or not. This strict liability may induce a party 
to mitigate the effects of such a liability regime through the incorporation of provisions 
which designate particular contingencies as unforeseen circumstances or as lying out-
side the control of the party in default. Such provisions will exculpate the defaulting 
party from liability, while simultaneously adding to the complexity of the contract. In 
contrast, under a rule of fault liability, see e.g. articles 6:74-75 of the DCC, parties may 
forego to incorporate the aforementioned clauses. Collins (1999) acknowledges that 
the difference in liability regimes may explain only part of the difference in contractual 
complexity, while divergent liability schemes find expression in exclusion and dis-
claimer clauses of the contract only. In addition, the distinction between strict and 
fault liability in the different legal systems is subject to so many exceptions and qualifi-
cations that the distinction is not always as clear in practice.3"1 The DCC for example, 
recognizes strict liability in a number of cases, while the general rule of strict liability in 
England has been mitigated in numerous ways. 
341 Zweigert and Kotz 1998, p. 510. For a detailed comparison see Treitel 1988, Cohen and McKendrick 2005, 
p. 32G. 
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Lundmark (2001) points to the divergence in rules on remedies for breach of con-
tract.342 In numerous civil law jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, the law grants 
the aggrieved party the right to choose from a range of remedies in case of breach: 
damages, performance, termination, or a combination of the foregoing. The aggrieved 
party may choose to either claim damages or specific performance, whichever best 
suits his situation, provided that the specific conditions for each remedy are fulfilled. In 
the Netherlands, the right to resort to termination is obstructed only when the non-
performance, given its special nature or minor importance, does not justify the termi-
nation of the contract and its consequences.343 In common law on the other hand, the 
claim for damages constitutes the primary remedy for breach of contract. An order for 
specific performance is only granted in cases where monetary damages form inade-
quate compensation for the loss incurred. The right to grant specific performance 
resides with the judge. Traditionally, specific performance has been awarded in cases 
concerning the sale of unique goods or the transfer of land. In contrast, damages have 
been found to offer an adequate remedy when the plaintiff is able to obtain the prom-
ised performance from another source.344 Furthermore, a party may resort to termi-
nate the contract only if its counterparty has breached a condition of the contract, i.e. 
a term which relates to the essence of the contract. This restriction attempts to reduce 
the incentive to appeal to termination, which is regarded as the most profound rem-
edy. This restriction may be compared with the constraint in Dutch law, where the 
non-performance must be of significance in order to justify termination. Lundmark 
(2001) contends that in case of a dispute, parties who have contracted under English 
and US law will, in principle, not be able to force performance of a specific clause. 
These parties will thus take care to stipulate in detail what performance is expected 
and what the relevant law is. Lundmark (2001) states furthermore that common law 
jurisdictions, in contrast to for example Dutch law, often do not enforce in terrorem 
penalty or punitive damage provisions.345 Penalty clauses are used to coerce the 
debtor to perform the principal obligation. This makes the aggrieved party even more 
dependent on the monetary damages awarded by the court.346 Under these condi-
tions, parties will draft elaborate performance provisions such that in case of a dis-
pute, it is clear what performance was expected of the parties, increasing the relative 
complexity of the contract. 
Implications for the complexity of contracts 
The examples on the distinctive default rules between the jurisdictions have conse-
quences for the observed levels of contractual complexity. The example given by 
M2 Likewise Farnsworth 1996, p. 235. See also Hesen and Hardy 2007. 
M 3 See Article 6:265(1) DCC and HR 24 November 1995, NJ 1996/160 (Tromp/Regency). 
3M Hesen and Hardy 2007. 
M5 See also Farnsworth 1996, p. 236, Dutch law for example does recognize the validity of such clauses 
(articles 6:91-94 DCC). 
3flG See also Hill and King 2004, p. 914. 
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Collins (1996) suggests that contracting parties will generally prefer a regime of fault 
liability over strict liability. This places parties in England and the US at a disadvantage 
compared to parties contracting under Dutch law: in contrast to the former, the latter 
are not wary to rely on default rules concerning liability for breach. Parties in England 
and the US will on the other hand, attempt to avoid the regime of strict liability im-
posed on them by law. As a consequence, these parties will carefully enunciate what 
circumstances are considered beyond their control and therefore exculpate them from 
any liability. Parties will incur additional contracting costs in drafting force majeure and 
other types of disclaimer clauses. However, the fact that parties proceed to incorpo-
rate these types of clauses in their contracts, must signify that the contracting costs 
are worthwhile in light of the advantages which these clauses bring. In addition, al-
though the initial costs of drafting these clauses may be relatively high, their recurrent 
use and thereby standardization means that in the long run, the costs of incorporation 
will be marginal. Low contracting costs increase complexity. 
The example relating to differences in available remedies for non-performance, illus-
trates that particular default rules may encourage greater contractual specification, in 
order to (1) avoid to the greatest extent possible a dispute and (2) ensure a correct 
application of the rule by the court once a dispute has arisen. More specifically, parties 
in England and the US will describe as precisely as possible each other's performance 
obligations in order to minimize any chance of incorrect performance. The associated 
increase in contracting costs is counters the expected enforcement costs. The liability 
regimes and remedies for non-performance constitute only a small part of the whole 
of contract law rules. In these particular cases, an additional contracting burden seems 
to be placed on parties contracting in the US or England as opposed to parties con-
tracting in the Netherlands. It is not apparent from these cases, however, which way 
the scales are tipped if the whole of contract law rules is taken into account. These 
specific cases may thus only attempt to explain a small part of the divergence in con-
tractual complexity. 
Civil procedure 
The focus of this chapter is on rules of contract law. However, several authors argue 
that the variations in contractual complexity may be explained by a difference in civil 
procedure rules in Continental Europe on the one hand and the US and England on the 
other hand.347 These authors point to the inefficiency of American, and to a lesser 
extent English348 civil proceedings. Empirical evidence seems to support the aforemen-
347 Langbein 1987, p. 385-392, Collins 1996, p. 4-5, Hill and King 2004, p. 904-906. 
348 In England, new Civil Procedure Rules 1998, often referred to as the Woolf Reforms, entered into force on 
26 April 1999. This revision, which was primarily aimed at increasing efficiency, has radically transformed 
English civil procedure. Amongst others, case control and court allocation and tracking have been improved 
and documentation requirements and procedures have been simplified (Slapper and Kelly 2006). 
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tioned statement. According to the World Business Environment Survey (2000)349, 
court systems are found to be consistent and reliable, 'sometimes', 'seldom' or 'never' 
by approximately seventy-two percent of US and sixty percent of UK respondents.350 In 
addition, the survey revealed that approximately eighty-two percent of US and eighty-
nine percent of UK respondents 'sometimes', 'seldom' or 'never' experience the court 
system as quick.351 The inefficiency and unpredictability of the Anglo-Saxon civil proce-
dure increases enforcement costs, which in turn positively affect the incentive of par-
ties to raise the complexity of their contract. In the following paragraphs, I will briefly 
review some of the factors which have been cited in the literature as possible sources 
of this inefficiency. 
First of all, several authors contend that the inefficiency of American civil procedure 
may be sought in the quality of the judiciary.352 In most European countries, and cer-
tainly in the Netherlands, judges receive specialized judicial training. In addition, these 
judges are likely to have expertise in commercial matters.353 In the US in contrast, 
judges are politically elected ex-lawyers and cases are in principle tried by jury: 'on the 
Continent, a complex transaction that results in litigation will be decided by people 
who are expert in the law governing such affairs - a notable contrast to the amateurs 
who populate the American generalist judiciary.'354 On the other hand, many civil law 
judges miss the practical experience of being an attorney due to the fact that they 
typically serve a professional lifetime as a judge.355 In relation to the foregoing, ac-
count must be taken of the fact that trial by jury has been abolished for commercial 
transactions in England, and the State of New York allows parties to opt out of jury 
trial. Empirical research indeed shows that this is one of the reasons why most foreign 
commercial parties prefer to dissolve their disputes in New York and have the law of 
the state of New York applied to their American contracts. 
In the second place, American and English civil procedure differ in structure from the 
Dutch process. In the Netherlands, like most civil law jurisdictions, a typical civil pro-
349 The World Business Environment Survey (2000), Washington D.C.: The World Bank. The World Business 
Environment Survey refers to a questionnaire which was administered to over 10,000 firms In 80 countries 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/). Unfortunately, The Netherlands did not take part, 
350 The question was: '[h]ow often do you associate the following descriptions with the court system in 
resolving business disputes? Consistent and Reliable'. The remaining twenty-eight (US) and forty (UK) per-
cent answered either: 'always', 'mostly' or 'frequently'. 
351 The question was: '[h]ow often do you associate the following descriptions with the court system in 
resolving business disputes? Quick'. 
352 Langbein 1987, p. 386-387, Hill and King 2004, p. 905-906, Stumer 2001. 
353 In most European countries, complex commercial matters are usually tried by specialized courts or divi-
sions (Ondernemingskamer in The Hague and the Commercial court division of the Queen's Bench Division in 
England). 
354 Langbein 1987, p. 387. 
355 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational civil procedure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, p. 
6. 
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ceeding is divided into three stages: (1) a brief preliminary stage where parties submit 
their pleadings and the hearing judge is appointed; (2) an evidence-taking stage; and 
(3) a decision making stage.356 American civil procedure is characterized by an elabo-
rate pre-trial process, referred to as 'discovery', in which parties are allowed to gather 
the evidence they may need at trial.357 This discovery phase is followed by a trial at 
which all the evidence is received consecutively. This process leads to a duplicative and 
inefficient process of witness examination and cross-examination: witnesses are exam-
ined and cross-examined at pre-trail and once again at trial. Whilst the facts to be 
investigated and their sequence are not limited, and there is no opportunity to search 
for further information once the trial-phase has set in, American lawyers strain to 
investigate everything that could possibility arise at trial. American discovery proce-
dure allows parties to search and fish for information.358 Such aggressive discovery 
procedures are unknown to Continental European, and since the Woolf Reforms, even 
to English civil procedure.359 In this light, it is also important to indicate that the role 
assigned to judges in these jurisdictions varies. In many civil law jurisdictions, the civil 
procedure is characterized as an inquisitorial model, in contrast to the adversarial 
nature of the civil process in common law.360 This means that in most Continental 
European countries, the judge carries the primary responsibility for eliciting the facts 
and the gathering of evidence, whilst in the United States and England the trial takes 
the form of a contest between two private parties, who are granted a large responsi-
bility in both the legal definition of the facts and the discovery.361 The discovery proce-
dure and the fact that parties lead the way in the development of evidence, may lead 
to the advancement of strategic misinterpretations in countries such as the US and 
England. 
Not all authors, however, emphasize the aforementioned inefficiency of Anglo-Saxon 
systems. Although Djankov et al. (2003) assert that '[rjules of evidence are sometimes 
considered to be a key factor in differentiating the overall efficiency of legal proce-
dures among countries'362, these authors conclude that the efficiency of courts is high-
est in countries as England and the US. Djankov et al. (2003) analyzed civil proceedings 
relating to the eviction of a nonpaying tenant and the collection of a bounced check in 
109 countries.363 The authors measured the degree of formalism, i.e. 'the substantive 
356 See also Merryman 1985, p. 111. 
357 Langbein 1987, p. 387-389, Kötz 2003, Stürner 2001, p. 871-878. 
358 Langbein 1987, p. 389, Kötz 2003, p. 61-77. 
359 Formerly England did recognize a more elaborate pre-trail/discovery procedure, but the Woolf reforms 
have limited the scope of the discovery and now foresee in a greater judicial control over parties. 
360 See also Jolowicz 2003. 
361 Hill and King 2004, p. 904-906, Langbein 1987, p. 388-389, Ferrarese 1997, p. 167. 
362 Djankov etal .2003. 
363 The participants in this study were attorneys at Lex Mundi and Lex Africa member firms, who received a 
questionnaire which covered the step-by-step evolution of an eviction and a check collection procedure 
before local courts In the country's largest city. 
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and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower level civil trail courts'36" 
and predicted that formalism can enhance weaker party protection, fairness, accuracy, 
and public welfare, but can also lead to delays, unfairness and inefficiency. The authors 
measure a higher degree of formalism for civil law jurisdictions, especially for systems 
of French legal origin, which includes the Netherlands, than common law jurisdic-
tions.365 In addition, formalism appears to be positively related to the duration of pro-
ceedings366 and has a negative effect on the level of fairness and impartiality, consis-
tency and honesty, confidence in the legal system, and access to justice and judicial 
efficiency.367 Their findings are confirmed by a comparable study of the World Bank in 
2006.368 This study, which is based on the earlier study of Djankov et al. (2003), inves-
tigates the efficiency of the judicial system, which is measured as an aggregate of the 
number of procedures369, the duration370 and cost (court and attorney costs)371, in 
resolving commercial disputes. On a scale of increasing efficiency, the Netherlands 
ranks thirty-first out of one hundred and seventy-five countries, compared to the US 
with rank six and the UK with rank twenty-two. Within the list of twenty-two OECD 
high income regions372, the Netherlands can be found only at position nineteen.373 The 
World Bank concludes that '[tjhe main reason to regulate procedures in commercial 
dispute resolution is that informal justice is vulnerable to subversion by the rich and 
powerful. But heavy regulation of dispute resolution has negative consequences. 
364 The formalism index is formed by adding up the following indices: '(1) professional versus laymen, (ii) 
written versus oral elements, (iii) legal justification, (iv) statutory regulation of evidence, (v) control of supe-
rior review, (vi) engagement formalities, and (vii) Independent procedural actions. The index ranges from 
zero to seven where seven means higher level of control or intervention in the judicial process.' (Djankov et 
al. 2003, p. 469). 
305 Djankov et al. 2003, p. 510. The data show that dispute resolution in socialist and French origin civil law 
countries is more formalized than in common law countries, even holding per capita income constant. 
366 The duration is a composite measure of (1) the duration until completion of the service of process; (2) the 
duration of the trail; and (3) the duration of enforcement. The 'duration' as such signifies the number of 
calendar days from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit until the actual moment of repossession 
(Djankov etal. 2003, p. 501). 
367 
Data for the variables is taken from the World Business Environment Survey, which unfortunately does 
not include data from the Netherlands (Supra n. 460). 
368 Doing business in 2006, OECD high income region, regional profile, The International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development / The World Bank (http://www.doingbusiness.org/, last accessed July 23 2007). 
363 'Any Interaction mandated by law or court regulation between the parties, or between them and the 
judge (or administrator) or court officer,' 
370 The number of calendar days, counted from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until pay-
ment. 
3,1 Cost is recorded as a percentage of the claim, which is assumed to equal 200% of income per capita. 
37! Tunisia, Netherlands, New Zeeaiand, Japan, France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Greece, Australia, Ice-
land, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, United States, UK, Portugal, Canada, Austria 
and Italy. 
373 The total number of procedures in the Netherlands amounts to 22 (cf. UK count of 19 and US count of 17) 
and the costs constitute 15.9% of debt - predominantly caused by attorney costs (cf. UK: 16.8% and US: 
7.7%). 
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Across countries, the more procedures it takes to enforce a contract, the longer the 
delays and the higher the cost. Less wealth is created.'374 
These empirical studies seem to contradict the general assumption in the literature 
that civil procedures in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions are less efficient, effective and reli-
able than comparable procedures in civil law jurisdictions. With regard to the Nether-
lands in particular however, some remarks must be made in light of the results pre-
sented by Djankov et al. (2003) and the World Bank study (2006). Data collected by 
Djankov et al. (2003) reveal that, of the forty states classified as French legal origin 
countries, the Netherlands scores below average on formalism.375 In addition, both the 
study by Djankov et al. (2003) and the World Bank (2006) demonstrate that the dura-
tion of proceedings in the Netherlands is extremely low. In the study of Djankov et al. 
(2003) proceedings amount to 52 and 39 days for eviction and check collection,376 (c/. 
French legal origin mean of 266 and 272 days and English legal origin mean of 199 and 
176), while the World Bank study (2006) reveals an average duration of 48 days for the 
Netherlands compared to 229 and 300 days for the UK and US. The foregoing illus-
trates that for the Netherlands in particular, a high degree of formalism may actually 
be associated with 'fast justice'. In addition, the measures relating to fairness, imparti-
ality, consistency, honesty and confidence in the legal system, which are included in 
the study by Djankov et al. (2003), are lacking for the Netherlands. This makes it diffi-
cult to extrapolate their conclusions to the Netherlands more in particular. 
Implications for the complexity of contracts 
Inefficient and unreliable civil proceedings may increase expected enforcement costs 
and thereby positively affect contractual complexity. Elaborate discovery procedures 
and adversarial models of procedure increase the opportunities for strategic misinter-
pretation and therefore parties will be tempted to draft complex contracts to prevent 
litigation from taking place. An unreliable administrative adjudication system and the 
absence of relevant expertise may incite parties to include in their contracts clauses 
which instead refer disputes to arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. In this light, Adams and Brownsword (1999) state that for technical 
commercial cases, parties will often entrust the settlement of the dispute to experts in 
the field.377 The referral of disputes to alternative mechanisms is enforced by the 
higher degree of privacy, the adversarial nature, less elaborate discovery procedures 
and reduced costs of the latter procedures. 
374 World Bank Report 2006, p. 28. 
375 A score of 3.00 for eviction [cf. French legal origin mean of 4.38 and US score of 2.97) and 3.07 for check 
collection (cf. French legal origin mean of 4.29). 
376 Cf. US: 49 and 54 days and UK: 115 and 101 days for eviction and check collection. 
377 Adams and Brownsword 1999. 
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While the literature seems to relate inefficiency and unreliability primarily with Ameri-
can and English civil procedures, recent empirical data seem to suggest otherwise. 
American and English civil procedure by contrast, seems quite reliable. However, the 
duration of American and English civil procedures is very long compared to the Nether-
lands. This is probably due to the lack of elaborate (pre-trial) discovery proceedings 
and the greater role for the judge to guide the adjudication process. The foregoing 
factors reduce chances of strategic misinterpretation and allow for greater reliance on 
the adjudication system. This may cause parties to perceive the level of expected en-
forcement costs to be higher in the US and UK than in the Netherlands. However, the 
literature and recent empirical studies are not conclusive in this respect. 
T H E S O C I O - C U L T U R A L E N V I R O N M E N T 
In this chapter, I have placed an emphasis on the manner in which the legal environ-
ment affects different contracting factors and thereby contractual complexity. How-
ever, some authors attribute the differences in contractual complexity to the (indirect) 
influence of the socio-cultural environment. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss 
briefly some aspects of the socio-cultural environment which have been addressed in 
the literature in this respect. 
American 'excessiveness' and 'perfectionism' 
Przeracki (1989) states that Americans write detailed (i.e. complex) contracts due to 
their character 'defect' of excessiveness. Przeracki (1989) refers to the fact that Ameri-
cans are given excess to all things '[they] earn the most money, drive the largest cars, 
commit the most crimes etc'378 and as a consequence, they write contracts 'so detailed 
as to make any applicable law (...) as unimportant as is possible and that frequently 
end by making [American] law applicable anyway in the unlikely event that it makes 
any difference.'379 Van Hecke (1962) establishes that the American lawyer, in contrast 
to legal experts in Continental Europe, is driven by a certain desire for perfection and is 
willing to incur the costs associated with this perfectionism. As a consequence, the 
American lawyer aspires to handle all eventualities in the contract, rather than leave 
them to the decision of the judge. The European client on the other hand, seems to 
realize that this perfection of a watertight contract cannot be reached anyway and is 
not willing to pay for such an unachievable objective: simplicity is preferred to the 
costs of perfectionism.380 Hill and King (2004) use a similar argument, namely that the 
378 Przeracki 1989, p. 170 and Przeracki 1989, p. 169, n, 124 in reference to Farnsworth 1969, p. 117. 
373 Farnsworth 1996, p. 117 cited by Przeracki 1989, p. 173. 
380 Van Hecke 1962. See also Farnsworth 1996, p. 231, who in this respect points out that common lawyers, 
and especially Americans, are more prolix compared with Continental European lawyers. Cf. Langbein 1987, 
p. 382: '[t]o speak of differing propensities for perfectionism merely restates the problem, which is to under-
stand why the Americans strive for contractual terms that are, in van Hecke's apt phrase "perfectly water-
tight".' 
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presence of highly customized contracts in the US is due to 'a failure to create and 
accept "good enough" solutions to non-adversarial (and some adversarial) issues par-
ties commonly face'.381 In addition, these authors argue that due to parties' fear for 
opportunistic behavior by their counterpart, parties become locked 'into an arms race 
in which each seeks to ferret out the other's possible strategic handles at every turn. 
The result is U.S.-style extensive custom tailoring of contracts. The participants in the 
process either believe, or persuade themselves to believe, that "every semicolon mat-
ters'".382 This tendency to draft watertight and elaborate contracts might also be re-
flected in the number of lawyers per capita. In 2006, the Netherlands encompassed a 
lawyer-inhabitant ratio of 1:1148, compared to a ratio of 1:267 in the US and 1:398 in 
the UK.383 Inverse reasoning is applied by Cooter and Ginsburg (2004) who indicate 
that the number of lawyers is likely to positively affect contractual specificity (i.e. 
complexity). They argue that a small legal profession is less monopolistic which pre-
vents free-rider problems and thereby produces shorter contracts for the same level of 
income. In the second place, a smaller number of lawyers will have a positive impact 
on legal fees and thereby reduce the demand for long contracts. Finally, a smaller legal 
population will increase the number of repeated games, which can lead to the devel-
opment of implicit understandings and thereby less contractual specificity.384 
Social norms of trust and trust- enforcing mechanisms 
As mentioned, trust and reputation are positively related to the complexity of con-
tracts. Laws and other mechanisms can act as basis for the creation of trust, and a 
deterrent for opportunism.385 The degree of trust, and the extent to which institutional 
frameworks and social networks constitute credible enforcement mechanisms capable 
of enforcing relations of trust, vary from one society to another.386 
Fukuyama (1995) characterizes Germany and the US as relatively high trust societies 
compared to countries such as France and Italy. However, there are numerous ways to 
measure the degree of trust within a society. The World Values Survey 1999 demon-
381 Hill and King 2004, p. 890. 
382 Ibid., p. 902. 
383Sources: ABA Market Research Department 6/2006 (http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/-
resource.html); Conseil des Barreaux Europeens / Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 2006 
(http://www.ccbe.org/); Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) 2006 (http://www.cbs.nl/nl-
NL/menu/themas/veiligheld-recht/publlcatles/artikelen/archief/2007/2007-2195-wm.htm) and The World 
Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) (all websites last accessed on July 
24 2007). 
384 Cooter and Ginsberg 2004, p. 21. See also their compiled list of lawyers per 10.000 inhabitants on p. 9. 
The mean of 14 Continental European countries is 7.98 lawyers per 10.000 inhabitants (outliers Spain: 15.87 
and Luxembourg: 16.67) compared to 15.38 lawyers per 10.000 inhabitants in the UK. Data covers the mid-
1990s. 
385 Rousseau 1998, p. 397 and p. 400. See also Gulati 1995, p. 93, Ring and Van de Ven 1992, p. 483-498, who 
indicate that institutional factors can act as support for the critical mass of trust that sustains risk taking. 
386 Shane 1994, p. 628. 
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strates that approximately only thirty-six percent of the respondents in the US and 
Germany, compared to twenty-one percent in France and thirty-two percent in Italy, 
believe that most people can be trusted. Fifty-nine percent of Dutch respondents on 
the other hand, find their fellow countrymen trustworthy.387 These survey results do 
not seem to substantiate Fukuyama's assumptions. Trust is difficult to render opera-
tional and levels of trust are not easily calculated. Hofstede (1980) takes another ap-
proach and classifies societies on dimensions of (amongst others) individualism (IDV), 
uncertainty avoidance (UA), Power Distance (PD) and Long-Term Orientation (LTO).388 
IDV and PD may serve to reference the degree of trust within a society. Individualism 
measures the extent to which individuals are integrated into groups. In individualist 
societies, ties are loose and individuals are expected to look after themselves, whereas 
collectivist societies are characterized5 by strong, cohesive in-groups, in which protec-
tion is granted in e x c h a n g e d loyalty. Collectivist cultures, in contrast to individualistic 
cultures, are dictated by high levels of trust and cooperation.389 PD measures the ex-
tent to which the members of organizations and institutions expect and accept power 
to be distributed equally. Hofstede (1997) finds that PD represents societal trust: PD 
societies are characterized by low levels of interpersonal trust and have a greater need 
for behavioral controls.390 
The Netherlands has an IDV score of eighty, compared to a value of ninety-one for the 
US and eight-nine for the UK (on a scale to one hundred). The US and UK appear to be 
only slightly more individualistic than the Netherlands. These relatively high IDV scores 
indicate a lower standard of trust, which Hofstede (1997) positively relates to the 
specificity of contracts.391 In contrast, the relatively low and similar PD scores - values 
of thirty-eight for the Netherlands, thirty-five for the UK and forty for the US (com-
pared to a mean of 56.8) - seem to point to a relatively high level of trust within these 
societies. In addition, Burchell and Wilkinson (1997) demonstrate that firms perceive 
trust as being established by the preference for and perceived importance of long-
term personal and trading relations. The latter preferences and perceptions relate to 
the LTO measure developed by Hofstede (1980). The Netherlands has a LTO score of 
forty-four compared to a score of twenty-five for the UK and twenty-nine for the US. 
This relatively high LTO score for the Netherlands (compared to the UK and US) might 
387 The question asked was: '[generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful In dealing with people?' Other answer categories were: 'can't be to careful', 'don't 
know' and 'no answer'. In addition, twenty-nine percent of respondents in Great Britain believe that most 
people can be trusted. 
388 Hofstede 1980, p. 327 
389 Between cultures, the tendency to trust is reversed: individualists are more optimistic than collectivists 
with regard to benevolence from strangers. 
390 Hofstede 1980, p. 327, Shane 1994, p. 629-630. 
391 Hofstede 1997, p. 60, concludes that the high level of Individualism in the US may be a cause of the 
increased length of American contracts, compared to their counterparts in Japan, which is a collectivistlc 
society. 
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point to the fact that Dutch individuals and thereby contracting parties, are more apt 
to trust one another and rely on this trustworthiness. 
It appears, however, difficult to derive a conclusive answer on (any difference in) the 
level of trust in each of the countries from these measures: in any case, trust seems 
present to some extent. However, the manner in which trust is enforced may differ 
across these countries and thereby serve to explain differences in contractual com-
plexity. 
Hill and King (2004) stipulate that compared to the US, the German business commu-
nity is smaller and trade associations play a more important role. They argue that 
Americans may also have good business norms, but that these norms may not work as 
well due to the less homogeneous and less repeat community. Langbein (1987) indeed 
states: '[c]ommercial dealings in Europe may have been conducted within a smaller 
and socially homogeneous group, and hence may have had more of the considerate 
overtones that Americans think are confined to long-term (that is, relational, or re-
peat-player) contracts.'332 This assumes that European parties are to a greater extent 
embedded in social networks in which trust may substitute for complex contracts. The 
findings of Hill and King and Langbein are confirmed by Arreghetti et at. (1997) and 
Burchell and Wilkinson (1997) for Germany, Italy and Britain more specifically.393 These 
authors indicate that the norms shaped and created by trade associations effect the 
relationship between parties by reinforcing cooperative trust-based behavior, and that 
institutional enforcement is greater in countries as Germany and Italy compared to 
Britain. Similar conclusions are reached by Collins (1999).394 However, even in coun-
tries where institutional bodies appear to play a smaller role in enforcing trust-based 
behavior in general, specific communities within these countries may proof otherwise. 
Bernstein (1992) for example, studied communities of Jewish diamond merchants in 
New York City and the cotton industry, where she examined mechanisms by which 
trade associations and other trading networks enforce private legal systems.395 Com-
plementary studies show how merchant communities recognize non-legal reputation 
mechanisms, which are most often enacted through social networks that induce mu-
tually and socially beneficial behavior.396 These communities are characterized by re-
peat transactions and every exchange comprises a feasibility to cheat, however, mis-
conduct will be known throughout the community and no one will transact with cheat-
392 Langbein 1987, p. 394. 
393 Arreghetti et al. 1997, Burchell and Wilkinson 1997. 
354 Supra n. 225. See also Hill and King 2004, p. 915, who generally establish that '[t]rade associations are far 
more important in Germany than they are in the United States' (they then use this observation to indicate 
that German companies often incorporate trade association forms by reference, enabling them to reduce 
the length of their contracts in comparison to American firms). 
395 Bernstein 1992 and 2001. 
396 Greif 1993, 1989, Greif et al. 1994, Milgrom et al. 1990, Richman 2004. 
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ing individual. Effectively, '[t]he assurance of ex post sanctions against cheaters allows 
transactors to commit credibly to fellow merchants that they will fulfill their contrac-
tual duties'.397 
Institutional bodies such as trade associations do not only function as reputation en-
forcing mechanisms. As briefly mentioned above, they may produce trade standards 
and develop trade usage, which supplement enacted legislation. Arreghetti et al. 
(1997) and Hill and King (2004) indicate that trade associations create and circulate 
standard forms which are frequently used and applied by commercial parties.398 These 
forms enhance the possibility to adopt standardized solutions. The ability to incorpo-
rate these standard forms and trade practices by reference reduces the need to con-
struct complex contracts. Such an elaborate practice of forms is not as evident in Eng-
land or the US. 
Perceptions of uncertainty 
As mentioned earlier, Hofstede uses several measures to reference values and norms 
within cultures. One of these measures is the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). This 
index refers to a society's tolerance of environmental uncertainty and ambiguity. The 
UAI reflects an individual's perception of environmental uncertainty and thus influ-
ences the level of the latter factor and thereby contractual complexity. Cultures with a 
high UAI demonstrate less tolerance for uncertainty. Hofstede (1997) argues that in 
these cultures, uncertainty and risks are minimized to the greatest extent possible 
through the enforcement of detailed and specific laws and rules.399 Ginsburg and 
Cooter (2004) illustrate that the specificity of legislation is positively correlated with 
the specificity (i.e. complexity) of contracts.400 The Netherlands scores fifty-three on 
the UAI compared to the US with a score of forty-six and the UK with a score of thirty-
five (cf. world average of sixty-four). The high UAI indicates that the Netherlands is 
characterized by a lower tolerance for uncertainty than the US and the UK, and accord-
ing to Hofstede (1997), the Netherlands should thus display more detailed and a 
greater amount of legislation. However, Ginsburg and Cooter (2004), in relating speci-
ficity of legislation to the specificity of contracts, find that the specificity of both con-
tracts and legislation is higher in e.g. the UK than in the Netherlands; this is also con-
firmed by my observation that contracts in the US and UK are relatively more complex 
than their Dutch counterparts. The effect of the level of UA on the complexity of con-
tracts is thus not conclusive. 
337 Richman 2004, p. 2335. 
398 Arreghetti et al. 1997, p. 19-21, Hill and King 2004, p. 915. 
399 Hofstede 1997, p. 120-121. 
"00 Cooter and Ginsberg 2004, p. 8-9. 
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D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N 
I began this chapter with the observation that American and English contracts display a 
contractual style which deviates from the Continental European and Dutch style of 
contract drafting. While this divergent style has been addressed in the literature, a 
consistent terminology to describe and explain these different styles is still lacking. In 
this chapter I reviewed the current theories and concepts and subsequently developed 
a notion of contractual complexity, which can be used to explain jurisdictional diver-
gences in contract design. This concept of complexity also allows me to extend my 
analysis to both legal and business economic theory. Business economic studies con-
cerned with the subject of contract design do not comprise international comparisons, 
but seek to explain why and when parties will conclude relatively complex contracts. In 
contrast, the legal literature is focused on international differences in contractual 
complexity and relates these variations to divergent legal environments in general and 
lawyers' perceptions and values concerning contracting in particular. This chapter was 
written in an attempt to reconcile both views and provide the reader with a multidisci-
plinary perspective on contract design. 
In principle, the design of a contract can be measured using the concept of complexity. 
Contractual complexity, which is measured along a continuum, comprises three di-
mensions: the number and types of terms incorporated in the contract, the specificity 
of these terms and the cognitive load necessary to understand the contract. The level 
of complexity is affected by a diverse range of factors. These factors derive mainly 
from the business economic literature and may be either positively related: trust and 
reputation, non-disclosure, parties' limits of cognition and contracting costs, or nega-
tively related: monitoring difficulties, asset specificity, strategic importance, environ-
mental uncertainty and enforcement costs, to contractual complexity. Most of these 
factors cannot, however, explain variations between countries in the complexity of 
contracts by themselves. They must be assessed in light of their legal and socio-
cultural environment. Some factors are not significantly influenced by the legal and 
socio-cultural operating context. These factors relate to limits of cognition, monitoring 
difficulties, asset specificity and the strategic importance of the contract. 
The legal environment affects both contracting and enforcement costs. In the Nether-
lands, parties are able to rely on extensive codifications of the law. The ability to rely 
on default rules together with a subjective approach towards the interpretation of 
contracts, enables parties to briefly refer to these default rules in their contracts or 
forego explicit incorporation altogether. This leads to relatively simple contracts, in 
contrast to contracts concluded under English or American law, where extensive codi-
fications of the law are lacking. A system of case law and the primarily objective ap-
proach toward the interpretation of contracts, in conjunction with a rule of parol evi-
dence, leads to higher expected enforcement costs and induces parties in these juris-
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dictions to increase contractual complexity. Parties incorporate extensive boilerplate 
clauses, plan for performance contingencies and accommodate for detailed business 
definitions. This increased complexity secures a party's interests once a dispute arises. 
The associated contracting costs thus appear worthwhile. However, notice must be 
taken of the fact that part of this complexity arises due to the incorporation of boiler-
plate clauses. Boilerplates are standardized terms which are used across the industry 
and legal profession. Parties will therefore be able to commit to their incorporation at 
relatively low costs. Concluding, contracting costs do not appear to vary extremely 
between the Netherlands, England and the US. More importantly, parties in both the 
US and England appear to perceive higher expected levels of enforcement costs, which 
justify the construction of complex contracts. 
Another recognized element of variation within legal environments is the recognition 
of the good faith principle. Good faith advances norms of fairness, trust and coopera-
tion regarding contractual practices. These norms reduce the necessity to draft con-
tracts with numerous detailed terms. The principle of good faith is awarded a larger 
role in the Netherlands, where it applies to contractual negotiations, performance and 
enforcement. In England and the US, piecemeal solutions substitute for the traditional 
absence of a general principle of good faith. Presently however, good faith, especially 
in the US, is increasingly recognized with regard to the performance of contractual 
obligations; this is exemplified by the more liberal approach to the implication of terms 
and the interpretation of contracts in general. Regardless of these observations, good 
faith does not permeate the English and American contracting practice in a similar 
manner as the Dutch. Due to the general and sustained recognition of good faith, par-
ties contracting in the Netherlands traditionally place greater reliance on conventions 
of fairness to guide their transactions. This gives rise to the construction of relatively 
simple contracts. 
Some authors argue that rules of civil procedure may influence expected enforcement 
costs and thereby contractual complexity. Civil procedures in the US and England are 
often designated as unreliable and inefficient. This raises expected enforcement costs 
and encourages parties to specify their performance obligations and sanctions. In con-
trast, the shorter duration of proceedings and lack of extensive discovery in the Neth-
erlands allows for fast and reliable justice, which lowers the expected level of en-
forcement costs. The basis of this longstanding comparison is questioned, however, by 
the modern reforms in England and some recent empirical studies. The latter studies 
seem to attribute efficiency primarily to the civil procedure in common law jurisdic-
tions. It may be stated that data concerning the efficiency and reliability of civil proce-
dures is not conclusive. Another observation may also point to the relatively small 
ability of civil procedure rules to affect contractual complexity through increased en-
forcement costs. Many commercial disputes, especially in relation to international or 
American contracts, are referred to arbitration. Arbitration and other alternative dis-
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pute resolution mechanisms are favored over litigation because the former decrease 
the possibilities for discovery, duration and costs, and are characterized by expert 
adjudicators. The contracts which incorporate arbitration clauses and thereby evade 
litigation appear to maintain a similar level of complexity as the contracts that incorpo-
rate litigation clauses. 
The focus of this chapter is on variations in the legal environment, which influence the 
level of the complexity factors. However, I briefly touched upon several aspects of the 
socio-cultural environment which may vary between countries. First of all, while study-
ing different societies, cultural differences in attitudes toward the drafting of contracts 
become apparent. The American drafting style is characterized by excessiveness and 
perfectionism, which feeds the desire to draft watertight, complex contracts. Dutch 
parties on the other hand, seem to take satisfaction with short concise documents 
which set out the basic elements of the deal. The desire in England and the US to draft 
complex documents is reinforced by the large population of lawyers. 
The socio-cultural environment also relates to the manner in which institutions such as 
trade associations, and informal social networks, are able to enhance and enforce 
trust. Trust and reputation may substitute (in part) for complex contracts. Several 
authors have attempted to measure the general level of trust across countries. These 
empirical studies illustrate, however, that it is difficult to determine whether one cul-
ture is more trusting than another. The ability of institutions and networks to enforce 
trust affects the extent to which trust actually plays a role in cooperative relationships. 
Studies have undisputedly demonstrated that trade associations play a larger role in 
civil law jurisdictions such as Germany, which are also categorized by a larger number 
of small business communities, compared to the US and England. Trust and reputation 
are able to affect contracts to a considerable extent in these civil law countries. This 
element of the socio-legal environment interacts with elements of the legal environ-
ment to reinforce the negative effect on contractual complexity. More specifically, 
norms and standards produced by trade associations are supplemented and strength-
ened by the reliance on the Code, e.g. the BGB or DCC.401 However, account must also 
be taken that the aforementioned arguments are generalizations: within any country, 
particular communities may exist where trust is very important and trustworthiness 
strictly enforced. 
I related a range of factors to contractual complexity. Standard conditions such as 
limits of cognition, monitoring difficulties, asset specificity and the strategic impor-
tance of the contract are specifically related to the characteristics of parties and the 
particularities of the exchange transaction. These factors may serve to explain condi-
tions of contractual complexity in general. However, in order to explain national varia-
101 Burchell and Wilkinson 1997, p. 217-237, Hill and King 2004, p. 916. 
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tions in contractual complexity it is necessary to evaluate some of these factors within 
their specific legal and socio-cultural context. The analysis makes clear that both legal 
and business perspectives are necessary to explain variations in contract design, more 
specifically contractual complexity between countries. This study offers only a prelimi-
nary investigation into the design of contracts from a multidisciplinary perspective. I 
have discussed elements of the legal environment in a very broad manner. It would be 
interesting, also in light of business economics, to analyze why and how particular 
rules of contract law and (intellectual) property law affect the terms of the contract. In 
addition, this study calls for a more detailed examination of different elements of the 
socio-cultural environment. Furthermore, empirical statistical analysis might be able to 
further substantiate the suggested effects of the different factors, controlling for the 
influence of the legal environment. I hope that this chapter has provided the reader 
with a greater understanding of contract design in general and contractual complexity 
in particular from a multi-disciplinary perspective. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTRACTUAL COMPLEXITY AND THE COGNITIVE LOAD OF R&D 
ALLIANCE CONTRACTS 
A modified version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in the Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies. 
Of course, the limits of cognition are not a universal explanation of either contract law 
or the limits of contract. Other teachings of experience, as well as concepts of efficiency 
and morality, also play leading roles. Even those other elements, however, can be given 
appropriate weight only when we know the psychological framework within which 
actors operate when making choices. 
Meivin Eisenberg 
Professor of Law 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Inter-organizational contractual arrangements, such as those set up to govern inter-
firm alliances, have become important mechanisms through which firms exchange 
products, services, and knowledge. Mayer and Argyres (2004) and Sampson (2004) 
argue that sophisticated contractual relationships are an increasingly important fea-
ture of the business landscape, particularly where high technology is involved. While 
previous research has focused predominantly on the manner in which firms govern 
these relationships, legal scholars, economists and business scholars have more re-
cently attempted to study '(...) the actual formalized documents that we call contracts 
(...)'.1 These studies have generally been based on transaction cost economics and 
property rights theory, which has led to an extensive examination of particular control 
rights2 and/or ownership rights3. 
Several authors have called for a more in-depth investigation of contract structure 
and have in that sense attempted to describe contracts in terms of the degree of 
'complexity'.4 This understanding of the complexity of contracts is relevant as this 
complexity indicates the costs that companies face in terms of designing, writing, im-
plementing, controlling, and enforcing contracts that govern the relationship with their 
contractual partners.5 Measures that authors have used to determine contractual 
complexity include the length of contracts in terms of the number of pages6, the 
'amount' of kilobytes of information in contracts7, or the number of provisions in con-
tracts and their stringency8. 
Although the complexity of contracts has received quite some attention in the 
literature, the actual understanding and conceptualization of contractual complexity as 
such remains a challenge. First of all, complexity is typically one of those concepts that 
are often used, yet difficult to define. Also, attempts to measure complexity are laden 
with intricacies. As stated by Kades (1997): '(...) scholars have not had an easy time 
defining complexity, and some have been disarmingly honest about this difficulty. One 
author admitted that he was tempted to define complexity by averring, 'I know when I 
read it.'9 My understanding of complexity is influenced by Simon, who defines com-
plexity in terms of the '(...) large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way (...) 
[where] (...) the whole is more than the sum of its parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysi-
'Suchman 2003. 
2 Lerner and Merges 1998, Robinson and Stuart 2007, Kaplan and Stromberg 2003, Elfenbein and Lerner 
2003. 
3 Elfenbein and Lerner 2003. 
4 Poppo and Zenger 2002, Ryall and Sampson 2007, Argyres et al. 2007, Reuer and AriRo 2007. 
5 Macleod 2002. 
6 Gillian etal. 2007. 
7 Robinson and Stuart 2007. 
8 Arino and Reuer 2004, Ryall and Sampson 2004. 
9 Ryall and Sampson 2004, p. 406, citing L.W. Rook, 'Laying Down the Law: Canons For Drafting Complex 
Legislation', Oregon Law Review 72,1993, p. 663, 669. 
149 
cal sense but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts 
and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the 
whole.'10 
For contracts, this implies that the more complex contracts are, the more they are 
characterized by many parts, e.g. provisions, with a large number of interdependen-
ces.11 More complex contracts also refine and increase the number of events, en-
forcement mechanisms and clauses that would otherwise be sparsely mentioned in a 
less complex contract.12 A higher degree of interdependency between provisions in a 
contract increases the information processing costs, caused by the limits of human 
cognition.13 Kades (1997) argues that legal rules '(...) the length and detail of (...) rules, 
along with their interconnectedness, (...) are directly related to their elaborative com-
plexity (...)'14 and as such this complexity goes beyond the mere length of contracts.15 
In that light, it becomes apparent that straightforward measures of length of contracts 
are probably not sufficient to fully capture the construct of complexity. 
In related work, some scholars from the field of law and economics, e.g. Schuck 
(1992) and Eggleston et al. (2000) suggest that objective measures of the complexity of 
contracts should be complemented by subjective measures related to the degree of 
cognitive load of contracts, i.e. the degree of difficulty that people face when they 
attempt to understand contracts.16 In other words, these authors argue that the com-
plexity of contracts has to be seen from a multidimensional perspective where both 
objective and subjective dimensions are taken into account. In order to better com-
prehend contractual complexity, as discussed in the above, I therefore follow up on 
these suggestions to include both subjective and objective elements within the con-
struct of contractual complexity as I investigate the feasibility of a multidimensional 
measure of the complexity of contracts. 
Given the general goal of this chapter, I attempt to make several contributions to 
the existing literature. First, I investigate whether different objective measures of 
complexity, such as the number of words, the number of pages, and the amount of 
kilobytes of contracts, are substitutes or complements. Second, I introduce a new 
measure of contractual complexity that has both an objective element, e.g. the length 
of contracts, and a subjective element based on the perception of the cognitive load of 
contracts. Third, my study also has some interesting interdisciplinary features, in the 
sense that I build upon the understanding of the complexity of contracts in business, 
10 Simon 1981. 
11 See also Rasmusen 2001. 
12 Macleod 2000. 
1 3 Smith 2006. 
14 Kades 1996, p. 413. 
15 Smith 2006. 
16 Schuck 1992, p. 3, indicates that a definition of complexity of the legal system and its rules might center 
on '(...) whether the people who are subjected to that legal rule, process, or institution perceive and experi-
ence It as complex (...).' (Miller 1993, cited by Kades 1997, p. 413). 
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economics, and law in combination with an understanding of the role of cognitive load 
as developed in the psychology and education literatures. 
The empirical analysis that I present is based on a combination of a sample of 
nearly 400 R&D alliance contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry and a measure-
ment of the perception and assessment of the cognitive load of these contracts. My 
findings indicate that diverse objective measures of contractual complexity, based on 
the length or size of contracts, are interchangeable. In addition, objective and subjec-
tive measures do indeed refer to different dimensions of contractual complexity where 
the cognitive load of contracts carries both objective and subjective characteristics. My 
expanded conception thus allows contractual complexity to vary simultaneously across 
an objective as well as a subjective dimension. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: in the next section I will give 
an overview of the different measures of contractual complexity currently discussed in 
the literature. This is followed by an introduction of the concept of cognitive load as 
this has been defined and researched in the psychology and education literatures. 
Methods and research design are discussed in the next section, after which I present 
the findings of my research. Finally, the section with the discussion and conclusions 
not only discusses my findings in the context of the literature on cognitive load, 
bounded rationality, and contractual complexity but also suggests some steps for fur-
ther research that links up to other recent contributions that advocate an in-depth 
understanding of the content of inter-firm contracts. 
O B J E C T I V E A N D S U B J E C T I V E M E A S U R E S OF C O N T R A C T U A L 
C O M P L E X I T Y 
So far, a relatively large number of economists and business scholars have defined 
contractual complexity in rather general terms and measured the degree of this com-
plexity through straightforward objective and quantitative indicators. Klein discusses 
how the greater specification of elements of performance in contracts and the increas-
ing number of contingencies lead to more complex contracts, to which he refers as 
'thicker' contracts, or 'thinner' contracts with fewer elements of performance and 
decreasing numbers of contingencies.17 In Rasmusen's reading cost model of contract-
ing, length of contracts is taken as a proxy for their complexity.18 Joskow (1998) and 
Lumineau and Oxley (2007) take the length of supplier contracts in vertical inter-firm 
relationships, i.e. the number of pages in these contracts, as a proxy for their contrac-
tual complexity. Similarly, Gillan et al. (2007) measure the complexity and length of 
CEO employment contracts by means of the number of pages of these contracts. 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) asked firms to indicate on a Likert scale to what extent a 
17 Klein 1996. 
18 Rasmusen 2001. 
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specific contract was highly customized and required considerable work, where higher 
values indicate higher levels of complexity. In addition, they also asked firms to indi-
cate the length of their contract, in terms of the number of pages.19 Robinson and 
Stuart (2007) approximate the complexity of alliance contracts in bio-pharmaceuticals 
through the size of the digital (ASCII) contract files in kilobytes. Their contribution 
suggest that larger ASCII files indicate that more future contingencies are identified in 
these contracts and that each possible contingent action requires more complex lan-
guage to describe these contingencies. 
Obviously, economists and business scholars are not the only ones who have stud-
ied contractual complexity. Legal scholars have focused on the complexity of contracts 
from the perspective of the optimal design of contracts in terms of the benefits of 
either simpler or more complex contracts. These benefits of different levels of the 
complexity of contracts are assessed in the context of the information asymmetry 
between contract parties, the circumstances of contractual enforcement, and court 
rulings that each affect the efficiency of the degree of contractual complexity. In an 
interesting response to calls for a broadening of the understanding of contractual 
complexity, Eggleston et al. (2000) propose a multidimensional construct for contrac-
tual complexity. Their contribution suggests that, apart from dimensions related to 
objective measures, the degree to which a contract imposes a significant cognitive 
load upon contract parties should be taken as another important dimension of con-
tractual complexity. More in particular, this cognitive load refers to the extent to which 
parties relevant to a contract are able to understand this contract, i.e. a significant 
cognitive load implies that a contract is more complex and more difficult to under-
stand.21 
The basic idea behind this particular understanding of the role of the cognitive 
load of contracts is that increasing incorporation of expected contingencies will raise 
the cognitive load of contracts. In addition, calculating relevant payoffs for contingen-
cies which might arise, demands an amount of mental effort needed to understand the 
intricacies of contracts. Cognitive load also represents something more, as e.g. '(...) a 
detailed schedule of payment amounts (...) will be more difficult to understand than a 
simple payment formula (for example, a 25% commission). And a payment of $X per 
widget will impose less cognitive load than an otherwise identical contract that bases 
payment on a fraction of profits which may be difficult to calculate (-..)'.22 Thus, apart 
from the number of contingencies and variability in payoffs, the way in which contract 
terms are formulated will influence the cognitive load and thereby the level of com-
plexity of contracts. In that context, it is important to note that, as argued by amongst 
others Smith (2006), there is not necessarily a linear relationship between the length 
19 However, the low response rate on this item precluded it from being used as a second indicator in their 
empirical analysis (Poppo and Zenger 2002, p. 217). 
20 Eggleston et al. 2000, Hill and King 2004. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. p. 91. 
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of contracts and the degree to which contracts impose cognitive difficulties. The in-
creased length of a contract provision may actually promote simplicity through modu-
larity and the extensive use of standard boilerplate provisions as also applied in a 
range of contracts. Although these different contributions point at various aspects of a 
more intricate understanding of contractual complexity, they share a common mes-
sage that suggests that an empirical analysis of contracts might need to go beyond a 
simple equation of length of contracts with complexity and also incorporate a cogni-
tive dimension of contractual complexity (see Appendix 1). 
C O G N I T I V E L O A D A S A D I M E N S I O N S OF C O N T R A C T U A L 
C O M P L E X I T Y 
Scholars in law, economics and business do recognize that human actors possess 
bounded rationality which is, amongst other things, affected by limitations to the ef-
fort and costs of processing information.23 Cognitive load refers to the effort and men-
tal activity imposed on a person's ability to process information. This cognitive load 
can therefore be seen as an important aspect of bounded rationality and, as suggested 
by Eggleston et al. (2000), an understanding of the role of cognitive load as the infor-
mation processing capacity and information processing efforts of contract parties 
could inform our perception of contractual complexity. However, cognitive load has 
yet to be empirically examined and applied in the study of contracts at the crossroads 
of economic, business and legal research. This stands in sharp contrast to some other 
academic disciplines such as psychology and education, where cognitive load plays a 
prominent role in research and theory development. In these disciplines, cognitive 
load is, given differences in individual cognitive abilities, e.g. cognitive processing 
speed, considered as a crucial factor in understanding a subject's ability to process 
information, to learn and to understand complex tasks.24 
Following Paas et al. (2003b) and Paas et al. (1993), I understand cognitive load as 
a complex construct in terms of three elements, i.e. mental load, mental effort and 
performance. 'Mental load' is the element of cognitive load, which is imposed by task 
or environmental demands, e.g. the structure of a task, its novelty, and the conditions 
under which a subject comprehends and completes a task. 'Mental effort' is defined as 
'(...) the aspect of cognitive load that refers to the cognitive capacity that is actually 
allocated to accommodate the demands imposed by the task; thus it can be consid-
ered to reflect the actual cognitive load (...).'2S Mental effort can be measured during 
or shortly after the execution of a task. 'Performance' is the element of cognitive load, 
23 Simon 1955, Williamson 1996, Eisenberg 1995, Korobkin and Uien 2000. 
21 Brunken et al. 2003. 
25 Paas et al. 2003a, p. 64. 
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which can be defined in terms of a subject's achievements, e.g. the time spent on 
performing a particular task, i.e. its time-on-task.26 
So far, different methods have been developed to measure cognitive load. In 
that context, both objective and subjective measures of cognitive load have been in-
troduced. An objective method of measurement refers to the time-on-task that pro-
duces an indication of the cognitive load that typically increases with task complexity. 
Increasing time-on-task then points towards a higher cognitive load of a task.28 A well-
known indirect subjective assessment of cognitive load uses a questionnaire where 
respondents are asked to report the invested mental effort in understanding particular 
materials.29 T h e relationship between the invested mental effort and cognitive load is 
indirect as a low level of mental effort could be the result of either a low cognitive load 
or, of such a disproportionately high cognitive load that the respondent subsequently 
decreased the invested mental effort.30 Despite this indirect relationship, numerous 
studies have shown that most people are quite capable of rating their invested mental 
effort on a numerical scale.31 Other subjective measures of cognitive load include the 
rating on a numerical scale of the difficulty of the materials that subjects have to 
evaluate32 and the reporting of their experienced stress level33. 
Most of these subjective measures are multi-factoral in the sense that they are 
assessed as groups of associated variables with both indirect and direct subjective 
measures. Paas and Van Merrienboer (1994) have demonstrated that reliable meas-
ures for cognitive load can be found using simple scales, such as ratings based on in-
vested mental effort. Subjective workload measurement techniques using rating scales 
are also widely used as they provide various benefits in the sense that they are easy to 
use and reliable, they do not interfere with primary task performance, they are inex-
pensive, they c a n detect small variations in workload, and they provide decent conver-
gent, construct, and discriminate validity.34 In other words, a substantial body of litera-
ture on the measurement of cognitive load indicates that cognitive load as a multifac-
eted construct can be measured in three main elements (mental load, mental effort, 
and performance) that represent both objective and subjective elements of this cogni-
tive load (see Appendix 1). 
26 Ibid., Corbalan et a I. 2006. 
27 Whelan 2007. 
28 Corbalan etai. 2 0 0 6 . 
29 Borg et al. 1971, P a a s 1992, Paas et al. 1994. 
30 Briinken etal. 2003. 
31 Gopher and Braune 1984, Paas et al. 2003a, Paas 1992. 
32 Kalyuga et al. 1998, Kalyuga et al. 1999, Kalyuga et al. 2000, Kalyuga et al. 2001, Kalyuga et al. 2004. 
33 Reid and Nygren 1988, Hart and Staveland 1988. 
34 Paas etal. 2003a, Paas 1992. 
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M E T H O D S A N D R E S E A R C H D E S I G N 
If I follow contributions such as those by Schuck (1992), Kades (1997) and in particular 
Eggleston et al. (2000), who suggest that contractual complexity has both objective 
and subjective dimensions, with a strong impact of the cognitive load of contracts, the 
question remains to what extent these dimensions represent very different aspects of 
contractual complexity or whether these dimensions are to some extent related to 
each other. If all elements of the cognitive load of contracts are highly correlated, not 
only with each other, but also with objective measures of complexity such as the 
length of contracts, then it should suffice to measure contractual complexity with a 
simple, straightforward indicator of the length of contracts measured through e.g. the 
number of words, pages or kilobytes. If not, these different dimensions and elements 
would suggest that contractual complexity is indeed a multidimensional phenomenon, 
in particular if there is some level of overlap between objective, quantitative measures 
of complexity and objective aspects of cognitive load. The latter aspect is relevant 
because conceptually it is important that contractual complexity in terms of the con-
tent of contracts is to some extent related to the cognitive load of contracts, which 
otherwise would only indicate that we are dealing with two very different and com-
pletely unrelated aspects of contracts. 
Following the above, the main research question that I address in the remainder of 
this chapter is then: to what extent do quantitative objective measures of complexity 
(e.g. length), objective elements of cognitive load (e.g. time-on-task), and subjective 
elements of cognitive load (e.g. mental effort) measure different aspects of contrac-
tual complexity? In order to answer this question, I analyze a sample of nearly 400 
inter-firm R&D alliance contracts with regard to their contractual complexity in terms 
of their length as well as in terms of their cognitive load. To measure the cognitive load 
of these contracts I set up a study where a large number of participants were asked to 
read the contracts and fill out a short questionnaire with various items related to the 
cognitive load of each contract. 
Data 
The dataset on contracts that I analyze in this chapter refers to a set of 387 contracts 
in the biopharmaceutical sector. The contracts were obtained from the PharmaDeals 
database, managed by PharmaVentures, a UK-based specialized consultancy firm serv-
ing the global pharmaceutical industry. The information on the actual contracts is 
based on contract filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).35 The 
collected contracts fall within one of either two categories identified by PharmaDeals; 
co-development contracts and collaborative R&D contracts. Co-development is de-
35 
Issuers of US publicly traded securities are required to disclose all contracts deemed 'material' in filings 
with the SEC. See Overdahl (1991) for more Information on the specific requirements and issues concerning 
contract filings with the SEC. 
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fined as '{...J two (or more) companies working together with the aim of developing a 
clinical-stage compound (...). Collaborative R&D is as co-development but used for 
preclinical or earlier stage research (...)' (PharmaDeals). The agreements refer to 219 
US (domestic) contracts, i.e. the contracting parties are both US-based firms, and 168 
international contracts, i.e. a US-based firm collaborates with a non-US based firm. A 
total of 342 firms were involved in these contracts and roughly two thirds of the 
agreements are concluded between an established pharmaceutical company and a 
start-up or emerging firm. All the agreements were set up between 1996 and 2005. 
The contracts in my sample represent the first interaction between the companies as 
filed with the SEC within this time period. 
The 'objective' measure of the complexity of contracts 
As shown by previous studies, a one-dimensional objective measure of contractual 
complexity can be constructed in terms of either the number of kilobytes of the ASCII 
file of a contract, the number of pages of a contract or the number of words in a con-
tract. The electronic copies of the contracts provide by PharmaDeals are presented in a 
comparable layout in PDF-format. 1 used the document conversion feature of a text 
miner to convert all the documents into a readable ASCII file. The text miner provides 
us with information on the number of words and a page count was obtained by open-
ing the ASCII files with Microsoft Word. The number of kilobytes of each file was re-
trieved from the file properties report. 
To see whether there was indeed a difference between the various objective 
measures of complexity in terms of length, I first performed a correlation test to inves-
tigate the possible association between these three measures (see table 1). Table 1 
illustrates that for my sample these measures (kilobytes, number of words, and num-
ber of pages) are almost perfectly correlated, ranging from 0.951 to 0.987. In my em-
pirical analysis, the number of words was taken as a first quantitative, objective proxy 
for contractual complexity in terms of the length of these contracts. 
Table 1 Correlations between Kilobytes, Number of Words, and Number of Pages in R&D Alliance 
Contracts (n= 387). 
kilobytes words pages 
kilobytes Pearson Correlation 1.000 
words Pearson Correlation .987** 1.000 
pages Pearson Correlation .951** .961** 1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Research design 
The study was conducted at Maastricht University in The Netherlands. In both the pilot 
study and the actual study, my participant pool consisted of graduate students from 
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Maastricht University.36 This choice might raise some concern as, compared to profes-
sionals, students lack professional experience and are generally younger, which may 
lead to a different attitude than one would expect for managers and corporate lawyers 
who would otherwise deal with these contracts. However, as Siegel and Harnett (1964) 
have shown, attitudes are not necessarily related to behavior. Research has provided 
significant evidence that students are indeed valid surrogates for professionals. Com-
paring professional and student behavior, many studies do not find a substantial dif-
ference in behavior.37 In addition, Levitt (1965) and Khera and Benson (1970) find that 
students tend to behave more like businessmen and businesswomen or other relevant 
professionals when they have an adequate background for the research task. 
In the pilot study, the group of participants consisted of six students from the 
Faculty of Law, three students from the Faculty of Economics and Business Administra-
tion, and two students from the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences. Each of the 
students completed their JD, MSc. and MD respectively and had entered the second or 
third year of their PhD program. Each PhD student received two contracts. 
I developed a questionnaire for the pilot study with a total of five questions based 
on validated and widely used items found in the cognitive load literature (see Appen-
dix 2). I used scale-based reporting to investigate the degree of cognitive load in rela-
tion to the contracts. As mentioned earlier, cognitive load comprises mental load, 
mental effort and performance. Therefore, a meaningful interpretation of cognitive 
load can only be given through the measurement of indicators of these different ele-
ments of cognitive load. 
As a direct subjective measure of cognitive load, I asked the participants to rate 
the perceived level of complexity of the contract (question 1). This question is based 
on Marcus et al. (1996) and Van Gog and Paas (2008). The cognitive load of informa-
tion is amongst others defined by the extent to which various elements interact. High 
element interactivity imposes a heavy load on working memory, which translates into 
a high level of perceived complexity.38 
As an indirect subjective measure, I asked participants to report the invested men-
tal effort necessary to understand the materials (question 2), adopted from a scale as 
first developed by Paas (1992) and Paas and Van Merrienboer (1993). Mental effort 
relates to the effort made to process and comprehend information. Mental effort 
measurements account for task characteristics, subject characteristics and their inter-
36 Although I did consider the option of having these contracts read by managers, corporate lawyers, and 
legal counsel to assess the cognitive load of the sample of contracts, both my reading of the relevant litera-
ture and the consultation of a number of experts convinced me that in practice it would be impossible to 
have a survey of nearly 400 contracts read by practitioners. 
37 Abbink and Rochenbach 2006, Siegel and Harnett 1964, Banks et al. 1994, King et al. 1992, DeJong et al. 
1988, Burnett and Dunne 1986, Alderfer and Bierman 1970, Cunningham et al. 1974, Park and Lessig 1977, 
Hughes and Gibson 1991. 
38 Pollock et al. 2002. 
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action, and provide information that is not rendered by mental load and performance 
measures. 
I also asked participants to report the perceived level of information in the con-
tract (question 3) and to assess the length of the contract given objectives (question 
4). Both questions are based on Brunken et al. (2003) and Paas et al. (2003b). The 
perceived level of information and the length given objectives are indicators of the 
amount of information, format and manner in which information is presented. These 
factors measure task demands imposed by information design and presentation.39 
The measurement of experienced stress levels (question 5), was adopted from the 
Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT)40 and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX)41. Stress is a direct subjective 
measure of cognitive load and as such complements mental effort, which is an indirect 
objective measure of cognitive load. Experienced stress levels measure setting, situa-
tion and context effects on the subject; i.e. a degree of effort may be required to man-
age discomfort and as such affect perceived workload. 
In cognitive load research, 7-point Likert scales are frequently used to measure the 
invested mental effort42 and the difficulty of the materials43. In compliance with this 
literature, the students were asked to record their responses on a 7-point Likert scale. 
The scale ranges from very low (1) to very high (7) or from very clear (1) to very un-
clear (7), depending on the question. 
The PhD students were also asked to report the time spent reading each contract 
and as such I obtained an objective indirect measure: time-on-task (see Appendix 2). 
Paas et al. (2003a) indicate that time-on-task is often neglected in cognitive load 
measurements. Corbalan et al. (2006) argue that time-on-task provides a meaningful 
measurement as this reflects the difficulty or ease of a task. Time-on-task typically 
increases with complexity and a high time-on-task points towards a high cognitive 
load. See also Brunken et al. (2003) who argue that time-on-task can be seen as an 
indicator of different cognitive load levels. In addition, the length of the contracts was 
recorded: each student was given one longer and one shorter contract in terms of the 
number of words. 
The pilot study led to some adjustments to the questionnaire for the actual study. 
The question on the level of information in the contract (question 3) was eliminated as 
the feedback from the test group indicated that 'the level of information' was subject 
to different interpretations. The word 'stress' in the final question was redefined as 
merely 'irritated, annoyed' in order to reduce the chance of divergent interpretations. 
Several participants remarked that it was easier to read the second contract, since the 
first contract created a learning effect, i.e. by reading the first contract the participants 
39 ibid. 
40 Reld and Nygren 1988. 
41 Hart and Staveland 1988. 
42 Corbalan et al. 2006, Tindall-Ford et al. 1997, Marcus et al. 1996, Moreno 2004. 
43 Haydee et al. 2002, Kalyuga 2000. 
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gained a sense of the structure and content of this sort of contractual agreements. 
Other studies have also shown that prior knowledge partly determines the level of 
cognitive load that an individual will experience.44 Therefore, I controlled for this learn-
ing effect by first administering one additional single contract of medium size to every 
participant in the study, i.e. all participants received the same contract first. This addi-
tional contract was obtained from another source but given its content, it is represen-
tative for the other R&D alliance contracts given to the participants in the study. The 
function of this contract, that was administered to all participants separately, is some-
what similar to a 'practice task' in psychological experiments. In the final questionnaire 
I also included some clear instructions for the task (see Appendix 3). This questionnaire 
contained a total of four questions. 
The actual study was conducted with two groups, each with 60 students. The first 
group consists of students from the Faculty of Law at Maastricht University. These 
students were enrolled in a masters-level course on 'European contract law', pursuing 
either a JD in 'European and Comparative law' or 'Dutch law'. 
If I were to only consider this group of participants, i.e. law students, one could 
wonder whether results would be only relevant for that particular group. In absolute 
terms, the cognitive load may differ across groups of individuals. For example, indi-
viduals trained as attorneys may read a contract and see structures and language that 
would require little extra effort, while others may need to employ a much greater 
effort to detect similar structures and language, assuming these individuals would be 
able to uncover such legal implications at all. If the cognitive load were to be measured 
in practice, it should be done by controlling for different groups within society. Con-
tracts are not only employed by attorneys or legally trained individuals, but also read 
and used by managers and other relevant professionals. These groups of professionals 
use, understand and manage contracts in different ways. See a recent paper by Ar-
gyres and Mayer (2007), in which the authors indicate that the management of con-
tract design capabilities resides differentially with managers, engineers and lawyers. In 
order to control for this potential bias, I also conducted a second study with a group of 
students from the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration at Maastricht 
University. These students participated in a course on 'Alliances and Mergers & Acqui-
sitions' which is part of an MSc program in International Business. Students in both 
groups have a Western European background, English is a foreign language to them 
but it is also a major language of instruction, which they had experienced during at 
least three years of university education. 
The students in both groups were given general information on the types of con-
tracts and they received a brief instruction on the reading of the contracts and how to 
fill out the questionnaire. Ideally, each student should have received the complete set 
of contracts. However, with a sample of nearly 400 contracts with an average length of 
about 50 pages per contract, this would lead to a reading load of nearly 20,000 pages 
Mlbid. 
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per participant. Therefore, each student was randomly administered a total of six or 
seven contracts. To avoid group pressure, these contracts were read and the ques-
tionnaires filled out in a private setting. 
Before these six or seven contracts were distributed to each student, as explained 
in the above, one contract, representative of the sample of 387 contracts, was admin-
istered to all students in a first round in order to control for learning effects. The 
scores of the students on the various questions for this representative contract were 
also used to consider the within-group variance for both groups.45 As demonstrated by 
the data on the coefficient of variation for the various questions, see table 2, the 
within-group homogeneity was relatively large for both groups. This implies that a 
single participant can be seen as representative of his or her group.46 This finding is 
important as it indicates that, in a second round, I could ask students in each group of 
60 students to read 6 or 7 contracts from the sample of 387 contracts in order to get 
valuable information on the cognitive load of each contract.47 During this second 
round, students were asked to read each contract they were given and answer the 
four questions from the questionnaire in addition to reporting the time-on-task for 
each contract. 
Table 2 Results on the Scores (Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation) for the Questions 
on the Representative Contract, Both Groups (n=60 for Both Groups). 
Law and 
Business 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Mean 
cv 
Ql: level of complexity Law 4.825 0.986 0.127 0.204 
Business 4.683 1.186 0.153 0.253 
Q2: mental effort Law 4.900 1.203 0.155 0.246 
Business 4.483 1.334 0.172 0.298 
Q3: length given objectives Law 4.842 1.155 0.149 0.239 
Business 4.797 1.126 0,147 0.235 
Q4: stress level Law 4.350 1.696 0.219 0.390 
Business 4.333 1.724 0.223 0.398 
Length (words) Law 14528.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Business 14528.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time (minutes) Law 59.833 36.309 4.687 0.607 
Business 81.500 44.979 5.906 0.552 
45 See also Mason 2006. 
"6 Bedeian and Mossholder 2000, Sorenson 2002. 
47 In theory, a random distribution of these contracts in both groups should have been sufficient but for this 
experimental setting I prefer to remain strict and test the degree to which there is within-group homogene-
ity. 
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R E S U L T S 
In the following, I will, given the similarity of the outcomes for the two groups, concen-
trate the discussion of the results of my empirical research on the group of law stu-
dents and discuss the results for the group of business students only in reference to 
diverging results.48 The descriptive statistics for each of the four questions, the length 
of contracts in number of words, and the time-on-task are presented in Table 3. The 
average length in words for these contracts is 14972 with a standard deviation of 
9407. The average time necessary to read these contracts was 50.58 minutes with a 
standard deviation of 39.19 for the group of law students and 67.42 with a standard 
deviation of 52.06 for the group of business students. 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics (Means and Standard Deviation) for Contractual Complexity (Cognitive Load 
and Time and Length) of Contracts, Law and Business Students (n=387). 
Group Items Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Law Ql : level of complexity 1.000 7.000 4.386 1.391 
Q2: mental effort 1.000 7.000 4.310 1.428 
Q3: length given objectives 1.000 7.000 4.528 1.378 
Q4: stress level 1.000 7.000 3.806 1.726 
Time (minutes) 2.000 270.000 50.576 39.192 
Length (words) 601.000 74415.000 14972.103 9407.515 
Business Q l : level of complexity 1.000 7.000 4.129 1.620 
Q2: mental effort 1.000 7.000 4.104 1.537 
Q3: length given objectives 1.000 7.000 4.311 1.523 
Q4: stress level 1.000 7.000 3.803 1.830 
Time (minutes) 5.000 300.000 67.419 52.064 
Length (words) 601.000 74415.000 14972.103 9407.515 
A first step in the analysis was to look at the inter-item correlations for the six item 
scores for the group of law students. The correlation matrix demonstrates that, as also 
suggested by the literature on cognitive load, several measures of cognitive load do 
correlate substantially: the level of complexity with mental effort and stress level, and 
the mental effort with stress level. In addition, relatively high correlations are found 
between the number of words and the length given objectives. For the group of busi-
ness students, I also find higher correlations between the perceived complexity and 
length given objectives, as well as the number of words and time-on-task. 
48 I also performed the same analyses with both groups for the contracts between US companies and be-
tween US and non-US companies separately, to see whether the domestic or international context of these 
contracts might impact the complexity of contracts. However, the results for these sub-samples are Identical 
to those for the overall sample. 
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Table 4a Item Correlations for Contractual Complexity (Cognitive Load and Time and Length) of Contracts, 
Law Students (n=387). 
Ql : Q2: Q3: 04: Time Length 
level of mental length stress level (minutes) (words) 
complexity effort given 
objectives 
0.1: level of complexity Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 
Q2: mental effort Pearson 
Correlation 
.777** 1.000 
Q3: length given objectives Pearson 
Correlation 
.463** .394** 1.000 
04: stress level Pearson 
Correlation 
.639** .645** .457** 1.000 
Time (minutes) Pearson 
Correlation 
.255** .223** .283** .173** 1.000 
Length (words) Pearson 
Correlation 
.315** .225** .533** .227** .429** 1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4b Item Correlations for Contractual Complexity (Cognitive Load and Time and Length) of Contracts, 
Business Students (n=387). 
_ _ 
level of mental 
complexity effort 
Ql: level of complexity Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 
Q2: mental effort Pearson 
Correlation 
.768** 1.000 
Q3: length given objectives Pearson 
Correlation 
.549** .430** 1.000 
Q4: stress level Pearson 
Correlation 
.621** .690** t449** 1.000 
Time (minutes) Pearson 
Correlation 
.384** 334** .427** .304** 1.000 
Length (words) Pearson 
Correlation 
.461** .337** .591** .330** .500** 1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Based on the correlation matrix as found in Table 4a, I use the scores of the law stu-
dents to conduct a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation with the 
following items: perceived complexity, mental effort, length given objectives, stress 
level, time-on-task and the length in words. The PCA renders two components and a 
high discriminant validity for all of the items. Perceived complexity, mental effort and 
stress level load high on component 1 and time-on-task and the number of words on 
component 2. Length given objectives (Q3), however, cross-loads on both components 
with loadings of .461 and .616 respectively. I eliminated this item from my analysis and 
ran the PCA with Varimax rotation again (see table 5). 
Q3: Q4: Time Length 
length stress level (minutes) (words) 
given 
objectives 
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Table 5 Principal Component Analysis of Contractual Complexity with Varimax Rotation, Law Students 
Component 
1 2 
0.1: perceived complexity 0.884 0.217 
Q2: mental effort 0.903 0.128 
Q4: stress level 0.854 0.086 
Time (minutes) 0.100 0.846 
Length (words) 0.165 0.822 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
Table 6 Principal Component Analysis of Contractual Complexity with Varimax Rotation, Business Students 
Component 
1 2 
Ql : perceived complexity 0.832 0.326 
Q2: mental effort 0.907 0.176 
Q4: stress level 0.855 0.154 
Time (minutes) 0.175 0.850 
Length (words) 0.225 0.833 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
This PCA also resulted in two components, with similar loadings as the first analysis 
(exclusive of length given objectives (Q3)), and it also generated high discriminant 
validity. The analysis reveals a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) score of .732 and a significant 
Bartlett's test. The total variance explained by both components is 76.53%. For each 
item the communality and thus common variance is above .700. The internal reliability 
measured by Cronbach's Alpha for the level of complexity, mental effort and stress 
level is .860. Cronbach's Alpha for both of the items that load on the second compo-
nent, the time-on-task and the number of words, is somewhat lower at .600. 
I find similar results for the group of business students (see Table 6). A preliminary PCA 
with Varimax rotation led me to eliminate length given objectives (Q3) due to cross-
loadings. A second PCA with Varimax rotation reveals two components, with compara-
ble item loadings as for the group of law students. The data for the business students 
show a lower discriminant validity as the 'level of complexity' (Q.1) loads to some ex-
tent on both components (.832 vs. .326). The test for internal reliability on the level of 
complexity, mental effort and stress level generates a Cronbach's Alpha of .866, which 
indicates that these three items load on component 1 and measure the same latent 
construct. I find a Cronbach's Alpha of .667 for the number of words and time-on-task. 
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 
My findings indicate that, as suggested by Eggleston et al. (2000), contractual complex-
ity is indeed a multidimensional phenomenon with both objective and subjective as-
pects. The length of contracts as a simple count-based indicator of complexity has 
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some clear overlap with the time-on-task as a performance measure of the cognitive 
load of contractual complexity. Despite their conceptual differences, both these ele-
ments of contractual complexity point at one particular objective dimension of con-
tractual complexity. 
However, there is more to contractual complexity than just length and time-on-
task as objective indicators of the complexity of contracts. My research indicates the 
relevance of another dimension of contractual complexity, based on a number of sub-
jective elements of the cognitive load of contracts, for understanding the complexity of 
contracts. The mental effort that people have to make to understand the content of 
contracts can be broken down in two sub-elements: the actual cognitive effort they 
make to understand contracts and the degree of stress that they experience as they 
have to read through contracts. The perceived level of the complexity of contracts 
suggests a more subjective perception of the mental load and the task difficulty that 
people face when they 'digest' these contracts. These different elements indicate the 
intricacy of cognitive load as such.49 This intricacy of the cognitive load is apparent in 
the context of inter-firm contractual agreements where mental load and mental effort 
are related to a more subjective dimension of contractual complexity whereas the 
performance element of the cognitive load of contracts (time-on-task) is part of an 
objective dimension of contractual complexity. 
Returning to the central question of this chapter, I find that the quantitative, ob-
jective measures of complexity, such as length, and objective as well as subjective 
elements of cognitive load do indeed measure different aspects of contractual com-
plexity. Both components of contractual complexity (an objective, quantitative dimen-
sion and a more subjective cognitive load-based dimension) and their individual ele-
ments suggest that contractual complexity is indeed a multidimensional phenomenon. 
Also, the relatedness of the objective aspect of cognitive load to the other objective 
aspect of contractual complexity, i.e. the length of contracts, suggests that a multidi-
mensional understanding of complexity which encompasses cognitive load is indeed 
relevant for understanding the complexity of contracts. 
These findings do indicate that it is worthwhile for scholars to not only 'measure' 
the complexity of contracts that establish inter-firm relationships through objective 
measures, even when these measures go beyond simple counts of pages or words. My 
study suggests that there is a cognitive dimension to the complexity of contracts, 
which expresses the degree to which contracts impose a cognitive load on contract 
parties. If the groups in my study are representative for managers and corporate law-
yers, who represent companies as contract parties, then the cognitive load of con-
tracts does indeed affect the degree to which these managers and lawyers experience 
the complexity of their alliance contracts beyond the mere length of such contracts. 
My understanding of the complexity of contracts that incorporates cognitive load 
as an important dimension of complexity has some interesting implications for the 
49 Paas et al. 2003a, Paas and Van Merrienboer 1994. 
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broader perspective of bounded rationality and its impact on contracts. Bounded ra-
tionality is expected to affect the degree to which economic actors (e.g. companies, 
managers, corporate lawyers, legal counsel) are limited in their cognitive capabilities 
to design and write contracts with an effective degree of contractual complexity that 
would fit all current and future contingencies that might affect the context of a con-
tract.50 In other words, bounded rationality has a front-end impact on the effective-
ness of contract design due to the limitations and costs of information processing. 
However, the cognitive load of contracts has some post-design implications for the 
bounded rationality with which contract parties are able to implement and monitor 
their contracts. If the cognitive load of contracts affects the complexity of contracts, 
this implies that higher levels of the cognitive load of contracts increase the likelihood 
that economic actors do not fully comprehend contracts or are limited in their inter-
pretation of the consequences of the content of their contract. As such, it appears that 
the cognitive load of contracts affects the bounded rationality with which contract 
parties have to govern their inter-firm contractual arrangements such as R&D alliance 
contracts. 
Another implication of my research is that my findings qualify a basic assumption 
of the economics of law literature and the managerial contract literature which state 
that with increasing levels of economic risk in inter-firm transactions, greater levels of 
contractual complexity are necessary to safeguard these transactions. However, in the 
context of the bounded rationality that contract parties face and given the cognitive 
load of contracts and its implications for the information processing ability of contract 
parties, there may very well be an upper limit to the actual level of complexity of con-
tracts that contract parties are able to absorb.51 
Although, my research generates some interesting insights regarding the complex-
ity of inter-firm contracts, it is important to note that my contribution is based on an 
experimental research design that leaves ample room for improvement and directions 
for further research. One line of future research would be to consider a broader set of 
indicators for contractual complexity that might lead to additional dimensions of this 
complexity. A number of recent contributions point at some interesting, possibly addi-
tional, indicators of contractual complexity. This line of work considers the complexity 
of contracts through counts of the number of particular groups of clauses and provi-
sions incorporated in a range of contracts, e.g. R&D alliances, human resource out-
sourcing contracts, standard outsourcing contracts, and vertical inter-firm agree-
ments.52 The complexity of these contracts is expected to increase with the number 
and the type of clauses and provisions, the monitoring mechanisms, and the descrip-
tion of specific tasks included in these contracts. 
50 Eisenberg 1995, Korobkin and Ulen 2000. 
511 am indebted to Laura Poppo for drawing my attention to this implication of my findings, 
52 See Arino and Reuer 2004, Barthélémy and Quélln 2006, Lumineau and Oxley 2007, Mellewlgt et al. 2007, 
Reuer and Arino 2002, Reuer et al. 2006, Ryall and Sampson 2006, Ryall and Sampson 2003. 
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In an alternative approach, Hansen and Higgins (2007) mention that the number of 
provisions included in a contract do not consistently define contractual complexity, 
while focusing only on certain provisions may ignore other relevant aspects of con-
tracts. These authors define contractual complexity along a multidimensional frame-
work of functional and technological scope. Functional scope provides a measure of 
breadth of the alliance contract, while technological scope provides a measure of 
depth of the alliance contract. This complexity indicator is a measure of the activities 
and technologies chosen to be in the alliance, which is subsequently specified in the 
contract. In particular, functional scope (breadth) identifies the extent of value chain 
activities, such as manufacturing, marketing and distribution while technological scope 
(depth) relates to firm capabilities and overall uncertainty of focal projects.53 
As with the other recent attempts to deepen or broaden my understanding of the 
complexity of contracts, briefly discussed in the above, it appears worthwhile for fu-
ture research to investigate the degree to which we can identify such additional di-
mensions of the complexity of contracts. However, in the end the value of such a mul-
tidimensionalization has to be found in studies that indicate the degree to which the 
complexity of contracts, in terms of the size of contracts, their cognitive load, the 
weight of different contractual terms, their value chain coverage, and their technologi-
cal scope, tells us something about the actual contracting behavior of companies. 
More in particular, the ultimate aim of such a multidimensional perception of contrac-
tual complexity is the understanding of the implications of different levels of contrac-
tual complexity for the costs of inter-firm contracts in terms of design, writing, imple-
mentation, control, and enforcement. In that light, my current chapter, although lim-
ited to two dimensions of contractual complexity, has to be seen as a first step to-
wards a more in-depth understanding of the complexity of inter-firm contracts, in 
terms of its objective and subjective characteristics, that can benefit future empirical 
research on this aspect of the contracting behavior of firms in various legal, industrial, 
and inter-firm settings. 
"ibid. 
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A P P E N D I X 1 
O V E R V I E W C O G N I T I V E L O A D A N D C O N T R A C T U A L C O M P L E X I T Y C O N S T R U C T S 
CONSTRUCT SU BJ ECTIVE/OBJECTIVE SUBCONSTRUCTS SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE SUBCONSTRUCT-
ELEMENTS 
INDICATORS 
MENTAL LOAD 
Perceived task 
difficulty/complexity 
subjective elements 
Subjective measure COGNITIVE LOAD MENTAL EFFORT 
Invested mental effort 
Stress level 
objective elements PERFORMANCE Time-on-task 
COMPLEXITY 
Words 
Objective measure LENGTH objective elements Kilobytes 
Pages 
i-» 
CT1 
v j 
A P P E N D I X 2 
Q U E S T I O N N A I R E P I L O T S T U D Y - PHD S T U D E N T S 
Questions 
(1) How do you perceive the level of complexity of the contract? 
(2) How much effort did you have to invest in order to understand the contract? 
(3) How do you perceive the level of information contained in the contract? 
(4) How would you rate the length of the contract, given the objective of the agree-
ment? 
(5) How stressed (insecure, discouraged, irritated, annoyed) did you feel while read-
ing the contract? 
Time needed for reading the contract. 
Question 1: see Marcus et al. (1996), Van Gog and Paas (2008). 
Question 2: see Paas (1992). 
Question 3: see Brünken et al. (2003), Paas et al. (2003b). 
Question 4: see Brünken et al. (2003), Paas (2003b). 
Question 5: adopted from the SWAT (Reid and Nygren 1988) and NASA-TLX (Hart and 
Staveland 1988) scales. 
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A P P E N D I X 3 
F I N A L Q U E S T I O N N A I R E - L A W A N D B U S I N E S S S T U D E N T S 
Instructions: 
'Imagine you are a legal counsel at an international company. One of your main tasks is 
to draft and conclude alliances. Please read the attached contract and answer ques-
tions 1-4. 
Please be aware of the following while reading the contract: 
(1) The page numbers indicated in the table of contents (if included), do not corre-
spond with the actual page numbers of the contract due to formatting. 
(2) The stars [***] in the contract designate confidential information which has been 
omitted.' 
Questions* 
(1) How do you perceive the level of complexity of the contract? 
(2) How much effort did you have to invest in order to understand the contract? 
(3) How would you rate the length of the contract, given the objectives of the agree-
ment? 
(4) How stressed (irritated or annoyed) did you feel while reading the contract? 
Time needed for reading the contract. 
* See Appendix 2 for the references to these questions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CONTRACTUAL COMPLEXITY OF R&D ALLIANCE CONTRACTS 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
In the last decade inter-firm collaborative agreements have gained importance in the 
international economy and are the most common organizational form through which 
firms engage in joint research and development (R&D).1 For 2000 for example, roughly 
25% of $26 billion US based financed pharmaceutical R&D can be traced to over 700 
inter-firm collaborative agreements.2 
Various economic theories have developed which attempt to explain the growth 
of these organizational forms. However, our understanding of these contractual col-
laborations does not mirror the expanding role these arrangements play in the busi-
ness landscape. Little is known about precise contract structure and operation.3 This 
might be caused in part by the fact that contracts have long been regarded as rather 
low-dimensional constructs.4 Contracts, however, are not only a collection of promises 
as classical theory asserts, but also governance structures which regulate relationships 
over time.5 The degree of diversity in these contractual arrangements is large and 
scholars have attempted to determine this heterogeneity by measuring the degree of 
contractual completeness. But as Furlotti (2007) asserts, heterogeneity cannot be 
captured effectively by variations along a single dimension. A more in-depth investiga-
tion of contract structure is necessary and consequently scholars have recently intro-
duced the concept of contractual complexity. 
Complexity theory argues that as a result of parties' drafting effort, contracts 
should include a higher number of clauses and provide for a larger array of enforce-
ment mechanisms. Drawing on a study by Parkhe (1993), several authors model com-
plexity by counting a certain number of pre-defined clauses in a contract and rank 
them according to their stringency.6 In a similar manner, Anderson and Dekker (2005) 
and Ryall and Sampson (2006, 2007) refer to complexity as the number and extensive-
ness of included contract terms. Other authors use the number of pages or amount of 
kilobytes of information to measure complexity.7 Hansen and Higgins (2007) argue that 
'broad measures such as contract length and number of provisions included in contract 
do not consistently define contractual complexity across heterogeneous contractual 
relationships and focusing only on certain provisions may be too limited and ignore 
other relevant aspects of contract design.'8 Hansen and Higgins (2007) define contrac-
tual complexity along a multidimensional framework of functional and technological 
scope. Other scholars such as Eggleston et al. (2000) propose a three-dimensional 
1 Robinson and Stuart 2007, Hagedoorn 2002, Faems et al. 2008. 
2 Robinson and Stuart 2007. 
3 Robinson and Stuart 2007, Mayer and Teece 2008, Argyres et al. 2007. 
* Furlotti 2007. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Arino and Reuer 2004, Reuer and Arino 2007, Reuer et al. 2006, Barthélémy and Quélln 2006. 
7 Robinson and Stuart 2007. 
8 Hansen and Higgins 2007, p. 7. 
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construct of complexity which comprises the expected number of specified pay-off 
relevant contingencies, the variance in the level of pay-offs, and the cognitive load 
necessary to understand the contract. 
Although the concept of complexity has received quite some attention in litera-
ture, the understanding and conceptualization of complexity remains a challenge. As 
Masten and Saussier (2002) indicate: theory so far does not offer a '(...) unifying struc-
ture for the specification and testing of contract design hypotheses.'9 In this chapter I 
take the foregoing limitations as point of departure. I use a multi-dimensional con-
struct of contractual complexity as developed in my recent paper.10 Based in part on 
Eggleston et al. (2000), I define complexity to consist of two dimensions: an objective 
dimension and a subjective dimension. A well-defined construct of complexity will give 
us a better insight into contract structure. 
I am also interested to learn under which conditions firms are inclined to increase 
contractual complexity. Most studies which try to understand and explain the diversity 
in contractual design, are heavily influenced by transaction cost economics and prop-
erty rights theory. These theories contend that contractual agreements may serve 
several important functions in managing exchange hazards. Exchange hazards in turn 
are represented by transaction characteristics such as size, asset specificity, (environ-
mental) uncertainty, task complexity and particular partner characteristics. Dyer 
(1997), Poppo and Zenger (2002), Reuer and Arino (2007), Barthélémy and Quélin 
(2006) and Anderson and Dekker (2005), find that for example the transactional at-
tribute of asset specificity generates greater contractual complexity. Other research 
findings illustrate that the strategic importance of the collaboration is positively re-
lated to the complexity of contracts.12 Finally, several studies focus on aspects of (envi-
ronmental) uncertainty, indicating that the latter raises contractual complexity. At 
the level of company experience, authors have found that prior collaborations may 
give rise to either more or less complex contracts. Some authors find that prior col-
laborations lead to the development of inter-organizational routines and/or trust, 
which allow firms to draft less detailed contracts.14 Argyres et al. (2007) and Ryall and 
Sampson (2006, 2007) find on the contrary that prior (partner specific) experience is 
correlated with more detailed contract terms. 
Based in part on this prior research, but also on other approaches found in empiri-
cal industrial organization, finance, strategic management, law and economics, and 
legal theory, I focus on three levels of conditions that impact contractual complexity: 
company characteristics, transaction characteristics, and the organizational routines of 
firms. For company characteristics I look at size asymmetry, R&D capability asymmetry 
9 Masten en Saussier 2002, p. 282. 
10 Chapter 4. 
11 Reuer and Arino 2007. 
12 Arino and Reuer 2004, Reuer et al. 2006. 
13 Barthélémy and Quélin 2006, Reuer and Arifio 2007, Hansen and Higgins 2007. 
14 Reuer et al. 2002, Reuer and Arino 2007, Ciccotello and Hornyak 2000, and Hansen and Higgins 2007. 
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and information asymmetry. Concerning transaction characteristics, I evaluate the 
impact of strategic importance and asset specificity of the R&D alliance. At the level of 
organizational routines, I analyze how general and partner-specific experience with 
R&D alliances affect the complexity of contracts. 
This chapter is part of a growing literature regarding empirical work on contract-
ing. Given the general goal of my chapter I attempt to make several contributions to 
the existing literature. First, 1 draw on prior work of Eggleston et al. (2000) and several 
other authors to come to a multidimensional concept of complexity. Second, I investi-
gate the impact of transactional and company characteristics, and organizational rou-
tines on the complexity of contracts. Finally, my chapter also incorporates interesting 
interdisciplinary features, while I use arguments from different disciplines to substan-
tiate my hypotheses and findings. 
The objectives of my chapter are primarily to improve the understanding of con-
tracting practices, more in particular in the area of research and development collabo-
rations. Creating a better insight of the facts that surround strategic alliance contracts 
enriches the already vibrant theoretical and empirical literature on inter-firm contract-
ing. I argue that contracts are about far more than mere legal formality: they define 
the framework for a relationship15 and more attention should thus be paid to contract 
structure. 
In the empirical analysis that I present, I study more than 300 contracts in the 
biopharmaceutical sector which are coded along two dimensions of contractual com-
plexity. My findings indicate that company characteristics, transaction level attributes, 
and the organization routines of contract parties define the degree of complexity of 
inter-firm R&D alliances. More specifically, my results reveal that asymmetries be-
tween contracting parties in terms of their size, R&D capabilities, and information 
asymmetry, raise the complexity of the contract. At the level of transactional attrib-
utes, my findings indicate that the higher partners perceive the strategic importance 
and asset specificity of an R&D alliance, the more complex these R&D alliances be-
come. Contrary to my expectations, learning to contract through a history of previous 
alliances or repeated ties leads to more complex contracts. Finally, my findings suggest 
that the subjective dimension of contractual complexity is mainly affected by two 
factors: the size asymmetries of firms and the asset specificity of the technology to 
which the contract refers. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in the next section I will give 
an overview of the different hypotheses. This is followed by a discussion of the data 
and sample description, and research design. The results of my research are discussed 
in the section thereafter. Finally, my discussion and conclusions section does not only 
discuss my findings in the context of the literature on complexity, but also suggests 
some steps for further research that links up to other recent contributions that advo-
cate an in-depth understanding of the content of inter-firm contracts. 
15 Mayer and Teece 2008, Macneil 1974. 
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H Y P O T H E S E S 
As explained in the Introduction, the literature on inter-firm contracting and contract 
design has not yet led to one or even a few coherent unifying theoretical approaches 
from which I can deduct a unified theory-driven set of hypotheses on the complexity of 
inter-firm contracts. Given this variety of theoretical approaches, inspired by a range 
of literatures, I will take a pragmatic and eclectic perspective to my exploratory re-
search. However, despite this disjointed nature of the current literature on this topic, 
this literature does suggest a number of analytical levels at which the conditions that 
impact contractual complexity can be analyzed. Following a range of contributions that 
will be discussed in more detail below, I will position my hypotheses at three levels: 
the level of the company characteristics of the partners involved in a contract, 
the level of the transactions to which a contract refers, and 
the level of the experience-based organizational routines, which refers to the 
preference that partners might have for certain contract designs. 
At the level of company characteristics that impact the complexity of inter-firm con-
tracts, the literature suggests three different aspects of inter-firm asymmetry, that 
refer to the difference between partners in terms of their size, their R&D capability, 
and their information asymmetry. At the level of the transactions to which an inter-
firm contract refers, 1 will distinguish between the strategic importance and the asset 
specificity of the alliance. Finally, the level of organizational routines differentiates 
between the general experience of firms with alliances and their partner-specific ex-
perience. In other words, the following hypotheses are formulated in the context of 
the attributes of the parties involved in an R&D alliance contract, the nature of the 
actual transaction governed by a contract, and the experience that parties have with 
these R&D alliance contracts. 
Level of company characteristics 
Size asymmetry 
Traditionally, the empirical industrial organization literature has paid extensive atten-
tion to the size of firms as an important aspect of their market power. In that context, 
size differentials between firms are expected to create inter-firm asymmetries through 
which larger firms can reap benefits of their market power in terms of both their 
economies of scale and scope and their bargaining power vis-a-vis smaller firms.16 This 
heterogeneity of firms engaging in commercial transactions is also recognized in the 
legal literature, where large parties are often found to possess substantial bargaining 
power, relevant organizational skills, information advantages, and greater legal exper-
tise relative to their smaller counterparts.17 
16 Barla 2000, Bresnahan 1989, Cohen and Levin 1989, Freeman and Soete 1997, Schmalensee and Willig 
1989. 
17 Tjittes 1994, Garvin 2005, Barnhizer 2005, Van Bijnen 2005. 
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Contributions to the alliance literature point out that the size of companies participat-
ing in alliances and in particular the size difference between partners can play a role in 
the risk perception of companies during the partnership formation process. This litera-
ture suggests that the size asymmetry of partners generates a higher appropriability 
hazard to the smaller firm due to the potentially opportunistic behavior of its larger 
partner. For instance, the literature on inter-firm cooperation through licensing indi-
cates that when firms of different size engage in technology collaboration, larger firms 
attempt to dominate the agreement based on bargaining asymmetries that affect the 
terms of the agreement.18 in more general terms, Barnhizer (2005) illustrates the 
negative effect that bargaining power disparities have on the ability of the weaker and 
smaller party to obtain preferred terms in inter-firm contracts. 
Following these suggestions, I assume that when companies of different sizes 
collaborate in R&D, smaller firms run a greater risk of losing control over the input to 
and output from their R&D cooperation than larger firms that have more resources 
and organizational capabilities to control and monitor their R&D cooperation. This 
implies that smaller partners have an incentive to engage in a more complex contract 
to curb their appropriability hazard and to compensate for their more limited organiza-
tional resources and capabilities to control and monitor the alliance. Due to their con-
trol and monitoring capabilities and their bargaining power, larger firms have fewer 
incentives to engage in more complex contractual arrangements. Given these differ-
ent incentives, the larger the difference in the size of companies and the more the 
market power lies with the larger firm, the more incentives the smaller partner has to 
increase the complexity of its contract. It is important to note that I do assume that 
the larger partner might prefer to economize on the transaction costs of more com-
plex contracts and hence favors a less complex contract but, given its control and 
monitoring resources, its inclination to opt for a less complex contract is less critical 
than the incentive for its smaller partner to draft a more complex contract. It is in 
particular the smaller partner that is expected to favour a contract that facilitates the 
monitoring of the alliance through a number of safeguards, control rights, enforce-
ment mechanisms, and other clauses that refer to specific responsibilities. Hence: 
HI: The larger the asymmetry between partners, in terms of their size, the higher the 
likelihood that the contract of their R&D alliance will be more complex. 
R&D capability asymmetry 
I expect the R&D capabilities of partnering companies to have an impact on the degree 
to which they prefer more or less complex contracts. From the perspective of one 
partner, collaborating with other companies that have well developed R&D capabili-
ties, that increase the probability of the success of the alliance, might be preferred to 
18 Bessy and Brousseau 1998, Caves et al. 1983, 
19 See also Van Bijnen 2005. 
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working with companies with less developed R&D capabilities that 'bring little to the 
table' that can be used in the actual R&D cooperation. This suggests that the benefits 
of a company's R&D alliance partly depend on the R&D capabilities of its alliance part-
ner. As stated by Baum et al. (2000), cooperating with skilled innovators increases the 
most promising opportunities for a company to improve its technological know-how 
and to learn new routines. 
However, the R&D capabilities of a company's partner are not only a source of 
input into the alliance. These R&D capabilities of a partner can also be seen as this 
partner's 'absorptive capacity'20 that enables this partner to benefit from the alliance. 
As there are at least two parties to an alliance (company A and B), the R&D capabilities 
of the partner (company B), which company A needs in order to learn from the alli-
ance, are also the capabilities that might enable its partner (company B) to learn from 
the alliance and from company A. 
There is some empirical research that points at the role of R&D capabilities that 
support companies in their attempt to benefit from alliances. Stuart (2000) finds that 
companies that create alliances with partners rich in well-established technological 
capabilities turn out to become more innovative than other companies that collabo-
rate with technologically unsophisticated partners. Baum et al. (2000) indicate that 
linking up to technologically advanced partners has a positive effect on the innovative 
performance of firms that participate in alliances. Silverman and Baum (2002) establish 
that the survival rates of new biotech firms increased the more they collaborated with 
companies with higher technological capabilities. Gomes-Casseres et al. (2006) report 
that companies with higher R&D expenditures receive higher knowledge flows from 
their alliance partner. This suggests that R&D capabilities create an absorptive capacity 
that helps firms to absorb external technology. 
The above implies that companies need their own current R&D capabilities to be 
able to benefit from the R&D capabilities that their partner brings to the alliance, 
whereas the same applies to their partner. This implies that the more both partners 
have somewhat similar R&D capabilities the more a company can learn form its alli-
ance but so can its partner. Given the appropriability hazards that both partners then 
face, I expect that the more equal the R&D capabilities that both partners bring to the 
alliance, the more one or both partners are inclined to increase the complexity of the 
alliance contract through additional safeguards, monitoring clauses, control rights, and 
intellectual property rights. Alliances with partners that have limited R&D capabilities 
are, given the expected lower returns of the alliance, less attractive to companies. 
Hence, I expect that: 
H2: The smaller the asymmetry between partners, In terms of their R&D capabilities, 
the higher the likelihood that the contract of their R&D alliance will be more complex. 
20 Cohen and Levinthal 1989,1990. 
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Information asymmetry 
I already introduced an element of general information asymmetry between partners 
in an R&D alliance through the first hypothesis where the size difference between 
partners indicates a market power differential which in its turn suggests that informa-
tion asymmetries can for example affect bargaining asymmetries between parties. I 
now turn to the possible effect of more specific information asymmetries where one 
party to the alliance has more or better information, relevant to the alliance, than the 
other party. This information asymmetry can potentially create hold up problems 
when one party lacks the necessary information to monitor the tasks that are to be 
undertaken in a particular alliance. See for instance, Barnhizer (2005) who discusses a 
party's access to information as an important source of bargaining power. 
When companies that engage in an R&D alliance differ in the extent to which they 
possess information on the specific R&D tasks that have to be performed, the party 
that faces the potential risk of moral hazard has an incentive to put a range of clauses, 
control rights, safeguards and enforcement mechanism in a contract turning this con-
tract more complex. Lerner and Malmendier (2005) find that in R&D alliances where 
one party is largely responsible for the R&D financed by its partner, both parties have, 
depending on their position, an incentive to add a variety of different clauses such as 
termination rights, intellectual property rights, and elements of option contracts. This 
implies that when the partners in an R&D alliance have very different roles, e.g. where 
one company is largely responsible for the actual R&D and the other company is re-
sponsible for financing this R&D, possibly in combination with complementary assets 
such as testing, production, etc., there is a built-in element of information asymmetry 
in the alliance. When companies engage in these information asymmetry-based R&D 
alliances, I expect that one or both partners have an incentive to increase the complex-
ity of the alliance contract. Hence: 
H3: The higher the degree of information asymmetry between partners, the higher the 
likelihood that the contract of the R&D alliance will be more complex. 
Level of transactions 
Strategic importance of R&D alliance 
When an alliance is of strategic importance to one or both partners, e.g. because the 
alliance activities comes close to the core capabilities of one or both companies, eco-
nomic and business theory indicates that there is greater risk of opportunistic behavior 
of partners and a range of safeguards from equity participation to contracts with 
monitoring clauses, control rights, and intellectual property rights are warranted. Vin-
cent-Jones (1989) states that detailed contracts tend to be specifically negotiated 
wherever particularly complex and costly transactions are involved. These detailed and 
carefully written contracts specify the primary obligations, the effect of certain contin-
gencies, defective performance, and the possibility of legal sanctions. As a conse-
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quence, the strategic importance of an alliance has an effect on the degree to which 
companies are expected to draft extensive, complex alliance contracts. 
Reuer et al. (2006) indeed find that contractual complexity is positively related to 
the strategic importance of an alliance. Related to the strategic importance of an alli-
ance, Robinson and Stuart (2007) establish that the size of upfront payment, equity 
stake and the investments in the alliance are highly correlated with contract length: 
contracts are longer when the investments and the strategic importance of the alliance 
increase. Anderson and Dekker (2005) and Argyres et al. (2007) find a positive relation-
ship between the value of the transaction organized through an alliance and the detail 
of task descriptions in the contract and contractual complexity and extensiveness of 
the alliance contract. Hence: 
H4: The higher the strategic importance of the R&D alliance to partners, the higher the 
likelihood that the contract of the R&D alliance will be more complex. 
Asset specificity of R&D alliance 
Prior research that focused in particular on buyer-seller relationships found that asset 
specificity is an important transactional attribute that affects contract design.22 This 
asset specificity refers to the degree to which investments create specialized transac-
tion-specific assets that are not easily re-deployable and hence unique to a specific 
task. Higher asset specificity describes the extent to which a party, through these spe-
cific investments, is tied into an inter-firm relationship such as an R&D alliance. Al-
though originally placed within a unilateral setting, where one party faces the risk of 
hold-up created by its partner23, the consequences of asset specificity in terms of hold-
up can also be bi-lateral as both parties might have made specific investments and/or 
face exit and switching costs.24 For inter-firm alliances this implies that if asset specific-
ity is high, there is a higher chance of holdup and thus parties are expected to negoti-
ate more complex contracts which cover consequences of breach and termination as 
well as the legal processes through which such threats are handled.25 
Arino and Reuer (2004) suggest that when the investment in the specific assets for 
an alliance is high, it pays off to incur the costs of drafting complex contracts.26 Reuer 
and Arino (2007) find support for this hypothesis as their research indicates that con-
tractual complexity is positively related to asset specificity. More specifically, they 
notice that the greater the transaction specific investment, the greater the number of 
contractual provisions and the more extensive the stringency of provisions built into 
an alliance contract. Poppo and Zenger (2002) and Anderson and Dekker (2005) find 
21 Arino and Reuer 2004, Reuer et al. 2006. 
22 Joskow 1988. 
23 Williamson 1983. 
2" Joskow 1988, Klein 1988. 
25 Dyer 1997, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Reuer and Arino 2007. 
26 See also Argyres and Mayer 2007. 
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that increases in exchange hazards characterized by higher asset specificity, encourage 
more complex contracts. I expect that this role of asset specificity is also relevant in 
the context of R&D alliances, where the asset specificity of certain R&D investments 
has specific consequences for the complexity of contracts. Hence: 
H5: The higher the asset specificity of the R&D alliance activity for partners, the higher 
the likelihood that the contract of the R&D alliance will be more complex. 
Level of organizational routines 
General experience with R&D alliances 
There is a well-established body of alliance literature which indicates that the experi-
ence of companies with setting up alliances through a variety of partners has a positive 
impact on their capabilities to organize and manage future alliances.27 This experience 
with both previous alliances and a variety of partners is expected to increase the or-
ganizational learning of companies which not only affects the actual management of 
newly established alliances but, as a major element in the institutionalization of setting 
up alliances, it can also affect the design of alliance contracts. I expect that companies 
that have little or no experience in setting up alliances will be inclined 'to play it safe' 
and to increase the complexity of their initial alliance contracts through a wide range 
of clauses that create safeguards, monitoring options, control rights, and intellectual 
property rights. From an organizational learning perspective, contracts of companies 
with little alliance experience that are still at an early phase of the learning-to-
contract-curve are expected to be more complex than the contracts of more experi-
enced companies that have gradually learned to set up less complex contracts that 
focus on an efficient contract design. From a legal perspective, Collins (1996) mentions 
that that market conventions may supplement the contractual discrete communica-
tion system between contract parties. Contractual relations are understood to be em-
bedded in existing market conventions and the familiarity of contract parties with 
these conventions increases with the transaction frequency. This implies that for ex-
perienced contract parties the conventions of the market may be sufficiently replete 
to dispense with the discussion of all but most central themes of contracts.28 
The efficiency of contract design is also relevant from a transaction cost economics 
perspective which stresses that, although companies are due to their bounded ration-
ality not able to design complete contracts, through their experience they can learn to 
customize their contractual relationships and improve on the efficiency of their other-
wise incomplete contracts.29 Given the transaction costs of designing, monitoring and 
controlling complex contracts and the competitive pressures to minimize these costs, 
there is an incentive for companies to minimize the transaction costs of contract de-
27 Anand and Khanna 2000, Lyles 1988, Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Sampson 2005. 
28 See also Beale and Dugdale 1975. 
29 Williamson, 1996. 
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sign and contract control. As expressed by Mayer and Argyres (2004) from a transac-
tion cost economics perspective, experience with previous alliances might help firms 
to design more efficient and, ceteris paribus, less complex contracts. From the per-
spective of companies with little or no experience, this implies that due their inexperi-
ence there is a higher likelihood that their alliance contracts will be more complex that 
those of experienced companies. Hence: 
H6: The smaller the alliance experience of parties, the higher the likelihood that the 
contract of their R&D alliance will be more complex. 
Partner-specific experience with R&D alliances 
Apart from the effect of the general experience that companies have with setting up 
alliances, 1 also expect that the specific experience that companies have with one par-
ticular partner, through their prior ties, will affect the complexity of their alliance con-
tract with that partner. Contributions by amongst others Gulati (1995), Nooteboom et 
al. (1997) and Saxton (1997) indicate that previous collaboration between partners will 
have an effect on their relational trust. As this relational trust between partners devel-
ops further, there is a declining need for elaborate contracts with a range of monitor-
ing and control options. Gulati (1995) establishes that there is a decreasing likelihood 
that companies with prior ties set up elaborate equity-based alliances with extensive 
contracting, whereas repeated ties increase the likelihood that these companies en-
gage in less complex contractual arrangements. In other words, as relational trust 
between companies develops through repeated interaction, there is less need for 
extensive contracting as this relational trust creates a certain degree of social control 
amongst partners that replaces contract-based monitoring and control.30 
These findings are also supported by legal scholars such as Collins (1996) who 
state that the inference of trustworthiness (expectations of trustworthy behavior) may 
be drawn from past dealings and previous transactions with a particular partner that 
proved satisfactory. One of the effects of this trustworthiness is that it reduces the 
need to specify in detail the precise content of the deal or to engage in close monitor-
ing of the performance. Somewhat similarly, Parkhe (1993) demonstrates that prior 
alliances between companies will lower their expectations regarding the potentially 
opportunistic behavior of these partners in future alliances and as partners are in-
clined to look for fewer contractual safeguards their future alliances will be character-
ized by less complex contracts. See also Ciccotello and Hornyak (2000) and Hansen and 
Higgins (2007) who find that prior ties lead to fewer contractual safeguards and less 
complex contracts. 
A slightly different line of argument was introduced by Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 
(2002) who state that that prior ties facilitate the development of inter-firm adminis-
trative routines shared by alliance partners through which both companies develop a 
30 See also Larsson, 1992. 
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mutual understanding of their decision making style, their administrative routines, and 
their management systems. Given this knowledge about their partner, there is less 
need for detailed, complex contracts that attempt to provide for a range of monitoring 
and control mechanisms. On the other hand, if companies have no or very few prior 
ties and less knowledge about their partners or if relational trust has not yet devel-
oped, I expect that companies will favor more extensive contracts with their unfamiliar 
alliance partners. Hence: 
H7: The fewer prior ties between alliance partners, the higher the likelihood that the 
contract of their R&D alliance will be more complex 
D A T A A N D S A M P L E D E S C R I P T I O N 
Contractual alliances occur frequently across a broad range of industries however, 
they tend to cluster in risky, high-tech R&D settings.31 Drug development is a highly 
uncertain and expensive endeavor and it is not surprising that alliances are frequently 
used to organize R&D.32 Since the inception of the biotechnology industry in the mid 
1970s, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology research firms have partnered to form 
alliances. These collaborations allow pharmaceutical companies to gain access to the 
latest technological and scientific advances in biotechnology and to combine comple-
mentary resources in order to cope with the dynamics of innovation in drug discovery 
research.33 Hagedoorn (1996) illustrates that especially in the biotechnology industry, 
collaborative activity has continued to grow steadily. Newly initiated R&D and tech-
nology alliances involving pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms grew from a couple 
of dozens during the mid 1980s to several hundreds in 2000.34 
The pharmaceutical development process often begins with the identification and 
validation of 'drug targets', enzymes or receptors that trigger or block biochemical 
processes within a cell. These targets are screened against thousands of molecules 
with the aim of finding compounds which trigger or block disease processes. When 
such 'lead' compounds are identified, they pass through several stages of testing and 
approval. The discovery/pre-clinical stage concerns laboratory/animal tests to control 
for toxicity and precedes the clearance request with for instance the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) for human testing.35 The pre-clinical stage is followed by three 
phases in which humans are used as test subjects. Phase I involves testing the com-
pound on a small number of volunteers for dosage and toxicity. Phase II concerns a 
larger number of patients on which the drug is tested for efficacy/side effects. Finally, 
31 Robinson 2008. 
32 Robinson and Stuart 2007. 
33 Hansen 2001, Powell et al. 1996. 
34 Hansen 2001. 
35 See also Hausier 2007. 
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Phase III trials entail a controlled experimental design which tests for long-term ad-
verse effects using a large group of human subjects. Phase III is followed by FDA review 
and possibly approval. Once approval is granted, additional tests may follow. The time 
path from the discovery stage to the marketing of a drug generally spans 10-15 years. 
Data suggest that for every 5,000 to 10,000 identified compounds, only 250 reach the 
pre-clinical testing stage.36 DiMasi et al. (2003) find that only about 20% of the drugs 
that begin Phase I trials will finally be granted approval by the FDA. Even then, securing 
FDA approval does not guarantee success.37 
The organizational and contractual structure of the collaborations between phar-
maceutical and biotechnology companies ranges from licensing agreements to more 
complex research agreements, including technology transfers, joint research and co-
development agreements and minority equity investments.38 As of 1995, Pharmaven-
tures, a UK-based information and consulting firm, has identified approximately 28.726 
alliances in the healthcare and biotech sector in their PharmaDeals database. The 
collected deals are grouped into 10 categories: licensing, technology access, collabora-
tive R&D, rights, distribution/marketing, manufacturing/supply, business acquisition, 
funding, co-development and marketing. For each agreement, the PharmaDeals data-
base provides information on the names of the partners, type of contractual relation-
ship, summary deal terms, upfront payment, product types, total deal value, territo-
ries, date deal signed, effective and expired, equity investment, milestone value and 
royalty value, relevant product areas and the technology field, press releases and 
where available actual contracts. These actual contracts are obtained from the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and Pharmaventures' clients. Publicly 
traded biotechnology firms are required by the SEC to file material documents. Bio-
technology firms tend to interpret this requirement conservatively and often file con-
tracts specifying alliances as amendments to 10-K, 10-Q, S - l or 8-K statements.39 In 
addition, a number of state governments in the USA require privately held companies 
with employee stock options to file material documents, which are then made avail-
able to the public. 
My dataset covers R&D alliance contracts and additional information for the years 
1996 to 2005 inclusive. I collected information on alliances where the main focus is on 
research and development and for which PharmaDeals includes an actual legal docu-
ment (contract). The sample of contracts falls within one of either two categories iden-
36 DiMasi etal. 1991. 
37 See also Robinson and Stuart 2007. 
38 Hansen 2001. 
39 See Overdahl (1991) for more information on the specific requirements and issues concerning contract 
filings with the SEC. Under the SEC requirements, companies file for their most substantial deals. Thus there 
is a tendency of overrepresentation of larger and publicly owned companies. Small firms are present in 
these filings but only when they partner with public companies who file with the SEC. The choice of con-
tracts may not be a random phenomenon. However, other authors using a similar type of dataset (Hansen 
and Higgins 2007, Higgins 2007, Sampson 2005) conclude that a systematic bias in contract type and activity 
is not present in the recorded agreements. 
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tified by the PharmaDeals database: (1) Co-development and (2) Collaborative R&D. 
Co-development is defined as '(...) two (or more) companies working together with the 
aim of developing a clinical-stage compound (...). Collaborative R&D is as co-
development but used for preclinical or earlier stage research (...)' (PharmaDeals). 
Using this sample I am able to generate a set of contracts in a homogeneous contract-
ing space, which facilitates the comparison of key contract features across alliances. In 
this manner, I can be assured that variation in contracting terms comes not from varia-
tion in the underlying contracting environment, but instead from different solutions to 
a common contracting problem, which in turn may reflect underlying differences in 
firm characteristics. The preliminary sample comprised 587 deals for the period 1996-
2005.1 excluded all the agreements where: 
one of the parties is a government agency or university 
the alliance is a renegotiation or restatement of a previous alliance between the 
two firms 
there is no research and development component to the alliance 
one firm has a controlling interest in the other firm (greater than 50%) 
contracts involve more than two parties. 
The final contract database contains a set of 309 contracts. These contracts repre-
sent the first interaction between the companies as filed with the SEC within the 
time period 1996-2005. 
The agreements include both US (domestic) contracts, i.e. the contracting parties are 
both US-based firms (179 alliances), and international contracts, i.e. a US-based firm 
collaborates with a non-US based firm (130 alliances). A total of 285 firms were in-
volved in the 309 contracts and roughly two thirds of the agreements are concluded 
between an established pharmaceutical company and a start-up or emerging firm. 
I collected additional information on for instance size, R&D, alliance experience, and 
prior ties between partners for the firms participating in these 309 deals. My complete 
dataset combines information from PharmaDeals with data retrieved from company 
annual reports, the MERIT Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators (CATI) 
Database, Datastream, Compustat, and Corptech. 
Dependent variable 
Contractual complexity. In prior studies, contractual complexity has been measured 
using objective constructs such as the number of pages, words or kilobytes of the con-
tractual document. In this chapter, I use the construct of contractual complexity as 
suggested by Eggleston et al. (2000) and Chapter 4, which includes both an objective 
and a subjective dimension of contractual complexity. The subjective dimension of 
contractual complexity refers to the degree to which a contract imposes a cognitive 
load upon contract parties. More specifically, cognitive load refers to the effort and 
mental activity imposed on a person's ability to process information. This cognitive 
load can therefore be seen as an important aspect of bounded rationality. As discussed 
by Eggleston et al. (2000), an understanding of the role of cognitive load as the infor-
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mation processing capacity and information processing efforts of contract parties in-
forms our perception of contractual complexity. In chapter 4 I find that the quantita-
tive, objective measures of complexity, such as the length of a contract, and objective 
as well as subjective elements of cognitive load do indeed measure different aspects of 
contractual complexity and suggest that contractual complexity is a multidimensional 
phenomenon. 
Using the construct of complexity as developed in chapter 4, the complexity of 
contracts consists of two dimensions. Dimension 1, the objective dimension of the 
complexity of a contract, consists of the time needed to read a contract (time-on-task) 
and the length of the contract in terms of the number of words. Given the different 
measurement scales these elements have been converted into a standard factor score 
ranging from -2 to 2 in order to compose Dimension 1. Dimension 2 contains three 
elements: (1) the invested mental effort that people have to make to read and under-
stand a contract; (2) the perceived complexity of a contract; and (3) the stress level 
that respondents experience while reading a contract. Each of these elements was 
measured using a 7-point Likert Scale based on previous research (the scale ranged 
from 'very low' to 'very high'). The Likert scores serve as the dependent variable and 
compose Dimension 2. See Appendix I for a further description of the measurement of 
the complexity of contracts. 
Independent variables 
Size asymmetry. Size asymmetry is based on the total asset turnover ratio of both 
parties. For each company I collected data on total asset turnover in millions of dollars. 
Average total asset turnover is calculated based on the total asset turnover of the year 
of deal conclusion and the previous year. A ratio of total asset turnover is obtained for 
each deal (company with largest average total asset turnover divided by company with 
smallest average total asset turnover).40 
R&D capabilities asymmetry. For each company I collected data on R&D expenses 
in millions of dollars. Average R&D expenses are calculated based on the R&D expendi-
tures during the year of deal conclusion and the previous year. A ratio of R&D ex-
penses is obtained for each deal (company with largest average R&D expenses divided 
by company with smallest average R&D expenses). 
Information asymmetry. The PharmaDeals dataset categorizes each company as 
either 'Established', 'Global' or'Start-up/Emerging'. Established companies are defined 
as '(...) companies with a history of profitability that generally operate on a limited 
territorial basis. Includes companies that have a global presence through distribution 
and marketing affiliates and partners.' Global companies are defined as '(...) multina-
tional companies with a true global presence, which are also included in the top 30 
healthcare companies as ranked annually by MedAdNews.' Start-up and emerging 
corporations are defined as '(...) new and emerging companies, including biotechnol-
40 Gillian et al, 2007, Ryall and Sampson 2007. 
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ogy, drug delivery and enabling technology companies. These are companies that have 
no record of sustained profitability.' Following Lemer and Malmendier (2005), infor-
mation asymmetry is indicated by the collaboration between established and global 
pharmaceutical companies, that have more general pharmaceutical research capabili-
ties and production and marketing skills, and the start-ups and emerging firms that 
have specialized bio-pharmaceutical R&D skills. I use a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the deal is concluded between an established or global and start-up or emerging 
company and 0 if otherwise. 
Strategic importance. As a proxy for the strategic importance of an R&D alliance I 
measure the extent to which intellectual property rights that results from an alliance 
are, according to the contract, shared equally between partners. Given the importance 
of intellectual property rights as a strategic tool in the pharmaceutical industry41, I 
understand the sharing of intellectual property rights between partners to indicate 
that both partners see the intellectual property rights that result from their R&D alli-
ance as of such importance that they demand an equal share in the intellectual prop-
erty rights. Using a text analysis program, I obtained data on whether a contract pro-
vides for joint intellectual property ownership. I use a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the contract provides for joint ownership of intellectual property and 0 if otherwise. 
Asset specificity. As a proxy for asset specificity I measure the extent to which a 
contract provides for exclusive licensing rights. Exclusive licensing rights specify the 
limited use of a technology to a specific user, a geographic region, a specific length of 
time, and/or a specific field of use. In other words, exclusive licensing rights limit the 
degree to which a transaction-specific asset, i.e. the technology developed through an 
R&D alliance, can be re-deployed and as such they indicate the asset specificity of this 
technology. I use a dummy variable which equals 1 if the contract contains any exclu-
sive licensing rights for either party and 0 if otherwise. 
Experience. I calculate the average alliance experience for each company per deal. 
Using the MERIT-CATI database42, I was able to obtain data on the prior R&D alliance 
experience of each company, counting back five years from the year of deal conclu-
sion. A five year window is widely accepted in the literature as an adequate period to 
measure the alliance experience of companies.43 For each deal I calculate the average 
R&D alliance experience based on the alliance experience of each partner. 
Prior ties. Using the MERIT-CATI database, I was also able to search for prior ties 
between alliance partners; counting back five years from the start of the R&D alli-
ance.44 As prior ties are usually limited to one previous tie, with very few partners 
having multiple prior ties, I use a dummy variable to indicate the existence of a prior 
relationship between the contracting parties. The dummy equals 1 if there are any 
earlier R&D alliances between partners, 0 if otherwise. 
41 Cohen et al. 2000. 
42 Hagedoorn 2002. 
43 See also Gulati 1999. 
44 See also Gulati 1995, 
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Control variables 
Year. As the propensity to engage in R&D alliance contracts may vary during the period 
1996-2005 I included year dummies. This year dummy equals 1 if the deal is concluded 
within the specific year and zero otherwise. 
Research stage. The PharmaDeals database provides information on the phase of 
the R&D underlying the deal. As mentioned in the above, PharmaDeals identifies two 
categories: collaborative R&D and co-development. Early stage collaborative R&D is 
characterized by high failure rates and the exact outcome of this kind of research is 
difficult to anticipate. Co-development of pharmaceutical products can be more read-
ily specified. Hence, I expect the research stage of an R&D alliance to impact the com-
plexity of contracts. I use a dummy variable which equals 1 if the deal concerns col-
laborative R&D and 0 if the deal concerns co-development. 
Foreign partner. To control for the possibility of greater divergence in expectations 
in contractual disputes spanning national boundaries, I include a dummy variable 
which takes on a value of 1 if the firms are headquartered in the same country (the US) 
and a value of 0 if otherwise (international deal). Firms are expected to have less in-
formation about foreign firms than about domestic firms and trust tends to emerge 
more readily between firms that share a similar social background, e.g. those that are 
domestic partners.45 This also suggests that behavioral uncertainty and opportunistic 
behavior may be more likely to arise in cross-border alliances, which affect the gov-
ernance of alliances.46 
Equity investment. For every alliance contract I noted if any type of equity invest-
ment was present. Equity participation generates some control in the alliance. This 
control might affect the degree to which partners draft more or less complex con-
tracts.47 Data was obtained by scanning each contract with a special text analysis pro-
gram. A dummy variable was created which equals 1 if the contract provides for some 
type of equity stake and 0 if otherwise. 
Same industry. Using the PharmaDeal data and the SIC categorization I assigned 
each company to a primary industry. The more companies are competitors in their 
main industry, the more they operate in similar product-markets and as direct com-
petitors I expect them to write more complex contracts because of a higher need to 
control R&D alliances with competitors. A dummy variable is included which equals 1 if 
both partners are active in either the pharmaceutical or biotechnological industry. If at 
least one partner's primary activity is in another industry (not pharmaceutical or bio-
technological) the dummy variable takes on a value of 0. 
45 Zucker 1936. 
"5 See also Hagedoorn et al. 2005. 
47 Robinson and Stuart 2007, Reuer and Arino 2007, Hansen and Higgins 2007, Ryall and Sampson 2007. 
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A N A L Y S I S 
In the following I will present models where complexity is defined as an objective di-
mension (dimension 1) and, alternatively as a subjective dimension (dimension 2). The 
dependent variable 'contractual complexity' with these two dimensions is measured 
by the average factor scores for dimension 1 and by the average Likert-scale scores for 
dimension 2. For dimension 1 the Shapiro-Wilk test (p<0.000) and residual plots do, 
however, reveal a somewhat skewed distribution of residuals, I also find that dimen-
sion 1 and 2 are characterized by slight heteroscedasticity. Failure of these assump-
tions underlying multiple regression analysis can lead to biased estimates of coeffi-
cients and standard errors. I therefore use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
with a Huber-White Sandwich estimator in my analysis. 
The basic structure of the different models, which test the factors associated with 
the degree of contractual complexity in R&D alliances, is as follows: 
Complexity=(30 + BiSize asymmetry + (S2R&D capabilities asymmetry +B3Experience+ 
f$4Prior ties + fS5Strategic importance + l56Asset specificity + ^Information asymmetry + 
RsResearch stage + RgEquity investment + (510Foreign partner + (S^Same industry + 
G12Year + E 
The contracts represent 'first interactions' between companies and a small number of 
firms appear in the dataset more than once. This occurs when company A contracts 
with company B and company A separately contracts with company C; both the AB and 
AC contracts are in the sample. Since company A's behavior in contract AB is likely not 
independent of company A's behavior in contract AC, error terms may not be inde-
pendently distributed. However, the independent distribution of the error terms is 
confirmed by the Durbin-Watson statistic and the Breusch-Godfrey test. 
A concern with estimating the effect of asset specificity and strategic importance 
on contractual complexity in an OLS regression is the potential endogeneity that may 
bias OLS estimates. Endogeneity arises when a regressor is correlated with the error 
term, thereby violating the exogeneity assumption.48 Asset specificity and strategic 
importance are measured through terms included in the alliance agreement and thus 
determined by contracting parties. 
A common technique to tackle endogeneity is the use of instrumental variables.49 
Instrumental variables are variables which are both uncorrelated with the error term 
and highly correlated with the endogenous regressor. I use a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) instrumental variable analysis (ivreg2 in Stata) to handle the potential endoge-
neity in the decision of firms regarding the level of complexity of their R&D alliance 
contracts. The 2SLS estimation consists of a first stage ('reduced form equation') re-
48 Wooldrldge 2002, Maddala 2006. 
49 Bascle 2008, Wooldrldge 2006. 
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gression of the endogenous variable on the instruments and covariates. The resulting 
fitted value of the endogenous regressor replaces the value of the original endogenous 
regressor in a second stage ('structural equation') regression. In my models I use 'Size 
difference' as an instrumental variable for strategic importance and 'Breadth deal' for 
asset specificity.50 These variables have been selected through instrumental variable 
inference. I run a robust 2SLS for each endogenous regressor independently.51 
I conduct a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test to examine potential endogeneity. 
This test is achieved in Stata by first specifying the 2SLS regression and then using the 
'ivendog' command which performs the test automatically.52 The DWH test examines 
whether the residuals of the regression of all exogenous variables on the suspected 
endogenous regressor are significant when included in the original model. The DWH 
test for dimension 1 and 2 is not significant for both asset specificity and strategic 
importance, with the exception of dimension 1 where instrumenting for asset specific-
ity yields a marginally significant DWH test. Because 2SLS can yield insignificant esti-
mates when endogeneity is not a concern, I report OLS estimates for my regression 
models of dimension 1 and 2. For the convenience of the reader I also report my 2SLS 
models for dimension 1 and 2. 
R E S U L T S 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. Table 2 and 3 present the results of the 
multivariate analyses. Table 2 (models 1-4) presents the results for the objective di-
mension of contractual complexity (dimension 1), table 3 (models 5-8) presents the 
results for the subjective dimension of contractual complexity (dimension 2).53 The 
first models reported in tables 2 and 3 are the basic models with the control variables. 
The other models include the independent variables. Tables 2 and 6 give the results for 
the standard OLS regression. Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 present the results with the instru-
mental variables. The size of most samples used in the regressions is smaller than 309 
50 Breadth deal refers to the number of pre-identified interest areas which may be covered by the alliance. 
The alliances in the database may cover up to eight different areas of interest as defined by PharmaDeals 
database. Size difference is based on the total number of employees of both parties. For each company I 
collected data on total number of employees. Average employee number is calculated based on the total 
number of employees of the year of deal conclusion and the previous year. A ratio of total number of em-
ployees is obtained for each deal (company with largest average total number of employees divided by 
company with smallest average total number of employees). 
51 2SLS estimation is very sensitive to finite-sample bias caused by e.g. weak instruments. As suggested by 
Bascle (2008) I therefore also run the instrumental variable regression with limited maximum likelihood 
(LIML), Fuller's modified UML (Fuller) and Moreira's conditional likelihood ratio (CLR). These regressions 
provide similar results to the 2SLS estimations. Note that the equation is exactly identified (one instrument 
for each endogenous regressor) and the LIML estimation is in fact the 2SLS estimation (Bascle 2008). 
52 Argyres et al. 2007. 
53 I treated my average Likert-scale scores of dimension 2 as a continuous variable (Johnson and Creech 
1983, Zumbo and Zimberman 1993). Ordered loglt regression leads to similar results. 
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due to missing values. In the following I first discuss the results for the objective di-
mension of contractual complexity (dimension 1) before I turn to the results for the 
subjective dimension of contractual complexity (dimension 2). 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that contractual complexity will be greater for R&D alliances 
with increasing size asymmetry between the partners. The results in table 2 (models 2-
4) provide support for this prediction. Hypothesis 2 argues that the smaller the asym-
metry between partners in terms of their R&D capabilities, the higher the likelihood of 
the agreement to be more complex. This hypothesis is rejected, see models 2-4. Ap-
parently, the larger the R&D capabilities asymmetry between partners, the more they 
are inclined to design complex contracts. Hypothesis 3 concerns the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry and predicts that the degree of information asymmetry between 
partners is positively related to contractual complexity. This hypothesis is supported in 
the models 2-4. The hypothesis related to the strategic importance of the alliance 
(hypothesis 4) predicts that the higher the strategic importance of the alliance for one 
or both partners, the greater the likelihood that parties will construct a complex con-
tract. This hypothesis is supported in models 2 and 4 but not in model 3. Asset specific-
ity has, as predicted by hypothesis 5, a positive impact on contractual complexity, i.e. 
asset specific investments increase the likelihood that a contract will be more complex 
(see models 2-4). Hypothesis 6 concerns the general alliance experience of parties and 
predicts that the smaller the experience, the higher the likelihood that parties will 
design a complex contract. However, models 2-4 show a reverse effect: the greater the 
experience of parties, the more likely that they will design a complex contract. Hy-
pothesis 7 argues that prior ties can substitute for formal safeguards in alliance con-
tracts leading to lower levels of contractual complexity. This hypothesis also does not 
receive support as my findings suggest a reverse effect (see models 2-4). 
Interestingly, I find rather different results for the subjective dimension of contrac-
tual complexity, see table 3. Only two key variables seem to impact the subjective 
dimension of contractual complexity: size asymmetry and asset specificity. Following 
hypothesis 1 the perceived contractual complexity will be greater for R&D alliances 
with increasing size asymmetry between the partners. The results in table 3 (models 6-
8) provide support for this prediction as the effect of size asymmetry is positive and 
marginally significant. As predicted by hypothesis 5, asset specific investments increase 
the likelihood that a contract will be more complex. There is partial support for this 
hypothesis as asset specificity has a positive impact on contractual complexity in two 
out of three models (see models 6-8). The other independent variables appear to have 
no impact on the subjective dimension of contractual complexity. 
Turning to the control variables, it appears that, with the exception of the research 
stage, these controls have only limited impact.54 For the objective dimension of con-
54 The international scope of the alliance for example has no effect. Experts In the field confirm this finding 
and indicate that in this sector, the fact that one partner is foreign does not significantly affect the complex-
ity of the contract, with some exceptions. For example, one of the partners of a US law firm, specialized In 
negotiating and drafting these types of agreements, revealed that he was once Involved In negotiations with 
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tractual complexity, the results for the research stage illustrate that earlier stage 
agreements (collaborative R&D) referring to preclinical research are generally less 
complex than later stage agreements (co-development) referring to clinical trials phase 
1 or above. It appears that when the research outcome is still uncertain, parties do not 
know yet what to expect, and the contractual agreement is not yet complex. However, 
when parties have more certainty that some output may result from their collabora-
tion and they have to invest more resources (larger trials etc), parties will draft more 
complex contracts. Interviews with experts in the field reveal that parties indeed ex-
perience the research stages in this manner and will invest in contractual complexity 
accordingly. 
In addition, I considered a number of (unreported) moderating effects of equity 
investments, expecting that the governance of R&D alliances through partial owner-
ship would decrease the need for more complex contracts. As such I expected that 
equity investments in combination with larger size asymmetry, smaller R&D capabili-
ties asymmetry, larger information asymmetry, higher strategic importance of alliance, 
and higher asset specificity of alliance would lead to less complex contracts. I also 
considered a number of other possible interaction effects, mainly related to size 
asymmetry, alliance experience, and prior ties. However, none of the tested interac-
tion effects were significant. 
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 
As explained in the Introduction to my chapter, my study is of an exploratory nature 
and applies the theoretical input from a diverse body of literatures that include legal 
studies, applied industrial organization, finance, strategic management, and law and 
economics. In addition, my understanding of the role of the cognitive load of contrac-
tual complexity is largely influenced by the applied psychology literature. Against this 
diverse theoretical background, it is interesting to note that I found such basic differ-
ences between the impact that company characteristics, transaction level attributes, 
and the organization routines of contract parties have on the objective and subjective 
dimensions the complexity of inter-firm R&D alliances. 
For the objective dimension of contractual complexity, I specified the length of 
contracts and the time-on-task to measure this complexity. My findings suggest that 
asymmetries between contracting parties in terms of their size, their R&D capabilities, 
and their information asymmetry affect the complexity of their R&D alliance contracts. 
Size asymmetries between companies indicate higher appropriability hazards due to 
a European pharmaceutical. Just prior to the negotiations this party had been exposed to a huge US product 
liability case. The company was thus very worried about liability issues and it had become fearful of the US 
legal system in general. This fear was strongly expressed by the executive board, which pressured the law-
yers involved to really focus on drafting lengthy provisions concerning (product) liability, representations, 
etc. 
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the potentially opportunistic behavior of the larger partner and lower ex post bargain-
ing power for smaller partners.55 The appropriability hazards for smaller firms imply 
that they face a higher risk of losing control over their R&D input and output than their 
larger partners that are better equipped to control and monitor their R&D coopera-
tion. Given this market power asymmetry, smaller partners have an incentive to favour 
a contract that facilitates the monitoring of the alliance through clauses that refer to 
specific responsibilities, control rights, enforcement mechanisms, and a number of 
other contractual safeguards. The larger partner in an R&D alliance probably prefers a 
less complex contract as this economizes on the transaction cost of a more complex 
contract but, given its control and monitoring resources, this preference is less critical 
than the incentive for its smaller partner to favour a more complex contract. My field 
research indicates that the smaller party often thinks its larger counterpart will behave 
opportunistically. Legal counsels indicate that a smaller party thus has a strong urge to 
write out what happens in every scenario. 
In case of information asymmetries, when one contract party has a relevant in-
formation advantage, this can create potential hold up problems for the other partner 
that might lack the necessary information to monitor certain tasks that are to be un-
dertaken through the alliance. This implies that when the partners in an R&D alliance 
have very different roles, e.g. where one company is largely responsible for the actual 
R&D and the other company is responsible for financing this R&D, possibly in combina-
tion with complementary assets such as testing, production, etc., there is a built-in 
element of information asymmetry in the alliance.56 Practitioners in the field of bio-
technology alliances argue that this is the case in particular where a biotechnology 
firm has an important patent/compound and seeks a partner to develop and market 
this patent/compound. In a competitive bidding process, the biotech firm will send out 
a contract to several pharmaceutical firms. This position of specialized R&D knowledge 
provides the biotech with a superior bargaining position. My findings suggest that 
when companies that engage in an R&D alliance face information asymmetry, con-
tracts are indeed found to be more complex. 
Interestingly, contrary to what I suggested in the hypotheses development, the 
third element of inter-firm asymmetry that refers to R&D capabilities has a similar ef-
fect as the other two asymmetry characteristics. It was expected that the more compa-
nies collaborate with companies with similar quantities of R&D capabilities, the higher 
the appropriability risks to both partners and the more they are inclined to add a range 
of monitoring clauses and intellectual property rights clauses to a contract, increasing 
its complexity. My current findings suggest the opposite, as with the other inter-firm 
asymmetry characteristics, the larger the difference of companies, i.e. the larger the 
asymmetry in terms of their R&D capabilities, the more complex their R&D contracts. 
This suggests that companies with more R&D capabilities than their alliance partners 
55 Barnhizer 2005, Bessy and Brousseau 1998. 
56 See also Lerner and Malmendier 2005. 
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might fear unintended knowledge leakage to partners with fewer R&D capabilities. 
More complex contracts with additional safeguards, monitoring clauses, control rights, 
and intellectual property rights clauses offer a monitoring option to companies in an 
attempt to avoid unintended knowledge leakage through an R&D alliance. 
My findings at the transaction level of R&D contracts that refer to the strategic 
importance and the asset specificity of an R&D alliance support the understanding of 
the complexity of inter-firm contracts that is largely influenced by transaction cost 
economics. The higher the strategic importance of an R&D alliance to partners and the 
higher the asset specificity of R&D investments made through an R&D alliance, the 
more complex these R&D alliances become. The higher the strategic importance of an 
R&D alliance, e.g. when both partners share the intellectual property rights signaling 
their interest in the alliance, the more effort is made to draft extensive alliance con-
tracts. To a similar degree, the higher the asset specificity of the alliance activity, i.e. 
the more limited the use of the technology developed through the alliance, the more 
specific the investments made and the fewer the alternative options for use of the 
technology, the more partners specify the stringency of provisions and the more com-
plex a contract becomes. 
When it comes to the organizational routines of contracting firms, be it in terms of 
the experience that have with R&D alliances in general or in terms of the more specific 
experience with particular partners, it turns out that these routines have an opposite 
effect to what I expected. Contrary to my expectations, learning to contract through a 
history of previous alliances or repeated ties, shared experience with these partners 
and perhaps even the emergence of joint inter-firm administrative routines lead to 
more complex contracts. Although my initial understanding of the effect of experience 
and prior ties is founded in a number of legal, economic and management literatures, 
there is a recent stream of publications that point at similar findings to mine. Argyres 
et al. (2007) indicate that both more general experience with contracting and prior ties 
with particular companies have learning effects in the opposite direction: through this 
experience and repeated interaction firms get a better understanding of the task de-
scriptions for both partners in the alliance. These task descriptions become more de-
tailed and lead to contingency planning that is incorporated in subsequent contracts 
that are then gradually becoming more complex. In a somewhat similar contribution, 
Mayer and Weber (2005) find that prior alliance contracts between partners invite 
firms to add useful provisions based on what they learned from their previous con-
tracts. Ryall and Sampson (2006) also find that repeated alliances between partners 
and the more general experience of firms with alliance contracts leads to more de-
tailed and complex contracts. These contributions and the current findings suggest 
that the organizational routines that companies have through inter-firm R&D alliances 
may improve their contracting capabilities through which they learn which contractual 
safeguards, monitoring clauses, control rights, intellectual property rights clauses, etc. 
to add to their contracts. In the end, the inclusion of many of these clauses will lead to 
more extensive and more complex contracts. Contracts are organic documents and 
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each event/crisis adds 'scar tissue'-not only concerning contracts between parties, but 
in general.57 As practitioners indicate, a party with more experience will know exactly 
which issues are important and should be addressed. As parties gain more general and 
specific partner experience, they will 'add on' to the agreement thereby increasing 
complexity. 
The second dimension of the complexity of these inter-firm R&D alliance con-
tracts, the subjective dimension of contractual complexity refers to the degree to 
which a contract imposes a cognitive load upon boundedly rational contract parties. 
More specifically, this cognitive load refers to the effort and mental activity imposed 
on a person's or a contract party's ability to process the information in a contract. In 
other words, the higher the effort and mental activity to process the information 
found in a contract, the higher the complexity of this contract. Interestingly, my find-
ings suggest that this subjective dimension of contractual complexity is mainly affected 
by two factors: the size asymmetries of firms and, to a larger extent, the asset specific-
ity of the technology to which the contract refers. The other factors that do play a role 
in explaining differences in the objective dimension of contractual complexity seem to 
play no role in explaining the perception, the subjective dimension of the complexity 
of R&D alliance contracts. The higher the asset specificity of the alliance activity, i.e. 
the more a contract refers to the limited the use of the jointly developed technology in 
terms of specific users, geographic region, a specific length of time, and/or a specific 
field of use, the more specific the investments made and the fewer the alternative 
options for use of the technology, the more these contracts are seen as complex con-
tracts. The fact that asset specificity affects the subjective dimension of complexity 
may be due to the types and number of clauses which are added to the agreement. 
These types of clauses usually relate to royalty payments, price adjustment, usage 
rights etc.; clauses which may be difficult to understand due to complicated payment 
structures.58 These 'payment' clauses are also often dependent on factors incorpo-
rated in other clauses, which means that the interrelatedness between contract terms 
increases. This in turn affects the comprehensiveness and thus subjective dimension of 
the complexity of contracts. This last argument of interrelatedness may also apply to 
the affect of size asymmetry. An argument to the contrary may be made for the re-
maining factors, which did not show a significant effect. These factors increase con-
tract length and parties' time on task (objective dimension) but do not appear to in-
crease the cognitive load (subjective dimension) of the contract. In measuring both 
objective and subjective dimensions of contractual complexity, I may conclude that 
increasing contract length does not always imply that the contract becomes more 
complex in the sense of the cognitive ability to understand the document, Adding 
contract clauses or increasing the length of a particular clause might even make a con-
tract more comprehensible (see e.g. the effect of information asymmetry on dimen-
" Buchheit, unpublished note. 
s" See also Eggleston et al. 2000. 
195 
sion 2, which was negative but insignificant). Further research would be necessary to 
substantiate these expectations. 
Although my contribution has, as discussed below, its limitations, my findings do 
demonstrate that, as suggested by Eggleston et al. (2000), the objective and subjective 
dimensions of complexity point at very different aspects of the complexity of con-
tracts. The company characteristics of partners, the transaction features and the ex-
perience of partners that explain to quite some extent the more objective dimension 
of the complexity of these R&D alliance contracts, have only limited impact on the 
more subjective cognitive load of these contracts. 
This chapter has a number of limitations that I translate into suggestions for future 
research. It would be interesting to see whether measuring the cognitive load of con-
tracts could be extended to a sample of legal professionals (corporate lawyers, legal 
counsel). Given the limitations that were discussed in the above, this would most 
probably imply that respondents are to evaluate a smaller sample of contracts, but 
even a small sample of inter-firm contracts could provide a 'real life' look into the 
professional perception of the complexity of contracts. In addition, the current chapter 
is based on an overall measurement of complexity along two dimensions. Future re-
search could benefit from a more in-depth analysis of elements of contractual com-
plexity in terms of the different contract clauses and their interactions that are ex-
pected to increase the level of contractual complexity. Also, the current chapter is 
based on a set of about three hundred contracts, limited to one particular industry, 
one group of alliances, i.e. R&D alliances, and the sample is very US focused. A larger 
sample with a multi-industry and international perspective and a range of inter-firm 
contracts that go beyond R&D can most probably provide a more thorough under-
standing of the contracting process between firms. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variable Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (U) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
1. Dimension 1 -0.007 0.986 1.000 
2. Dimension 2 4.244 1.319 0.193 1.000 
3. Size asymmetry 10.542 22.363 0.163 0.078 1.000 
4. R&D capabilities 6.657 2.026 0.023 0.000 0.093 1.000 
asymmetry 
5. Experience 9.238 8.683 0.251 0.019 -0.056 -0.271 1.000 
6. Prior ties 0.472 0.500 0.187 0.025 -0.041 -0.035 0.272 1.000 
7. Asset specificity 0.631 0.483 0.229 0.168 -0.013 0.008 -0.032 0.064 1.000 
8. Strategic importance 0.608 0.489 0.168 0.111 -0.079 0.054 -0.045 0.054 0.055 1.000 
9. Information 1.926 0.538 0.046 0.009 -0.012 -0.393 0.150 -0.073 0.036 -0.050 
symmetry 
10. Year 2000 2.000 0.269 0.115 0.060 0.101 0.169 0.059 -0.086 0.056 -0.035 1.000 
11. Research stage 0.663 0.473 -0.098 -0.044 -0.095 -0.018 0.141 0.196 -0.055 0.032 -0.103 0.051 1.000 
12. Equity investment 0.181 0.386 0.107 0.058 0.051 0.056 -0.075 0.063 0.195 0.021 0.063 -0.045 -0.089 1.000 
13. Foreign partner 0.421 0.494 0.143 -0.005 0.067 -0.273 0.139 0.015 0.008 -0.099 0.173 0.092 -0.080 -0.088 1.000 
14. Same industry 0.828 0.378 0.108 0.002 -0.156 0.024 0.186 0.136 0.058 0.099 -0.095 0.151 0.009 0.053 -0.030 1.000 
15. Breadth deal 2.194 1.280 0.130 0.011 -0.102 -0.036 0.073 0.184 0.184 0.063 0.046 0.022 0.180 0.024 -0.032 -0.080 1.000 
16. Size difference -0.206 0.491 0.073 0.026 0.082 -0.415 0.150 -0.065 0.002 -0.125 0.312 0.030 -0.057 0.051 0.108 -0.027 -0.058 
to 
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Table 2 Regression results from Dimension 1: ordinary least squares, instrumental variable regression 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Size asymmetry 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
R&D asymmetry 0.080** 0.080** 0.061+ 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) 
Information asymmetry 0.595*** 0 599*** 0.493** 
(0.152) (0.157) (0.183) 
Strategic importance 0.260* 0.225 0.253* 
(0.106) (0.794) (0.113) 
Asset specificity 0.396*** 0.396*** 1.296* 
(0.107) (0.103) (0.562) 
Experience 0.021* 0.021* 0.023** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Prior ties 0.367*** 0.370** 0.291* 
(0.105) (0.127) (0.128) 
Year(1997) 0.008 0.078 0.076 0.131 
(0.153) (0.169) (0.165) (0.177) 
Year(1998) 0.080 0.160 0.163 0.259 
(0.174) (0.178) (0.186) (0.215) 
Year(1999) 0.138 0.238 0.232 0.407+ 
(0.184) (0.196) (0.243) (0.227) 
Year (2000) 0.133 0.150 0.146 0.384+ 
(0.157) (0.159) (0.186) (0.233) 
Year (2001) 0.393* 0.454* 0.449* 0.738** 
(0.193) (0.196) (0.215) (0.259) 
Year(2002) 0.835** 0.674* 0.670* 0.910** 
(0.266) (0.261) (0.260) (0.316) 
Year(2003) 0.850** 0.584* 0.588* 0.691* 
(0.292) (0.267) (0.268) (0.303) 
Year(2004) 0.202 0.059 0.060 0.161 
(0.224) (0.223) (0.216) (0.316) 
Year(2005) 1.539*** 1.791*** 1.808** 1.877** 
(0.395) (0.496) (0.600) (0.608) 
Research stage- 0.206+ -0.380*** -0.379*** -0.338** 
(0.118) (0.114) (0.110) (0.127) 
Equity investment 0.294* 0.130 0.130 -0.063 
(0.146) (0.131) (0.125) (0.191) 
Foreign partner 0.263* 0.128 0.124 0.104 
(0.117) (0.114) (0.141) (0.123) 
Same industry 0.224+ 0.196+ 0.202 0.107 
(0.117) (0.110) (0.173) (0.143) 
Constant -0.491** -2.074*** -2.061*** -2.488*** 
(0.161) (0.356) (0.484) (0.458) 
R-squared 0.162 0.369 0.369 0.197 
F-value 4.26*** 7.68*** 7,14*** 5.21*** 
N 296 277 277 277 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.002 2.978+ 
Endogenous Strategic Asset specificity 
regressor importance 
Instruments Size difference Breadth deal 
t p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** pcO.OOl 
198 
Table 2 Regression results from Dimension 1: ordinary least squares, instrumental variable regression 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 7 
Size asymmetry 0,004+ 0.004+ 0.004+ 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
R&D asymmetry 0.004 0.003 0.004 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.046) 
Information asymmetry -0.132 -0.133 -0.130 
(0.248) (0.242) (0.271) 
Strategic importance 0.230 0.268 0.230 
(0.167) (1.157) (0.161) 
Asset specificity 0.398* 0.398** 0.382 
(0.160) (0.154) (0.980) 
Experience 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
Prior ties 0.065 0.062 0.066 
(0.168) (0.177) (0.172) 
Year (1997) 0.377 0.362 0.365 0.361 
(0.333) (0.371) (0.364) (0.357) 
Year(1998) 0.412 0.364 0.359 0.363 
(0.368) (0.404) (0.413) (0.392) 
Year (1999) 0.466 0.490 0.496 0.487 
(0.331) (0.356) (0.385) (0.381) 
Year (2000) -0.134 -0.083 -0.079 -0.087 
(0.331) (0.372) (0.368) (0.418) 
Year (2001) 0.016 0.114 0.118 0.109 
(0.344) (0.394) (0,402) (0.466) 
Year (2002) 0.877* 0.871* 0.873* 0.866* 
(0.345) (0.383) (0.372) (0.434) 
Year(2003) 0.711+ 0.760+ 0.756+ 0.759* 
(0.383) (0.393) (0.401) (0.379) 
Year (2004) 0.678 0.672 0.668 0.670 
(0.418) (0.450) (0.452) (0.434) 
Year (2005) 1.539*** 1.363* 1,344+ 1.362** 
(0.423) (0.539) (0.765) (0.520) 
Research stage- -0.135 -0.161 -0.162 -0.162 
(0.156) (0.176) (0.170) (0,175) 
Equity investment 0.191 0.051 0.050 0.055 
(0.198) (0.210) (0.203) (0.286) 
Foreign partner -0.073 -0.038 -0.034 -0.038 
(0.153) (0.174) (0.207) (0.167) 
Same industry -0.036 -0.117 -0.122 -0.115 
(0.189) (0.199) (0.254) (0.218) 
Constant 4.035*** 3.704*** 3.686*** 3.712*** 
(0.306) (0.584) (0.786) (0.708) 
R-squared 0.084 0.111 0.111 0.111 
F-value 2.85*** 2,03** 1.86** 1.77* 
N 309 288 288 288 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.001 0.000 
Endogenous Strategic Asset specificity 
regressor importance 
Instruments Size difference Breadth deal 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** pcO.OOl 
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A P P E N D I X I 
T H E M E A S U R E M E N T OF C O N T R A C T U A L C O M P L E X I T Y 
In order to measure the contractual complexity for these 309 contracts I used the 
method applied in chapter 4 which suggests a multi-dimensional and multi-item meas-
urement of contractual complexity with both objective and subjective characteristics. 
This measurement includes the cognitive load of contracts as an important element of 
contractual complexity as suggested by Eggleston et al. (2000). 
The length of contracts as an objective measure of contractual complexity is 
measured through the number of words in a contract. The electronic copies of the 
contracts provided by PharmaDeals are presented in a comparable layout in pdf-
format. The document conversion feature of a text miner was used to convert all the 
documents into a readable ASCII file. The text miner provides me with information on 
the number of words in each contract.59 
To measure the cognitive load of these contracts, sixty graduate students of the 
Faculty of Law of Maastricht University in The Netherlands were asked to read the 
contracts and fill out a short questionnaire with various items related to the cognitive 
load of each contract. This choice for students might raise some concern as, compared 
to professionals, students lack professional experience and are generally younger, 
which may lead to a different attitude than one would expect for managers and corpo-
rate lawyers who would otherwise deal with these contracts. Although the option of 
having these contracts read by managers, corporate lawyers, and legal counsel to 
assess the cognitive load of the sample of contracts was considered, both the reading 
of the relevant literature and the consultation of a number of experts made it clear 
that in practice it would be impossible to have a survey of hundreds of contracts, with 
an average of fifty pages per contract, read by practitioners. Korobkin (2002) indicates 
that using actual contracting parties as experimental subjects, however, raises other 
validity concerns. Moreover, research on this topic provides significant evidence that 
students are indeed valid surrogates for professionals. Comparing professional and 
student behavior, many studies do not find a substantial difference in behavior.60 
The actual measurement of the cognitive load of contracts is based on a question-
naire with three validated and widely used items found in the cognitive load litera-
ture.61 Scale-based reporting was used to investigate the degree of cognitive load in 
relation to the contracts. As a direct subjective measure of cognitive load, participants 
were asked to rate the perceived level of complexity of the contracts (question 1). The 
cognitive load of information is amongst others defined by the extent to which various 
elements in e.g. a contract interact. High element interactivity imposes a heavy load 
on working memory, which translates into a high level of perceived complexity. As an 
59 The number of words, number of pages, and the kilobytes of information in these contracts are highly 
correlated (between 0.95 and 0.99). 
60 See chapter 4 for a review of the literature. 
61 See the discussion of this literature in chapter 4. 
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indirect subjective measure, participants were asked to report the invested mental 
effort necessary to understand the contracts (question 2). This mental effort relates to 
the effort made to process and comprehend information in the contracts. The meas-
urement of experienced stress levels while reading these contracts (question 3), was 
adopted from the Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT)62 and the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX)63. Stress is a 
direct subjective measure of cognitive load and as such complements mental effort. 
Experienced stress levels measure the perceived workload of assessing the information 
in a contract. Finally, the respondents were also asked to report the time spent reading 
each contract and as such an objective indirect measure was obtained: time-on-task. 
Time-on-task provides a meaningful measurement as this reflects the difficulty or ease 
of a task. Time-on-task typically increases with complexity and a high time-on-task 
points towards a high cognitive load. 
A representative 'dummy' contract was first administered to all respondents to 
measure the within-group homogeneity of the respondents. The results for this test 
indicated that each respondent could be taken as representative for the group of re-
spondents as a whole and each respondent received a randomly distributed small 
number of contracts. Principal component analysis was used to investigate the degree 
to which perceived complexity, mental effort, stress level, time-on-task, and the length 
in words represent different dimensions of contractual complexity. The results of this 
analysis indicated that time-on-task and the number of words load on one dimension 
of contractual complexity, which I label as the objective dimension of contractual 
complexity (dimension 1). Perceived complexity, mental effort and stress level load on 
the other dimension, labeled as the subjective dimension of contractual complexity 
(dimension 2). 
62 Reid and Nygren 1988. 
63 Hart and Staveland 1988. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
This dissertation started out with the observation that diverse theories of contract 
exist across a range of disciplines, but empirical proof of these theories is scarce. The 
main purpose of this thesis is to integrate different perspectives on contract in order 
to look beyond the face value of the legal document at the intricacy of contract design. 
What insights have we gained? This final chapter provides an overview of the most 
important conclusions of this dissertation. I will seek to answer the research questions 
and reflect on the results of the analyses, thereby elaborating on the methodological, 
theoretical and empirical implications of this study. 
In the introduction to this dissertation I presented the following general research 
question: 
How do we define contract design and what differences do we find within a particular 
industry and between countries? 
In order to answer this question, I made use of three sub-questions, which can be 
traced to the different chapters of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 investigated to what degree commercial agreements are governed by 
either a classical or more relational contracting perspective. This chapter is based on 
six case studies concerning inter-firm collaborations: two non-equity contractual col-
laborations, two licensing contracts, and two equity joint venture agreements between 
companies in the bioscience, fine chemicals, biotechnological and pharmaceutical 
industries. The case studies encompass an analysis of the actual legal documents un-
derlying the collaborations, and interviews with legal counsel and corporate lawyers 
involved in drafting these documents. 
In chapters 3 to 5 I sought to answer what method(s) may be used to measure 
contract design and subsequently what factors create discrepancies in contract design. 
As a measure of contract design, I presented the concept of contractual complexity, 
which I verified empirically (chapter 4). In chapters 3 and 5,1 evaluated to what extent 
different factors, controlling for their environmental embeddedness, affect contractual 
complexity. The empirical validation in these chapters is based on a dataset of over 
400 R&D alliance contracts in the biotechnological and pharmaceutical sector, on sur-
veys with graduate students in law and economics, and on interviews with profession-
als involved in drafting commercial (R&D) contracts. 
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S Y N O P S I S OF S O M E M A J O R F I N D I N G S 
Strangers and friends - from classical to relational perspectives on contract 
Several authors contend that transactional styles and their specific mode of govern-
ance necessitate a diversified set of contract law systems.1 Modes of governance, 
ranging from discrete via hybrid to hierarchy are expected to follow classical (market) 
and more relational (hybrid and hierarchy) doctrines of contract. Considering inter-
firm agreements, other contributions indicate that equity joint ventures are quasi-
hierarchical in nature, non-equity collaborations represent contractual hybrids, and 
licensing agreements largely reflect market exchange. Accordingly, equity joint ven-
tures and non-equity contractual collaborations are expected to be governed by a 
more relational contracting perspective, while licensing contracts should almost exclu-
sively reflect a classical contracting perspective. In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I ex-
amined to what extent contract clauses referring to revision, adaptation (hard-
ship/force majeure), damages, warranties and dispute resolution reflect a more classi-
cal or relational contracting perspective in each of the aforementioned agreements. 
Scholars consider these clauses, in addition to property rights allocation, as important 
contractual safeguards in inter-firm contracts, especially in high-technology settings 
where exchange hazards are high. In general, I expected the relational perspective to 
correspond with the incorporation of revision clauses, damages based on the reliance 
and restitution interest, warranties, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In 
contrast, agreements governed by a more classical contract doctrine were expected to 
lack revision clauses and consequential damage awards, but support warranties and 
adjudication in court. 
The case studies generally confirm my expectations and my findings suggest that 
different types of inter-firm agreements are governed by either a more classical or 
relational contracting perspective (see also chapter 2, table 1). However, there are 
some surprises. Contrary to my expectations, I did not find explicit revision clauses in 
the equity joint venture and non-equity agreements. Instead, the opportunity for revi-
sion was often integrated in other clauses such as force moy'eure/hardship and sever-
ability. This indicates that although parties value flexibility, there must be an explicit 
reason to revise. In addition, licensing contracts were found not to always contain 
extensive warranties. My findings also indicate that non-equity partnerships provide 
for litigation where patent disputes are involved. This was not expected while non-
equity partnerships are associated with 'softer' dispute resolution mechanisms such as 
arbitration and mediation. However, this choice may be related to the fact that many 
countries recognize special patent judges and a court's decision is open to appeal. In 
addition, the profits associated with a patent might outweigh the substantial costs 
associated with litigation in some jurisdictions. Furthermore, discovery procedures 
allow valuable information to be gained from the other party. 
1 Macneil 1978, Williamson 1979. 
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More in general, the non-equity collaborations are characterized by a clear division of 
property rights even though these collaborations do not involve a de facto common 
ownership structure (cf. equity joint ventures). An analysis of the contracts for the 
equity joint venture and non-equity collaborations also revealed the inclusion of 
elaborate appendices with project plans, explicit task and responsibility descriptions, 
and other agreements. This finding emphasizes the relational perspective governing 
equity joint ventures and non-equity collaborations while such appendices place the 
actual collaboration and the inter-relationship of the partners in the realm of the con-
tract itself. In addition, the set initial duration of the joint venture collaborations, 
shows how much companies place their long-term relationship at the centre of the 
agreement.2 
Defining relationships - contractual complexity 
As the foregoing paragraphs show, existing theories of contract such as relational and 
classical perspectives on contracting entail a predefined framework in which we may 
place contractual provisions. This means we are pressed to qualify provisions and con-
tracts either as relational or classical while it is not evident that every contractual ele-
ment can be positioned within this spectrum. In addition, it is debatable how strictly 
classical and relational aspects should be defined. The theory of incomplete contracts, 
the extent to which contracts efficiently provide for every possible contingency, is a 
more general and less arduous theory, which has developed in both the legal and eco-
nomics literature. It is apparent that most contracts are incomplete and subsist as 
such. The (degree of) incompleteness becomes evident or 'problematic' only in the 
event of a dispute. Ex ante, the theory of incomplete contracts cannot offer much 
insight in contract design.3 In chapters 3 to 5 I presented the concept of contractual 
complexity in order to study the intricacy of contract design. I use this concept to in-
vestigate the differences between countries (chapter 3) and within sectors (chapter 5). 
In chapter 3 I define contractual complexity as a multidimensional concept relating 
to the number and types of terms incorporated in a contract, the specificity of these 
terms and the cognitive load necessary to understand a contract. The idea of contrac-
tual complexity initially developed in relation to the observation, that compared to the 
Netherlands and other Continental European jurisdictions, relatively complex legal 
documents dominate the contracting environment in the US and England. This com-
plexity is often attributed to specific elements of the contract: the definition of terms, 
provisions for contingencies in performance, task descriptions, and boilerplate provi-
sions. Business economic theory tells us that factors such as trust and reputation, non-
disclosure, parties' limits of cognition and contracting costs positively affect contrac-
tual complexity, while monitoring difficulties, asset specificity, strategic importance, 
2 Elsenberg 2000, Speidel 2000. 
3 Especially given the fact that only a fraction of all contractual relationships results in a dispute. This ex post 
approach is also evident from the literature, as most scholarly work on incomplete contracting Is concerned 
with rules on contract Interpretation and gap-filling (see e.g. Ayres and Gertner 1989, Van Bijnen 2005). 
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environmental uncertainty and enforcement costs negatively affect contractual com-
plexity. However, to tease out differences between countries, we must evaluate these 
factors within their legal and socio-cultural context.4 
A study of different aspects of the legal environment illustrates that the legal set-
ting has a significant influence on contracting and enforcement costs, and the disclo-
sure of information. Contracting costs are often used as an argument to substantiate 
the existence of relatively simple contracts. In principle, contracting costs are an im-
pediment to complexity. One aspect of the legal system that may reduce contracting 
costs is the existence of an extensive codification. The willingness to rely on this codifi-
cation allows parties to write either (1) simple contracts; or (2) complex contracts at a 
relatively low cost. Parties in the Netherlands, a civil code jurisdiction, write contracts 
which appear simple compared to contracts in the US and England, both common law 
jurisdictions. This seems to suggest that the ability to rely on an extensive codification, 
i.e. the default rules therein, allows parties to suffice with simple contracts.5 
While the existence of a general codification may be said to negatively affect con-
tracting costs, this argument is largely negated by the development of word processing 
programs. Such programs enable practitioners to store standard form contracts 
(forms) on their computer from which the preferred template can be pulled and 
amended when necessary.6 The emergence of these programs is a global technological 
development, evident in the US, England, the Netherlands, Germany, etc., and thus 
not dependent on a particular type of legal system. Even if contracting costs are ini-
tially larger in a particular jurisdiction, the storage of forms creates economies of scale 
which cause contracting costs to decrease with each successive contract. Why then do 
forms in both the US and England exhibit greater contracting effort, i.e. complexity? 
Moving from the front to the back end of the contracting process, I seek an answer in 
the realm of enforcement costs. 
Front end contracting costs and back end enforcement costs are to a large extent 
affected by their legal environment. Parties to a contract will exert contracting effort 
at the frond end of the contracting process as long as this creates benefits at the back 
end of the contracting process; a decrease thus in enforcement costs. Enforcement 
costs are predominantly influenced by the manner in which the judiciary is organized 
and functions. A system of case law and rules of parol evidence in conjunction with a 
primarily objective approach toward the interpretation of contracts as found in the US 
and England, may lead to higher enforcement costs. In addition, some authors argue 
that rules of civil procedure in these countries give rise to unreliable and inefficient 
proceedings, which may lead parties to experience greater enforcement costs. Such 
4 As mentioned in chapter 3, several factors are not directly shaped by their legal and socio-cultural envi-
ronment. These factors relate to limits of cognition, monitoring difficulties, asset specificity and the strategic 
importance of the contract. 
5 Common law countries such as the US and England are not completely devoid of codes and statutes, but in 
contrast to the Netherlands, case law remains the primary source of law. 
6 Tjittes and Hartllef 2005, Buchheit 2006, Schweitzer 2007. 
208 
increased enforcement costs may induce parties in the US and England to incur greater 
contracting costs, in the sense that they add more terms to their contract, thereby 
eventually increasing contractual complexity. In contrast, the shorter duration of pro-
ceedings, the expertise of the judiciary and the lack of extensive discovery make for 
swiftness and reliability in the Netherlands7, which is also characterized by a more 
subjective approach toward contract interpretation My analysis suggests that the level 
of enforcement costs in the US and England render it beneficial for parties to exert a 
greater contracting effort at the front end of the contracting process, which leads to 
an increase in contractual complexity. 
Without solid numerical evidence it, however, remains difficult to correctly quan-
tify and evaluate both contracting and enforcement costs. I therefore propose that 
parties' perception of enforcement costs and their attitude towards contracting prac-
tices are elements which should not be disregarded. I believe that the socio-cultural 
environment and to a lesser extent the legal environment play a significant role in 
shaping these perceptions and attitudes. For example, a legal principle that permeates 
the contracting practice in the Netherlands is the principle of good faith. Good faith 
advances norms of fairness, trust and cooperation.8 Due to the general and sustained 
recognition of good faith, parties contracting in the Netherlands may traditionally 
place greater reliance on conventions of fairness to guide their transactions, which 
gives rise to the construction of relatively simple contracts. 
Generally, the socio-cultural environment affects levels of trust and reputation, 
environmental uncertainty, and the manner in which parties perceive enforcement and 
contracting costs. Diverse literatures suggest that trust and reputation may substitute 
(in part) for complex contracts.9 The degree to which trust and reputation play a role 
as supporting governance mechanism is dependent upon their institutional endorse-
ment. A homogeneous and repeat contracting community cultivates trust, produces 
behavioral norms and facilitates reputational sanctions. Network institutions such as 
trade associations for example, play a role in enforcing norms and reputation. Differ-
ent studies have illustrated that the aforementioned institutional features are espe-
cially characteristic of civil law jurisdictions such as Germany and the Netherlands.10 In 
these countries, behavioral norms and standards are additionally reinforced by the 
ability to rely on a general codification.11 Turning to another facet of the socio-cultural 
environment, some authors point to the fact that Americans are prone to excessive-
ness and perfectionism; characteristics which transcend their contracting practice. In 
combination with an increased apprehension of opportunistic behaviour, American 
parties strive to reduce contracting risks to a minimum. As Hill and King (2004) indi-
7 Note must be taken that the data underlying these civil procedure claims is not conclusive (see chapter 3). 
8 See also Eggleston et al. 2000. 
9 However, empirical studies Illustrate that It is difficult to make concepts such as trust operational and thus 
determine whether one culture is more trusting than another (see chapter 3), 
10 Langbeln 2001, Arreghetti et al. 1997, Collins 1999 (<:ƒ. Bernstein 1992). 
11 Burchell and Wilkinson 1997, Hill and King 2004, p. 916. 
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cate, the failure to accept 'good enough' solutions to a diverse range of issues of con-
flict means that American contracting parties often become involved in a costly 'arms 
race'. The result is a highly complex contract. The risk averseness and litigious culture is 
reinforced (or created?) by the large lawyer to laymen ratio.12 Concluding, I believe 
that the legal and socio-cultural environments are not unimportant in evaluating con-
tractual complexity. 
Chapter 4 and 5 of this dissertation offered an empirical verification of some of the 
more theoretically embedded assertions of chapter 3. Chapter 4 explored to what 
extent we can actually speak of a multidimensional concept of contractual complexity. 
My findings indicate that, as suggested by Eggleston et al. (2000), contractual complex-
ity is indeed a multidimensional phenomenon. Quantitative, objective measures of 
complexity, such as length, and objective as well as subjective elements of cognitive 
load, such as mental effort, mental load and time on task, do indeed measure different 
aspects of contractual complexity. Based on an exploratory factor analysis, I define the 
objective dimension of complexity to comprise both the length of the contract in 
words and the time on task.13 In addition, I retrieve a subjective dimension of contrac-
tual complexity which is related to the cognitive load of contracts. This dimension of 
cognitive load can be broken down into two factors: (1) the mental load and (2) the 
mental effort individuals experience while reading the contract. Mental load refers to 
the task complexity. This perceived level of complexity suggests a more subjective 
perception of the task difficulty that people face when they 'digest' contracts. The 
element of mental effort can be broken down into two sub-elements: (a) the actual 
cognitive effort individuals make to understand contracts and (b) the degree of stress 
that they experience as they have to read through contracts. These different elements 
signal the intricacy of cognitive load as such and illustrate that it is worthwhile for 
scholars to not only determine the complexity of contracts through objective meas-
ures, even when these measures go beyond simple counts of pages or words. 
Chapter 5 is a study of an exploratory nature using the concept of contractual 
complexity - as developed and verified in chapters 3 and 4 - as response variable in a 
model which tests assumptions from a varied theoretical background that includes 
legal studies, applied industrial organization, finance, strategic management, and law 
and economics. Interestingly, I find that basic differences exist between the impact 
that company characteristics (size, information and R&D capabilities asymmetries), 
transaction level attributes (strategic importance and asset specificity), and the organ-
izational routines (prior ties and contracting experience) of contract parties have on 
the objective and subjective dimensions of the complexity of inter-firm R&D alliances. 
Chapter 5 confirms some of the theoretical assumptions made in chapter 3, namely 
that asset specificity, strategic importance and monitoring difficulties - the latter 
12 See chapter 3. Data over 2006 renders the following ratios: Netherlands 1:1148, US 1:267 and England: 
1:398. 
13 In this manner I can also account for the extensiveness of contractual terms. Data shows that the number 
of words, clauses and kilobytes are all highly correlated (see also chapter 4). 
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founded in the existence of information asymmetries - positively affect contractual 
complexity, independent of the particular legal or socio-cultural environment. 
My chapter 5 findings suggest that asymmetries between contracting parties in terms 
of their size, R&D capabilities, and information asymmetry positively affect the objec-
tive dimension of the complexity of R&D alliance contracts. First of all, size asymme-
tries between companies indicate higher appropriability hazards due to the potentially 
opportunistic behavior of the larger partner and lower ex post bargaining power for 
the smaller partner.14 Given this market power asymmetry, smaller partners have an 
incentive to favor a contract that facilitates the monitoring of the alliance through a 
diverse range of clauses. My marginal note that this incentive of the smaller partner is 
greater than the incentive of the larger partner to draft a less complex contract is con-
firmed. In the second place, information asymmetries create potential hold up prob-
lems for the partner that lacks the necessary information to monitor certain alliance 
tasks. This means that in the situation where partners to an R&D alliance have very 
different roles, there is a built-in element of information asymmetry in the alliance.15 
This may be the case in particular where a biotechnology firm has an important pat-
ent/compound and seeks a partner to develop and market this patent/compound. In 
line with my expectations, parties to an R&D alliance that face information asymme-
tries draft relatively complex contracts. In chapter 3, I assumed that the information 
asymmetry that contracting parties face potentially has two opposing effects on con-
tractual complexity, namely a negative effect created by the non-disclosure of infor-
mation and a positive effect by way of monitoring difficulties. My findings seem to 
illustrate that in the particular area of R&D alliances, monitoring difficulties have a 
stronger impact on the complexity of the contract than the non-disclosure of informa-
tion. This may be due to the fact that in these types of contracts, parties are very wary 
of any undisclosed information and the contracts are often characterized by extensive 
warranties, representations and indemnifications.16 
Third and contrary to my hypothesis, my findings suggest that the R&D capabilities 
asymmetry between parties is positively related to contractual complexity. It was ex-
pected that partners with similar quantities of R&D capabilities would face higher 
appropriability risks and therefore be inclined to add a range of monitoring clauses and 
intellectual property rights clauses to a contract, increasing its complexity. However, 
companies with greater R&D capabilities than their alliance partners apparently fear 
unintended knowledge leakage to partners with fewer R&D capabilities, causing the 
former to incorporate more contractual safeguards. My hypotheses on the transac-
tional level relate to the strategic importance and the asset specificity of the R&D alli-
ance. I argue that when parties perceive the strategic importance of the R&D alliance 
M Barnhizer 2005, Bessy and Brousseau 1998. 
15 Lemer and Malmendier 2005. 
16 Hill 2001, and Hermalin and Crasweii 2007 on the general effects of information asymmetry in relation to 
contracting. 
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to be high and the asset specificity of their investments to be large, the complexity of 
the R&D alliance contract will increase. In line with earlier studies, my findings confirm 
this expectation. The organizational routines of contracting firms - in terms of the 
experience that they have with R&D alliances in general or in terms of the more spe-
cific experience with particular partners, - appear to have an effect opposite effect to 
what I expected. Learning to contract through a history of previous alliances or re-
peated ties, shared experience with these partners, and perhaps even the emergence 
of joint inter-firm administrative routines, lead to more complex contracts. Although 
my initial understanding of the effect of experience and prior ties is founded in a num-
ber of legal, economic and management literatures, there is a recent stream of publi-
cations that point at similar findings. Several other authors indicate that both more 
general experiences with contracting in a particular sector and prior ties with partner-
ing companies create learning effects which induce firms 'to add' to their agreement.17 
Practitioners acknowledge this finding, and point to the fact that a party with more 
experience will know exactly which issues are important and should be addressed. This 
finding also endorses the view of contracts as 'organic documents', in the sense that 
each market crisis ads 'scar tissue' to the document.18 In addition, these results may 
have implications for the extent to which trust can be viewed as a complement or 
substitute to formal contracting.19 Prior ties and experience may engender trust and 
create reputational effects. In chapter 3 I posited an inverse relationship between trust 
and reputation on the one hand, and complexity on the other hand. The findings in 
chapter 5 seem to suggest that the role trust may play as a substitution to formal con-
tracts is secondary to any learning effects. 
In contrast to my findings concerning the objective dimension of R&D alliance 
contracts, the subjective dimension of contractual complexity is mainly affected by 
two factors: size asymmetry between firms and, to a larger extent, the asset specificity 
of the technology to which the contract refers. The positive direction of these effects 
corresponds with my results related to the objective dimension. The fact that asset 
specificity positively affects the subjective dimension of complexity may be due to the 
types and number of clauses which are added to the agreement. These types of 
clauses usually relate to e.g. royalty payments, price adjustment and usage rights, 
clauses which may be difficult to understand due to complicated incentive structures.20 
These clauses are often dependent on the content and scope of other clauses, which 
means that the interrelatedness between contract terms increases. Cross-references 
17 Argyres et al. 2007, Mayer and Weber 2005, Ryall and Sampson 2006. 
18 See Buchheit (unpublished note), Buchheit (2006), p. 16 on Eurocurrency agreements: '[s]ome people 
want to lend money, some other folks want to borrow it, and then the crowd of the first part would like to 
get the money back again. It should not, you might think, require 50 pages of single-spaced text to express 
this business objective.' But '[a] Eurocurrency loan agreement carries its scars like an aging prize fighter (...) 
each bearing silent witness to some major or minor skirmish that has disturbed the Euromarket during its 
relatively short history.' 
19 Poppo and Zenger 2002. 
20 Eggleston et al. 2000. 
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and interrelatedness negatively affect the comprehensiveness and thus subjective 
dimension of the complexity of contracts. This last argument of interrelatedness may 
also hold for the results relating to size asymmetry. An argument to the contrary may 
be made for the other factors concerning organizational routines, transactional attrib-
utes and asymmetries which did not render a significant effect. My findings suggest 
that these factors increase contract length and parties' time on task (objective dimen-
sion) but do not appear to increase the cognitive load (subjective dimension) of the 
contract. In measuring both objective and subjective dimensions of contractual com-
plexity, I may conclude that increasing contract length does not always imply that the 
contract becomes more complex in the sense of the cognitive ability to understand the 
document. Adding contract clauses or increasing the length of a particular clause might 
even make a contract more comprehensible.21 A simultaneous effect on both the ob-
jective and subjective dimension of complexity seems to appear especially with the 
addition of complicated clauses and/or clauses which increase the interrelatedness of 
the contractual terms overall. 
My understanding of the complexity of contracts has some interesting implications 
for the broader perspective of bounded rationality and its impact on contracts. 
Bounded rationality, as mentioned earlier, generally refers to the fact that our ability 
to process information and solve problems is limited.22 This defective capability dis-
torts the manner in which an actor searches for, processes and weighs information and 
scenarios. Bounded rationality is expected to affect the degree to which economic 
actors are limited in their cognitive capabilities to design and write contracts that 
would fit all current and future contingencies.23 In other words, bounded rationality 
has a front-end impact on the effectiveness of contract design due to the limitations 
and costs of information processing. However, the cognitive load of contracts has 
some post-design implications for the bounded rationality with which contract parties 
are able to implement and monitor their contracts. If the cognitive load of contracts 
affects the complexity of contracts, this implies that higher levels of the cognitive load 
of contracts increase the likelihood that economic actors do not fully comprehend 
contracts or are limited in their interpretation of the consequences of the content of 
their contract.24 As such, it appears that the cognitive load of contracts affects the 
bounded rationality with which contract parties have to govern their contractual 
agreements such as R&D alliance contracts. Given this bounded rationality and the 
21 See also Smith 2006, who wonders why longer contracts should be costly to read: '[a] few extra pages can 
be read quickly and lawyers are experts at looking for provisions that do not suit their clients, especially if 
the problem is the addition or not of a given clause.' (p. 1123). Smith (2006) does acknowledge that complex 
contracts may be difficult to process. 
22 Simon 1955. See more recently in relation to contracts Eisenberg (1994). 
23 See for example the literature on transaction cost economics and incomplete contract theory. 
24 See also Eisenberg 1994, and some authors who write on the complexity of legal rules, Schuck (1992) 
relates complexity to constraints on an individual's capacities and indicates that complexity's demands are 
bound to outstrip the given capacities to manage it. Likewise Kades (1997) indicates that technical (elabora-
tive) rules represent cognitive difficulties for people. 
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cognitive load of contracts, the there may very well be an upper limit to the actual 
level of complexity of contracts that not only contract parties, but also judges, juries 
and lawyers are able to absorb. This has implications for the assumption in the eco-
nomics of law and managerial contract literature that increasing levels of economic 
risk necessitate greater levels of contractual complexity in order to safeguard the 
transaction. 
Building relationships: what can we learn? Methodological, theoretical and empirical 
implications 
Does complexity matter? Certainly! Parties at all levels of the contracting process 
should be concerned with contractual complexity. In the following paragraphs I will 
review some of the implications that complexity has for practitioners, such as lawyers 
and legal counsel. In addition, I will briefly touch upon some complexity-related issues 
that are relevant for third party enforcers and policymakers. 
Practitioners - drafting 
Parties involved in drafting contracts need to think about the complexity of their 
documents.25 Adding clauses may come at a cost and it is questionable whether more 
detail is always good.26 As my research illustrates, the relative complexity of contracts 
is driven by numerous factors. It appears that complexity evolves over time. This proc-
ess is facilitated by the rapid technological advancement of computer systems and 
programs, allowing law firms and legal departments of multinational corporations to 
collect and store large datasets of contracts.27 Forms then appear to instigate complex-
ity in the sense that with each successive draft contract, contract terms may be added 
and interrelatedness between contract terms may increase. 
The use of forms, regardless complexity issues, also offers several advantages. 
First of all, forms achieve standardization of a contracting practice within a particular 
firm. But more importantly, the use of a form is less costly than producing a contract 
from scratch, due to economices of scale with each successive use. A form is thus able 
to increase drafting efficiency. A form provides a baseline document, which incorpora-
tes the benefits of experience. More specifically, the use of forms; creates learning and 
network externalities.28 Learning externalities emerge when a firm adopts a term that 
has been commonly used in the past, independent of whether its peers will continue 
to use this term in the future. Network benefits arise when a firm incorporates a provi-
sion in it's contract which is at the same time incorporated by it's peers, independent 
25 See also Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 126: '[f]urther research should focus on how lawyers ought to evaluate 
complexity when drafting contracts.' 
26 Eggleston et al. 2000. 
27 Eijsbouts 2002, p. 50-51, who refers to the worldwide database of contracts at Akzo Nobel N.V. 
28 Learning externalities emerge when a firm adopts a term that has been commonly used in the past, inde-
pendent of whether its peers will continue to use this term In the future. Network benefits arise when a firm 
incorporates a provision in it's contract which is at the same time incorporated by it's peers, independent of 
whether the term has been commonly used in the past (Kahan and Klausner 1997). 
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of whether the term has been commonly used in the past.29 The path dependency of 
corporate contracting is evident: a term gains value with its use and this standardizati-
on is evidenced by the use of forms in general and boilerplate provisions in particu-
lar.30 Standardized provisions appear to reduce the possibility for any misunderstan-
dings. 
Parties drafting contracts must remain aware of the informational cascade: net-
work effects are capable of trumping the benefits of improved provisions and there is 
a risk that too much of the text is saved in each new incarnation of the contract. As 
mentioned, the pervasive use of forms may enhance contractual complexity - both in 
terms of length and comprehensiveness - an attribute often bemoaned in accounts 
with practitioners. How does this happen? 
One malefactor of increased complexity is the path dependency. The reputation of 
the drafting party hinges on the success or failure of his/her drafting efforts and the 
reputational damage appears to be greater when it concerns 'the failure' of a custom-
ized contract than 'the failure' of a more standardized form contract. Departures from 
the form appear to be disfavored: deletions must usually meet high standards of justi-
fication while adding provisions that don't seem to help - but do not hurt - require a 
lower level of justification. The (inexperienced) associate often cannot discern the 
relevance of certain provisions, in particular whether the contract will benefit from the 
deletion of a particular contractual clause.31 Provisions which are regarded as standard 
are thus often adopted without taking into account previously established and possibly 
conflicting arrangements between parties. As a result, templates may cover the same 
issues several times, leading to the co-existence of multiple (conflicting) provisions.32 
Sloppy drafting techniques only enhance the dense language and duplication of terms: 
'[yjou will find yourself staring for 10 minutes at a paragraph containing 38 single-
spaced lines and, try as you might, the light of comprehension will be repeatedly 
snuffed out in the fourth line. (...) With an audible sigh, the recipient of such a text 
must pick up a pencil and start reconstructive surgery on contractual language that has 
the density of uranium 238.'33 
Routinisation may increase tolerable levels of complexity - experience of a repeated 
complex pattern may reduce cognitive load. However, even lawyers cannot always 
oversee complexity in the sense of the number of added terms and their density. 
Grosheide (2000) correctly notes that professional support and advice with regard to 
contract drafting is not always a guarantee for clarity. It is common practice for corpo-
2Q Kahanand Klausner 1997. 
30 This path dependency is reinforced by limits of cognition such as the status quo bias (favouring the status 
quo rather than changing it), the anchoring bias (favouring the initial starting point) and the conformity bias 
(the form is also used by peers). See also Kahan and Klausner 1996, Kahan and Klausner 1997, Hill 2008. 
31 Buchheit (2006) and Hill (2001) on the inexperience of junior associates In relation to commercial contract 
drafting. 
32 King and Segain 2007, Hermalin et al. 2007. 
33 Buchheit 2006, p. 169. 
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rate lawyers to simply copy a lot and thus also each others' mistakes.34 In short, only 
counterparties and their counsel willing to acknowledge the limitations of their own 
reading comprehension will have something to say about the contract.35 
It is clear that cognitive limitations stemming from bounded rationality have ex 
post design implications: individuals drafting contracts must acknowledge that the 
ability of lawyers and laymen to concentrate on the contract and understand its inter-
dependencies is limited. The incidence of small and large mistakes increases with the 
length of contracts, and the interrelatedness of provisions and complex language of 
the latter. Unfortunately, mistakes are usually caught only when a party attempts to 
determine his/her rights under the contract, at which point things usually are not go-
ing well.36 In accordance with Visée (2002) and Buchheit (2006), I believe that drafting 
a high-quality contract is a true skill which 'calls for razor sharp clarity.'37 A contract 
should not only be accurate in the legal-technical sense, but must also remain man-
ageable for the client.38 The drafter of the contract should continuously consider 
whether the contract still comprises a comprehensible narrative. In the following sec-
tion, I will review some recommendations which may serve to limit contractual com-
plexity. 
Given the above, I believe that one of the cardinal rules of drafting contracts is to 
be sparing with cross-references and the interrelatedness of terms in general. These 
features contribute to contractual complexity, especially in the subjective sense. Cross-
references often occur due to the careless addition of clauses and the fear of eliminat-
ing a clause which potentially creates ripple effects in the rest of the document. In this 
light, Smith (2006) propagates the concept of modularity, which refers to 'splitting a 
system into relatively autonomous components.'39 According to Smith (2006) Modular-
ity is a mechanism which can increase drafting quality while it enables the reduction of 
unnecessary interrelatedness between contract provisions. A modular provision can be 
34 Grosheide 2000. Likewise Buchheit 2008: 'considering the tasks performed by lawyers one might think 
that lawyers are perfectly able to suppress needless complexity and promote reading comprehension. 
However, lawyers suffer the handicap of being lawyers and Why do some contracts (...) not occasion more 
expressions of outrage by bankers, analysts, rating agencies, investors and regulators (they do sometimes 
incur the wrath of the judiciary)? Is it because the legal profession has dazzled them all into believing that 
contract drafting is such an arcane science that no one other than a consecrated practitioner has standing to 
express a view about what is good and what is truly dreadful? Is it because they think that impenetrability in 
contract drafting is a sure sign of the drafter's capacious intellect? Complexity can obscure the risks of the 
transaction, and the danger lies therein that the market must be able to see the risks before it is possible to 
sensibly price them.' 
35 Buchheit 2006, p. 170. 
36 See also Grosheide 2000: 'overeenkomsten dienen zo duidelijk mogelijk te worden opgesteld want er 
'komt een dag dat iemand zal proberen het contract onderuit te halen'. 
37 Visée 2002, p. 56: '[hjet schrijven van een goede overeenkomst is een echt ambacht. Het lukraak invullen 
van een "uit de kast gerukt" model leidt vaak niet tot een goed resultaat.' 
38 This is substantiated by accounts of partners at global law firms and the legal counsel at several multina-
tional corporations. See also Visée 2002. 
39 Smith 2006, p. 1196, and Simon (1978) who refers to 'a patterned structure'. 
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added to or subtracted from the contract without substantial disruption to the con-
tract as a whole. Because such modular clauses interact only in a specific manner, a 
clause can be substituted for another as long as they perform similar roles. Allowing 
for modularity also sheds light on whether the same material is covered in more than 
one provision, a phenomenon which is not uncommon in the forms of large law firms. 
I believe that two particular sections of contracts in which modularity may create 
added value are the Definitions and Boilerplate sections. The Definitions section of a 
contract is often lengthy, unnecessarily befuddled, and prone to non-modularity.40 The 
only terms that I believe should be included in the Definitions section, are terms that 
are used in the contract often and/or are subject to problems of holistic and complex 
interpretation. Closely related definitions of a given term which are 'hidden' in sub-
stantive provisions should also be factored out and defined in the Definitions section. 
Preferably, the Definitions section should be inserted at the beginning of the contract, 
directly visible to the reader. In this manner, no confusion can arise over term in the 
drafter's idiosyncratic language, with the corresponding terms highly discernible with 
each repetition in the contract. 
The concept of modularity may also be applied to boilerplate provisions of the 
contract. Examples of boilerplate provisions which according to Smith (2006) are suit-
able for modularization are governing law and severability provisions.41 Smith (2006) 
indicates that most governing law provisions select the law of a single state to govern 
the agreement, with the exclusion of the state's conflict of laws rules. Other variations 
are less common. The selection of one state, combined with a bar on the choice of law 
rules, increases modularity and predictability: '[by] selecting one state, these contracts 
are displacing off-the-rack law that might involve nonmodular and hard-to-foresee 
choice of law questions (...) By blocking a state's conflict of laws rules, the provision is 
even more modular: the choice of law of a certain state will not vary with changes in 
the business or contract context.'42 
Severability relates to the validity and enforceability of contractual provisions and 
can be taken as an expression for modularity and against re-modularization by the 
court.43 The modularity of severability clauses lies therein that they apply to the entire 
contract and are usually not parsed for separate provisions. This cross-referencing and 
interconnection of terms is also apparent in provisions governing the warranties and 
representations. Parties may make broad representations and warranties but bury 
catch-all exclusions in schedules, related agreements or other parts of the contract.44 
1,0 Buchheit 2006, p. 22: '[b]rowse through the Definitions section at the front of a complicated Indenture or 
a debt restructuring agreement. You may easily find yourself at page 30 before the drafter offers you the 
first taste of an operative clause,' 
41 Smith 2006. 
42 Smith 2006, p. 1194. 
43 Smith 2006. 
44 See also on tricky drafting techniques E. Goldman, 'Ethical Issues in Contract Drafting, Seminar on Teach-
ing Contract Skills to Young Lawyers', 4 August 2006 Annual Meeting of ABA Section of Business Law, p. 4 8 -
64, cited in King and Segain 2008. 
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However, parties drafting contracts must realize that cross-references cannot be fully 
eliminated; non-modularity will always continue to exist to some extent. Therefore, 
care must be taken to use symmetrical language: interrelated provisions must comply 
with each other.45 
Apart from modularity concerns, there are some other issues concerning the 
structure of a contract which may mitigate the effects of or reduce (subjective) com-
plexity. I believe headings for example, are fairly important to enhance reading com-
prehension. Parsing an agreement into sections and subsections improves clarity and 
promotes an orderly system. Contracting parties should also take care to keep the 
main document 'clean': detailed information on collateral documents and other ar-
rangements should be included in schedules and exhibits to the main legal text. In 
addition, it is useful to spell out the intentions of parties in plain language at the be-
ginning of the document. This section may be referred to as the Preamble. A preamble 
will help parties, especially those not involved with the drafting process itself, to 
quickly discern parties' intentions and the main goal of the agreement. Finally, drafter 
must question themselves whether a provision is really necessary taking into account 
the environment, i.e. which factors (including past market events) would justify the 
inclusion of such a term. 
The aforementioned tools may be helpful in constraining complexity. But the study 
of the complexity of contracts also sheds light on another issue. The commercial con-
tracting practice in Continental Europe, characterized by relatively simple contracts, is 
increasingly influenced by complex Anglo-Saxon contract models.46 Hill (2008) notes 
that the transcendence of American drafting techniques may be the product of agency 
costs within law firms and between law firms and their clients, as well as path depend-
ency47 The convergence relates to the complexity of the contract as a whole, but is 
explicitly visible with regard to certain provisions. I will refer to these provisions as 
'legal transplants' which include US-style boilerplates such as entire agreement 
clauses, representations and warranties, provisions for contingencies such as material 
adverse change clauses and break-up fees, and sections relating to Definitions. As set 
out in chapter 3 of this dissertation, I believe that contract design and thereby com-
plexity is very much influenced by the legal and socio-cultural environment. As illus-
trated, the legal and socio-cultural environments on both sides of the Atlantic are 
quite diverse. I believe it is important to note that while Continental Europe may as-
similate its corporate practice with its Anglo-American counterpart, it has not neces-
sarily adopted the Anglo-American system of doing deals. The integration of the Anglo-
American contract practice into Continental European legal systems is a continuous 
For example, representations and warranties will have counterparts in the covenants section and these 
will be repeated in certificates and legal opinions). 
"6 Schuit 200, and Drion 2002, who primarily points to the process of the 'localization' of contracts. This 
implies that American law firms increasingly demand European firms to render American contracts compil-
able with mandatory rules of European law (see also Schweitzer 2007, Hofstede and Oostwouder 2006). 
"'Hil l (2008) in reference to a similar trend in Latin America. 
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and ongoing process. Parties should carefully consider randomly adopting foreign 
drafting techniques. They should take into account the governing law and forum provi-
sions of the respective contract. In their 'local' context, provisions may have a particu-
lar meaning and legal effect which the foreign user of the term is not always familiar 
with.48 Already, it has become clear that certain concepts, even if identical in name, 
have significantly different functions and legal effects, which the user of the term may 
not be familiar with. 
Schweitzer (2007) singles out three Anglo-Saxon concepts which are frequently 
used in merger agreements and copied to the European corporate practice: Letter of 
Intent (Lois), Material Adverse Change (MAC) clauses and break-up fees.49 Other legal 
transplants include entire agreement provisions50 and IMOM clauses. Hofstede & Oost-
wouder (2006) draw attention in particular to the risks of using Anglo-American con-
cepts in Dutch contracts. The example they offer is of 'representations' and 'warran-
ties'. The authors indicate that in English law these terms have distinct legal implica-
tions, a gradation which is not necessarily present in Dutch law. The use of foreign 
legal concepts may also create interpretation risks. This risk appears to increase due to 
the fact that contrary to the US and England, the Dutch court takes a predominantly 
subjective approach towards contract interpretation. Corporate parties, however, 
would often prefer the court to take a more objective approach toward contract inter-
pretation. An objective approach toward contract interpretation is believed to push 
the court to stick with the document as written and as such create greater certainty.51 
Contracting parties may therefore strive to reduce potentially undesirable interpreta-
tion to a minimum and ironically attempt to use foreign legal concepts (legal trans-
plants) to do so.5 2 For example, inserting an American style Definitions section may 
minimize the risk of a more subjective interpretation which goes against the intention 
of parties. In addition, parties may insert entire agreement and NOM clauses.53 
Adjudicators - enforcement 
I believe that complexity should also be of concern to courts and other adjudicators. In 
the Introduction to this dissertation, I wonder whether greater levels of contractual 
complexity will lead to more mistakes and subsequently litigation. In addition, I won-
der whether varieties in contract design should give rise to a differentiated enforce-
ment of contracts. The first issue concerning litigation levels does not have a simple 
"B Tjittes 2008. 
1,3 Lois generally contains procedural rules for further negotiations to which the parties have agreed, the 
MAC grants the buyer a termination right when the state of the target looses significant value between a 
particular date (usually signing) and the closure date of the agreement, and a breakup fee Is a lump sum 
payment due by one of the parties in case the transaction is unsuccessful. On MAC clauses see HR 7 Sep-
tember 2007, RVDW 2007, 747. 
50 See chapter 3 and Schelhaas 2007, 2008. 
51 Tjittes 2005. 
52 De Vrey 2006, Drion 2002. 
53 HR 29 June 2007, NJ 2007, 576, HR 19 January 2007, NJ 2007, 575. 
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answer, while empirical data is not easy to obtain. I may observe that litigation rates 
appear to be higher in the US (where contracts are relatively complex) than for exam-
ple the Netherlands (where contracts are relatively simple). It is, however, question-
able whether this litigious culture is the driver of contractual complexity or vice versa. 
On the one hand, a culture where litigation is not uncommon may encourage parties 
to increase the complexity of the contract in order to ensure that nothing is left to 
chance. This would substantiate the vision that litigiousness increases complexity. On 
the other hand, as complexity raises the misunderstanding of contract (terms), com-
plexity may increase the potential for the development of disputes. The latter point of 
view supports the claim of complexity as a cause of litigation. However, increased 
complexity in terms of length in conjunction with modularity may actually lead to sim-
plified contracts that ease the interpretation, which in turn will reduce the potential 
for disagreements. The issue thus remains unclear and subject to speculation. 
I find the promulgation of a differentiated enforcement of contracts, a difficult 
issue. My research findings illustrate that the complexity of a contract may signal to 
the court information on the contracting process and environment. This may help the 
judge to understand and interpret the agreement, especially if we assume that the 
normative goal of the court is to maximize the ex ante value of contractual relation-
ships.54 Dependent upon the causes of the simplicity or complexity of the contract, the 
court may apply different interpretation techniques.55,56 Eggleston et al. (2000) for 
example offer some suggestions on how the court should react to various causes of 
contractual simplicity.57 However, parties must beware that adjudicators also suffer 
from cognitive limitations. Complexity may thus create problems of interpretation, 
increasing enforcement costs. Furthermore, the fact that Dutch contracts are increas-
ingly influenced by the Anglo-Saxon corporate practice, does not only concern con-
tracting parties, but also the adjudicator. I believe that courts should therefore take 
care to interpret legal transplants in a consistent and practical manner. 
Policymakers - legislation 
A greater understanding of the complexity of contracts may substantiate the debate 
on the proper content of and role for contract law. In the Introduction to my disserta-
tion I wondered to what extent parties opt out of default law rules, and whether the 
54 The goal of the court may also be another one, such as achievement of efficiency or ex post optimization. 
55 There is a large incomplete contracts literature which theorizes on how the court should fill contractual 
'gaps' due to incompleteness (Ayres and Gertner 1989,1992). 1 will not address this literature in this conclu-
sion. 
56 The focus of this dissertation is on commercial agreements, but one could relate complexity to consumer 
contracts as well, i.e. in the sense that consumers are confronted with complex language and lengthy con-
tracts. Examples are mobile phone contracts, car rental agreements, insurance contracts and software 
licensing agreements. The contractual complexity given the contracting environment may be a reason for 
the courts to construe such contracts in favor of consumers. Another argument made for interpretation 
slanted in the favor of consumers is their relatively 'weak' position as layperson. 
57 Eggleston et al. 2000, p. 128. 
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answer should lead us to reconsider the argument for more or less law. Contract law 
being largely non-mandatory; firms contract in the realm of the freedom of contract 
and often develop rules tailored to their particular relationship. Subsequently, contract 
terms vary depending on parties' characteristics and goals, their shared understand-
ings, transaction costs, the characteristics of the transaction, and the background legal 
regime. When parties opt-out of default rules, this may point toward the sub-
optimality of these rules. However, the relatively simple contracts in the Netherlands 
seem to illustrate that firms are generally not wary to rely on default rules. This may in 
part be due to the fact that civil law jurisdictions define concepts very systematically in 
their legislation which means parties do not have to devote much effort to defining 
these concepts themselves: background civil law may substitute for the role boiler-
plate plays in American contracts. The extent to which firms actually contract around 
default rules in practice, necessitates further research. 
The study of the complexity of contracts may be able to offer some insights into 
the harmonization of contract law rules, especially on a European level.59 A compara-
tive study of contractual complexity sheds light on the internationalization and cross-
pollination of contract styles. As mentioned numerous times already, Anglo-Saxon 
style contracts appear to increasingly dominate the (international) corporate practice. 
Schuit (2001) indicates that the choice of law of a commercial agreement is not in the 
first place determined by the legal system which supplies the 'best' law, but especially 
by other factors such as power relations, common practice of the type of transaction, 
the issue of bankability, etc. He continues with an account on the openness of the 
Dutch economy which creates ample room for foreign influences welcoming develop-
ments which also bring with them also create the risk of the 'impoverishment' of 
Dutch law: contracts will be characterized increasingly by a convergence of to English 
type forms and language. Convergence takes place within the limits set by (immutable) 
rules of domestic law.60 De Ly (2006) states that international contract drafting has 
been developed by practitioners responding to practical problems and needs.61 In 
most jurisdictions commercial contract law is largely non-mandatory in nature, and 
contracting parties are limited only by rules of mandatory law, which - at least for large 
firms - emanate predominantly from corporate and securities law. The aforemen-
tioned developments might let us wonder what the European harmonization of con-
tract law may still offer the (internationally oriented) corporate contracting practice. 
The idea behind the harmonization of contract law rules is that national laws create 
constraints to inter-state trade and hamper the creation of an internal market. The 
58 Smith 2006, Hill and King 2007, Kahan and Klausner 1997. 
59 Other scholars have already written extensively on this topic and I will merely point to some Issues which I 
encountered while studying the relative complexity of contracts between jurisdictions. 
60 See also De Kluiver 2001, p. 4-14: 'wat de ondememingsrechtelljke praktijk onderscheid van de algemene 
contractspraktijk is dat ondernemingsrechtjuristen contracteren tegen de achtergrond van een in beginsel 
dwingendrechtelijk systeem.' 
S1 See also Bercowitz et al. (2003) who emphasize that it is law In practice and not law in books that matters. 
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goal of harmonization then should be the facilitation of the internal market and the 
creation of the 'best' law. But only the aforementioned immutable rules seem to carry 
the potential to hamper inter-state trade and thus the creation of an internal market. 
Collins (1999) argues that even the internal market argument does not provide a justi-
fication for the top-down implementation of a civil code. It appears to be predomi-
nantly the different socio-cultural environment that creates constraints to the func-
tioning of the internal market.62 Likewise, Grosheide (1996) indicates that in the area 
of international commercial contract law, of decisive significance are the legal culture 
of the international transactional practice and the familiarity with and involvement 
therein of parties such as legal counsel, lawyers, arbitrators, and commercial chamber 
judges. I believe that a European civil code will not take away these constraints; parties 
will have to solve these problems themselves. Smits (2002) also emphasizes that firms 
are skeptical about the benefits of harmonization. In the first place because the role of 
private law is overestimated: other constraints such as the manner in which parties 
cooperate and trade (the contracting practice) are more important. If rules of law 
would hamper the creation of the internal market, it is specifically rules of tax and 
corporate law which are more important than private law rules. Second, corporations 
profit from as little change as possible.63 Smits (2002) therefore proposes that compe-
tition between legal systems should create a practice of 'best' or 'most favorable' law. 
This competition will lead to the best possible rules, because otherwise a system of 
law will be 'pushed out' of the market. 
There are some remarks I would like to make to this account. First of all, the cur-
rent transplantation of Anglo-Saxon concepts and convergence of corporate style con-
tracting seems indeed illustrative of the competitive and practical approach. But at the 
same time, the 'impoverishment' of Dutch law lurks - at least with regard to the corpo-
rate practice. Smits may thus be right in the sense that some legal systems 'loose' 
value in their application. But I would question whether competition between legal 
systems indeed generates the 'best' law. Why does the preference for American style 
contracts dominate when there is as a high cost associated with this style in sense of 
complexity costs and is the move to a more efficient style lacking?64 The transplanta-
tion of Anglo-Saxon terms and the associated contracting style is not a flawless proc-
ess, which creates risks and does not always encompass the 'best' rules. Apparently, 
parties have a preference for this system, whose commonality is in part induced by 
path dependency and standardization. Actually the competitive process illustrates a 
market inefficiency or failure. Parties are caught in an informational trap: unless com-
parative law specialists either rely on outside lawyers or own law, they thus accept law 
with few constraints such as English law and live with verbose contracting and tricky 
drafting. Given these observations, the most interesting approach to harmonization of 
62 See also Smits 2000, 2002, 2003, and Van den Bergh 2002. 
63 Smits 2002. 
64 King and Segain 2007. 
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contract law seems the optional code as propagated by Smits. In this manner parties 
may choose whether or not they will 'switch' to the law embedded therein, Currently, 
the Common Frame of Reference seems to be the first step in this direction. However, 
given network effects and path dependency, I wonder whether the harmonization of 
contract law rules will indeed provide an advantage in the sense of a superior system 
to large corporations.65 This is confirmed by several authors who find that the Dutch 
corporate practice has until now shown little interest in the Common Frame of Refer-
ence project.66 
Contracts in general 
Complexity in a multidimensional sense triggers us to think about contract design. In 
drafting contracts, parties must constantly be aware of the specific characteristics of 
the transaction and the environment in which the transaction takes place in order to 
justify the relative complexity of a contract. Complexity may show distrust and over-
whelm the cognitive abilities of parties, absorb resources, and have other negative 
consequences67 and parties should always be aware of the contextual embeddedness 
of complexity. In addition, depending on the type of relationship parties aspire they 
may give the contractual terms a more classical or relational content. 
L I M I T A T I O N S A N D S U G G E S T I O N S F O R F U R T H E R R E S E A R C H 
This dissertation offers a preliminary investigation into the design of contracts from a 
multidisciplinary perspective, but it is only a small step on the long road leading to a 
more detailed understanding of, what Ronald Coase described as the actual process of 
contracting between companies. This chapter has a number of limitations that I would 
like to translate into suggestions for future research. 
My contribution is based on a dataset that comprises about four hundred con-
tracts, but focuses on a limited number of modes of governance: inter-firm collabora-
tions, and one particular contractual setting: the biopharmaceutical industry. While my 
research clearly invites further study of legal and managerial implications of inter-firm 
65 Basedow 1998, p. 7, who states that the harmonization of contract law is of less useful for smaller firms 
and (who trade mostly in a national context) and larger firms (who have the expertise and resources to 
impose their own terms). 
66 Bouwes 2005. Smits (2002) states that Dutch government has not received many complaints from SMEs 
on the diversity of contract law rules (cf. Vogenauer en Weatherill 2006). This may be different for consum-
ers who are often seen as weaker party and may be less able to exert influence on the terms of the contract 
(Elsenberg 1994, Smith 2006). Even if terms are written clearly, a consumer usually will be unable to fully 
understand their effects, because preprinted terms characteristically vary the form takers' baseline legal 
rights and most consumers do not know their baseline rights. This may call for harmonization primarily for 
protection of the consumer (as evidence by numerous Directives). 
67 See for example Buchheit (2008) who argues that the current financial crisis was triggered not only by the 
complexity of financial products, but also by the corresponding complexity of the legal documents used to 
memorialize the transactions. 
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technology collaborations based on larger samples of companies and contracts, my 
dissertation is also an encouragement for contract research with a larger sample 
across other industries. For example, a range of commercial contracts where technol-
ogy is not of primary importance (e.g. marketing agreements, customer-supplier rela-
tionships, and outsourcing) can most probably provide a more thorough understanding 
of the contracting process between firms. Furthermore, my dataset is very much US 
oriented, datasets of a more international nature will surely provide relevant new 
insights. It would for example be interesting to investigate further whether either 
common law or civil law jurisdictions are predominantly classically or relationally ori-
ented. This also brings me to the point of the contractual setting. Future research 
would benefit from a more in-depth understanding of the specific context in which the 
contracting and negotiation process takes place. I have highlighted only several ele-
ments of what I call the legal and socio-cultural environment. It would be interesting, 
also in light of business economics, to analyze for example why and how particular 
rules of contract law and (intellectual) property law, which will vary according to each 
jurisdiction, affect the terms of a contract. Do parties choose to make use of default 
rules or are they guided predominantly by the freedom of contract and create their 
own system of law (where possible)?68 In light of the asymmetries between contract-
ing partners, it would be interesting to asses whether terms are particularly slanted in 
favour of one of the parties.69 
My research is based on a dataset of actual contracts. A limitation concerning this 
type of research is that these contracts represent the outcome of a particular contract-
ing process. Data relating to actual contracting practice is scarce. Even for a small(er) 
dataset, it would be wonderful to shed light on the negotiation processes themselves 
and when and how parties to contracts consider using any alternative means for the 
governance of their relationship. 
Finally, I would like to offer some suggestions for future research related to the 
measurement of contractual complexity. It would be interesting to see whether meas-
uring the cognitive load of contracts could be extended to a sample of legal profes-
sionals (corporate lawyers, legal counsel). Given the limitations discussed earlier, this 
would most probably imply that respondents are to evaluate a smaller sample of con-
tracts, but even a small sample of inter-firm contracts could provide a 'real life' look 
into the professional perception of the complexity of contracts. In addition, the disser-
tation is based on a concept of complexity along two dimensions. In addition to in-
sights into the respective weights that each of these dimensions should be assigned, 
future research could benefit from a more in-depth analysis of elements of contractual 
complexity in terms of the different contract clauses and their interactions that are 
expected to increase the level of contractual complexity. The ultimate aim of a multi-
dimensional perception of contractual complexity is the understanding of the implica-
68 Marotta-Wurgler 2007. 
69 Marotta-Wurgler 2009. 
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tions of different levels of contractual complexity for the costs of commercial contracts 
in terms of design, writing, implementation, control, and enforcement. 
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SUMMARY 
The real world is always more complex than we can attempt to capture in any model. 
This thesis is an endeavor to de-theorize and simplify at least a small corner of this 
complex world. In four distinct chapters, I integrate different perspectives on contract 
theory in order to look beyond the face value of the legal document at the intricacy of 
contract design. To this extent I introduced the following general research question: 
How do we define contract design and what differences do we find within a particular 
industry and between countries? 
Each of the chapters of this dissertation sheds light on different aspects of contract 
design. Chapter 2 investigates to what degree commercial contracts are governed by 
either a classical or more relational contracting perspective. In chapters 3 to 5 I seek to 
answer what method(s) may be used to measure contract design and subsequently 
what factors create discrepancies in contract design. The empirical validation in these 
chapters is based on a dataset of over 400 R&D alliance contracts in the biotechnologi-
cal and pharmaceutical sector, on surveys with graduate students in law and econom-
ics, and on interviews with professionals involved in drafting commercial (R&D) 
agreements. 
In chapter 2, I study some major legal implications of inter-firm technology part-
nering through equity joint ventures, non-equity partnerships, and licensing contracts. 
These different partnerships are placed within the classical and relational contracting 
perspectives, while also considering intellectual property rights issues. My findings 
suggest that different types of inter-firm agreements are governed by either a more 
classical or relational contracting perspective. Equity joint ventures and non-equity 
partnerships are found to largely follow a relational contracting perspective, while 
licensing contracts are governed by a classical contracting perspective. 
I use both legal and business perspectives on contract theory to develop a multi-
dimensional framework of contractual complexity in chapter 3. Complex contracts are 
defined as those contracts that contain many clauses with a relatively large number of 
interdependencies that also impose a significant cognitive load upon parties. My find-
ings illustrate that factors generally invoked to explain the complexity of contracts, 
such as contract and enforcement costs, limits of cognition, asymmetric information, 
asset specificity and strategic importance, uncertainty of the environment, trust and 
reputation, are ultimately driven by their embeddedness in the particular legal and 
socio-cultural environment. A study of different aspects of the legal environment 
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shows that the legal setting has a significant influence on contracting and enforcement 
costs, and the disclosure of information. The socio-cultural environment generally 
affects levels of trust and reputation, the parties' perception of enforcement and con-
tracting costs, and environmental uncertainty. 
The extent to which we can speak of a multidimensional concept of contractual 
complexity is evaluated in chapter 4. I find that quantitative, objective measures of 
complexity, and objective as well as subjective elements of cognitive load, measure 
different aspects of contractual complexity. The objective dimension of complexity 
comprises both the length of the contract in words and the time on task, i.e. the time 
it takes an individual to read a contract. The subjective dimension of contractual com-
plexity comprises the cognitive load of a contract. The cognitive load can be broken 
down into two components: (1) the mental load and (2) the mental effort individuals 
experience while reading the contract. The element of mental effort consists of two 
sub-elements: (a) the actual cognitive effort individuals make to understand contracts 
and (b) the degree of stress that they experience as they have to read through the 
contracts. 
In chapter 5,1 investigate to what extent firm characteristics, transactional charac-
teristics and the organizational routines of firms affect contractual complexity. I find 
that basic differences exist between the impact that company characteristics (size, 
information and R&D capabilities asymmetries), transaction level attributes (strategic 
importance and asset specificity), and the organizational routines (prior ties and con-
tracting experience) of contract parties have on the objective and subjective dimen-
sions of the complexity of inter-firm R&D alliance contracts. Asymmetries between 
contracting parties in terms of their size, R&D capabilities, and the availability of in-
formation, positively affect the objective dimension of the complexity of R&D alliance 
contracts. With regard to the level of transactional attributes, I find that both the stra-
tegic importance of the R&D alliance and the asset specificity of the investments in-
volved are positively related to the objective dimension of contractual complexity. 
With regard to the organizational routines of contracting firms, I find that the history 
of previous alliances and repeated ties, shared experience, and perhaps even the 
emergence of joint inter-firm administrative routines, leads to more complex con-
tracts. The subjective dimension of contractual complexity is mainly affected by two 
factors: the size asymmetry between firms and the asset specificity of the technology 
to which the contract refers. 
Chapter 6 comprises my conclusions. Based on my research results, I believe that a 
multidimensional concept of contractual complexity is able to enhance our under-
standing of contract design. In particular, my findings illustrate that there may very 
well be an upper limit to the actual level of complexity of contracts that not only con-
tract parties, but also judges, and other third parties are able to absorb. Parties at all 
levels of the contracting process should thus be concerned with contractual complex-
ity. 
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Parties drafting contracts must consider that the ability of individuals to understand 
the different elements of a contract is limited. Awareness of the relative complexity of 
contracts may is also important for a third party such as a judge. An awareness and 
understanding of contractual complexity may advance contract interpretation in case 
of a dispute. Finally, contractual complexity may be relevant for policymakers in light 
of the design of legal rules and policies. 
To conclude, my research is a first endeavor into actual contract design. I acknowl-
edge that my research is characterized by several limitations. In the end, however, I 
believe that a multidimensional construct of complexity enables our understanding of 
the implications of different levels of contractual complexity for the costs of commer-
cial contracts in terms of design, writing, implementation, control, and enforcement. 
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EEN EMPIRISCHE ANALYSE VAN OVEREENKOMSTEN 
Empirische en theoretische beschouwingen over de vormgeving van 
overeenkomsten 
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SAMENVATTING 
De praktijk is vaak te gecompliceerd om in een model te bevatten. Deze dissertatie is 
een poging om een inzicht te verschaffen in een (klein) deel van de contracteringsprak-
tijk. In de vier kernhoofdstukken van deze dissertatie behandel ik verschillende con-
tractstheorieën waarbij het accent ligt op het doorgronden van de wijze waarop over-
eenkomsten worden vormgegeven. Hiertoe introduceer ik de volgende algemene 
onderzoeksvraag: 
Wat kenmerkt de specifieke vorm van een overeenkomst en welke verschillen treffen 
we hierin aan binnen een bepaalde bedrijfstak en tussen diverse landen? 
De vier kernhoofdstukken van dit proefschrift behandelen elk verschillende aspecten 
van de vormgeving van overeenkomsten. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt onderzocht in hoeverre 
verschillende typen commerciële overeenkomsten gekenmerkt worden door de klas-
sieke danwel relationele theorie van de overeenkomst. In de hoofstukken 3 tot en met 
5 onderzoek ik op welke manier de specifieke vorm van een overeenkomst gekwantifi-
ceerd dan wel gekwalificeerd kan worden en welke factoren van invloed zijn op de 
vormgeving van overeenkomsten. Voor de empirische analyses in deze deze hoofd-
stukken maak ik gebruik van een dataset van meer dan 400 samenwerkingsovereen-
komsten op het gebied van onderzoek en ontwikkeling (O&O) in de biotechnologische 
en pharmaceutische industrie, enquêtes die zijn afgenomen bij rechten- en economie-
studenten en interviews met professionele partijen die zich bezighouden met het op-
stellen van commerciële samenwerkingsovereenkomsten op het gebied van O&O. 
In hoofdstuk 2 bestudeer ik in het bijzonder de juridische implicaties van samen-
werkingsovereenkomsten op technologisch gebied door een aantal overeenkomsten 
die betrekking hebben op equity joint ventures, non-equity samenwerkingsverbanden 
en intellectueel eigendomslicenties te analyseren. Deze verschillende overeenkomsten 
worden bestudeerd in het licht van de klassieke en relationele contractstheorieën. Ook 
onderzoek ik in hoofdstuk 2 een aantal interessante intellectueel eigendomsaspecten. 
Uit mijn bevindingen volgt dat de vormgeving van de bestudeerde overeenkomsten in 
overwegende mate wordt gekenmerkt door elementen uit de klassieke dan wel de 
relationele contractstheorie. De vormgeving van de overeenkomsten die betrekking 
hebben op de equity joint venture en non-equity samenwerkingsverbanden wordt 
voornamelijk gekenmerkt door de relationele contractstheorie, terwijl de licentieover-
eenkomsten vooral elementen van het klassieke contractsmodel vertonen. 
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Om de vorm(geving) van een overeenkomst te kunnen kwalificeren, gebruik ik het 
begrip van de complexiteit van een overeenkomst, in hoofdstuk 3 bestudeer ik hiertoe 
enkele juridische en bedrijfseconomische theorieen die betrekking hebben op de 
vormgeving van commerciële overeenkomsten. Complexe overeenkomsten definieer 
ik als die overeenkomsten die zijn opgebouwd uit meerdere contractsbedingen met 
een grote onderlinge samenhang, waarbij de overeenkomst een aanzienlijke cognitie-
ve belasting voor de contractspartijen met zich meebrengt. In zowel de bedrijfseco-
nomische als juridische literatuur wordt een aantal factoren genoemd die van invloed 
zijn op de vorm(gevmg) van overeenkomsten. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn transactiekos-
ten, cognitieve beperkingen, informatie asymmetrieën, bedrijfsspecifieke investerin-
gen, strategische belangen, de veranderlijkheid van de transactie omgeving, het ver-
trouwen en de reputatie van contractspartijen. Mijns inziens spelen de juridische en 
sociaal-culturele context een aanzienlijke rol in de mate waarin deze factoren van 
invloed zijn op de vorm(geving) c.q. complexiteit van overeenkomsten. De juridische 
context beïnvloed de transactiekosten en de informatie asymmetrieën tussen partijen. 
De social-culturele context heeft voornamelijk een effect op het vertrouwen tussen 
contractspartijen, de reputatie van contractspartijen, de wijze waarop contractspartij-
en transactiekosten ervaren, alsmede de mate van verandering van de transactie om-
geving. 
De wijze waarop de complexiteit van overeenkomsten gemeten kan worden, 
onderzoek ik in hoofdstuk 4. Uit hoofdstuk 4 volgt dat de complexiteit van overeen-
komsten bepaald kan worden aan de hand van een objectieve en subjectieve maatstaf. 
Deze maatstaven weerspiegelen verschillende dimensies van de complexiteit van een 
overeenkomst. De objectieve dimensie van complexiteit omvat zowel de lengte van de 
overeenkomst - gemeten aan de hand van het aantal woorden van een overeenkomst 
- als de tijd die een individu nodig heeft om een overeenkomst te lezen. De subjectieve 
dimensie van complexiteit bestaat uit een cognitieve maatstaf. Deze cognitieve maat-
staf omvat twee elementen: (1) de mentale belasting; en (2) de mentale inspanning 
die een individu ervaart tijdens het lezen van een overeenkomst. De mentale inspan-
ning omvat weer twee subonderdelen: (a) de daadwerkelijke mentale inspanning die 
een individu nodig heeft om de overeenkomst te begrijpen; en (b) de mate van stress 
die een individu ervaart wanneer hij of zij een overeenkomst leest. 
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoek ik de mate waarin specifieke eigenschappen van een 
onderneming, transactiegerelateerde eigenschappen en organisatorische routines 
bepalend zijn voor de complexiteit van een overeeenkomst. Uit mijn onderzoek volgt 
dat de specifieke eigenschappen van een onderneming (de asymmetrieën tussen de 
grootte van de contractspartijen, informatie-asymmetrieën en asymmetrieën in O&O-
capaciteiten), transactiegerelateerde eigenschappen (het strategisch belang van de 
overeenkomst en de bedrijfsspecifieke investeringen), en organisatorische routines (de 
specifieke en algemene transactie-ervaring van een onderneming) op verschillende 
wijze van invloed zijn op de objectieve en subjectieve dimensie van de complexiteit 
van een overeenkomst. Asymmetrieën tussen partijen in de zin van de grootte van de 
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contractspartijen, informatie en O&O-capaciteiten, hebben een positief effect op de 
complexiteit van een overeenkomst. Op het niveau van de transactiegerelateerde 
eigenschappen concludeer ik dat er een positieve relatie bestaat tussen zowel het 
strategisch belang van de samenwerking als de bedrijfsspecifieke investeringen ener-
zijds en de objectieve dimensie van de complexiteit van een overeenkomst anderzijds. 
Met betrekking tot de organisatorische routines, toont mijn onderzoek aan dat een 
grotere partijspecifieke en algemene ervaring met betrekking tot het aangaan van 
samenwerkingsovereenkomsten, leidt tot complexere contracten. De subjectieve di-
mensie van de complexiteit van een overeenkomst wordt vooral beïnvloed door twee 
factoren: de verschillen in de grootte van de contractspartijen en de bedrijfsspecifieke 
investeringen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat een samenvatting van mijn bevindingen. Uit de onderzoeksre-
sultaten van de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5 blijkt dat het concept van de complexiteit 
van overeenkomsten een verhelderend inzicht kan bieden in de wijze waarop com-
merciële overeenkomsten worden vormgegeven. Uit mijn onderzoek volgt mijns in-
ziens meer specifiek dat alle partijen die op enigerlei wijze betrokken zijn bij het op-
stellen van overeenkomsten zich bewust dienen te zijn van de mate van de complexi-
teit daarvan. 
Partijen die zich bezig houden met het opstellen van overeenkomsten dienen zich 
te realiseren dat de mogelijkheid van individuen om de verschillende onderdelen van 
een complexe overeenkomst te begrijpen, begrenst is. Een inzicht in de mate van de 
complexiteit van overeenkomsten kan ook een voordeel opleveren voor rechters en 
andere partijen die aangewezen zijn om een overeenkomst uit te leggen wanneer zich 
een conflict voordoet. Daarnaast is een inzicht in de mate van complexiteit van over-
eenkomsten ook van belang voor de wetgever. 
Ten slotte merk ik op dat mijn onderzoek slechts een poging is om door middel van 
empirisch onderzoek een licht te werpen op de wijze waarop overeenkomsten worden 
vormgegeven. Het concept van de complexiteit van overeenkomsten kan daarbij in-
zicht bieden in de mate waarop de kosten van het ontwerp, opstellen, implementeren 
en de afdwingbaarheid van de overeenkomst van invloed zijn op de vormgeving van de 
overeenkomst. 
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